sacrificing that portion of his own property for the purpose of keeping out the water. Reference may also be made to Bald v. Alloa Coal Company, 30th May 1854, 16 D. 870; Baird v. Williamson, 33 Law Journal, C. Pleas, 101; Acton v. Blundell, 12 Meeson and Welsby, 324; Chasemore v. Richards, 1859, 7 House of Lords Cases, 349, 29 Law Journal, Exchr. 81; Smith v. Kenrick, 18 Law Journal, C. Pleas, 172; Broom's Comms., pp. 79, 82, 85. "But while the respondent has undoubtedly this right of working out his own minerals to the very edge of his march-even although the effect of this may be to send water into the Polton coalfield-the Lord Ordinary thinks it is equally clear that the respondent must not touch or interfere with the strata, material, or wastes in the Polton coal-field, so as thereby to facilitate the escape of water from the Dalhousie workings. For example, if the ordinary barrier had been left by the Polton coal-owner along the rise of his own field, in order to keep out the water from Dalhousie, it is manifest that the Dalhousie tenant could not destroy that barrier either by directly piercing it, or by dislocating or cracking it by blasting or otherwise, so as to let the water pass through it. In short, while each mineral owner or tenant may work out within his own limits to the fullest extent, he must not interfere, directly or indirectly, with the neighbouring properties; and, above all, he must not, with a view to his own advantage, destroy the barriers which his neighbour has left for the protection of the field to the dip." After narrating the facts of the case, his Lordship proceeded:-"The point in controversy between the parties is, Were the blasts which the respondent fired on the 5th and 6th May 1870 lawful or not? The suspender says that these blasts disturbed, shook, or dislocated the strata or material within the Polton march, or, at all events, opened seams or crevices in Polton ground, and thus let the water flow into Polton. On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the blasts merely cleared out the waste in the encroachment within the Dalhousie march, and that this was quite legitimate. Now, there is undoubtedly conflicting evidence as to the effects which the blasts would probably produce. Necessarily, it is a matter of skilled opinion, to be judged of in the circumstances, for there is no access to the old waste to see what the blasts really did. The only fact proved is, that immediately after the blasts a large flow of water took place into Polton coal-field. It is matter of conjecture and skilled opinion how this result was brought about. On the whole, and without weighing too nicely the reasoning of the skilled witnesses, the Lord Ordinary has come to be of opinion that the blasts were not a fair and legitimate exercise of the respondent's rights, and, accordingly, he has interdicted their repetition. The following are the leading considerations which have induced him to do so:-(1) Blasts of the size in question (12lb canisters) are very unusual in ordinary mining operations. Blasts by lb or ib charges are not uncommon, but it is in very exceptional circumstances that anything like a 12lb charge is ever used. (2) The blasts were fired very near the Polton march-that is, at the bottom of the pit sunk within 10 yards of the march. Such blasts fired so near the Polton ground may easily be supposed to have some effect within the Polton march. The evidence of opinion is conflicting; but, even if the matter were held to be doubtful, this would be enough to entitle the VOL VIII. suspender to complain. Even Mr M'Kenzie, one of the respondent's witnesses, admits that firing such blasts so near the march was unneighbourly.' (3) Although the blasts might not affect solid strata, they might easily open crevices in strata already dislocated, which crevices would otherwise have remained silted up, and, at all events, the blasts would shake, loose, or open up the rubbish or material which was in the jewel waste. This last was the very object avowed by the respondent; and, although he maintains that the rubbish thus disturbed and shaken would be all within the encroachment, and therefore within the Dalhousie boundary, the Lord Ordinary cannot take this to be so certain as to allow the blasts to be repeated. The skilled witnesses differ as to how far the effects of the blasts would go, and, operating in loose material, the Lord Ordinary cannot think it unlikely that they would produce effects within the Polton march. It is admitted, and at all events is clear, that the respondent had no right to touch or to shake either strata, or rubbish, or silting outside his own march. (Lastly) The blasts are not necessary, in any view, for the respondent's mining operations. They were not resorted to either to sink the shaft or to take out coal. respondent can sink his shaft quite well without such blasting, and has actually done so, and of course there is no coal to blast in the waste of the encroachment where the blasts were fired. The respondent argued that he could produce the same effect by boring without blasting, and there is certainly some evidence that a second 10-inch bore without blasts sent water to Polton, though it is difficult to say that this might not have been assisted by the previous blasts. But the true answer is, that if blasting is unnecessary, why resort to it? It is undoubtedly attended with risk, and may interfere with the strata, crevices, and packing