that they contain nothing applicable. As to the general jurisdiction, the *writ will run where the Crown has authority, that is to say,

*625] where the inhabitants are subjects of the Crown. It is unim

portant whether the island be part of the dominions or part of the realm: but, as it is inalienably attached to the Crown, it appears to be part of the realm.

PATTESON, J.-As at present advised, I am inclined to think that a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum will run into the Isle of Man since stat. 5 G. 3, c. 26, whatever might have been the law before that act. The passage cited from Com. Dig. Navigation (F 2,) refers to the state of things prior to the statute. In Bishop of Sodor and Man v. Earl of Derby, 2 Ves. sen. 337, 351, it was said that, although at the time, namely 1751, the Isle of Man was not part of the realm, it was part of the King's dominions, being a feudatory of the King, and held by liege homage. It had been granted by James I., to the Earl of Derby, yet not as independent of the King, for the King was in some way the superior lord; and it was therefore considered that the question which had arisen there, between the Duke of Athol and the Earl of Derby, might be discussed in the English Court of Chancery, if no other jurisdiction were affirmatively shown. Then stat. 5 G. 3, c. 26, transfers the Island to the King, his heirs and successors, unalienably: so that the King would hold it, not in his individual right, but in right of the Crown. Therefore I cannot help thinking that, at least since this statute, the Island forms a part of the dominions of the Crown, so that a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum would run to it at common law. I do not say that it would *do so under stat. 31 C. 2, c. 2; for the *626] Island is not named in sect. 11; nor, though the Island is named in stat. 56 G. 3, c. 100, s. 1, is that statute applicable to a case like the present.

Then, assuming that the writ will now run to the Isle of Man, is this a case in which the Court is bound to issue it? The form in which this question arises is not material: I take the case as if cause had now been shown against our issuing the writ.

The first objection urged to the commitment is, that it does not, on the face of it, appear to have been made by the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man, inasmuch as it is signed only by the Lieutenant Governor of the Island, and it does not appear that he is the Judge of that Court. I think, however, that we have before us materials from which, when I was applied to at chambers, I might have collected that the commitment was the act of the Court: though certainly I did not do so, perhaps from want of sufficient attention. It does appear that proceedings had taken place in that Court: then that a libel had been published reflecting intemperately on those proceedings; that an order had been made on the publisher to come before the Court; and that the holding of the Court had been postponed in consequence of the illness of the

66

Lieutenant Governor. From this I might have collected that he was a constituent part of the Court. The newspaper editor comes into Court, and makes an apology; but he is committed. Then Mr. Crawford comes before the Court, and says that he is the author of the publication, and desires that he may be dealt with, instead of the editor. The Court, however, say to him, without letting off the publisher, that he is [*627 in contempt; and he is committed also. Certainly that appears to be the act of the Court; for he is not suffered to go at large at all. He remains in prison for three hours; and then he sends a letter of remonstrance to the Lieutenant Governor, saying that he has been committed by the authority of the verbal order of committal of your Excellency." From this I might have collected that the Lieutenant Governor is the Court. Then a written warrant is made out. That does not purport expressly to be made by the Court. But all takes place on the same day the avowal of the authorship, the act of the Court, and the written warrant, which states that "it is therefore hereby ordered that the said John Crawford be, for such his contempt, committed a prisoner," &c., "there to remain until further order." It does not indeed appear whether the original verbal commitment was "till further order," or how it was framed. Still, taking these facts as they appear before us, I think that, if I had been more attentive, I should have perceived that this is a commitment, by the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man, of the avowed author of what the Court adjudge to be a contemptuous libel.

It is then objected that the Court could have no general power of commitment for a libel published out of Court some time before. This point has not been expressly decided upon. In Van Sandau's Case,(a) the libel appears to have been published both in court and out of it. In Rex v. Almon, (b) there was a very learned judgment by Chief Justice WILMOT, which he intended to deliver, though it [*628

was not delivered in fact, the case having been dropped. He satisfactorily shows that a court of record has power to punish, by commitment for contempt, a libel published while the Court is not sitting. There must be a choice as to the mode of proceeding; for he says that the punishment may be by indictment or by committal for contempt: he treats it throughout as a matter of election. That may be an answer to the difficulty suggested by my brother COLERIDGE to Mr. Peacock: we need not, however, determine as to this: it is enough for us to see that the Court has the power: and that is clear law. If that be so, the question whether the particular publication be libellous or contemptuous is clearly, as has been said in many instances, a question for the Court which commits. We have not to inquire into this matter, which has (a) Van Sandau v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773 (E. C. L. R. vol. 51); Ex parte Van Sandau, 1 Phillips's Rep. 445, 605.

