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Appropriation by Personal Representatives

The

SECT. 41 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 gives to personal representatives extensive powers of appropriating real or personal property in or towards satisfaction of legacies, or of any other interest or share in the property of a deceased person, whether dying testate or intestate, and whether before or after the commencement of the Act. following consents are necessary. In the case of a person absolutely and beneficially entitled in possession, the consent of such person. In the case of settled property the consent of the trustee, if any (not being the personal representative), or the person for the time being entitled to the income. In the case of appropriation in favour of an infant, lunatic, or defective, the consent of the guardian, committee, or receiver, or, if in the case of an infant there is no such parent or guardian, of the court on the application of the next friend of the infant. If there is no committee or receiver of a lunatic or defective, then if the appropriation is of an authorised investment, no consent is required; and in the case of a settled legacy, if there is no trustee, and no person of full age entitled to the income, no consent is required (sub-sect. 1). If necessary, the personal representative should employ a duly qualified valuer; and the personal representative may make any conveyance (including an assent) requisite for giving effect to the appropriation (sub-sect. 3). If after any real estate has been appropriated the person to whom it was conveyed disposes of it, then in favour of a purchaser the appropriation shall be deemed to have been made in accordance with this section, and after all requisite consents, if any, have been given (sub-sect. 7). The Act does not prescribe any particular mode of appropriation, and no particular formality appears to be required; but in the case of land the appropriation would usually be completed by conveyance, which would recite the appropriation: (see a form in Key and Elphinstone's Precedents, 12th edit., vol. 1, part II., p. 1070). As pointed out in Prideaux's Precedents, 22nd edit., vol. 2, p. 563, note, as a general rule no deed of appropriation (which it is thought must mean of property other than land), is required; evidence of the appropriation will generally be shown by recital in a release, and letters of consent will be kept, if the consenting parties do not join in the release. The aforesaid power of appropriation is a great improvement on that given by sect. 4 of the Land Transfer Act 1897.

Small Holdings and Allotment Act 1926

A FEW words about the Small Holdings and Allotment Act 1926 (16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 52) may not be out of place. "The Act was passed on the 15th Dec. 1926. By sect. 1 county councils, if satisfied that there is a demand for small holdings in the county, "by persons who desire to buy or lease and will themselves cultivate the holdings and are able to cultivate them properly," and if they are of opinion that they can do so without incurring loss, and subject to the provisions of Part 1 of the Act, they may provide small holdings notwithstanding that loss may thereby be incurred. Sect. 2 contains provisions enabling the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries to contribute to such loss, and he may, subject to the approval of the Treasury, make regulations for carrying such section into effect, but the regulations must be laid before Parliament, and may be annulled by His Majesty in Council. For the purpose of providing small holdings a county council may purchase, or take on lease, land (situate within or without the county), either by agreement or, if necessary, compulsorily; but the council are not to acquire land for such purpose without the consent of the aforesaid Minister, unless the council are satisfied that the transaction will not involve any loss to the county (sect. 4). The purchase money on sale of a small holding is (as a rule) to consist of a terminable annuity, of an amount equal to the full fair rent of the holding for sixty years, or at the option of the purchaser, for the period of less than sixty years of an equivalent capital value (sect. 5). For a term of forty years from the date of the sale, and so long thereafter as the holding remains charged with the terminable annuity, it is to be held subject to the following conditions: (a) Due payment of the annuity. (b) Not to be sold or let without the consent of the county council. (c) To be properly cultivated for agricultural purposes only. (d) One dwelling-house only to be erected, unless the council think additional accommodation is required for the cultivation of the holding. (e) The dwelling-house to comply with the council's requirements for securing healthiness. (f) To be repaired and insured against fire to the satisfaction of the

council. (g) Not to be used for the sale of intoxicating liquor. (h) In the case of a holding on which the council think a dwelling-house ought not to be erected, no dwelling-house shall be erected without the consent of the council. On breach of any condition the council may, after giving the owner an opportunity of remedying the breach (if capable of remedy), either take possession, or order a sale without taking possession (sect. 6). If the council order a sale, the balance (if any) of the proceeds is to be paid to the owner (sect. 8). The council may delegate its powers to the councils of boroughs, or urban or rural districts, in the county (sect. 9). The council may also provide cottage holdings, that is, holdings comprising a dwelling-house with not less than forty perches, and not more than three acres, of agricultural land, but this power is not to be exercisable by the council of a county | borough; and the council are not to sell a cottage holding unless they are satisfied that the proposed purchaser is a bona fide agricultural labourer, and that he has the intention, knowledge and capital to cultivate the land satisfactorily (sect. 12). The council may make advances for the purpose of adapting or equipping small holdings (sect. 14). The Act also contains a few amendments of the Small Holdings and Allotment Acts (sects. 16 and 23).

