The injunction was refused. The commonest form of passing off is by means of a similar title and binding, but any act which induces the public to believe that A's book is the book of B is equally actionable, and will be sustained. Thus for A to announce his book as a continuation of B's book,1 or in any other way to so advertise it as to induce the public to believe that it is B's work is actionable. 3 Malicious Criticism. It would be actionable to publish of an author's work that which was obviously untrue; for instance, that it was an immoral or a libellous work, when no suggestion of immorality or libel could be found in it. Apart from absolute falsehood of this kind there is no limit to the range of criticism; 3 a man is entitled to form what opinion he pleases of another's work, and to publish these opinions. So long as he confines himself to the work criticised and the author thereof as author, he has very full liberty of saying what he thinks. It may be actionable to say that a man is the author of a work which is not his. The offence if anything would be defamation of the author.* Slander of Title.-No doubt an action would lie against any one publishing statements in disparagement of the owner's right to a literary or artistic work.5 Special damage is of the essence of such an action. Author who has parted with Copyright is entitled to protect his Reputation.-Although a purchaser of copyright may do what he pleases with what he has purchased, he may not mutilate an artistic or literary work and present it to the public in its mutilated form as the work of the original author. The copyright in a law book was purchased by a bookseller. The author refused to edit a third edition, and the bookseller had the necessary alterations made for himself. The third edition was then published without any notice that it was prepared by any one other than the author. It contained numerous errors. In an action by the author against the bookseller, Lord Tenterden, C.J., in summing up, put it to the jury that if they were of 1 Hogg v. Kirby (1803), 8 Ves., 215. Seeley v. Fisher (1841), 11 Sim., 581. 2 Seeley v. Fisher (1841), 11 Sim., 581. 4 Martin v. Wright (1833), 6 Sim., 297. Ward v. Beeton (1874), L. R., 19 Eq., 207; opinion that the third edition would be understood by those who bought it to have been prepared by the plaintiff, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict; but if they were of opinion that persons using reasonable care would think that this third edition was not prepared by the plaintiff, their verdict should be for the defendant. The jury returned a verdict of five pounds for the plaintiff.1 The nature of the remedy is really an action for the defamation of the plaintiff's reputation as an author. The Court is slow to grant an interlocutory injunction in such an action. No doubt it would be done in an extreme case, for instance, if the owner of performing rights in a play inserted indecent or scandalous matter without the consent of the author, but the Court prefers to have the legal question as to whether the altered version is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation tried first. In Cox v. Cox 2 the plaintiff had written a legal article for the purpose of insertion in the defendant's book. The defendant revised and shortened the article to a considerable extent, and the plaintiff applied for an injunction in Chancery to restrain the defendant from publishing the article in its mutilated form. Page Wood, V.C., refused an injunction, and, in his judgment, said : 3 "In respect to what was said about the plaintiff's reputation suffering from having the legal matter supplied by him published in a mutilated and erroneous form, according to Sir J. Clark's case, the loss of reputation, unless connected with property, was not a ground for coming to this Court, though it might be an ingredient for the Court to consider when there was property." One might almost infer from this judgment that if the plaintiff had parted with his property no right of action lay for injury to his reputation. It must be observed, however, that this was a claim for an injunction in equity, and the judgment of Lord Tenterden in Archbold v. Sweet was not referred to. That and the subsequent cases make it clear that there is a right of action on the ground of injury to reputation alone, and that in urgent cases the Court will interfere by interlocutory injunction. In Gilbert v. Boosey 5 the owner of a performing right in an opera 1 Archbold v. Sweet (1832), 5 C. and P., 219. 2 (1853), 1 W. R., 345, 11 Hare, 118. 4 (1832), 5 C. and P., 219. 3 Clark v. Freeman (1848), 11 Beav., 112. 5 The Law Times, September 28, 1889. inserted without the permission of the author two songs, and one of the author's songs was left out. The opera was advertised and performed simpliciter as the plaintiff's opera without any mention of alterations. On an application for an interlocutory injunction, Denman, J., refused to interfere at such an early stage, but he intimated that if the songs had been indecent or such as would obviously damage the plaintiff's reputation, he might have granted an injunction. In Lee v. Gibbings1 the defendant had acquired the copyright in the plaintiff's "Autobiography of Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury." He published a condensed edition, on the title-page of which the plaintiff was stated simpliciter to be the author. The plaintiff alleged that the work was unscholarly and injurious to his reputation, and craved an interim injunction. Kekewich, J., refused the motion. The plaintiff's remedy, he said, was founded on libel by reason of the injury to his reputation. Of late years there had been no such thing as an injunction to restrain a libel (except in the case of a trade libel) on an interlocutory application or before the