bodies respectively, without any deduction except certain poundage, and are to apply the amount authorized to be raised for compensation rate, &c., and are to render monthly "statements of the total amounts which shall have been received by the collectors on account of the said rates respectively;" and may retain a specified portion of each for a limited time. [ALDERSON, B.-Suppose a rate-payer pays only half the sum assessed on him; under what rate is the residue to be levied by distress?] The rate is not levied as so many distinct rates; it is as much a dock rate and paving rate as a poor rate: but it is neither; it is a combined On comparing stat. 3 G. 4, c. xxiv. ss. 42, 43, 44 (as to survey and assessment for the purposes of that act), with stat. 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. lxxxvi. ss. 8, 25, 28, as to the assessment of borough rates upon the city and upon the added parishes, (a) it will be seen that there is one joint rate on the ancient city of Bristol: the Gloucestershire *419] *parishes are added for municipal purposes only, and are therefore assessed only to the borough rate; but that is applicable to criminal lunatics.

rate.

The first point depends on stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 32, coupled with the interpretation clause, sect. 109, of stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76. The Court below have held this incorporation to be both a parish and a union: it cannot be both; in fact it is neither: it is not, within the terms of the latter section, a "parish, city, borough, town, township, liberty, precinct, vill, village, hamlet, tithing, chapelry, or any other place, or division or district of a place, maintaining its own poor," terms all referring to locality or extent of space: neither is it "any number of parishes united for any purpose whatever, under the provisions of this act, or incorporated under" stat. 22 G. 3, c. 83 (Gilbert's Act), incorporated for the relief or maintenance of the poor under any local act:" the relief or maintenance of the poor is not the purpose of the incorporation: and it is not the parishes that are incorporated, but certain individuals. Under Gilbert's Act the parishes are united, and the visitors and guardians are incorporated, whether they be appointed by united parishes, or by a single parish adopting the provisions of the act.(6) Here, the parishes are not united; for the maintenance of the poor is still confined to the old district; there is only an incorporation of the individuals.

Tomlinson, contrà.-First, as to the powers of the Poor Law Commissioners. The power to unite parishes and unions into one district for a common audit was *complete under stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, ss. 15, *420] 46, 47. Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 32, is only more specific: the word combined, there, is equivalent to the word united in the former statute, s. 46, that is, joined in voting and paying the salary; this is clear from the first proviso in s. 37 of the later act, which speaks of (a) It has not been thought necessary to set out these clauses.

(b) See stat. 22 G. 3, c. 83, ss. 4, 11, 21.

unions and parishes which had been then already "combined" by the Commissioners. The parties to vote here are the Governor and deputy governor, as appears by stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, ss. 32, 64, and the interpretation of the word guardian by stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 109. Then what have the Commissioners done in the present instance? The articles of their order show that they have executed their powers, and nothing more. The description of the incorporation may be untechnical, though it uses the name which is used many times in stat. 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. lxxxvi.; but the word "corporation" is not necessarily to be taken in a technical legal sense; here it means an association of districts for the relief of the poor so as to have some common account. Under stat. 22 G. 3, c. 83, the visitors and guardians are incorporated by a certain title as individuals, and the district has nothing in common but a workhouse; nevertheless, in the case of the Allstonefield incorpora tion, (a) it was held that the Commissioners might, under stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 46, direct the appointment of an auditor for a Gilbert's union it follows that to constitute a union under these enactments there need not be an association for all purposes. Here, however, all powers are *vested in the Corporation, even that of appointing collectors [*421 of poor rates; there is only one rate; and the powers of the corporation extend over the whole district for the relief of the poor. This is a union of parishes under a local act: unions for audit are not unions of lands the only three purposes for which audit districts are formed are voting, paying, and auditing. [ALDERSON, B.-If the incorporation did not include the parishes, the audit might be eluded: the collectors might return that they had paid the amounts collected to the Corporation; there must be some means of calling the governing body to account.]