Vendor and Purchaser-Easements

IN contracts for, and conditions of, sale of land, it is usual to insert a stipulation that the property is sold subject to all rights of way and other easements affecting the same, or some such condition. The effect of that stipulation is doubtful. It is no doubt binding on the purchaser at law, but it would not enable the vendor to enforce specific performance of the contract subject to any easement which would be a serious incumbrance, and was known to the vendor, but not mentioned in the particulars of contract: (Williams on Vendor and Purchaser, 3rd edit., p. 66, note (b), and Heywood v. Mallalieu, 49 L. T. Rep. 658). But where one tenant has acquired a right of way against another tenant, under the same landlord, and both tenements are simultaneously sold by the landlord, under a condition that they are to be taken subject to and with the benefit of all subsisting rights of way, the purchaser of one tenement gains no right of way against the purchaser of the other, the meaning of the condition being that, if there are any rights of way as against the vendor, the purchaser shall take subject to them: (Dart on Vendors and Purchasers, 7th edit., p. 172, and Daniel v. Anderson, 7 L. T. Rep. 185). The Law Society's General Conditions of 1925 qualify a condition of the kind as follows : "Provided that nothing in this condition shall discharge the vendor from the obligation to disclose on or before the date of the sale the existence of all latent easements, rights, privileges or other liabilities which are known by him to affect the property."

Resealing of Foreign Probates in England - and Vice Versa

Ir may be convenient to state very shortly how far probates of wills, or the equivalent instruments granted out of this country, can be resealed here, so as to have the same effect as if they had been granted in this country, and vice versa. In order that a Scottish confirmation may be resealed here it must be shown that the deceased died domiciled in Scotland, and apparently a confirmation cannot be resealed if the only property in England consists of realty. In that case it seems necessary, in order to deal with the English real estate, to take out a separate grant in England: (Coote and Tristram's Probate Practice, 16th edit., p. 302). Any probate or letters of administration granted by the Court of Probate in England can be made effective in Scotland by a process equivalent to resealing there. Irish probates and letters of administration can be resealed in England, but it is necessary to make a distinction between grants made by North Ireland, and those made by the Irish Free State. In both cases the mode of procedure varies according to the date of the death of the deceased: (Coote and Tristram, p. 306 et seq.). But grants issued by the Irish Free State on or after the 1st April 1923 are not to be resealed in England, notwithstanding that the death may have occurred before the 1st April 1923: (Coote and Tristram, p. 313). English probates can be resealed in Ireland, but the mode of procedure varies according to the date of death of the deceased; and as to the Irish Free State, grants made in England on or after the 1st April 1923 are not to be transmitted to the Irish Free

State for resealing there, notwithstanding that the death may have occurred before the 1st April 1923. Colonial probates granted by British possessions and protectorates, to which the Colonial Probate Act 1892 applies by Order in Council, can also be resealed in England; and grants by British courts in foreign countries having jurisdiction out of the King's dominion, in pursuance of an Order in Council, can also be resealed in England: (Coote and Tristram, p. 323).

Period of Ascertaining Class

MR. JUSTICE ASTBURY has held in Re Chartres (137 L. T. Rep. 52; (1927) 1 Ch. 466) that the existence of a power of appointment which the donee releases does not affect the rule of convenience which fixes the period at which the constitution of a class is fixed. As the rule of convenience does not always carry out a testator's intention and is not always present to the draftsman's mind, the statement of the rule by that learned judge may be useful. The rule is divided into three heads, and the following is a summary of what Mr. Justice Astbury said: First, if there is an immediate gift in a will to the children of A., only those children in existence at the death of the testator take, but if there are no children of A. in existence at the testator's death, then all subsequently born children of A. take. Secondly, if there is a gift to A. for life and subsequently to the children of B., then only those children of B. who are alive at A.'s death can take, but if there are no children of B. alive at A.'s death, all subsequently born children of B. take. Thirdly, if there is a gift to A. for life and after his death to the children of B. who attain twenty-one, then if there are children of B. who at the death of A. have attained twenty-one the class closes at A.'s death, or if there are none such then the class closes as soon as a child of B. subsequently attains twenty-one. The learned judge was careful to point out that "in all cases the rule is excluded if there is an express intention of the testator to the contrary." A phrase such as "the children whenever born" would generally get over the difficulty, and it may be safely said that the rule of convenience under which the younger children may be excluded to the advantage of their elders should in most cases be negatived.