in Polton. If boring alone will answer the respondent's ends, there is no interdict against his boring to any extent in his own land. The Lord Ordinary has somewhat varied the terms of the interdict, so as to make it clear that what is interdicted is blasting, or operations which may affect, shake, or disturb strata, material, or crevices within the Polton march." Mr Hood reclaimed. The FRASER, SHAND, and STRACHAN, for him-It is not proved that the effect of the explosion extended beyond the Dalhousie march. The flow of water into Polton would equally have followed in conse quence of the sinking of pit No. 3, and the boring, which were operations that could not be complained of. MILLAR, Q.C., and G. S. DUNDAS, in answerWhat Mr Hood did was a novel and extraordinary operation, close to the march, and not in the fair course of working. It is proved that Mrs Durham has in fact suffered injury, and it therefore lies upon Mr Hood to prove that his operations were not the cause of the injury. At advising The LORD PRESIDENT-The general principles of law in regard to the subject of this case are well settled, but there is some difficulty in applying them to the circumstances. On the one hand, an owner of a mine is entitled to work out his minerals without regard to the interests of his neighbour, so long as he resorts to no extraordinary operations. If the effect is to throw water on the mineral field of the lower heritor, it is a natural servitude to which the latter must submit, and if NO. XXII, he desires to protect himself he must leave a sufficient barrier of his own minerals. All this is clear enough. The peculiarity of the present case lies in the fact that some years beforea previous tenant in Polton committed an encroachment on the Dalhousie coal-field by working the jewel coal beyond the line of march. This wrong, which was probably unintentional, has turned out most disastrous to the party representing the wrong-doer. After the encroachment, it became impossible in the jewel seam to maintain any efficient barrier to prevent the flow of water from Dalhousie to Polton. This, however, does not seem to have caused any great mischief to Polton till the proceedings of Mr Hood now complained of. The question before us is whether these proceedings in his own ground are of such a nature that Mrs Durham is entitled to interdict them. They were undoubtedly very peculiar, and it is not disguised that they were resorted to, at least partially, with the view of getting rid of the water. Mr Hood, after sinking two other pits, sinks a third pit within 10 yards of the Polton march, right over the jewel waste. This is not said to be illegal in itself, and if he had confined himself to sinking the pit, or else sinking it so far and boring the rest of the way, I am not prepared to hold that any legal wrong would have been committed. But he did not find it answer his purpose. He says that if he had gone on boring, his object would have been equally well though more slowly attained. However he resorts to a new expedient, viz,-firing heavy shots in the waste within his own bounds. Mrs Durham says that this was a very dangerous proceeding as regards her interest, calculated to dislocate the strata in her field, and to allow the water to flow more freely, and that in point of fact a rush of water on her workings followed the blasts. I do not think we have any very satisfactory evidence of the connection between the explosions and the flow of water. No doubt the flow of water followed on Mr Hood's operations, and especially on the blasts. But if it can be shown that the effect of blasting was merely to clear out the Dalhousie waste without affecting the Polton strata, Mrs Durham would have no remedy in law. On the one hand, it is not proved that the blasts affected either the solid strata or the packed rubbish on the Polton side. On the other hand, it is not proved that the effects of blasts were confined to the Dalhousie side. The explosions were of an extraordinary character, used very near the march, not for the direct purpose of working and winning the coals, but for the purpose of facilitating the flow of water from one mine to the other. Mrs Durham says that if a party resorts to such extraordinary operations near the march, and they are followed in point of fact by injury to her, she is not obliged to connect the operations and injury as cause and effect, but that it lies on the respondent to prove that the course he took was not the cause of the injury. I think this argument is sound and equitable. It is impossible to prove as matter of fact that the blasts did disturb the strata in Polton. The waste is not accessible. On the other hand, the extent of the waste on the Dalhousie side is so small that a disturbance there would not probably be confined to it. The formal question that arises is, whether such operations as explosions of large quantities of gunpowder were justifiable on the part of Mr Hood? I think not; Mrs Durham had at least reasonable grounds of apprehension, and if she had, that justified interim interdict; and before such inter dict can be recalled, the respondent must justify his proceedings and show that they are not productive of injurious consequences. He has failed to do this, and I am of opinion that the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary should be adhered to. LORD DEAS and LORD ARDMILLAN concurred. LORD KINLOCH-I agree with the Lord Ordinary and your Lordships. There