insignificant, or be driven to usurpation. We have examples of this in the government of the United Netherlands, before it was swept away by the violence of the French revolution. While that government moved within its constitutional limits, it was more absolutely nerveless than any other government which ever existed. The states general could neither make war or peace, or contract alliances, or raise money, without the consent of every province; nor the provincial states conclude those points, without the consent of every city having a voice in their assemblies. The consequence was, that the federal head was frequently induced, by imperious necessity, to assume power unwarranted by the fundamental charter of the union, and to dispense with the requisite unanimity. This was done in the years 1648, 1657 and 1661, as well as in another strong instance in 1668, given by Sir William Temple, and of which he was the author.a

The former confederation of this country was defective, in not giving complete authority to congress to interfere in contests between the several states, and to protect each state from internal violence and rebellion. In many respects our confederation was superior to those of Germany, Holland or Switzerland, and particularly in the absolute prohibition to the several states, from any interference or *con- *216 cern in foreign or domestic alliances, or from the maintenance of land or naval forces in time of peace. But in the leading features which I have suggested, and in others of inferior importance, it was a most unskilful fabric, and totally incompetent to fulfil the ends for which it was erected. Al

Temple's Works, vol. i. pp. 115. 128. 337. In 1781, a report was made by a committee of congress, for submitting to the states an amendment to the 13th article of the confederation then recently subscribed by all the states, in which amendment it was to be provided, that in case of refusal or neglect of any one or more of the confederated states to abide by and obey the determinations of congress, in respect to requisitions of men and money, agreeably to the apportioned quotas, congress might employ the land and naval forces of the United States to compel compliance by the delinquent states, and to make distress of the property of such state and its citizens, and also prohibit and prevent their trade and commerce with other states and with foreign powers. Mr. Madison, and even General Washington, perceived the necessity of such a coercive federal power. The Madison Papers, vol. i. pp. 81. 86. 88. But the power was never formally proposed to the states, or granted; and if it had been, it never would or could have been executed, without leading to the destruction of the Union.

most as soon as it was ratified, the states began to fail in a prompt and faithful obedience to its laws. As danger receded, instances of neglect became more frequent, and before the peace of 1783, the inherent imbecility of the government had displayed itself with alarming rapidity. The delinquencies of one state became a pretext or apology for those of another. The idea of supplying the pecuniary exigencies of the nation, from requisitions on the states, was soon found to be altogether delusive. The national engagements seem to have been entirely abandoned. Even the contributions for the ordinary expenses of the government fell almost entirely upon the two states which had the most domestic resources. Attempts were very early made by congress, and in remonstrances the most manly and persuasive, to obtain from the several states

the right of levying, for a limited time, a general im*217 post, for the exclusive *purpose of providing for the

discharge of the national debt. It was found impracticable to unite the states in any provision for the national safety and honour. Interfering regulations of trade, and interfering claims of territory, were dissolving the friendly attachments, and the sense of common interest, which had cemented and sustained the union during the arduous struggles of the revolution. Symptoms of distress, and marks of humiliation, were rapidly accumulating. It was with difficulty that the attention of the states could be sufficiently exerted to induce them to keep up a sufficient representation in congress to form

The efforts of Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance, in the years 1781 and 1782, to infuse some portion of life and energy into the languishing powers of the confederation, were incessant, devoted and masterly, and his appeals to the interests and honour of the states were most eloquent, but utterly unavailing. See, among others, his Circular Letters to the Governors of the States, of the date of January 3d, February 15th, May 16th, and October 21st, 1782, and his Letters to Congress, of February 11th and May 17th, 1782, and March 17th, 1788. Diplo matic Correspondence, edited by J. Sparks, vol. xii. Here we may say, if ever it might be truly said,

Si Pergama dextra

Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent;

and the perusal of the original correspondence of Mr. Morris, while at the head of the financial department of the United States, cannot but awaken in the breasts of the present generation, in respect to the talents and services of that accomplished statesman, the most lively sentiments of admiration and gratitude.

a quorum for business. The finances of the nation were annihilated. The whole army of the United States was reduced, in 1784, to 80 persons; and the states were urged to provide some of the militia to garrison the western posts. In short, to use the language of the authors of the Federalist," each state, yielding to the voice of immediate interest or convenience, successively withdrew its support from the confederation, till the frail and tottering edifice was ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins."

Most of the federal constitutions in the world have degenerated or perished in the same way and by the same means. They are to be classed among the most defective political institutions which have been erected by mankind for their security. The great and incurable defect of all former federal governments, such as the Amphictyonic, the Achæan and Lycian confederacies, in ancient Greece; and the Germanic, the Helvetic, the Hanseatic and the Dutch republics, in modern history, is, that they were sovereignties over sovereigns, and legislations, not for private individuals, but for communities in their political capacity. The only coercion for disobedience was physical force, instead of the decree and the pacific arm of the civil magistrate. The inevitable consequence, in every case in which a member of such a confederacy chooses to be disobedient, is either a civil war, or an annihilation of national authority.

of States in 1786.