Trustees-Duty to Answer Inquiries

LORD JUSTICE LINDLEY, in Low v. Bouverie (65 L. T. Rep. 533; (1891) 3 Ch. 82) laid down that: "The duty of a trustee is properly to preserve the trust fund, to pay the income and the corpus to those who are entitled to them respectively, and to give all his cestuis que trust on demand information with respect to the mode in which the trust fund has been dealt with, and where it is. But it is no part of the duty of a trustee to tell his cestui que trust what incumbrances he has created, nor which of his incumbrancers have given notice of their respective charges. It is no part of the duty of a trustee to assist his cestui que trust in selling or mortgaging his beneficial interest and in squandering or anticipating his fortune; and it is clear that a person who proposes to buy or lend money on it has no greater rights than the cestui que trust himself. There is no trust or other relation between a trustee and a stranger about to deal with a cestui que trust, and although probably such a person in making inquiries may be regarded as authorised by the cestui que trust to make them, this view of the stranger's position will not give him a right to information which the cestui que trust himself is not entitled to demand. The trustee is under no obligation to answer such an inquiry." If a trustee did answer such inquiries it was held that he was not liable for a misrepresentation made honestly through forgetfulness or carelessness. He might, however, so express himself as to create an estoppel : (Porter v. Moore, 91 L. T. Rep. 484; (1904) 2 Ch. 367). This was the law before 1926. The Law of Property Act 1925, has considerably modified this immunity of trustees and has provided a means by which mortgagees, intending to advance money to a beneficiary, may discover whether the security offered is subject to prior charges or no. The Act does not overrule Low v. Bouverie entirely so as to give intending mortgagees a direct right to require a trustee to furnish information as to the state of the trust fund; but, by sect. 137 it provides that: "Where a notice in writing of a dealing with an equitable interest in real or personal property has been served on a trustee under this section, the trustees from time to time of the trust property affected shall be entitled to the custody of the notice, and the notice shall be delivered to them by any person who for the time being may have the custody thereof; and subject to the

payment of the costs any person interested in the equitable interest may require production of the notice." This gives the cestui que trust a right to require the trustees to produce notices of dealings with equitable interests. An intending mortgagee should insist on the beneficiary exercising this right, and should inspect the notices in writing himself. If this is done the mortgagee will know what incumbrances there are which rank in priority to his. Though the trustee is only bound to produce written notices, as sub-sect. (3) of sect. 137 provides that a notice otherwise than in writing, given to a trustee after the commencement of the Act as respects any dealing with an equitable interest in real and personal property, shall not affect the priority of competing claims of purchasers in that equitable interest, any mere verbal notice given after 1926 will not rank in front of the mortgagee's charge, if he himself, in his turn, gives a proper notice in writing. By sect. 138 of the Act a trust corporation may be appointed to whom notices of dealings with the trust estate may be made. If such a corporation has been appointed the beneficiary has a similar right to inspect the corporation's register of notices as he has under sect. 137 to inspect any notices held by trustees.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS

By Our Reporters in the Several Courts
COURT OF APPEAL

Deed of assignment—Assignment of business and goodwill— Benefit of creditors-Covenant by debtors to assist trustee to realise property and distribute assets-Old customers of debtor's business canvassed by assignor on behalf of other trader. By a deed of assignment, the debtors, C. T. H., G. A. H., and C. H. H., who had been carrying on business at Harrow as bakers, under the name of Hill Brothers, assigned the business and the goodwill thereof to the plaintiff as trustee, who was empowered to carry on the business as far as might be necessary for the winding-up of the estate; and the debtors covenanted, inter alia, that they would "do all such acts and things in relation to the debtors' property and the distribution of the proceeds thereof among the creditors as may be reasonably required by the trustee, and will aid to the utmost of their power the realisation of the debtors' property and the distribution of the proceeds thereof among the creditors." The plaintiff alleged that while he, as trustee, was carrying on the business so assigned for the benefit of the creditors, the debtors themselves solicited orders from the old customers of the business on behalf of another bakery business carried on at Harrow by themselves and (or) the defendant Cooper. The plaintiff, the trustee under the deed of assignment, brought an action against the defendants claiming damages and an injunction to restrain the debtors from soliciting the customers of the business for orders and an injunction to restrain the defendant Cooper from instigating the debtors so to do. At the trial, the jury having found against two of the debtors and the defendant Cooper, and awarded damages, Finlay, J. gave judgment for the plaintiff for the damages awarded; for an injunction restraining the two debtors from soliciting orders from customers of the business; and an injunction restraining the defendant Cooper, his servants or agents, from endeavouring to induce customers of Hill Brothers to deal with him.

