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to natural causes subordinate to, and directed still by a divine ; except some corporealists and mechanics, who vainly pretended to make a world without a God. The hidden force that unites, adjusts, and causech all things to hang together, and move in harmony, which Orpheus and Epedocles styl. ed love; this principle of union is no blind principle, but acts with intellect. This divine love and intellect are not themselves obvious to our view, or otherwise discerned than in their effects. Intellect enlightens, Love connects, and the sovereign Good attracts all things.
260. All things are made for the supreme good, all things tend to that end : and we may be said to account for a thing, when we shew that it is so beft. In the Phædon, Socrates declares it to be his opinion, that he, who supposed all things to have been difposed and ordered by a mind (c), should not pretend to afsign any other cause of them. He blames physiologers for attempting to account for phænomena, particularly for gravity and cohesion, by vortexes and æther, overlooking the το αγαθόν and το δέον, the 1trongeft bond and cement which holds together all the parts of the universe, and not discerning the cause it self from thole things which only attend it. : 261. As in the microcosm, the constant regular tenor of the motions of the viscera and contained juices doth not hinder particular voluntary motions to be impressed by the mind on the animal spirit; even so in the mundane system, the fteddy observance of certain laws of nature, in the grosser masses and more conspicuous motions, doth not hinder, but a voluntary agent may sometimes communicate particular impreffions to the fine ætherial medium, (c) 154, 160.
which in the world answers the animal fpirit in man. Which two (if they are two) although invisible and inconceivably small, yet seem the real latent springs, whereby all the parts of this visible worldare moved; albeit they are not to be regarded as a true cause, but only an instrument of motion; and the inftrument not as a help to the creator, but only as a sign to the creature,
262. Plotinus supposeth that the foul of the universe is not the original cause or author of the fpecies, but receives them from intellect, the true principle of order and distinction, the source and giver of forms. Others consider the vegetative soul only as some lower faculty of a higher soul, which animates the fiery ætherial spirit (d). As for the blots and defects which appear in the course of this world, which some have thought to proceed from a fatality or necessity in nature, and others from an evil principle, that same philosopher observes, that. it' may be the governing reason produceth and ordaineth all those things; and, not intending that all parts should be equally good, maketh some worse than others by design, as all parts in an animal are not eyes : And in a city, comedy, or picture, all ranks, characters, and colours are not equal or like; even so excesses, defects, and contrary qualities, conspire to the beauty and harmony of the world.
263. It cannot be denied, that with respect to the universe of things, we in this mortal ftate are like men educated in Plato's cave, looking on sha. dows with our backs turned to the light. But though our light be dim, and our situation bad, yet if the best use be made of both, perhaps something may be seen. Proclus, in his commentary on the theology of Plato, observes there are two (d) 178.
forts of philosophers. The one placed body first in the order of beings, and made the faculty of thinking depend thereupon, supposing that the principles of all things are corporeal : that body most really or principally exists, and all other things in a secondary sense, and by virtue of that. Others, making all corporeal things to be dependent upon fout or mind, think this to exist in the first place and primary sense, and the being of bodies to be altogether derived from, and presuppose that of the mind.
264. Sense and experience acquaint us, with the course and analogy of appearances or natural effects. Thought, reason, intellect, introduce us into the knowledge of their causes. Sensible appearances, though of a flowing, unstable, and uncertain nature, yet having first accupied the mind, they do by an carly prevention, render the after task of thought more difficult: and as they amuse the eyes and ears, and are more suited to vulgar uses and the mechanic arts of life, they easily obtain a preference, in the opinion of most men, to those superior principles, which are the later growth of the humane mind arrived to maturity and perfection, but, not affecting the corporeal sense, are thought to be so far deficient in point of solidity and reality, sensible and real to common apprehensions being the same -thing. Although it be certain, that the principles of science are neither objects of sense nor imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to truth.
265. The successful curiosity of the prefent age, in arts and experiments and new systems, is apt to elate men, and make them overlook the ancients. But notwithstanding that the encouragement and purse of princes, and the united endeavours of great focieties in these later ages, have extended experi
mental and mechanical knowledge very far, yet it must be owned, that the ancients too were not ignorant of many things (e), as well in physics as metaphysics, which perhaps are more generally, though not first known in these modern times.
266. The Pythagoreans and Platonists had a notion of the true syftem of the world. They allowed of mechanical principles, but actuated by soul or mind: they distinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the secondary, making the former to be physical causes, and they understood physical causes in a right sense : they saw that a mind infinite in power, unextended, invisible, immortal, governed, connected and contained all things: they saw there was no fuch thing as real absolute space : that mind, soul or spirit, truly and really exists: that bodies exist only in a secondary and dependent sense: that the soul is the place of forms: that the sensible qualities are to be regarded as acts only in the cause, and as pafsions in us: they accurately confidered the differences of intellect, ra. tional soul, and sensitive soul, with their distinct acts of intellection, reasoning, and senfation, points wherein the Cartesians and their followers, who consider sensation as a inode of thinking, seem to have failed. They knew there was a subtil æther pervading the whole mass of corporeal beings, and which was itself actually moved and directed by a mind: and that physical causes were only instruments, or rather marks and signs.
267. Those ancient philosophers understood the generation of animals to confilt, in the unfolding and distending of the minute imperceptible parts of pre-existing animalcules, which passeth for a modern discovery: this they took for the work of nature, but . (7) 166, 167, 168, 241, 242, & s.
nature animate and intelligent (f): they understood that all things were alive and in motion : they supposed a concord and discord, union and disunion in particles, some attracting, others repelling each other: and that those attractions and repulsions, so various, regular, and useful, could not be accounted for, but by an intelligence presiding and direct, ing all particular motions, for the conservation and benefit of the whole.
268. The Ægyptians, who impersonated nature, had made her a distinct principle, and even deified her under the nime of Ilis. But Osiris was understood to be mind or reason, chief and sovereign of all. Osiris, if we may believe Plutarch, was the first, pure, unmixed and holy principle, not discer: nible by the lower faculties; a glympse whereof like lightening darting forth, irradiates the understanding; with regard to which Plutarch adds, that Plato and Aristotle termed one part of philosophy įmotioxòx; to wit, when having soared above com. mon mixed objects, and got beyond the precincts of sense and opinion, they arrive to contemplate: the first and most simple being, free from all matter and composition. This is that soice óvows gone of Plato, which employeth mind alone ; which alone governs the world, and the soul is that which immediately informs and animates nature.
269. Although the Ægyptians did symbolically represent the supreme divinity sitting on a lotus, and that gesture has been interpreted to signify the most holy and venerable being to be utterly at rest reposing within himself; yet, for any thing that appears, this gesture might denote dignity as well as repose. And it cannot be denied, that Jamblicus, so knowing in the Ægyptian notions, () 172.