Secondly, the order is correct: it does not claim to look farther into the other purposes than is necessary to ascertain what funds are applicable to the relief of the poor; the auditor will deduct the payments on the other accounts, and will then deal with the balance: if the accounts, are kept so completely separate that the auditor need not see the other accounts, the Commissioners do not require that they shall be shown to him. [MAULE, J.-The writ goes farther, and requires them to account for the whole.] That argument was strongly pressed in Regina v. Governors of St. Andrew's, 6 Q. B. 78 (E. C. L. R. vol. 51); but the Court, dwelling on s. 47, said that the governors must account for the whole. Here also the maintenance of the poor is the dominant object; and all difficulty is removed by stat. 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. lxxxvi., under which there is only one rate, with fixed charges for the docks, paving, and other charges, such as compensation rates and borough *rates, under stat. 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. lxxxvi., s. 23, that are paid out of the poor rate. The powers of the auditor will operate on the balance;

(a) Regina Poor Law Commissioners, 11 A. & E. 558 (E. C. L. R. vol. 39).

Y

[*422

if there be no such powers, the incorporation will be altogether exempt from audit under the statutes: but it cannot be said that this balance so obtained is not a rate, levy, or contribution raised, levied, collected, or disbursed for the relief of the poor, within the meaning given to "poor rate" in stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 109.

Even assuming the proceedings to have been defective, a certiorari should have, been sued out; the defendants cannot on this mandamus take advantage of the alleged defects; stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, ss. 42, 95, 98, 105, 108: stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 13, ss. 8, 9, 13.(a)

*423]

Unthank (in the absence of Crowder), in reply.-The record shows that these proceedings are under stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101; they cannot, then, be supported on the general act alone. The order should have required an account of money applicable to the relief of the poor within the limits that could not have been evaded; for in obeying such a writ the Corporation must have shown what sum was so applicable. But according to the present form the auditor may disallow dock rates; for whatever is to be accounted for he may disallow. [ALDERSON, B.-As regards such charges he can only see that they have been paid.] The Corporation has two districts, one more extensive than the other: the *maintenance of the poor affects the smaller district only; but the mandamus relates to the whole. Cur. adv. vult. PARKE, B., now delivered the judgment of the Court. In this case three objections have been taken. First: that the Poor Law Commissioners, under stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 32, which authorizes them "to combine" parishes into districts for the audit of accounts" (that is, to appoint what parishes and unions shall have their accounts audited and pay towards the salary of the auditor; for that is the meaning of "combine"), had no power to combine this Corporation as they have done, because it is not a corporation for the management of the poor only, but for other purposes also. Secondly: that, if they had this power, their order is informal and invalid. Thirdly: that, at all events, the request by the auditor to account, and the mandamus also, requires more than the Corporation were bound to do, and, consequently, cannot be supported.

We are of opinion that no one of these objections is well founded. The first objection depends on stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 32; but, to ascertain the meaning of the words "parish" and "union" there used, it is necessary to refer to sect. 109 of stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76. This interpretation clause says "the word 'parish' shall be construed to include any parish, city, borough, town, township, liberty, precinct, vill, village, hamlet, tithing, chapelry, or any other place, or division or district of a place, maintaining its own poor, whether parochial or extraparochial." It is not necessary to say whether, if this stood alone, the city of Bristol *would fall within it; perhaps it might not. the clause goes on to say, "the word union' shall be construed (a) On the point as to charges for criminal lunatics, Tomlinson was stopped by the Court.

*424]

But

to include any number of parishes united for any purpose whatever under the provisions of this act, or incorporated under" Gilbert's act, 22 Geo. 4, c. 83," or incorporated for the relief or maintenance of the poor under any local act." Strictly speaking, Bristol itself, certainly, is not incorporated under its local act for the management of the poor; nor, indeed, are any parishes incorporated under Gilbert's Act; for certain selected inhabitants only are incorporated. But Bristol is incorporated for the management of the poor under its local act, in the same sense in which parishes are so incorporated under Gilbert's act. Is Bristol, then, the less incorporated for this purpose, because the Corporation of the poor of the city have, under the local acts by which their functions. are regulated, something else to do besides taking care of the poor? Stat. 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. lxxxvi. recites (s. 1) that the Corporation have been constituted guardians of the poor" of the city and county; and authorizes them, in several clauses, to make rates for the support of the poor, and for various other purposes. (His lordship here referred to the clauses as to assessing and levying the several rates, and the form of assessment.) The object was that the rates referred to, instead of several, should all be included in one, as more convenient to levy, and less vexatious to the persons assessed. Under this act, then, there is one rate, out of which sums for the relief of the poor and for other purposes are to be paid. We think that the Corporation is not the less a corporation for the management of the poor, and is, therefore, still. incorporated for the maintenance of the poor under a *local act; [*425 that, consequently, it is a "union" within stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 109; and, therefore, that the Poor Law Commissioners had authority to combine the parishes of the city and county with other parishes and places for the audit of accounts.