Held, on appeal by the defendant Cooper, that the acts which it was alleged that the defendant Cooper had instigated or allowed were not wrongful, but were acts which the debtor C. T. H. was, in the circumstances, justified in doing, and, therefore, it could not be made a matter of complaint that the defendant Cooper had instigated them. The principle of Walker v. Mottram (45 L. T. Rep. 687; 19 Ch. Div. 355); and Green and Sons v. Morris (110 L. T. Rep. 508; (1914) 1 Ch. 562) applied, and the trustee under the deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors was not entitled to restrain the debtors from soliciting the customers of the business. Appeal allowed.

[Farey v. Cooper and others. Ct. of App.: Bankes, Atkin, and Lawrence, L.JJ. June 30 and July 1.-Counsel: Sullivan, K.C. and Elkin; Pritt, K.C. and A. W. Roskill; Solicitors Geo. H. Exeter; Biddle, Thorne, Welsford, and Gait.]

Practice-Claim against Air Council Application to strike out -Action not maintainable-R. S. C. Order XXV., r. 4.

Appeal from a decision of Fraser, J. at Chambers. The plaintiff, who was a consulting engineer and designer of aeroplanes and other aircraft, in an action brought by him against the Air Council, alleged that he had constructed for and supplied to the defendants an aeroplane according to his own invention, and that he had received £31,000 from the defendants in respect of the work and labour done, materials supplied, and money expended by him in the construction of that aeroplane. Pars. 6 and 7 were in the following terms :-(6) The defendants, wrongfully or fraudulently, secretly converted to their own use and benefit and deprived the plaintiff of his property in his said invention or inventions and in the said reports, specifications, designs, plans, drawings, prints, and other documents relating thereto and to the said aeroplane and to the said other aeroplanes, and the information derived from their said inspections of the said aeroplane, the subject-matter of all the aforesaid, whereby the plaintiff has suffered damage. The defendants also detained from the plaintiff the said reports, specifications, designs, plans, drawings, prints, and other documents and still so detain them, whereby the plaintiff has suffered damage. (7) The defendants, for the purposes complained of in paragraph 6 hereof, conspired with and (or) through one Frederick Handley Page and (or) Handley Page, Limited, and (or) others whereby the plaintiff has suffered damage. An application was thereupon made by the defendants to strike out the statement of claim, or to dismiss or stay the action on the grounds (1) that the action was frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court ; and (2) that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action. Master Bonner granted the application, but his decision was reversed by Fraser, J. who, in the exercise of his discretion, thought that the action ought not to be dismissed in a summary way. The Air Council appealed.

Held, that the action was one founded on tort, that the Air Council was a department of State, and that the acts and matters complained of, if done at all by members of the Air Council, or by their orders, were acts and matters done by virtue of their statutory position as members of the council. In these circumstances no action for tort could lie against the statutory body which had been set up under the name of the Air Council. Appeal allowed.

[Mackenzie-Kennedy v. The Air Council. Ct. of App. : Bankes, Scrutton, and Atkin, L.JJ. July 4.-Counsel : for the appellants, H. M. Giveen (Sir Douglas Hogg, K.C. (A.-G.), with him; the respondent in person. Solicitor for the appellants: The Treasury Solicitor.] Practice-Parties-Action in tort against joint defendants— Claim against defendants personally and in a representative capacity Members of trade association-Unregistered trade union No common interest-Claim in representative capacity struck out-R. S. C. Order XVI., r. 9-Trades Disputes Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 47), s. 4.

Appeal from a decision of Fraser, J. The plaintiffs were agents for the sale of and dealers in motor-cars, and brought this action for damages for conspiracy and libel and for money had and received against the defendants both personally and as representing the Motor Trade Association. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were trustees of, and controlled the funds of, the association, which was an unregistered trade union. On summonses taken out by the defendants, Master Jelf ordered that the writ and statement of claim should be amended by striking out the claim against the defendants in their representative capacity, and against the Motor Trade Association. The plaintiffs were members of the association, which was formed to protect the interests of the trade and prevent cutting of prices, and they alleged that the three defendants, C., B., and D., had conspired with another person N. to induce the plaintiffs to sell a certain motor-car to N. at a lower price than the standard price, and the plaintiffs having done so, proceeded to extort money from them under the threat of putting them on the "stop list " of the association, which would have the effect of preventing any other members of the association from having any trade dealings with them. Fraser, J. affirmed the Orders of the Master, holding that the case could not be brought within Order XVI., r. 9. There was no common interest in the matters sued on

between the defendants and the members of the association generally. The plaintiffs by leave appealed.

