that the foul of man was originally furnished with native inbred notions, and ftands in need of fenfible occafions, not abfolutely for producing them, but only for awakening, roufing, or exciting into act what was already pre-exiftent, dormant, and latent in the foul; as, things are faid to be laid up in the memory, though not actually perceived, until they happen to be called forth and brought into view by other objects. This notion feemeth fomewhat different from that of innate ideas, as understood by thofe moderns who have attempted to explode them. To understand and to be, are according to Parmenides the fame thing. And Plato in his feventh letter makes no difference between vs and sun, mind and knowledge. Whence it follows, that mind, knowledge, and notions, either in habit or in act, always go together.

310. And albeit Ariftotle confidered the foul in it's original state as a blank paper, yet he held it to be the proper place of forms, lux Gvα TÓTOV Adar (a). Which doctrine firft maintained by others he admits, under this restriction, that it is not to be understood of the whole foul, but only of the vonlin; as is to be feen in his third book De anima. Whence, according to Themiftius in his commentary on that treatife, it may be inferred that all beings are in the foul. For, faith he, the forms are the beings. By the form every thing is what it is. And he adds, it is the foul that imparteth forms to matter; lw lw μορφῶσα ποικίλαις μορφαῖς. Therefore they are frft in the foul. He further adds, that the mind is all things, taking the forms of all things it becomes all things by intellect and fenfe. Alexander Aphrodifæus faith as much, affirming the mind to be all things, κατά τε τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πάνες. And (a) 269.

this in fact is Ariftotle's own doctrine in his third. book De anima, where he alfo afferts, with Plato, that actual knowledge and the thing known are all one: τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐςιν ἡ κατ ̓ ἐνέργειαν ἐπισήμη τῷ πράγματι. weypal. Whence it follows that the things are where the knowledge is, that is to fay, in the mind. Or, as it is otherwife expreffed, that the foul is all things. More might be faid to explain Ariftotle's notion, but it would lead too far.

311. As to an abfolute actual existence (b) of fenfible or corporeal things, it doth not feem to have been admitted either by Plato or Ariftotle. In the Theaetetus we are told, that if any one faith a thing is or is made, he muft withal fay, for what, or of what, or in refpect of what, it is or is made; for, that any thing fhould exift in it felf or abfolutely, is abfurd. Agreeably to which doctrine it is also farther affirmed by Plato, that it is impoffible a thing fhould be fweet, and fweet to no body. It muft neverthelefs be owned with regard to Ariftotle, that, even in his Metaphyfics there are fome expreffions which feem to favour the abfolute exiftence of corporeal things. For inftance, in the eleventh book fpeaking of corporeal fenfible things, What wonder, faith he, if they never appear to us the fame, no more than to fick men, fince we are always changing, and never remain the fame our felves? And again, he faith, Senfible things, although they receive no change in themselves, do nevertheless in fick perfons produce different fenfations and not the fame. Thefe paffages would feem to imply a diftinct and abfolute existence of the objects of fenfe.

312. But it must be observed, that Ariftotle diftinguifheth a twofold existence, potential and actual. It will not, therefore, follow that, ac(b) 264, 292, 291.

cording

cording to Ariftotle, because a thing is, it must actually exift. This is evident from the eighth book of his Metaphyfics, where he animadverts on the Megaric philofophers, as not admitting a poffible existence diftinct from the actual: from whence, faith he, it must follow, that there is nothing cold or hot or fweet or any fenfible thing at all, where there is no perception. He adds, that in confequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no fenfe but while we actually exert it: we are blind when we do not fee, and therefore both blind and deaf feveral times in a day,

th 313. The exéxea wewτar of the Peripatetics, that is, the fciences, arts, and habits, were by them diftinguished from the acts or exéxas STERα, and fuppofed to exift in the mind, though not exerted or put into act. This feems to illuftrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their followers conceived innate (c) notions to be in the foul of man. In was the Platonic doctrine, that humane fouls or minds defcended from above, and were fowed in generation, that they were ftunned, ftupified, and intoxicated by this defcent and immerfion into animal nature. And that the foul, in this végis or flumber, forgets her original, notions, which are fmothered and oppreffed by many falfe tenets and prejudices of fenfe. Infomuch that Proclus compares the foul, in her defcent invefted, with growing prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the fea, and there contracting divers coats of fea-weed, coral, and fhells, which stick: clofe to him and conceal his true shape.