cannot be any doubt of the general principle, that a lower ground proprietor must receive the water flowing from the higher ground, whether on the surface or beneath it. But the obligation holds only where the water flows down in the natural course of things, and where the upper proprietor is doing nothing more than exercising legitimate acts of ownership. Wherever he makes use of artificial operations, not called for in the ordinary exercise of his rights of property, for the express purpose of sending down the water on the lower grounds, he will be liable to be controlled by the Court. More especially will this be the case if the effect of the operations is to create physical dismemberment to the property of his neighbour, as by the dislocation of the strata of an adjoining coal-field. In the present case, I think it is the fair conclusion from the evidence that the operation of the respondent Mr Hood, in blasting with large charges of gunpowder within little more than ten yards from the march, was not performed in the due and ordinary exercise of his rights as tenant of the Dalhousie Coal-field. It was clearly not necessary to enable him to sink his shaft, or work his coal; nor was it in the ordinary course of working for these purposes. I think it clearly made out that his primary, if not exclusive, object was, by means of a violent artificial operation, to send down the water into the Polton Coal-field. Even with this for his intention, the case might have presented some difficulty had the operation clearly had no effect except on the substance or rubbish of his own coal-field. But I think it the fair result of the evidence, including that given by the experts, read, as it is both the right and duty of the Court to read it, in the light of practical common sense, that the operation was calculated more or less to dislocate the strata, and disturb the rubbish in the Polton Coal-field; to open cracks and crevices; and to shake out the silt with which previously they had been filled up. The difficulty in the proof is to discover conclusive evidence that this has actually been done. But however much it might be necessary in an action of damages to bring conclusive proof of the actual fact, it is sufficient, in a question of interdict, to show that such is a natural and probable effect of the operation, and that the proceeding is such as creates a reasonable apprehension of this result. I am of opinion that this has been clearly established; and therefore I think the Lord Ordinary was right in granting interdict in the terms in which his judg ment is expressed. The Court adhered. Agent for Mr Hood-T. F. Weir, S.S.C. Tuesday, January 24. SECOND DIVISION. SHEARER AND OTHERS v. HAMILTON. Right of Way-Statutory Powers of Road Trustees -Prescription-Possessory Judgment— Notice to the Public. The Act 56 Geo. III., c. 83, gave to the trustees of the Glasgow and Carlisle Turnpike Road power to shut up and sell to the adjacent proprietors the solum of such portions of the roads under their charge as should be superseded by the construction of new roads, and thereby rendered superfluous and unnecessary to the public. Held that their right so to do was mera facultatis, and could not be lost by the operation of the negative prescription. Further, that the public, though using and possessing the superseded portion for forty years dating from the construction of the new road, did not thereby acquire a separate right on a new title their title being merely that of the trustees in whom the roads were vested, and that the circumstances alleged did not entitle to a possessory judgment. Held that where an Act of Parliament required that intimation of a meeting of statute labour road trustees should be given by advertisement on the door of a parish church "on a Sunday, at least ten days before such meeting," that such advertisement made on two consecutive Sundays, intimating a meeting to be held on the Tuesday following the second Sunday, was insufficient, and the proceedings of the trustees thereby invalidated. This was an application to the Sheriff of Lanarkshire at the instance of Gavin Shearer and other residents in or near Larkhall, in the county of Lanark, against W. H. M'Niell Hamilton, Esq., of Raploch, for the purpose of having him interdicted from carrying out certain building operations, and others, which were alleged to amount to an obstruction of certain roads on the respondent's property of Raploch, and to an illegal interference with the rights of the petitioners as members of the public to their use and enjoyment. This application was supported by an allegation of possession and use of the roads in question by the petitioners and the public from time immemorial, or for upwards of forty years. The roads although continuous consisted of two portions-one (marked BC on the plan produced with the petition) being a portion of what was formerly the turnpike road between Glasgow and Carlisle until superseded, about the year 1820, by the construction of the present road; and the other (marked E D BA on the said plan) being a statute labour road. With regard to the portion of the old turnpike road B C, it was alleged for the respondent that the road, having been superseded by the construction of the new portion in 1870, had ceased to be of any use to the trustees or the public, and that in consequence thereof the trustees, acting under the authority of the 38th and 39th sections of their statute (56 