the English judges to their extreme view, as expressed by Lord Halsbury in Walter v. Lane, i.e. " that the copyright law requires neither literary merit nor intellectual labour nor originality either in thought or in language." The Court, however, in Illustrated Mott v. Clow2 refused to follow the English decisions. After Catalogues reviewing the American, and particularly the earlier American decisions, they say : "The result of these decisions would seem to place this construction upon the Constitutional provisions under consideration that only such writings and discoveries are included which are the result of intellectual labour; that the term writings may be liberally construed to include designs for engravings and prints that are original and are founded in the creative powers of the mind, the fruits of intellectual labour; that prints upon a single sheet might be considered a book if it otherwise met the spirit of the constitutional provision; and that to be entitled to a copyright, the article must have, by and of itself, some value as a composition, at least to the extent of serving some purpose other than a mere advertisement or designation of the subject to which it is attached.' The "book" before the Court was a catalogue in the form of a bound volume, containing illustrations of household wares offered for sale, and giving the dimensions and price of each. The Court referred to Maple v. Junior Army and Navy Stores 3 where a similar catalogue in England was protected. "It is to be observed in this case that it was ruled largely upon the language of the Act of Parliament (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45). . . . It is to be here remarked that the Parliament of Great Britain, unlike the Congress of the United States, is unlimited in power, and with the construction and effect placed upon the preamble of the Act by the Court, there would seem to be little escape from the conclusion at which the Court arrived. In this country under the Constitution the power lodged with the Congress is not unlimited, but is restricted to the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts. The ruling of the English Court is therefore not pertinent except as it illustrates the subject." 4 The Court cited with approval Baker v. Selden, which had expressly approved Cobbett v. Woodward, an English case overruled in Maple v. Junior Army and Navy Stores; they further cited and approved the judgment of Thompson, J., in 1 [1900], A. C., 539. 3 (1882), 21 Ch. D., 369. 2 (1897), 53 U.S. App., 461. 4 (1879), 101 U.S. Rep., 99. 6 (1882), 21 Ch. D., 369. 6 Clayton v. Stone,1 quoted above. The judgment concludes with the following paragraph : "It is possibly not beyond comprehension that pictures of slop-sinks, wash-bowls, and bath-tubs, with or without letterpress statement of dimensions and prices, though intended mainly for advertisement, may in localities where such conveniences are not in common use, be the means of instruction and of advancement in knowledge of the arts, and, when they are the products of original intellectual thought, may possibly come within the scope of the Constitutional provision. It is enough for the present purpose to say that, in our judgment, the Congress has not seen fit to enact a law which can reasonably be given so broad a construction." 5 6 Diction In considering the authority of some of the cases cited below, the judgment in Mott v. Clow 2 must not be lost sight of. It is probable that some of these cases are not in accordance with it, or with the older cases, such as Clayton v. Stone 3 and Baker v. Selden therein expressly approved. Subject to this note of warning, the following may be taken as examples of what have and what have not been accepted as works of art or literature within the scope of the Constitution and the Acts of Congress. Directories and dictionaries have both Directories. been protected. In the case of the latter, there is copyright in aries. the definitions of the words, however short. A list of the credit ratings of marble, granite, and stone dealers of the United States Mercantile and Canada was protected in Ladd v. Oxnard.1 In Clayton v. Stone, which has been approved as sound law, a daily state of the market was refused protection. A racing guide containing a list of race-horses and statistics as to their age and performances was protected in one case,10 and in the other case a list of trotting horses and their paces." In Brightley v. Littleton a Forms of blank form of application for liquor licence was held to be tion. copyright. In Carlisle v. Colusa County 13 copyright was denied to a blank form of property statement for assessment purposes. 8 12 Statistics. Applica Dramatic Law This latter decision appears, however, to have been partly on the ground that as the assessors were obliged to issue a form, it would embarrass their duties if forms drawn up by private persons were entitled to copyright. A circular in pamphlet form used as an advertisement, and explaining a certain method of distribution of coupons to cash purchasers from certain merchants named in the pamphlet, has been held to be the subject of copyright.1 The circuit judge, however, in his judgment, says: "It requires some stretch of imagination to say that this pamphlet comes within the purpose of Congress, the encouragement of learning, and the increase of useful knowledge, but the official charged with the duty has granted a copyright to this pamphlet, and his decision is accepted." 2 3 Dramatic works have been protected, although not of a very high literary standard. In Henderson v. Tompkins' protection was given to a topical song which was designed merely to amuse. It was sufficient if it accomplished that purpose. 