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guished from the 'anima mundi, than as life is from foul, and, upon the principles of the oldest philofophers, may not improperly or incongruously be ftyled the life of the world. Some Platonics indeed, regard life as the act of nature, in like manper as intellection is of the mind or intellect. As the first intellect acts by understanding, fo nature according to them acts or generates by living. But life is the act of the foul, and feems to be very nature it felf, which is not the principle, but the refult of another, and higher principle, being a life refulting from foul, as cogitation from intellect.

279. If nature be the life of the world, animated by one foul, compacted into one frame, and directed or governed in all parts by one mind: This fyftem cannot be accused of atheism; tho' perhaps it may of mistake or impropriety. And yet, as one prefiding mind gives unity to the infinite aggregate of things, by a mutual communion of actions and paffions, and an adjustment of parts, caufing all to concur in one view to one and the fame end, the ultimate and fupreme good of the whole, it fhould feem reasonable to fay, with Ocellus Lucanus the Pythagorean, that as life holds together the bodies of animals, the cause whereof is the foul; and as a city is held together by concord, the cause whereof is law; even fo the world is held together by harmony, the caufe whereof is God. And in this fenfe, the world or univerfe may be confidered either as one animal (f) or one city.

280. Ariftotle difapproves the opinion of those who hold a foul to be diffufed throughout the world; and for this reason, because the elements are not alive. Tho' perhaps it may not be eafy to prove, that blood and animal fpirit are more alive in man, than water and fire in the world. That phi(f). 172,-277.

lofopher,

lofopher, in his books of the foul, remarks upon an opinion fet forth in. the Orphics, of the foul's entering from the universe into living creatures be ing born by winds, that this cannot be true of plants or of certain animals which do not breath. But air veffels are by later experiments allowed to be found in all plants and animals. And air may

in fome fort not improperly be faid, to be the carrier or vehicle of the foul, inasmuch as it is the vehicle of fire, which is the spirit immediately moved and animated by the foul (g).

.

281. The living fire, the living omniform feminary of the world, and other expreffions of the like nature occurring in the ancient and Platonic philofophy, how can they be understood exclufive of light or elemental fire, the particles of which are known to be héterogeneous, and, for ought we know, may fome of them be organized, and, notwithstanding their wonderful minuteness, contain original feeds which, being formed and fown in a proper matrix, do gradually unfold and manifeft themselves, ftill growing to a juft proportion of the species.

282. May not this æthereal feminary, confiftently with the notions of that philofophy, which afcribed much of generation to celestial influence, be fuppofed to impregnate plants and animals with the first principles, the ftamina, or thofe animalcules which Piato, in his Timæus, faith are invifible for their smallness, but, being fown in a proper matrix, are therein gradually diftended and explicated by nourishment, and at length the animals brought forth to light. Which notion hath been revived and received of late years by many, who perhaps are not aware of it's antiquity, or that it was to be found in Plato. Timæus Locrenfis in

4

(g) 163, 171.

his book of the foul of the world, fuppofeth even fouls to be derived from the celeftial luminaries, excepting only the rational or intellectual part. But what influence or influx is there from the celeftial bodies, which hath not light for it's vehicle (a)?

283. What other nature there fhould be intermediate between the foul of the world (b) and this grofs corporeal fyftem, which might be the vehicle of life, or, to use the language of philofophers, might receive or be impreffed with the forms of things, is difficult to comprehend. It is a vulgar, remark, that the works of art do not bear a nice microscopical infpection, but the more helps are used, and the more nicely you pry into natural productions, the more do you difcover of the fine mechanism of nature, which is endless or inexhaustible; new and other parts, more fubtile and delicate than the precedent, ftill continuing to offer themselves to view. And these microscopical obfervations have confirmed the ancient theory concerning generation, delivered in the Timæus of Plato. But that theory or hypothefis, how agreeable foever to modern discoveries, is not alone fufficient to explain the phænomena, without the immediate action of a mind. And Ficinus, notwithstanding what himself and other Platonics fay of a plastic nature, is obliged to own, that with the mundane force or foul it is to be underftood there is joined an intelligence, upon which the feminal nature conftantly depends, and by which it is governed.

284. Alcinous, in his tract of the doctrine of Plato, faith that God hath given the world both mind and foul: others include both in the word foul, and fuppofe the foul of the world to be God. (b) 171..

(a) 43.

Philo appears to be of this opinion in several parts of his writings. And Virgil, who was no ftranger to the Pythagorean and Platonic tenets writes to the fame purpose.

Deum namque ire per omnes Terrafque tractufque maris coelumque profun dum.

Hinc pecudes armenta, viros, genus omne fe

rarum,

Quemque fibi tenues hafcentem arceffere vitas: Thus much the fchools of Plato and Pythagoras feem agreed in, to wit, that the foul of the world (b) whether having a diftinct mind of its own, or directed by a fuperior mind (c) doth embrace all it's parts, connect them by an invifible and indiffoluble chain, and preferve them ever well adjufted, and in good order.

285. Naturalifts, whofe proper province it is to confider phænomena, experiments, mechanical organs and motions, principally regard the vifible frame of things or corporeal world, fuppofing foul to be contained in body. And this hypothefis may be tolerated in phyfics, as it is not neceflary in the arts of dyalling or navigation to mention the true fyftem or earth's motion. But those who, not content with fenfible appearances, would penetrate into the real and true caufes (the objec of theology, metaphyfics, or the philofophia prima) will rectify this error, and fpeak of the world as contained by the foul, and not the foul by the world.

286. Ariftotle hath obferved there were indeed fome who thought fo grofly, as to fuppofe the universe to be one only corporeal and extended nature: but in the first book of his Metaphy

(b) 153, 172,

(c) 154, 279.

fics he justly remarks they were guilty of a great miftake; forafmuch as they took into their account the elements of corporeal beings alone; whereas there are incorporeal beings alfo in the universe; and while they attempted to affign the causes of generation and corruption, and account for the nature of all things, they did at the fame time destroy the very cause of motion.

287. It is a doctrine among other fpeculations contained in the Hermaic writings, that all things are one. And it is not improbable that Orpheus, Parmenides, and others among the Greeks, might. have derived their notion of To Ev, THE ONE, from Egypt. Tho' that fubtil metaphyfician Parmenides, in his doctrine of visas, feems to have added fomething of his own. If we fuppofe, that one and the fame mind is the univerfal principle of order and · harmony throughout the world, containing and connecting all it's parts, and giving unity to the. system, there' seems to be nothing atheistical or impious in this fuppofition.

288. Number is no object of sense: it is an act of the mind. The fame thing in a different conception is one or many. Comprehending God and the creatures in one general notion, we may say that all things together make one universe, or r wav. But if we fhould fay, that all things make one God; this would, indeed, be an erroneous notion of God, but would not amount to atheism, fo long as mind or intellect was admitted to be the To eμovinov, the governing part. It is neverthelefs more refpectful, and confequently the truer notion of God, to fuppofe him neither made up of. parts, nor to be himself a part of any whole whatfoever.

289. All thofe, who conceived the universe to be an animal, muft in confequence of that notion,

suppose

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