THE

JUDICIAL DICTIONARY.

A

A. "A" is sometimes read as tr

the real,

the "; e.g. an act done "with a view" of giving a creditor a fraudulent preference (Bankry Act, 1869, s. 92; and now s. 48, Bankry Act, 1883), means with the view, effectual, substantial, dominant view of giving a preference (Ex p. Hill, Re Bird, 52 L. J. Ch. 903; 23 Ch. D. 695: Ex p. Taylor, 18 Q. B. D. 295: Vh. Re Mills, 58 L. T. 871; 4 Times Rep. 284: Re Tweedale, 1892, 2 Q. B. 216; 61 L. J. Q. B. 505; 66 L. T. 233: New's Trustee v. Hunting, and Sharp v. Jackson, cited VIEW: Re Clay, 3 Manson, 31, Vthe, Re Eaton, 66 L. J. Q. B. 491; 1897, 2 Q. B. 16; Svthle, Re Laurie, 46 W. R. 491; 67 L. J. Q. B. 431). V. MOTIVE.

So "an Attorney acting generally in the action" may appear for a party in a County Court, s. 10, 15 & 16 V. c. 54, means the attorney (Bookham v. Potter, 37 L. J. C. P. 276; L. R. 3 C. P. 490; 16 W. R. 806; 18 L. T. 479); and a like interpretation was given to the like phrase in s. 72, Co. Co. Act, 1888 (R. v. Snagge, 1894, 2 Q. B. 440; 63 L. J. Q. B. 689; 70 L. T. 874; 42 W. R. 603). Cp. Ex p. Pratt, cited AN. "A" may sometimes be read as some," e.g. in an Order under s. 28 (5), 47 & 48 V. c. 70, directing a prosecution for "a" Corrupt Practice (R. v. Riley, cited CORRUPT PRACTICE). But more frequently "a" is the equivalent of "any "; and therefore where by s. 52, Agricultural Holdings (England) Act, 1883 (46 & 47 V. c. 61 extended to distresses generally, s. 7, 51 & 52 V. c. 21), BAILIFFS for levying a distress on an agricultural holding are to be appointed in writing "by the judge of a County Court," that does not mean "of the County Court in the district of which the holding is," but means "of any County Court"; so that a bailiff appointed by any County Court judge may levy an agricultural distress anywhere (Re Sanders, Ex p. Sergeant, 54 L. J. Q. B. 331). So, Recognizances on an appeal to Quarter Sessions, "before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction," s. 31 (3), 42 & 43 V. c. 49, may be before any such Court (R. v. Durham Jus., 1895, 1 Q. B. 801; 64 L. J. M. C. 189; 72 L. T. 465; 43 W. R. 423; 59 J. P. 264). So, "Notice to appoint an Arbitrator," s. 5, Arb. Act, 1889, does not require that an Arbitrator be named in the Notice (per Esher, M. R., Re Eyre and Leicester, cited APPOINT, at end). So, semble, "a Solr " producing a deed is thereby

authorized to receive its consideration, s. 56, Conv. & L. P. Act, 1881, means any Solr (King v. Smith, 1900, 2 Ch. 425; 69 L. J. Ch. 598; 82 L. T. 815, commenting on Day v. Woolwich Bg. Socy., 58 L. J. Ch. 280; 40 Ch. D. 491; 60 L. T. 752; 37 W. R. 461).

But "on, or in, or about a Railway, Factory," &c, s. 7 (1), Workmen's Comp. Act, 1897, does not mean any" Ry, &c, but means the Ry &c of the Employer of the Workman (Francis v. Turner, 1900, 1 Q. B. 478; 69 L. J. Q. B. 182; 81 L. T. 770; 48 W. R. 228; 64 J. P. 53). It is difficult to read " a as all": the phrase "a LESSEE includes an Original or Derivative Under-lessee," s. 14 (3), Conv. & L. P. Act, 1881, does not include all Under-lessees, e.g. it does not include an Under-lessee of part of the demised property (Burt v. Gray, 1891, 2 Q. B. 98; 60 L. J. Q. B. 664; 65 L. T. 229; 39 W. R. 429).

""

A grant of " a Right of Sporting on land, gives only a concurrent right; but "the" right would give it exclusively (Graham v. Ewart, 25 L. J. Ex. 47; 26 Ib. 97; nom. Ewart v. Graham, 29 Ib. 88; 7 H. L. Ca. 331; the Devonshire v. O'Connor, cited FREEHOLD: Vf. Sutherland v. Heathcote, cited LIBERTY OF WORKING). V. FISHERY: EXCLU

SIVE RIGHT: HUNTING.

So a clergyman may be "a" Minister of a Church, without being "the" minister. V. MINISTER.

"A Share"; V. Re Fickus, cited SHARE.