The second question turns on the objection that the Commissioners, instead of combining the parishes under the management of the Corporation, have combined the Corporation itself, with the other members of the union. We think that what they have done is correct, substantially at all events. They have combined that body which has power to join in the election of the auditor, and is bound to contribute to his salary. It is unnecessary, therefore, to dispose of the last argument of Mr. Tomlinson, though we think there was great weight in it, that the order is a valid and binding order until set aside.

On the remaining question we quite agree with the Court of Queen's Bench. There is but one rate, though ultimately applicable to different objects. In dealing with that rate, the Corporation act as a body having the care of the poor, but having also the duty of receiving and paying over moneys for other purposes. Until the auditor had ascertained how much money was raised and paid for these different purposes, he would. not know how much was applicable to the relief of the poor, and could not call upon the Corporation to account for their disposal of what was

so applicable. We think, therefore, that he was quite right in calling for an account in the terms stated by the return. As soon as he has got the accounts, and ascertained how much the Corporation have paid for other purposes than the relief of the poor, he will then *exer*426] cise his power of allowing or disallowing the payments made out of that portion of the fund which is applicable to the relief of the poor. Judgment affirmed.(a)

(a) The case in the Exchequer Chamber is reported by R. Hall, Esq.

IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.
(Error from the Queen's Bench.)

HOLFORD v. BAILEY, in Error.

A declaration, reciting that defendant had been summoned to answer plaintiff in an action of trespass, charged that defendant, with force and arms, broke and entered a fishery, to wit, the sole and exclusive fishery of plaintiff, in a certain part of a river then flowing and being over the soil of one F., and then fished for fish in the said fishery of plaintiff, and the fish of the said fishery of plaintiff, there found, and being in the said fishery, chased and disturbed: Conclusion, contra pacem. Plaintiff having recovered on this count,

Held, by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, reversing the judgment of Q. B.,

(1.) That the words "sole and exclusive fishery" were, at any rate after verdict, equivalent to "several" fishery.

(2.) That the statement that the soil was in F. did not vitiate the count or render it necessary for the plaintiff to deduce title from the owner of the fee. And,

(3.) (Agreeing with Q. B.) that trespass lay for the injury described.

THE declaration stated that the defendant had been summoned to answer the plaintiff in an action of trespass; and it contained four counts. The first was for breaking and entering, with force and arms, &c., a several fishery of plaintiff in the river Usk, in Brecknockshire. The second count charged that the defendant, to wit, on, &c., with force and arms, &c., broke and entered a certain other fishery, to wit, the sole and exclusive fishery of the plaintiff, to wit, in the said river Usk, in a certain other part of the said river, then flowing and being over the soil of one Philip Francis, and adjacent to, &c., situate in the said county, and then fished for fish in the last-mentioned fishery of plaintiff, and the fish, to *wit, five salmon, &c., of the last-mentioned fishery of plaintiff, *427] there found, and being of great value, to wit, &c., then being in the last-mentioned fishery, then chased and disturbed. The declaration concluded: "and other wrongs," &c., "against the peace," &c.

Ten pleas were pleaded, leading to issues of fact.

The plaintiff had a verdict on the issues relating to the second count. On other issues, disposing of the counts 1, 2, and 3, the verdict was for defendant.

The Court of Queen's Bench arrested judgment on the second count.(a)

(a) Holford v. Bailey, 8 Q. B. 1000 (E. C. L. R. vol. 55).