(b) Notes and Opinions by Chief Justice Wilmot, 243, 252, 271. See 19 How. St. Tr. 1082

been adjudicated upon by a Court of competent jurisdiction. But it is said that this should go to a jury. The fact of authorship is admitted by Mr. Crawford, who comes forward to avow it, openly and very properly. The construction of the publication was for the Court. We therefore cannot interfere, unless there has been some error in the manner and form of the proceeding.

There is no material question as to the form of the warrant till we come to the end. It there appears that the party is committed "until further order." Now I cannot help thinking that this is in the nature of punishment, the offence being visited in this way by the Court; and that it is not like a committal of a party till he answer, which is rather in the nature of process. Then, being a punishment, it ought to be as *certain as a sentence. That was held in Rex v. James, 5 B. & *629] Ald. 894 (E. C. L. R. vol. 7), where magistrates committed a party, for contempt of them in the execution of their office, till "discharged by due course of law," there being no course of law for discharging him: and this Court said that the commitment should have been for a time certain. Mr. Peacock argues that this rule does not apply to superior courts; and he distinguishes the present case from cases where, as in the instance of magistrates, the proceedings might be brought up by certiorari. I do not know how far that distinction is good but I think that no English Court, if their attention were called to the point, would commit by way of punishment, except for a time certain. The point was not discussed, either in this Court or in Chancery, in Van Sandau's case, (a) where the commitment was not for a time certain. But then, if I understand the affidavits correctly, this is the ordinary form in which commitments take place in the Isle of Man: and we know that the law of the Isle of Man is not the law of England, but differs from it in some respects. We must leave this to the local law, as we did in Carus Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 984 (E. C. L. R. vol. 53), and Brenan's Case, 10 Q. B. 493 (E. C. L. R. vol. 59): we cannot disturb what has been done in conformity with the law of the Island: we are not a Court of appeal. Before this writ goes, we must see that the commitment is bad: and I cannot come to the conclusion that it is contrary to the law of the place. The rule must, therefore, be absolute. *ERLE, J. As at present advised, I agree that the writ would

*630] run to the Isle of Man. I would merely, in addition to what has

been said, refer to the language of Lord MANSFIELD in Rex v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834, 856 (A. D. 1759). "To foreign dominions, which belong to a prince who succeeds to the throne of England, this Court has no power to send any writ of any kind. We cannot send a habeas corpus to Scotland, or to the Electorate: but to Ireland, the Isle of Man, the plantations, and (as since the loss of the Duchy of Normandy, they

(a) Van Sandau v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773 (E. C. L. R. vol. 51); Ex parte Van Sandau, 1 Phillips's Rep. 445, 605.

have been considered as annexed to the Crown, in some respects), to Guernsey and Jersey, we may; and formerly, it lay to Calais; which was a conquest, and yielded to the Crown of England by the treaty of Bretigny." He seems, therefore, to have had no doubt on the subject. Taking this, then, as an ordinary case of an application for a habeas corpus, we are to see whether there has been a lawful order of a competent tribunal. We have nothing to do with questions as to the propriety of the law of the Isle of Man, or as to the propriety of the application of it by the Court there. It is clear, on these affidavits, that the committal is by the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man, and that the Court is competent to commit for a contempt.

Then is there here a lawful ground for committal? The power of Courts to commit for contempt, in this country, has been discussed: and it has been established, on good reason, that a tribunal has power to protect itself by committing for a contempt relating to the exercise of its powers. The commitment here was for a contempt in publishing, while the Court was not *sitting, and perhaps at some distance [*631 of time and place, a libel on the proceedings of the Court. In the elaborate judgment to which my brother PATTESON has referred, it is shown that such a publication may have a strong and immediate tendency to paralyze the proceedings of the Court. Such cases may easily. be conceived: the propriety of the decision in the particular case is a question for the Court itself.