A License to fish "with a ROD AND LINE," does not justify the use of more than one Rod and Line (Combridge v. Harrison, 72 L. T. 592; 64 L. J. M. C. 175; 59 J. P. 198). By a covenant not to erect any building "except a PRIVATE DWELLING-HOUSE," not merely the class of building is defined in the exception but only ONE of that class is permitted thereby (per Denman, J., Smith v. Standing, 32 S. J. 734). Vf. Kimber v. Admans, and Rogers v. Hosegood, cited HOUSE.

So, the provision for issuing a Bankry Notice against a Debtor, “if a Creditor has obtained a FINAL JUDGMENT against him," s. 4 (1 g), Bankry Act, 1883, means one jdgmt, and two or more jdgmts cannot be included in any one Notice (Re Low, 1891, 1 Q. B. 147; 60 L. J. Q. B. 265; 63 L. T. 694; 39 W. R. 181).

The provision in s. 1, Exors Act, 1830, 11 G. 4 & 1 W. 4, c. 40, that an exor is to be deemed "a Trustee " for the Next-of-kin, quà an undisposed of residue of personalty, does not make him an "EXPRESS Trustee " (Re Lacy, 1899, 2 Ch. 149; 68 L. J. Ch. 488; 80 L. T. 706; 47 W. R. 664). Vh. s. 30, Sum. Jur. Act, 1879, as doubted and expounded by s. 8, Sum. Jur. Act, 1884.

V. AN: EVERY ONE: THE.

ABANDON. —

"Abandon or expose a child under two years of

age, s. 27, 24 & 25 V. C. 100:

- These words "include a wilful omission

to take charge of the child on the part of a person legally bound to do so,

and any mode of dealing with it calculated to leave it exposed to risk without protection" (Steph. Cr. 196, citing R. v. White, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 311; 40 L. J. M. C. 134: R. v. Falkingham, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 222; 39 L. J. M. C. 47). Vf. Arch. Cr. 839, 840: Rosc. Cr. 348.

A creditor does not "abandon the excess

of his claim, s. 81, Co. Co. Act, 1888, by merely suing for part of his demand (Vines v. Arnold, 8 C. B. 632; 19 L. J. C. P. 98).

Abandoned Lands; V. SUPERFLUOUS LAND, at end.

Abandon Salvage; V. SALVAGE.

ABANDONMENT. In a policy of Marine Insurance, Abandonment is of the essence of a claim for constructive TOTAL LOSS.

"The word 'abandon' is one in ordinary and common use, and in its natural sense well understood; but there is not a word in the English language used in a more highly artificial and technical sense than the word 'abandon'; in reference to constructive total loss, it is defined to be a cession or transfer of the ship from the owner to the under-writer, and of all his property and interest in it, with all the claims that may arise from its ownership, and all the profits that may arise from it, including the freight then being earned" (per Martin, B., Rankin v. Potter, 42 L. J. C. P. 200; L. R. 6 H. L. 139: Vh. Park, ch. 9). a Notice of Abandonment it is not necessary to use the word " abandon "; an equivalent expression suffices (Currie v. Bombay Insrce, L. R. 3 P. C. 78, 79). Vf. 8 Encyc. 192-195.

What is an Abandonment of a WRECK, so as to avoid liability respecting it; V. The Snark, 1899, P. 74; 68 L. J. P. D. & A. 22; 80 L. T. 25; 47 W. R. 398, and cases there cited; affd. 1900, P. 105; 69 L. J. P. D. & A. 41; 82 L. T. 42; 48 W. R. 279. V. OWNER, towards end.

"The surrender of a Child to an adopted parent as an act of prudence or necessity under the pressure of present inability to maintain it, and if done in the interests of the Child, cannot be regarded as an Abandonment or DESERTION, or even as unmindfulness of parental duty," within s. 3, Custody of Children Act, 1891, 54 V. c. 3 (per Fitz-Gibbon, L. J., Re O'Hara, 1900, 2 I. R. 244).

An Abandonment of POSSESSION, by a Sheriff in an Execution, or by a Bailiff in a Distress, is always one of fact, to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case (Bagshawes v. Deacon, 1898, 2 Q. B. 173; 67 L. J. Q. B. 658; 78 L. T. 776; 46 W. R. 618: whe reviewed, amongst other authorities, Swan v. Falmouth, 6 L. J. O. S. K. B. 374; 8 B. & C. 456: Ackland v. Paynter, 8 Price, 95, and Eldridge v. Stacey, 15 C. B. N. S. 458; 33 L. J. C. P. 31; 9 L. T. 291; 12 W. R. 51. Vƒ. Lumsden v. Burnett, 1898, 2 Q. B. 177; 67 L. J. Q. B. 661; 78 L. T. 778; 46 W. R. 664: Bannister v. Hyde, and Jones v. Beirnstein, cited POSSESSION).

As to WAIVER, or Abandonment, of a RIGHT, "it is necessary to under