Geo. III., c. 88), had, on the application of the respondent or his predecessor in the estate of Raploch, and for a pecuniary consideration, conveyed to him the solum of the portion in question, and that by a disposition dated 21st March 1860. Upon this disposition infeftment had been taken in 1865, and in 1869 or 1870 the respondent had proceeded to take the steps complained of by the petitioners to have the road shut up, and its solum converted to other purposes. With regard to the statute labour road, it was stated that in October 1869 the respondent had presented a petition to the Statute Labour Road Trustees for the middle ward of the county, representing that this road had by the construction of new roads been rendered unnecessary, and craving the trustees to exercise the powers conferred on them by the Act 47 Geo. III. c. 45, and shut up the said portion of road. The trustees having ordered the statutory intimation to proprietors, occupiers and the public, and having duly inspected the road, and the portions of new road proposed to be substituted therefor in a minute of meeting, dated 10th January 1870, found that the substitution of the new road for the portion of the old parish road mentioned in the petition would be of great public benefit, and ap prove thereof accordingly; and further, that the portion of the old parish road mentioned in the petition is superseded by the new road; is superfluous and unnecessary, and ought to be shut up; and appoint the same to be shut up accordingly for all which authority is hereby granted in terms of the prayer of the petition." For the petitioners it was contended that, with regard to the portion of road B C, the trustees, not having excercised the power given by their statute to sell and shut up disused portions of the roads, under their charge during forty years, had lost it by the negative prescription; and also that by their forty years' possession the public had acquir. ed a separate right on a title different from that of the road trustees, dating from the substitution of the new road for the old. With regard to the statute labour road, it was urged that the proceed. ings of the statute labour road trustees, following on the petition of the respondent, had not been in conformity with the statute 47 Geo. III, cap. 45, no sufficient notice, in terms of the 36th section of that statute, of the proceedings having been given to the public. In that section it is provided that notice be given by advertisement upon the church doors of the parishes in which the said grounds lie, upon a Sunday ten days at least before such meeting." In this case a certificate of intimation on the door of the parish church of Dalserf on two successive Sundays, of a meeting to be held on the Tuesday following the latter Sunday, had been produced, and it was contended for the petitioners that the notice was insufficient, neither of the Sundays on which the intimation had been made having been "ten days at least before such meeting." The proceedings were thereby vitiated, and were ab initio null and inept. On the whole cause, it was contended that the petitioners were entitled to be protected in their possession of the various roads. The Sheriff-Substitute at Hamilton (W.C.SPENS) dismissed the petition, without closing the record, on the preliminary plea of the petitioners' want of title to sue. The Sheriff (GLASSFORD BELL) adhered in the following interlocutor:-" Glasgow, 10th October 1870.-Having heard parties' procura. tors on the pursuer's appeal, and thereafter made avizandum with the whole process, finds that a declarator of a public right of way is incompetent in this Court: Finds that it is only such a public right of way that is sought to be vindicated in the present action, and this notwithstanding that as regards the public high road first and chiefly re ferred to in the petition, another road was in the year 1860 substituted for that portion of the old road by the road trustees in whom it was vested, and who, in conformity with their statutory powers, then disponed the piece of old road to the defender, who has been ever since the feudal proprietor thereof as instructed by the titles produced, and has exercised his rights of ownership thereon, the challenge of which raises an heritable question likewise incompetent in this Court: Finds as regards the statute-labour roads second and third referred to, that the petition does not set forth that the pursuers have used the same for seven years, or for any other period; and, as regards the second of said roads, the pursuers do not deny in the record the authenticity of the certified extracts, No. 73, from the minutes of the statute-labour trustees who had the management of the road, from which it appears that they resolved it should be shut up, and another more convenient piece of road substituted for it, which was done accordingly, and if the pursuers or any others interested were aggrieved with the actings of the trustees in the matter, their remedy was by appeal in the manner permitted by section 51 of the act 47 Geo. III, cap. 45; Finds therefore that there are no termini habiles in the petition to warrant a possessory judgment in virtue of which the conclusions ad factum præstandum and for interdict could be granted. The action, on the contrary, being substantially one of a declaratory character, competent only in the Supreme Court, therefore dismisses the appeal; Sustains the preliminary pleas, and adheres