Held, that the appeal must be dismissed for the reasons given at length by Fraser, J. in his judgment. There was no ground for saying that the members of the association had any interest in the subject-matter of the action. Moreover, no claim in tort could be brought against the Motor Trade Association as such, as it was a trade union, and under the Trades Disputes Act 1906, s. 4, no action in tort could lie against a trade union. The trade unions referred to in the section are not confined to trade unions consisting exclusively of workmen, or exclusively of masters. The test of a trade union is its objects, and not its personnel. [Hardie and Lane Limited v. Chilton and others. Ct. of App.: Lord Hanworth, M.R., Sargant and Lawrence, L.JJ. June 29.-Counsel: Sir Henry Slesser, K.C. and H. Simmons; Sir J. Simon, K.C. and Giveen; Merriman, K.C. and St. John Field. Solicitors: C. S. Tomlinson; Kenneth Brown, Baker, Baker, and Co.]

CHANCERY DIVISION

Trade mark Registration-Claim to register as old marks Alterations since 1875-Refusal to register on the ground that they materially affected the identity-Royal ArmsRegistrar's discretion-Trade Marks Acts 1905 to 1919– Trade Mark Rules 1920, r. 12.

The Winterbottom Book Cloth Company Limited was incorporated in 1891, and they and their predecessors had carried on business since 1868. They had two labels, one, the Sagar, being an upright oblong and round top with a double coat of arms, and below the word "Trademark and the words "The Vellum Tracing Cloth Sagars "; the other, the Dowse, was similar with the words "The Vellum Cloth Dowse Improved Finish." These, they said, had been in use before the 13th Aug. 1875. In 1926 they applied to have these registered as old marks, but the registrar objected, first, because the marks were not exactly the same as before the 13th Aug. 1875, which was the fact, and, second, that the alterations made therein affected their identity. The alterations had been made as long ago as 1895. By the Trade Mark Rules 1920, r. 12, a representation of the Royal Arms, which these contained, was forbidden, but nothing therein was to preclude the registrar from permitting the registration as an old mark, i.e., before Aug. 1875, or one capable of registration before the Act of 1905. For the company it was contended that these were substantially old marks within the meaning of the rule. For the registrar it was said that his decision was correct: (Banham v. Reddaway and Co., 136 L. T. Rep. 485; (1927) A. C. 413) ; McDowell v. Standard Oil Company, New Jersey, (1927) W. N. 171).

Held, that the decision appealed from was based on the ground that the alterations materially affected the identity, that under the rule they could not be registered unless they came within the proviso. It was said that an exact reproduction was not necessary: (Re Adams' Trade Mark, 66 L. T. Rep. 610). But having regard to the cases on which the registrar had proceeded, viz., Re Phillips (65 L. T. Rep. 373), Re Colman (64 L. T. Rep. 507), and Re Brown (61 L. T. Rep. 156), and to the judgments in Banham v. Reddaway and Co. (sup.) his decision appeared to be right, The and ought not, therefore, to be set aside or varied. motions, therefore, by way of appeal therefrom, would be dismissed, the applicants to pay the registrar's costs.

[Re Winterbottom Book Cloth Company Limited's Applications. Ch. Div.: Eve J. June 25.-Counsel: Sir D. M.

Kerly, K.C. and Trevor Watson; Stafford Crossman. Solicitors: W. J. and E. H. Tremellen, for Blair and Seddon, Manchester; Solicitor to the Board of Trade.]

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with the defendant as bailee during an engagement between the parties to marry. He alleged that the engagement had been broken by the defendant, and that he became entitled to the return of the above articles. The defendant contended that the real issue in the action was one of breach of promise, and that, therefore, the action was not within the jurisdiction of the County Court.

Held, following Hunt v. North Staffordshire Railway Company (2 H. & N. 451), that regard must be had not merely to the plaint and particulars, but to the actual facts. The claim was in substance for damage arising out of a matter excluded from the jurisdiction of the County Court, namely, breach of promise of marriage, and the writ of prohibition ought to issue.

[Parsons v. Burgess. K. B. Div.: Acton, J. July 7.Counsel R. T. Sharpe; E. B. Calvert. Solicitors: Colman and Knight; Godfrey and Godfrey.]