point had been submitted to a jury. He saw no reason for making an exception in the case before him, and he would express no opinion as to whether there was a libel or not. The Court would restrain one who published a book falsely representing that it was the work of another.2 Protection from Breach of Faith or Contract. The relationship of parties may give rise to rights and obligations in reference to literary or artistic matter which could not exist as between strangers. Such rights and obligations are supported on the various grounds of express contract, implied contract, and breach of faith. As to express contract there is little difficulty, the ordinary rules of contract will apply. As to implied contract or breach of faith, these are really the same, only common law based its remedy on the former and equity on the latter. It usually arises in the case of a clerk or other employee between whom and the employer a confidential relationship exists. As regards employees, the law stated briefly is this, that during his employment he must do nothing which is 1 (1892), 8 T. L. R., 773. 2 Byron v. Johnston (1816), 2 Meriv., 29. contrary to the interests of his employer; he may not in any way assist in the production of literary or artistic work which may compete with the work of his employer. After the termination of his employment, apart from express contract, he is entitled to compete with his late employer, and for that purpose may make use of the general knowledge and information which he acquired in his employment: but he may not for such purpose use any materials such as documents, notes, printing blocks, &c., which he acquired in his capacity of employee and a fortiori if he acquired them surreptitiously. In Jovatt v. Winyard1 a veterinary surgeon employed a journeyman for the purpose of selling his medicine. While in such service the journeyman surreptitiously got access to his books of recipes and copied them. It was held that there was a breach of trust, and the journeyman was restrained from selling the medicines or printing or selling printed directions for their use. In Prince Albert v. Strange a workman, who was entrusted by the Prince Consort with certain plates for the purpose of reproducing privately drawings which had from time to time been made by Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort, in breach of the trust reposed in him sold impressions to the defendant, who published a descriptive catalogue of the drawings. Knight Bruce, V.C., granted an injunction against the publication of the catalogue. In Reuter's Telegram Co. v. Byron3 the defendants had for some time acted as agents in Australia of the plaintiff company, sending on and receiving telegraphic messages on their behalf. In the course of this agency they became acquainted with the cypher used by many of the company's customers. On the termination of their employment the defendants started a rival telegram business and sent circulars to the plaintiffs' customers, mentioning that they had their cyphers. On a motion to restrain the defendants from making use of the list of cyphers acquired in the plaintiffs' employment, Jessel, M.R., refused an interim injunction. He said : "The Court will always restrain a man from publishing or divulging that which has been communicated to him in confidence. But this is a 1 (1820), 1 Jac. and W., 394. 3 (1874), 43 L. J. Ch., 661. 2 (1849), 2 De G. and Sm., 652. totally different case. The plaintiffs do not here seek to restrain the defendants from publishing anything but from making use of knowledge acquired while the relation of principal and agent subsisted after that relation terminated." In Lamb v. Evans1 the defendants had been employed by the plaintiff as canvasser for his trade directory. On the termination of their employment they published a rival directory and made use of blocks and notes which they had acquired in the plaintiff's employment. The Court held that this was an improper use for the defendants to make of materials so acquired. Bowen, L.J., in his judgment, said : "It is not a question of copyright-that must be kept out of sight altogether-nor is it, on the other hand, a simple question of the absolute property at law in the documents themselves or in the blocks themselves. It is a question of whether the plaintiff, whatever the property in the documents may be or whatever the property in the materials may be, has not sufficient special property in them to entitle him to restrain the use of them against him when they had been obtained for his use by his agents in the course of their employment. That depends entirely, I think, on the terms upon which the employment was constituted, through which the fiduciary relation of principal and agent came into existence." In commenting on Reuter's Telegram Co. v. Byron, the same judge said: "I think if Reuter's case is to be judged by the result, it no doubt is right and Sir George Jessel was generally right-but I do not think that the propositions reported in the Law Journal as laid down by him can be considered to be sound. It seems to me that as a matter at law or as a matter of equity, the conduct of the defendants in that case cannot be justified to the extent to which the learned judge is made by the report to justify it. If Reuter's case is cited as an authority for the propositions which the Master of the Rolls is there stated to have laid down, I am not prepared to follow it." In Merryweather v. Moore2 a clerk while in the employment of a firm of engine-makers had made a table of dimensions of various types of engines. After he had left their employment he was restrained from publishing or communicating the table or its contents to any one. In Louie v. Smellie3 the plaintiff carried on a 1 Lamb v. Evans [1893], I Ch., 218. 3 (1895), 11 T. L. R., 515. 2 [1892], 2 Ch., 518. |