*The first effort to relieve the people of this country #218 Convention from a state of national degradation and ruin came from Virginia, in a proposition from its legislature in January, 1786, for a convention of delegates from the several states to regulate our commerce with foreign nations. The proposal was well received in many of the other states, and five of them sent delegates to a convention which met at Annapolis, in September, 1786. This small assembly, being only a par

• Though the proximate origin of the federal convention of 1787 was the proposition from Virginia, in 1786, yet the necessity of a national convention, with full authority to amend and reorganize the government, was first suggested, and fully shown, by Colonel Hamilton, in 1780, while he was an aid to General Washington. In his masterly and very extraordinary letter, (considering his age of only 23 years,) addressed to the Honourable James Duane, a member of congress from New-York, in September, 1780, he showed most manifestly the defects and absolute inefficiency

tial representation of the states, and being deeply sensible of the radical defects of the system of the existing federal government, thought it inexpedient to attempt a partial, and probably only a temporary and delusive alleviation of our national calamities. They concurred, therefore, in a strong application to congress for a general convention, to take into consideration the situation of the United States, and to devise such further provisions as should be proper, to render the federal government not a mere phantom, as heretofore, but a real government, adequate to the exigencies of the Union. Congress perceived the wisdom, and felt the patriotism of the suggestion, and recommended a convention of delegates from the several states, to revise, amend and alter the articles of confederation. All the states, except Rhode Island, acceded to the proposal, and appointed delegates, who assembled in a general convention in Philadelphia, in May, 1787.

of the articles of confederation; and that the United States, for their safety and happiness, if not for their future existence, stood in need of a national government, clothed with the requisite sovereign powers, such as the confederation theoretically contained, but without possessing any fit organs to receive them. This letter is to be seen at large in "The Life of Alexander Hamilton, by his son, John C. Hamilton," vol. i. pp. 284-305, and in the Hamilton Papers, vol. i. 428, edited by Dr. Hawks. The earliest legislative suggestion of a convention for the purpose of reforming the government, was the concurrent resolutions of the two houses of the legislature of New-York, passed on the 20th and 21st of July, 1782. They were introduced into the senate by General Schuyler, and they stated, that "the radical source of most of our embarrassments was the want of sufficient power in congress; that the confederation was defective in several essential points, particularly in not vesting the federal government either with a power of providing revenue for itself, or with ascertained and productive funds; that its defects could not be repaired, nor the powers of congress extended, by partial deliberations of the states separately; and that it would be advisable to propose to congress to recommend, and to each state to adopt, the measure of assembling a general convention of the states, specially authorized to revise and amend the confederation." New-York Journals of the Senate and Assembly, July 20th and 21st, 1782.

There is no doubt of the justness of the inference drawn by his son, (Life of Hamilton, vol. i. p. 405,) that Colonel Hamilton, who was attending the legislature when the resolutions passed, and who had an interview with a joint committee of the two houses, in his public character, under the superintendent of finance, and who was, at the same time, chosen a delegate in congress, by the legislature, was the distinguished individual, who by his wisdom suggested, and by his influence promoted, that earliest authoritative measure taken for a general convention of the states.

Convention

This was a crisis most solemn and eventful, in respect to General our future fortune and prosperity. All the fruits of the revo- in 1787. lution, and perhaps the final destiny of republican government, were staked on the experiment which was then to be made to reform the system of our national compact. Happily for this country, and probably as auspiciously for the general liberties of mankind, the convention combined a very rare union of the best talents, experience, information, patriotism, probity and character which the country afforded and it commanded that universal public confidence which such qualifications were calculated to inspire. After several months of tranquil deliberation, the convention agreed, with unprecedented unanimity, on the *plan of government *219 which now forms the Constitution of the United States. This plan was directed to be submitted to a convention of delegates, to be chosen by the people at large in each state, for their assent and ratification. Such a measure was laying the foundations of the fabric of our national polity, where alone they ought to be laid, on the broad consent of the people. The constitution underwent a severe scrutiny and long discussion, not only in public prints and private circles, but solemnly and publicly, by the many illustrious statesmen who composed these local conventions. Nearly a year elapsed before it received the ratification of a requisite number of conventions of delegates of the people of the states to give it a political existence. New-Hampshire was the ninth state which adopted the constitution, and thereby, according to one of its articles, it was to become the government of the states so ratifying the same. Her example was immediately followed by the powerful states of Virginia and New-York; and on the 4th of March, 1789, the government was duly organized and put into operation. North Carolina and Rhode Island withheld some time longer their assent. Their scruples were, however, gradually overcome, and in June, 1790, the constitution had received the unanimous ratification of the respective conventions of the people in every state.

The peaceable adoption of this government, under all the circumstances which attended it, presented the case of an effort of deliberation, combined with a spirit of amity and of mutual concession, which was without example. It must be VOL. I.

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