3 Robbins. Jacquelin v. Erie Railroad Co. such states have, by legislation, so provided. For this reason there is not the bulk of law upon this subject-matter which one would expect. So many of the questions which arise between those who use the railroads and the companies are settled by these administrative bodies that the courts have not been appealed to so frequently, and there is not so much discussion of the power of the court as there otherwise would have been. In this state, where we have no such administrative body, and where hardships and injuries may ensue to citizens and properties if railroads are allowed unrestrainedly to conduct their operations in a way to injure the citizen and his property, it is natural that applications should be made to courts of equity to restrain such invasions of what the citizen esteems to be his rights. If the court could, without violating certain principles which I find to be absolutely settled in this state, grant to the complainants herein a preliminary injunction to hold matters in statu quo until the legal questions could be settled, I would find much reason for adopting that course, especially as by balancing the conveniences, as the court does in the matter of granting or withholding preliminary relief, the weight is all in favor of the complainants, because the injury which will ensue will surely affect them, while the defendant would merely be required to continue temporarily that which it has been voluntarily doing for some sixty years. But if the complainants have any right at all which a court may enforce, it is, as I have heretofore stated, a legal right, and the legal remedy is by mandamus. The remedy by mandamus, however, is only effective to command the doing of an act which it is the corporate or official duty of the defendant to perform. It is not the equivalent of an injunction, and the court which has power to issue it has no means under its procedure to grant temporary relief pending the hearing and final disposition of the application for the writ. As a result there are many cases, of which this one may be an example, in which injury claimed to be irreparable will take place before the common-law court can decide the legal rights of the parties. Since, however, the hands of a court of equity are tied until such legal right is settled, or, to speak more Jacquelin v. Erie Railroad Co. 69 Eq. exactly, the legal principle has been settled, there is in the existing state of the law no provision for such a situation. I think that it is a subject which should receive careful consideration by those who have the power to alter it, and that the rigidity of the present rules respecting the granting of preliminary injunctions to protect legal rights might well be relaxed in many cases so as to permit a court of equity to hold matters in statu quo until the rights of the parties may be settled at law. Since this was a course which was urged upon me as a proper one to adopt in this case, so that the ends of justice might be served, I gave it the fullest consideration; but, in view of the decisions of the courts of this state bearing upon the questions which arise in this case, I reach the conclusion that, under our decisions, this course is not only unauthorized but would be directly in the face of the precedents. The Erie Railroad Company, the defendant, is operating this part of its railroad under the provisions of the charter of the Paterson and Ramapo Railroad Company. This latter company was incorporated by an act passed on the 10th day of March, 1841. P. L. 1841 p. 97. It is not necessary to refer to this charter in detail further than to point out that there is no provision therein requiring the company to operate the road or to establish stations at any points. My attention has not been directed to any legislation of this state respecting the location or maintenance of stopping places by railroads, and my own research has not resulted in finding any such statute. To justify the court in granting the motion in this case the complainants must clearly establish the following principles: 1. That they have a right, equitable or legal, and, if legal, that it is clear and undisputed. 2. That irreparable injury will ensue if the preliminary injunction is not issued. 3. That this is a proper case for an injunction, at least partaking of a mandatory nature, to be issued upon preliminary hearing. 4. That the complainants have the right to compel the de 3 Robbins. Jacquelin v. Erie Railroad Co. fendant to perform its legal duty in the premises by injunction out of equity and not by mandamus at law. 1. I have already sufficiently stated my conclusions with respect to the character of the primary or fundamental right of the complainants, and have decided that such right is legal in its nature and not equitable. The decisions in this state are numerous and positive that if the right of the complainant is legal and is not clear and undisputed, a preliminary injunction must not issue. Morris and Essex Railroad v. Attorney-General and Prudden, 20 N. J. Eq. (5 C. E. Gr.) 530 (Court of Errors and Appeals, 1869); Stevens v. Paterson and Newark Railroad Co., 20 N. J. Eq. (5 C. E. Gr.) 126 (Chancellor Zabriskie, 1869); Hackensack Improvement Co. v. New Jersey Midland Railway Co., 22 N. J. Eq. (7 C. E. Gr.) 94 (Chancellor Zabriskie, 1871); Citizens Coach Co. v. Camden Horse Railroad Co., 29 N. J. Eq. (2 Stew.) 299 (Court of Errors and Appeals, 1878): Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. v. Central Stockyard, &c., Co., 43 N. J. Eq. (16 Stew.) 77 (Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet, 1887); affirmed, Idem 605; Dodge