to the interlocutor appealed against, in as far as it dismisses the action; Adheres also as regards expenses, and decerns." The petitioners having appealed to the Second Division of the Court of Session, their Lordships allowed certain amendments; and on 22d December 1870 closed the record, and heard parties. SOLICITOR-GENERAL and LANG for the appel lants. SHAND and H. J. MONCRIEFF in answer. LORD JUSTICE-CLERK (after stating the facts relative to the turnpike road and the statute-labour road) said-This proceeding commenced by an application to have Mr Hamilton prohibited from shutting up a certain road, consisting of two portions, the one a part of the old Glasgow and Carlisle road, the other a statute-labour road. As to the first piece of road, which was formerly part of the Glasgow and Carlisle road, I am of opinion that the defence must prevail. It appears to me that from the time when the new road was substituted for the old, the old remained vested in the trustees, subject to their right, as confined by the Act of Parliament, to sell or alienate the solum, and so destroy its character as a road. Two views were urged on us to support the right of the public. One that the trustees, not having exercised their right of sale within forty years, had lost their right to sell by the negative prescription; the other that the public had acquired a separate right on a new title, dating from the time when the new road was substituted for the old. Both these pleas proceed on the footing that forty years had elapsed before the disponee took infeftment on the conveyance from the trustees. I think neither plea well founded. The right to alienate was a power meræ facultatis in the trustees, and while the old road remained vested in them the public had no other title than that of the trustees. If, after the sale to Mr Hamilton, the public had used the road for forty years, they might have ac quired a new right, but nothing of that sort exists here. There is therefore no room for the operation either of the negative or the positive prescription. The question is one of nicety, whether the pos session of the public for seven years after the sale does not entitle them to a possessory judgment. How that would have stood if the application had been founded on an allegation of forty years' possession on a title separate from that of the trustees, and seven years' possession, it is not necessary to decide. In Carson v. Miller, 13th March 1863, 1 Macph. 663, we held that possession for seven years without a title was not sufficient to found a possessory judgment, We had the same point raised lately in Calder v. Adam. There, however, the question arose with a tenant, and as he was only a possessor himself, it was held that the point did not really arise. It is equally unnecessary to express any opinion here, as the possession for seven years in the circumstances which appear on the face of this application is clearly insufficient. The question as to the statute-labour road is different; and I am of opinion that the trustees have not proceeded in terms of the statute, and that the road has not been properly shut up. The necessary notices were not properly given. That is admitted; for while, by the Act, ten days' notice is required, the ten days can only be made up by including the day on which the notice was given, and the day on which the meeting was held. The only difficulty was the case of Crawford v. Lennox, 15 July 1852, 24 Jur. 629, 1 Stuart. 1065, where the Court held that there was no jurisdiction, because a remedy had been provided by the Act of Parliament; but there, at the distance of thirty years, the objection was taken by the public, that the notices to the proprietors were imperfect. It was held that they had nothing to do with these notices, if those to themselves were sufficient. Here the notices to the public are insufficient; and, without further entering into the question, I think the objection is fatal. Such notices would be of no value if, although they have been omitted, the public should be still barred from objecting. In the Hawthornden case we acted on the same principle. On the whole matter, as to the piece of road B to C, I think the defence must prevail; but as to the statute-labour road, that the proceedings have been irregular. Both parties moved for expenses. The Court, however, holding that the success obtained had been about equal, allowed no expenses to either, with the exception of the expense of the amend ing the record, to which the respondent was entitled. Agents for Appellants (Petitioners)—D. Craw ford and J. Y. Guthrie, S.S.C. Agents for Respondent-Morton, Whitehead & Greig, W.S. Saturday, February 4. FIRST DIVISION. HILL V. WILSON. Seduction-Issue. An issue of seduction must be single, and specify the occasion. This was an action of damages for breach of promise of marriage and seduction. The pursuer proposed to take either an issue in general terms, without specifying the time and place of seduction, or two issues specifying different occasions, one in 1860 and the other in 1863. SCOTT for pursuer. SOLICITOR-GENERAL and THомS for defender. The Court observed that the time at which a woman is seduced is a definite point, and must be well known to her, and so with regard to the place. There cannot be two different occasions. It is an essential part of the pursuer's case, though it is no longer the practice to put it in issue, that up to the time of seduction she was a