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bers, do manifeftly infer a mind or intellect to be the cause thereof.

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354. THE ONE Or To v may be conceived either by compofition or divifion. For as, on the one hand, we may lay the world or univerfe is one whole or one animal; fo we may on the other hand, confider THE ONE, Tov, by divifion or abftraction, as fomewhat in the order of things prior to mind. In either fenfe there is no atheism, fo long as mind is admitted to prefide and direct the animal; and fo long as the unum or To v is fuppofed not to exift without mind (a). So that neither Heraclitus nor Parmenides, nor Pythagoras, nor Plato, neither the Egyptians nor Stoics, with their doctrine of a divine whole or animal, nor Xenophanes with his ev xal nav, are juftly to be açcounted atheists. Therefore modern atheism, be it of Hobbes, Spinofa, Collins, or whom you will, is not to be countenanced by the learning and great names of antiquity.

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355. Plato teacheth, that the doctrine concerning the one or unite is a means to lead and raise the mind (b) to the knowledge of him who truly is. And it is a tenet both of Aristotle and Plato, that identity is a certain unity. The Pythageorans alfo, as well as the Platonic philofophers, held unum and ens to be the fame. Confiftently with which that only can be faid to exift, which is one and the fame. In things fenfible and imaginable, as fuch, there feems to be no unity, nothing that can be called one prior to all act of the mind; fince they being in themfelves aggregates, confifting of parts or compounded of elements, are in effect many. Accordingly it is remarked by Themiftius, the learned interpreter of Ariftotle, that to collect many notions into one, and to confider them as one, is the work of intellect, and not of fenfe or fancy..

356. Ariftotle himfelf, in his third book of the (a) 287, 288.. (3) 294, 295.

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Soul,

Soul, faith it is the mind that maketh each thing to be one, τὸ δὲ ἐν ποιῶν τᾶτο ὁ νῆς ἕκασον. How this is done, Themiftius is more particular, obferving, that as being conferreth effence, the mind by virtue of her fimplicity conferreth fimplicity upon compounded beings. And, indeed, it feemeth that the mind, so far forth as perfon, is individual (a) therein resembling the divine one by participation, and imparting to other things what itfelf participates from above. This is agreeable to the doctine of the ancients, however the contrary opinion of fuppofing number to be an original primary quality in things, independent of the mind, may obtain among the moderns.

357. The Peripatetics taught, that in all divisible things there was fomewhat indivifible, and in all compounded things fomewhat fimple. This they derived from an act of the mind. And neither this fimple indivisible unite, nor any fum of repeated unites, confequently no number, can be feparated from the things themfelves, and from the operation of the mind. Themiftius goeth fo far as to affirm, that it cannot be separated from the words or figns; and, as it cannot be uttered without them, fo faith he, neither can it be conceived without them. Thus much upon the whole may be concluded, that, diftinct from the mind and her operations, there is in created beings neither unite nor number.

358. Of inferior beings the human mind, felf, or perfon is the moft fimple and undivided effence (b). And the fupreme father is the most perfect one. Therefore the flight of the mind towards God is called by the Platonics Quyn μóvy węòs μóver. The fupreme being, faith Plotinus, as he excludes all diverfity, is ever alike prefent. And we are then present to him, when, recollected and abstracted from the world and fenfible objects, we are moft free and difengaged (c) from all variety. He adds, that in the intuition of (a) 345, 346, 347. (6) 347. (c) 268.

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the fupreme deity the foul finds her wifhed for end and repofe; which that philofopher calls awaking out of his body into himself.

359. In the tenth book of the arcane, or divine wisdom of the Ægyptians, we are taught that the fupreme being is not the caufe of any created thing; but that he produced or made the word; and that all created beings were made by the word, which is accordingly ftyled the cause of all caufes: and that this was alfo the doctrine of the Chaldæans. Plato, likewise, in his letter to Hermias, Eraftus, and Corifcus, fpeaks of God the ruler and caufe of all things, as having a father: And in his Epinomis, he exprefly teacheth that the word or aóyos made the world. Accordingly faint Auguftine in his commentary on the beginning of faint John's Gofpel, having declared that Chrift is the wifdom of God by which all things were made, obferves that this doctrine was alfo found in the writings of philofophers, who taught that God had an only begotten Son by whom are all things.

