fuppofe all things to be one. But to conceive God to be the fentient foul of an animal, is altoge ther unworthy and abfurd. There is no fenfe, nor fenfory, nor any thing like a fenfe or sensory in God. Senfe implies an impreffion from fome other being, and denotes a dependence in the foul which hath it. Senfe is a paffion; and paffions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things, as pure mind or intellect, but nothing by fenfe, nor in nor through a fenfory. Therefore to fuppofe a fenfory of any kind, whether space or any other, in God would be very wrong, and lead us into false conceptions of his nature. The prefuming there was fuch a thing as real abfolute uncreated space, feems to have occafioned that modern mistake. But this prefumption was without grounds.

So far

290. Body is oppofite to fpirit or mind. We have a notion of fpirit from thought and action. We have a notion of body from resistance. forth as there is real power, there is spirit. So far forth as there is refiftance, there is inability or want of power. That is, there is a negation of fpirit. We are embodied, that is, we are clogged by weight, and hindered by refiftance. But in refpect of a perfect fpirit, there is nothing hard or impenetrable: there is no refiftance to the Deity Nor hath he any body: nor is the fupreme being united to the world, as the foul of an animal is to it's body, which neceffarily implieth defect, both as an inftrument, and as a conftant weight and impediment.

291. Thus much it confifts with piety to fay, that a divine agent doth by his virtue permeate and govern the elementary fire or light (d), which ferves as an animal fpirit to enliven and actuate the

(d) 157, 172.

S 2

whole

whole mafs, and all the members of this visible world. Nor is this doctrine lefs philofophical than pious. We fee all nature alive or in motion. We fee water turned into air, and air rarified and made elaftic (e) by the attraction of another medium, more pure indeed, more fubtil, and more volatile than air. But ftill, as this is a moveable extended, and, confequently, a corporeal being (f), it cannot be itself the principle of motion, but leads us naturally and neceffarily to an incorporeal spirit or agent. We are conscious that a spirit can begin, alter, or determine motion, but nothing of this appears in body. Nay the contrary is evident, both to experiment and reflection.

292. Natural phænomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, fuch as we fee and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, therefore, the fame; paffive without any thing active, fluent and changing without any thing permanent in them. However, as thefe make the firft impreffions, and the mind takes her firft flight and fpring, as it were, by refting her foot on these objects, they are not only firft confidered by all men, but most confidered by moft men. They and the phantomes that refult from thofe appearances, the children of imagination grafted upon sense, such for example as pure space (i) are thought by many the very firft in existence and ftability, and to embrace and comprehend all other beings.

293. Now although fuch phantomes as corporeal forces, abfolute motions, and real fpaces, do pafs in phyfics for caufes and principles (g), yet are they in truth but hypothefes, nor can they be the objects of real fcience. They pass nevertheless in physics converfant about things of sense, and con(e) 149, 152, 200. (f) 207. (i) 270. (g) 2202

249, 250.

fined to experiments and mechanics. But when we enter the province of the philofophia prima, we discover another order of beings, mind and it's acts, permanent being, not dependent on corporeal things, nor refulting, nor connected, nor contained; but containing, connnecting, enlivening the whole frame; and imparting those motions, forms, qualities, and that order and symmetry to all those tranfient phænomena, which we term the course of na

ture.

294. It is with our faculties as with our affections: what first feises, holds faft (a). It is a vulgar theme, that man is a compound of contrarieties, which breed a reftlefs ftruggle in his nature, between flesh and spirit, the beaft and the angel, earth and heaven, ever weighed down and ever bearing up, During which conflict the character fluctuates: when either fide prevails, it is then fixed for vice or virtue. And life from different principles takes a dif ferent iffue. It is the fame in regard to our faculties. Senfe at firft befets and overbears the mind. The fenfible appearances are all in all, our reasonings are employed about them; our desires terminate in them: we look no farther for realities or causes; till intellect begins to dawn, and caft a ray on this. fhadowy scene. We then perceive the true principle of unity, identity, and exiftence. Those things that before seemed to constitute the whole of being, upon taking an intellectual view of things, prove to be but fleeting phantomes.

295. From the outward form of grofs maffes which occupy the vulgar, a curious inquirer proceeds to examine the inward ftructure and minute parts, and from obferving the motions in nature, to discover the laws of those motions. By the way he frames his hypothefis and suits his language to bad 264.

this natural philofophy. And these fit the occafion and answer the end of a maker of experiments or mechanic, who means only to apply the powers of nature, and reduce the phænomena to rules. But, if proceeding still in his analysis and inquiry, he afcends from the fenfible into the intellectual world, and beholds things in a new light and a new order, he will then change his fyftem and perceive, that what he took for fubftances and causes are but fleeting fhadows; that the mind contains all, and acts all, and is to all created beings the fource of unity and identity, harmony and order, existence and stability.

296. It is neither acid, nor falt, nor fulphur, nor air, nor æther, nor vifible corporeal fire (b), much lefs the phantome fate, or neceffity, that is the real agent, but by a certain analysis, a regular connection and climax, we afcend through all thofe mediums to a glympfe of the firft mover, invifible, incorporeal, unextended, intellectual fource of life and being. There is, it must be owned, a mixture of obfcurity and prejudice in human speech and reasonings. This is unavoidable, fince the veils of prejudice and error are flowly and fingly taken off one by one. But if there are many links in the chain which connects the two extremes of what is grofly fenfible and purely intelligible, and it feem a tedious work, by the flow helps of memory, imagination, and reafon, oppreffed and overwhelmed, as we are, by the fenfes, through erroneous principles and long ambages of words and notions, to ftruggle upwards into the light of truth, yet as this gradually dawns, further discoveries ftill correct the ftyle, and clear up the notions

297. The mind, her acts and faculties, furnish a new and diftinct clafs of objects (c) from the

(b) 155.

(c) 163, 266.

contempla.

contemplation whereof arife certain other notions, principles, and verities, fo remote from, and even fo repugnant to, the first prejudices which surprize the fenfe of mankind, that they may well be excluded from vulgar speech and books, as abstract from fenfible matters, and more fit for the speculation of Truth, the labour and aim of a few, than for the practice of the world, or the subjects of experimental or mechanical inquiry. Nevertheless, though, perhaps, it may not be relifhed by fome modern readers, yet the treating in physical books concerning metaphyfical and divine matters can be juftified by great authorities among the ancients; not to mention, that he, who profeffedly delivers the elements of a science, is more obliged to method and fyftem, and tied down to more rigorous laws, than a mere effay writer. It may, therefore, be pardoned if this rude effay doth, by infenfible tranfitions, draw the reader into remote inquiries and fpeculations, that were not thought of, either by him or by the author, at firft fetting out.

298. There are traces of profound thought as well as primæval tradition in the Platonic, Pythagoræan, Egyptian, and Chaldaic philofophy (p). Men in those early days were not overlaid with languages and literature. Their minds feem to have been more exércifed, and lefs burthened, than in later ages; and, as fo much nearer the beginning of the world, to have had the advantage of patriarchal lights handed down through a few hands. It cannot be affirmed indeed (how probable foever it may feem) that Mofes was that fame Mochus, with whofe fucceffors, priests and prophets, Pythagoras is faid to have converfed at Sidon. Yet the study of philofophy appears to be of very great antiquity and remote original; inafmuch as Timæus (p) 179, 266.

Locrenfis,