Criminal law-Offences against the person-Wounding with intent to murder-Blow struck on British ship on high seasSubsequent death of victim on foreign territory-Whether prosecution should proceed on charge of wounding.

Trial before Swift, J. and a jury at the Central Criminal Court. The prisoner was charged with wounding one Blagg with intent to murder him, under sect. 11 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and also with wounding him with intent to do him grievous bodily harm under sect. 18 of the same Act. He was further charged with wounding one Burgess with intent to murder him, and wounding him with intent to do him grievous bodily harm. The case for the prosecution was that the prisoner attacked the two men on board a British steamship on the high seas, while on a voyage from Las Palmas, Canary Islands, to Genoa. The ship put back to Las Palmas, and both Blagg and Burgess were taken to hospital there. Burgess died in hospital, and his death accordingly took place on Spanish territory.

Held, in view of the fact that a foreign power might subsequently wish to prosecute the prisoner for the murder of Burgess, it was not expedient to try him here for the lesser offences of wounding Burgess with intent to murder him or wounding him with intent to do him grievous bodily harm, and that the prosecution ought to proceed only on the charges in relation to Blagg.

[Rex v. Friederiksen. Central Criminal Court: Swift, J. July 7.-Counsel for the Crown, Eustace Fulton, instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions; for the prisoner, Sir Travers Humphreys, instructed by C. O. Humphreys.]

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL Criminal law-Threat to accuse of crime-Sodomy-Evidence equally consistent with threat to accuse of gross indeceny—— Ambiguity Larceny Act 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50), s. 29, sub-s. 2.

Appeals against conviction and sentence. The appellants were all convicted on counts of an indictment which charged them with threatening to accuse the prosecutor of a crime, namely, sodomy, and thereby compelling him to execute valuable securities, contrary to sect. 29, sub-sect. 2, of the Larceny Act 1916. The indictment also contained counts for uttering threatening letters under sect. 29, sub-sect. 1, of the same Act, for demanding money with menaces, for obtaining money by false pretences, and for conspiracy. Four of the appellants were sentenced to twelve years', ten years', fifteen years', and ten years' penal servitude, respec tively, and the appellant T. to penal servitude for life on the counts charging the threat to accuse of crime, and to concurrent sentences of five years' penal servitude for demanding money with menaces, and two years' hard labour for conspiracy. T. and another of the appellants were also convicted on counts charging them with uttering threatening letters, and received concurrent sentences of penal servitude for life and penal servitude for fifteen years respectively. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that, as the evidence given was equally consistent with a threat to accuse the prosecutor either of sodomy, which is a "crime" within the meaning of sect. 29 of the Larceny Act, or of the lesser offence of gross indecency with a male person which is not a "crime" within the meaning of that section, the accused were entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and should not have been convicted on the counts charging the threat to accuse of a crime; and that in view of the ambiguity of the words used by the

accused in the alleged threats, it was dangerous to leave these counts to the jury.

Held, there was evidence that a threat was made by the appellants to accuse the prosecutor of the crime of sodomy; and that, therefore, the mere fact that the threatening words might be capable of being understood to mean something else afforded no defence to the charge of threatening to accuse of crime. The question was rightly left to the jury what was the effect of the words on the mind of the person on whom they were intended to operate. The appeals must, therefore, be dismissed.

[Rex v. Stuart and others. Ct. of Crim App.: Avory, Sankey, and Salter, JJ. July 11.-Counsel: for the appellants other than Taylor, G. D. Roberts, instructed by Croft and Russell; for the appellant Taylor, E. F. Lever, instructed by Edmond O'Connor; for the Crown, Sir Travers Humphreys and Gerald Dodson, instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions.]

LAW LIBRARY

The Selden Society have sent us the Liber Pauperum of Vacarius, edited by Mr. F. de Zulueta and dedicated to the memory of Paul Vinogradoff, who was deeply interested in this as in other studies of the society. The Liber Pauperum is held by Mr. de Zulueta to have been written about 1149, that is, in the first phase of the author's career in England, when he was fresh from the study of the Civil Law at Bologna, and consists of selected passages from the Digest and Code of Justinian shortened, rearranged, and on occasion paraphrased, to meet the needs of poor scholars, with copious explanatory glosses. The magnitude of the task undertaken by Mr. de Zulueta, including, as it did, the collating and critical examination of various manuscripts, is indicated by the fact that the work was commenced as long ago as the close of 1912, although of course interrupted by the War. The manuscript on which he has primarily based his text is the comparatively complete one belonging to Worcester Cathedral. The volume, which is provided with no fewer than ten indexes, will be welcomed as forming a scholarly contribution to the objects of the Selden Society, and is published by Quaritch.