v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 43 N. J. Eq. (16 Stew.) 351 (Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet, 1887); affirmed, 45 N. J. Eq. (18 Stew.) 366; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. National Docks, &c., Railway Co., 53 N. J. Eq. (8 Dick.) 178 (Court of Errors and Appeals, 1895). Can it be said that the legal right of the complainants in this case is clear? I understand that what is meant by this rule is not that the precise question has ever been settled by the courts of law of this state, but that the precise principle has been thus settled. The broad general principle has undoubtedly been settled in this state that common carriers are under a legal duty to serve the public, and in cases where, under their charters or under the statutes, a duty is manifested, the courts will compel them to perform such duty. New York and Greenwood Lake Railroad Co. v. Montclair, 47 N. J. Eq. (2 Dick.) 591 (Court of Errors and Appeals, 1890); City of Bridgeton v. Bridgeton and Millville Traction Co., 62 N. J. Law (33 Vr.) 592 (Supreme Court, 1898). Jacquelin v. Erie Railroad Co. 69 Eq. But the complainants in this case must go much further than this, and must demonstrate that the courts in this state have established the principle that at common law and in default of legislation a court of law will hold it to be the duty of a common carrier to locate stations at such points as the court shal! determine, or at least not to discontinue stations at points where the court shall determine that they should remain. The complainants must show that our courts have established a principle which does not stop short of holding that the whole matter of regulating the method, manner, kind and quantity of service that common carriers shall render the public has, in cases in which the legislature has made no provision, been committed to the courts for determination and decision. I am clearly of opinion that the principle contended for by the complainants must have the scope above indicated, if such principle exists at all. No cases in New Jersey holding any such principle have been cited to me, nor have I found any. I cannot see upon what ground a court may logically exert power to compel railroads to stop at certain places unless the court holds that it has power in every instance to determine, as between the public and the corporation, what the corporation must do to fulfill its legal duty to the public. If the discretion. of the directors with respect to these unregulated matters has not been controlled or hampered by statute or charter, it seems to me that the court must either hold that such discretion is reviewable by the courts in every instance or that it is not reviewable at all. Courts will compel the completion of a road if the charter clearly imposes that duty upon the company. They will also compel the operation of the road, and any other clear duty enjoined upon the corporation. Spell. Inj. & Extr. Rem. (2d ed.) p. 1377 ¶ 1593 et seq.; see also note to 24 L. R. A. 564. The strongest argument which the complainants could make would be founded upon the decisions and opinions of the supreme court of the United States in the so-called "Granger Cases," beginning with Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; 24 L. Ed. 77. A long and instructive note, with all the subsequent 3 Robbins. Jacquelin v. Erie Railroad Co. decisions, will be found in 9 Rose's Notes on U. S. Reports, p. 21. From what is said by the court in the Munn Case, one might be led to conclude that the court was the proper power to determine the measure of duty of common carriers even where there was no statutory or charter provision in respect to the subject-matter. But in subsequent cases in the same court it clearly appears that such was not the opinion of the court, and it did not so decide when that precise question and other analogous questions were raised and determined. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393; 34 L. Ed. 385; Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Washington, ex rel. Dustin, 142 U. S. 492; 35 L. Ed. 1092; Jones v. Newport News, &c., Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 738; 31 U. S. App. 92; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. v. People, 177 U. S. 514; 44 L. Ed. 868; Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; 43 L. Ed. 702; Inter-State Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co., 162 U. S. 184; 40 L. Ed. 935; 167 U. S. 479; 42 L. Ed. 243. In some jurisdictions there seems to be an inclination, in default of positive legislation, to draw to the court power to regulate and enforce the duties of common carriers in these unregulated matters. State v. Republican Valley Railroad Co., 17 Neb. 647; State, ex rel. Grinsfelder, v. Spokane, &c., Railway Co. (Wash.), 19 Wash. 518; 41 L. R. A. 515; Railroad Commissioners v. P. & O. C. R. R. Co., 63 Me. 269; 18 Am. Rep. 208; State v. H. & N. H. R. R. Co., 29 Conn. 538; Concord and Montreal Railroad v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 67 N. H. 464; 41 Atl. Rep. 263. In Illinois the courts have not been consistent, in my view. In some cases they have held that, although the subject was not regulated by charter or statute, the court had power to determine what the company should do and enforce its determination, while in other cases, which I cannot distinguish, they have held that it was entirely beyond the power of the court and must be left either to the discretion of the directors or must be remedied by legislation. Ohio and Mississippi Railway Co. v. People, 120 Ill. 200; People, ex rel. Hunt, v. C. & A. R. Co., |