314. Hence, according to this philofophy, the mind of man is fo reftlefs to fhake off that flumber, to difengage and emancipate herfelf from . those prejudices and falfe opinions, that fo ftraitly

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befet and cling to her, to rub off those covers, that disguise her original form, and to regain her primæval state and firft notions: Hence, that perpetual struggle to recover the loft region of light, that ardent thirft and endeavour after truth and intellectual ideas, which fhe would neither feek to attain, nor rejoice in, nor know when attained, except fhe had fome prænotion or anticipation of them, and they had lain innate and dormant like habits and sciences in the mind, or things laid up, which are called out and roused by recollection or reminiscence. So that learning feemeth in effect reminifcence.

315. The Peripatetics themselves distinguish between reminifcence and mere memory. The miftius obferves that the best memories commonly go with the worst parts; but that reminifcence is moft perfect in the most ingenious minds. And notwithstanding the tabula rafa (d) of Aristotle, yet fome of his followers have undertaken to make him fpeak Plato's fenfe. Thus Plutarch the Peripatetic teacheth as agreeable to his master's doc trine, that learning is reminifcence, and that the

xa is in children. Simplicius alfo, in his commentary on the third book of Ariftotle ai tus, fpeaketh of a certain interiour reason in the foul, acting of it felf, and originally full of it's own proper notions, πλήρης ἀφ' ἑαυτῇ τῶν οἰκείων γνωτῶν.

316. And as the Platonic philofophy supposed intellectual notions to be originally inexiftent or innate in the foul (e), fo likewise it fuppofed fen-> fible qualities to exift (though not originally) in the foul, and there only. Socrates faith to Theætetus, You must not think the white colour that you fee is in any thing without your eyes, or in your eyes,3 (a) 308. (e) 309, 314.

or

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or in any place at all. And in the Timæus Plato teacheth, that the figure and motion of the particles of fire dividing the parts of our bodies produce that painful fenfation we call heat. And Plotinus, in the fixth book of his fecond Ennead, obferves that heat and other qualities are not qualities in the things themselves, but acts: that heat is not a quality, but act, in the fire that fire is not really what we perceive in the qualities light, heat, and colour. From all which it is plain, that whatever real things they fuppofed to exift independent of the foul, thofe were neither fenfible things, nor cloathed with fenfible qualities.

317. Neither Plato nor Ariftotle by matter, Ay, understood corporeal fubftance, whatever the moderns may understand by that word. To them certainly it fignified no pofitive actual being. Ariftotle defcribes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity nor quality nor effence. And not only the Platonifts and Pythagoreans, but also the Peripatetics themfelves declare it to be known, neither by fenfe, nor by any direct and just reafoning, but only by fome fpurious or adulterine method, as hath been obferved before. Simon Portius, a famous Peripatetic of the fixteenth century, denies it to be any fubftance at all, for, faith he, nequit per fe fubfiftere, quia fequeretur, id quod non eft in actu effe in actu. If Jamblichus may be credited, the Egyptians fuppofed matter fo far from including ought of fubftance or effence, that, according to them, God produced it by a feparation from all fubftance, effence or being, ἀπὸ ἐσιότης αποχιοθεισης υλότης. That matter is actually nothing, but potentially all things, is the doctrine of Ariftotle, Theophraftus, and all the antient Peripatetics.

318. According to those philofophers, matter is U

only

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