The Law Quarterly Review for July 1927, edited by Mr. A. L. Goodhart (Stevens and Sons Limited), contains, in addition to its always valuable notes, "The King's Title and the Great Seal," by Sir Malcolm Macnaghten, K.C.; "The Conception of Usufruct in Classical Law," by Professor W. W. Buckland; "The Legislative Competence of the Dominions," by Professor Herbert A. Smith; "The Infant's Liability for Necessaries," by Sir John C. Miles; and "Partnership Property," by Mr. Harold G. Hanbury. In addition, Professor Courtney Kenny continues his interesting reminiscences, "What an Old Reporter Told Me."

We have received from the Solicitors' Law Stationery Society Limited Private Street Works, by Mr. Alexander Macmorran, K.C., which is a reprint of a series of articles contributed by the author to The Solicitors' Journal. Although the space at his disposal does not permit of the notice of more than the more important of the points which have to be considered by those to whom is entrusted the administration of the law on this subject, the author's name is sufficient guarantee of the accuracy and utility of the pamphlet.

Workers' Compensation in New Zealand, by Mr. C. A. L. Treadwell and Mr. E. S. Parry (Whitcombe and Tombs Limited, Auckland, New Zealand), contains a plain enunciation of the principles involved in the administration of the law affecting workers' compensation in New Zealand, read in the light of the leading and most recent New Zealand and English cases, with a note where necessary showing the differences between the statutory law of the two countries.

NEW EDITIONS

The legislation of 1925 has rendered necessary the entire revision of that well-known text-book Coote's Treatise on the Law of Mortgages, and this has been done by Mr. R. L. Ramsbotham, who is responsible for the new and Ninth Edition. We can quite believe that the editor has found it difficult to decide what original matter to omit, and we agree that the interests of his readers have been best served by retention rather than omission. As the old law relating to land will for many years affect the title to land, the knowledge of both the new and the old law is essential, and these have been successfully linked by Mr. Ramsbotham. In the addenda will be found references to cases of importance decided while the edition was passing through the press, and the excellent index of 200 pages will greatly assist the practitioner in his use of this valuable work.

A Second Edition of The Law of Extradition from and to British India, by Sir Alexander Muddiman, has been prepared by Mr. L. Graham and Mr. J. A. Samuel (Thacker, Spink, and Co., Calcutta). This book contains a careful examination of the Indian Extradition Act of 1903 and the Extradition Acts and Fugitive Offenders Act of this country, the relative treaties being found in appendices. The book has been brought well up to date by reference to the latest Acts and treaties, the notes to the Indian Act being both complete and concise.

Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens, by Dr. R. J. Bonner (University of Chicago Press), is a contribution to research which will be of interest to those members of the Profession who are students of its evolution. The whole book presents a convincing picture of public life in Athens, where law was in the hands of amateurs and "plain people," and traces most carefully the limited activities of the advocates, speech-writers and sycophants, who made a living in spite of the jealousy of the expert which characterised the Athenians. Of particular interest are the chapters on the Judiciary, Practice and Procedure, The Character of the Athenian Courts and Tactics and Technicalities in Litigation. Illustrations of procedure are afforded in the concluding chapter, which summarises four notable Athenian trials, concluding with the illuminating burlesque contained in Aristophanes' Wasps.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Treadwell and Parry on Workers' Compensation in New Zealand. Whitcombe and Tombs Limited, 9 and 10, St. Andrews-hill, Queen Victoria-street, E.C. 4. Price 15s. net.

Coote on Law of Mortgages. 2 Vols. Ninth Edition by R. L. Ramsbotham. Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane; and Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 2 and 3, Chancery-lane, W.C. 2. Price £4 10s. net.

Muddiman's Law of Extradition from and to British India. Second Edition by L. Graham and J. A. Samuel. Thacker, Spink, and Co., Calcutta. Price Rs. 10.8.

Reports of Tax Cases. Vol. XII. Parts 4, 5, and 6. H.M. Stationery Office, Adastral House, Kingsway, W.C. 2. Price each part 1s. net.

The Old Benchers of the Inner Temple by Charles Lamb. With annotations by Sir F. D. Mackinnon. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Price 21s. net.

Mr. Henry Joseph Liggins, solicitor, left estate of the gross value of £4500 (limited to settled land).

Sir Charles Porten Beachcroft, late judge of the Calcutta High Court, left unsettled property of the gross value of £13,682, with net personalty £10,273.