virtuous woman. If she was seduced in 1860 it is impossible that she could have been seduced in 1863. The occasion in 1860 is well and relevantly stated in her condescendence. She must take a single issue, and that occasion must be embodied in it. Agent for Pursuer-D. F. Bridgeford, S.S.C. Agents for Defender-Lindsay & Paterson, W.S. Saturday, February 4. FORBES V. THE MINISTERS OF OLD MACHAR. (Ante, Vol. V, p. 335, and Vol. VI, p. 726.) House of Lords-Petition to apply Judgment—Expenses. Where the House of Lords has pronounced a judgment exhausting a cause, and not containing any finding as to expenses before appeal, the Court will not dispose of the question of expenses. In the process of augmentation and locality of Old Machar a question arose between the ministers and certain heritors, of whom Mr Forbes was one, as to the validity of certain decrees of valuation of teinds. The Court of Session held the valuations bad, and found the heritors liable to the ministers in expenses. On appeal, the House of Lords reversed and ordered the expenses paid by the appellants to the respondents to be repaid, but made no order as to the appellants' expenses in the Court of Session. In a petition for applying the judgment of the House of Lords, Mr Forbes now moved for his expenses previous to the appeal. FRASER for him. ASHER in answer. The cases of Stewart v. Scott, 11 March 1836, 14 S. 692, and Railton, 12 June 1846, 8 D. 812, were referred to. LORD PRESIDENT—This is a question on a closed record. It arose in a process of locality, but every question on which a record is made up and judgment pronounced is for all practical purposes a separate cause. The House of Lords exhausts the case, and while it orders the expenses paid by the appellants to the respondents to be repaid, it says nothing farther as to expenses. The rule laid down in Stewart v. Scott is directly applicable, that where a judgment of the House of Lords exhausts a cause and contains no finding as to expenses, it is not intended that we should dispose of them. The other Judges concurred. The Court applied the judgment, but refused the prayer so far as it prayed for expenses in this Court previous to the appeal. Agents for Petitioner-Henry & Shiress, S.S.C. Agents for the Ministers-H. & A. Inglis, W.S. Wednesday, February 8. GOWANS V. BRATHWAITE CHRISTIE AND ANOTHER. Landlord and Tenant-Lease-Sterility-Clause— Process Reduction Competency. Circumstances in which a tenant, under a lease of freestone and other minerals, was held not entitled to insist in an action of reduction of his lease upon the ground of "sterility" or "non-workableness to profit," there being in the contract of lease a special machinery devised which was manifestly intended by the parties to obviate all such questions. X Observed by the Lord President, that the question of sterility in mineral leases was quite different from what it was in agricultural ones, for the former were now-a-days viewed much more in the light of contracts of hazard than the latter. This was an action of reduction at the instance of James Gowans, railway contractor, against Mr Brathwaite Christie of Baberton and Mrs Agnes Mossman or Christie, widow and sole executrix and heir in mobilibus of the late Alexander Christie of Baberton. There was sought to be reduced a certain lease of the whole freestone and minerals, and all materials and substances lying under the lands and estate of Baberton, entered into in February 1866 between the said Alexander Christie of Baberton, as heir of entail then in possession of the said estate, and the said James Gowans, the pur suer. The more important clauses of the said lease were as follows:-"The said Alexander Christie has set, and by these presents, in consideration of the rents or tack duties, and other prestations after-mentioned, lets to the said James Gowans and his heirs and assignees, all and whole the freestone and minerals, and all materials and substances, of what nature soever, lying in and under the lands and estate of Baberton, which are in the parishes of Currie and Colinton, and sheriffdom of Edinburgh, and that for the space of twenty-one years from and after the term of Candlemas Eighteen hundred and sixty-six, which is hereby declared to be the commencement of this lease, and the entry of the said James Gowans to the premises, in virtue hereof; with full power to the said James Gowans and his foresaids, at their own expense, to search for, work, win, raise, and carry away the freestone, and all minerals, materials, and substances of what nature soever, lying in and under said lands, as fully and freely as the said Alexander Christie could do himself. (then follow clauses regulating the working). Which tack, under the conditions and reservations above-written, the said Alexander Christie binds and obliges himself, and his heirs and successors, to warrant at all hands and against all mortals, as law will: For which causes, and on the other part, the said James Gowans binds and obliges himself and his heirs, executors, and successors whomsoever, to pay to the said Alexander Christie, and his heirs and successors, for the said freestone, minerals, and substances, and materials hereby let, the sum of two hundred pounds sterling of fixed money rent per annum, and that half-yearly, at the terms of Lammas and Candlemas; and it is hereby agreed that the said fixed rent shall not be exacted for the year or period X aff - Hoth. 14 dely 1873–10. p.318 |