360. Now, though Plato had joined with an imagination the most splendid and magnificent, an intellect not lefs deep and clear; yet it is not to be fuppofed, that either he or any other philofophers of Greece or the eaft, had by the light of nature attained an adequate notion of the Holy Trinity, nor even that their imperfect notion, fo far as it went, was exactly juft; nor perhaps that thofe fublime hints, which dart forth like flashes of light in the midst of a profound darkness, were originally ftruck from the hard rock of human reafon; but rather derived, at leaft in part, by a divine tradition (a) from the author of all things. It feems a remarkable confirmation of this, what Plotinus obferves in his fifth Ennead, that this doctrine of a Trinity, father, mind, and fouls was no late invention, but an ancient tenet.

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361. Certain it is, that the notion of a Trinity is to be found in the writings of many old heathen philofophers, that is to fay, a notion of three divine hypoftafes. Authority, light, and life did, to the eye of. reafon, plainly appear to fupport, pervade, and animate the mundane fyftem or macrocofm. The fame appeared in the microcofm, preferving foul and body, enlightening the mind, and moving the affections. And thefe were conceived to be neceffary, univerfal principles, co-existing and co-operating in fuch fort, as never to exift afunder, but on the contrary to conftitute one Sovereign of all things. And, indeed, how could power or authority avail or fubfift without knowledge? or either without life and action?

362. In the adminiftration of all things there is authority to establish, law to direct, and juftice to execute. There is first the fource of all perfection, or fons deitatis, fecondly the fupreme Reason, order, or a, and laftly the Spirit which quickens and infpires. We are fprung from the father, irradiated or enlightened by the fon, and moved by the fpirit. Certainly, that there is father, fon, and fpirit; that thefe bear analogy to the fun, light, and heat; and are otherwife expreffed by the terms, principle, mind, and foul; by one or òv, intellect, and life; by good, word, and love; and that generation was not attributed to the second hypoftafis, the vas or ady, in refpect of time, (g), but only in respect of origine and order, as an eternal neceffary emanation; thefe are the exprefs tenets of Platonifts, Pythagoreans, Ægyptians, and Chaldæans.

363. Though it may be well prefumed there is nothing to be found on that fublime fubject in hu man writings, which doth not bear the fure figna→ tures of humanity; yet it cannot be denied, that feveral fathers of the church have thought fit to illuftrate the chriftian doctrine of the holy Trinity, by fimilitudes

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fitudes and expreffions borrowed from the moft emi nent heathens, whom they conceived to have been no ftrangers to that mystery; as hath been plainly proved by Beffarion, Eugubinus, and Doctor Cudworth.

364. Therefore, how unphilofophical foever that doctrine may feem to many of the prefent age, yet it is certain, the men of greatest fame and learning among the ancient philofophers held a Trinity in the Godhead. It must be owned, that upon this point fome later Platonists of the Gentile world feem to have bewilder'd themfelves, (as many Chriftians have alfo done) while they pursued the hints derived from their predeceffors, with too much curiofity.

365. But Plato himself confider'd that doctrine as a venerable mystery, not to be lightly treated of or rafhly divulged. Wherefore, in a letter to Dionyfius he writes (as he himself profeffeth) ænigmatically and briefly in the following terms, which he giveth for a fummary of his notion concerning the fupreme being, and which being capable of divers fenfes, I leave to be decyphered by the learned reader. περὶ τὸν πάντων βα σιλέα πάντ ̓ ἔτι, ἢ ἐκεινα ἕνεκα πάντα, κι ἐκεῖνο αιτιον απάν των τῶν καλῶν, δέυτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δέυτερα, και τρίτον περὶ τὰ κρίτα. Teira. Plato enjoins Dionyfius over and over, with great earneftnefs not to fuffer, what he communicates concerning the mystery of the divine nature, to fall into illiterate or vulgar hands, giving it withal as a reason for this caution, that nothing would feem more ridiculous or abfurd to the common run of mankind. He adds, that in regard writings might mifcarry, the prudent way was to write nothing at all on thofe matters, but to teach and learn them by word of mouth: for which reafon, faith he, I have never wrote any thing thereon; nor is there, nor fhall there ever be any thing of Plato's extant on that fubject. He farther adds, as for what hath been now faid, it belongs all to Socrates.

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