Mr. Harold Fillingham Williams, solicitor, of Ringwood, left estate of the gross value of £6405 (net personalty £4187)

Mr. James Thomas Gruning Donaldson, barrister-at-law, left estate of the gross value of £22,350 (net personalty £20,872).

Mr. Bradford Leslie Gordon, barrister-at-law, of the Legal Branch, Board of Education, left estate of the gross value of £4122 (net personalty £3008).

CRIMINAL LAW

BOROUGH QUARTER SESSIONS

Banbury, Friday, Aug. 19.
Bath, Saturday, July 16.
Berwick-upon-Tweed, Friday, July 22.
Bournemouth, Monday, July 25.
Bristol, Monday, July 18, at 10
Bury St. Edmunds, Monday, July 18.
Cambridge, Tuesday, August 2.
Canterbury, Monday, July 25.
Cardiff, Thursday, July 21.
Chichester, Thursday, July 21.
Croydon, Thursday, July 21.
Gravesend, Thursday, July 28.
Great Yarmouth, Monday, July 18.
Grimsby, Tuesday, July 19.
Halifax, Thursday, July 28.
Hereford, Friday, Aug. 19.
Kingston-upon-Hull, Tuesday, July 26.
Leicester, Monday, July 25.

Lincoln, Saturday, July 16 at 10.
Maidstone, Saturday, July 23, at 11.
Margate, Saturday, July 16th, at 11.30
Merthyr Tydfil, Wednesday, Aug. 3.
Middlesbrough, Wednesday, July 27.
Newcastle-under-Lyme, Fri., July 22.
Oswestry, Friday, Aug. 5.
Oxford, Wednesday, July 27.
Poole, Friday, July 22.
Rochester, Thursday, July 21,
Salisbury, Friday, July 22.
Sandwich, Saturday, July 23.
Smethwick, Friday, July 22.
Southampton, Friday, July 29.
Stamford, Thursday, July 28.
Sudbury, Wednesday, July 20.
Wenlock, Saturday, July 30

LEGISLATION

The Prayer-Book Measure

THE recent meetings of the Assembly have resulted, as our readers know well, in the passage of these proposals by majorities of a very substantial character in all three Houses, There was probably no single moment during the whole long period of months of discussion upon this subject-matter when the Assembly showed itself more worthy of respect than in the few minutes which elapsed between the announcement of the figures and the adjournment. There was not the slightest token, audible or visible, either of victory or defeat. This should be some augury of the spirit of conciliation to be expected throughout the country if Parliament should see fit to give effect to these proposals. It is not within the scope of this journal to discuss the deviations and additions rendered possible in the book of 1662, but it is even now necessary to remind readers that the measure itself, by which these deviations and additions are made permissible, needs to be studied with as much care as is accorded to other Acts of Parliament, and when studied it will be found that some questions of practical interest may be raised. Clause 2 (2) (c) gives the conservative parson an impregnable position if he chooses to stand out for the 1662 book, while sub-clause (1) gives a far less defensible position to the conservative laity who desire to continue in the old paths. It is only necessary for the parson to obtain the consent of his council, and this in most cases merely involves asking for it. If this consent is given the people as a whole outside it have no remedy. If, on the other hand, consent is withheld, then the questions which thereupon arise automatically stand referred to the diocesan. The latter is then left with a free hand to consult anyone he likes, both the people and the council, and is enabled to make final orders. These provisions when accepted by Parliament will sooner or later require consideration, for their wording is patient of some ambiguity. Clause 5, relating to copyright being vested in the Crown, opens up some possibilities as to prices and as to the measure of the liberty to be granted in the future for wholesale reproductions of the new matter in the deposited book for the purposes of other works. of a devotional character. Here again it is quite possible that some questions may arise in the near future if and when Parliament should endorse the view expressed by the Assembly with such overwhelming majorities.

Banns of Marriage

SOME interesting changes in the law on this subject are under consideration and a measure may at a later date be prepared to put the suggestions into concrete form. It is contemplated that a marriage after due publication of banns should be made permissible in a parish church in which either of the parties appears on the electoral roll as a non-resident elector. Sect. 14 of the Marriage Act 1856 enacts that the superintendent registrar may grant a licence for the solemnisation of a marriage in a registered building outside of the district wherein the parties reside provided it is not more than two miles beyond the limits of the district in which the notice of marriage has been given and if it is the usual place of worship of one of the parties. The proposals now made are in harmony with the principle of this section and have been placed before persons of authority in these matters in whose opinion they seem to present no difficulties. It would be quite a different thing to authorise banns being.

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