5 Law Reports are protected so far as they consist of original intellectual matter; the protection may thus extend to the title-page, table of cases, the head notes, the statements of facts, the argument of counsel, the index, the order and arrangement of cases, the numbering and pagination of the volumes, the table of cases cited in the opinions, the subdivision of the index into condensed titles, and the cross references. The original work of the reporter is alone protected. In the opinion of the Court there is no copyright; these constitute part of the law of the land open to all to make use of as they please, and neither the state, the judge, nor the reporter can acquire or confer any conclusive 6 3 Aronson v. Fleckenstein (1886), 28 Fed. Rep., 75; Daly v. Webster (1892), 1 U.S. App., 573; Henderson v. Tompkins (1894), 60 Fed. Rep., 758. 4 (1894), 60 Fed. Rep., 758. 5 Callaghan v. Myers (1888), 128 U.S. Rep., 617; Wheaton v. Peters (1834), 8 Pet., 591; Little v. Hall (1855), 18 How., 165; Gould v. Banks (1832), 8 Wend., 562; Heine v. Appleton (1853), 4 Blatchf., 125; Cowen v. Banks (1862), 24 How. Pr., 72. 6 Callaghan v. Myers (1888), 128 U.S. Rep., 617. 7 Connecticut v. Gould (1888), 34 Fed. Rep., 319; Gray v. Russell (1839), 1 Story, 11; West v. Lawyers (1896), 51 U.S. App., 216, 64 Fed. Rep., 360. 8 Wheaton v. Peters (1834), 8 Pet., 591; Nash v. Lathrop (1886), 142 Mass., 29. 2 privilege of copying them. The same rule applies to the head notes in those states where they are prepared by the judge.1 On the same grounds of public policy no one Statutes. can have copyright in the statutes; the legislature of the state cannot confer it on any one. There may be copyright in the head notes and arrangement of a digest of the statutes.* 3 Notes and metic. tions. The contents of a book do not require to be entirely new; if partially old there will be copyright quoad the new material New Arithor new arrangement." Thus there is copyright in notes and Adaptaadditions to an old work, in a new arithmetic combining old material in new form, in translations, in the adaptation of an old drama introducing a new title, new dialogue, minor characters, scenery, and dramatic situations with the orchestration and orchestra part songs and music," and in the dramatization of a novel.10 11 In one case it was held that the adaptation of a musical Musical Arrangepiece from the notation suitable to one instrument to that ment. suitable to another was not a sufficiently intellectual process to entitle the adapter to copyright in his adaptations. It was said that "a mere mechanic could make the adaptation and accompaniment." Since then, however, it has been held that a musical arrangement is the subject of copyright. In Thomas v. Lennox an orchestral accompaniment for a non-copyright oratorio by Gounod was held to be the subject of copyright. In Carte v. Evans 13 an arrangement for the pianoforte of the orchestral score of an opera was held to be copyright. 306. 12 Banks v. Manchester (1888), 128 U.S. Rep., 244; Chase v. Sanborn (1874), 4 Cliff., 2 Davidson v. Wheelock (1886), 27 Fed. Rep., 61; Banks v. M'Divitt (1875), 13 Blatchf., 163; Howell v. Miller (1898), 91 Fed. Rep., 129. 4 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 5 Emerson v. Davis (1845), 3 Story, 768; Lawrence v. Dana (1869), 4 Cliff., 1; Black v. Allen (1893), 56 Fed. Rep., 764. 6 Brightley v. Littleton (1888), 37 Fed. Rep., 103; Gray v. Russell (1839), 1 Story, 11; Lawrence v. Dana (1869), 4 Cliff., at p. 79; Mead v. West (1896), 80 Fed. Rep., 380. 7 Emerson v. Davis (1845), 3 Story, 768. 8 Emerson v. Davis (1845), 3 Story, at p. 780; Shook v. Rankin (1875), 6 Biss., 477. 9 Aronson v. Fleckenstein (1886), 28 Fed. Rep., 75. 10 Boucicault v. Fox (1862), 5 Blatchf., 87, at p. 100. 11 Jollie v. Jacques (1850), 1 Blatchf., 618. See Reed v. Carusi (1845), 8 L. R., 411; 72 Fed. Cas., No. 11, 642. 12 (1883), 14 Fed. Rep., 849. 13 (1886), 27 Fed. Rep., 861. Q New Editions. Form of Publication. Mechani cal Devices. Copyright in new editions runs quoad the new material from the date of the new edition. The additions or cor- rections must be of substantial value. "3 A book need not be a book in the ordinary sense of the word; the word in the Act is not to be construed by reference to lexicographers: "the literary property to be protected by the Act is not to be determined by the size, form, or shape in which it makes its appearance, but by the subject-matter." A single sheet containing literary matter will be protected as a book. No doubt, however, the subject to be protected must be ejusdem generis as a book or leaflet. The subject-matter must convey, and the form must be suitably adapted for conveying, information to the reader. The copyright law embraces those things that are printed and published for information and not for use in themselves. Thus what is really a mechanical instrument, and if original entitled to protection under the patent law, will not be protected by the copyright law. In Letter File. Amberg File v. Shea protection was claimed in a letter file. It was said that the spaces between the index letters were adjusted to the average requirements of the correspondent. These average requirements were ascertained by exhaustive research in different directories. Copyright was refused. In Baker v. Selden blank account books of an original type or pattern were refused protection. The judge in that case drew the distinction between what was a proper subject of the patent laws and what was a proper subject of copyright law-"The object. of the one is explanation, the object of the other is use."" In Drury v. Ewing a "ladies' chart for cutting dresses and basques for ladies, and coats, jackets, &c., for boys" was protected. It is almost certain, however, that this decision would not now be accepted as sound. Mere labels will not Account 6 8 1 Lawrence v. Dana (1869), 4 Cliff., 1; Gray v. Russell (1839), 1 Story, 11. 2 Snow v. Laird (1900), 98 Fed. Rep., 813. 3 Clayton v. Stone (1828), 2 Paine, 382; Brightley v. Littleton (1888), 37 Fed. Rep., 103; Mott v. Clow (1897), 53 U.S. App., 461. 4 Clayton v. Stone (1828), 2 Paine, 382; 5 (1897), 53 U.S. App., 449. 7 101 U.S. Rep., at p. 105. Drury v. Ewing (1862), 1 Bond, 541. |