Then, is the power exercised in a form which makes the act clearly void? Gosset v. Howard, 10 Q. B. 411, 453 (E. C. L. R. vol. 59), establishes the competency of the superior courts in England to settle the forms of their own writs. But, without at present insisting on that principle, the affidavits show that this form has constantly prevailed in the Isle of Man: the power therefore was lawfully exercised there. If the form be good according to the law of the Island, it cannot be contended before us, sitting here, that it is wrong. Whether, in general, the proper mode be to commit for a short interval, or until further order, or till the party be brought up, may be settled hereafter on future discussion; but we must take the form to be lawful here.

Then, the question here being, in effect, whether the writ, if it had never issued, ought to go, we must make the rule absolute for setting aside the writ.

PATTESON, J.—I should have stated that my brother COLERIDGE, who was obliged to leave the Court during the argument, quite agrees in our view of the case. (a) Rule absolute.

(a) Lord DENMAN, C. J., was absent on account of illness.

It is a contempt punishable by attachment to publish remarks in a newspaper, which have a tendency to prejudice the public with respect to the merits of a cause depending in Court, and

to corrupt the administration of justice. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319; Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wallace, 77, 102; Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates, 438; Bronson's Case, 12 Johns.

460. It is not a contempt of Court for the publisher of a newspaper to remark on the conduct of a juror who, whilst engaged in the trial of a capital case, and separated from the public and in charge of the officers of the Court, was furnishing articles for daily publication in a newspaper; and admitting a communication from a correspondent calculated to irritate the presiding judge, though not reflecting on his integrity or in any way impeaching his conduct. Stuart v. The People, 3 Scamm. 395. The publication of an order of a Court of Equity, misrepresenting the effect of that order, was held not to be punishable as a contempt, nor to affect injuriously the rights of the opposite party, and therefore after an explanation by the offending party he was allowed to go free-both parties paying costs. Morrison v. Moat, 4 Edw. Ch. 25. Denying any criminal or disrespectful design in publications reflecting on proceedings before the Court, will not justify the party, if they appear to the Court to amount to a contempt. People v. Freer, 1 Caines, 485, 518.

Although the Courts of the United States are deprived, by the act of Congress of March 2d, 1831, of the power to punish, as for a contempt of Court, the publication, during trial, of testi

mony, in a case, yet, having power to regulate the admission of persons and the character of proceedings within its own bar, the Court can exclude from within the bar any person coming there to report testimony during the trial United States v. Holmes, Wallace, Jr., 1.

The Supreme Court will not grant a habeas corpus, where a party has been committed for a contempt, by a Court having competent jurisdiction, and if granted would not inquire into the sufficiency of the cause of commitment. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Clark v. People, 1 Breese, 266; Bickley v. The Commonwealth, 1 J. J. Marsh. 575; State v. White, Charlt. 136. The sufficiency of affidavits to support an attachment for contempt cannot be inquired into, on a habeas corpus. Matter of Smethurst, 2 Sanf. Sup. Ct. 724. Where a Court imposes a fine or imprisonment for a contempt, if the order does not state the facts, constituting the contempt, and the Court is not bound to set them out, no other tribunal can reverse their decision. But if the Court does state the facts upon which it proceeds, a revising tribunal may, on a habeas corpus, discharge the party, if it appear that the facts do not amount to a contempt. Ex parte Summers, 5 Iredell, 149.

*632]

*ELLIOT and Others v. VON GLEHN. May 1.

Assumpsit on charter-party, by which defendant hired a ship from plaintiffs to go to Cronstadt, and there take a full cargo of tallow or of tallow and deals, &c., and proceed thence to London: allowance for laying days and demurrage: Averment that the ship went to Cronstadt: Breaches, that defendant did not load a cargo as agreed, but shipped deals only and no tallow: and that he detained the ship beyond the time stipulated: whereby plaintiffs earned less freight than they otherwise would, and lost the use of the ship during the extra time of detention. Plea: That at the time of making the charter-party, plaintiffs represented to defendant that the ship was at Wyburgh in Russia, and defendant entered into the charter-party confiding in such representation, whereas, at the time, &c., the ship was not at Wyburgh. Replication; That, at the time of making the charter-party, and of the said representation, plaintiffs also represented to defendant, and it was mentioned in the charter-party, that the ship was bound on a voyage from Wyburgh to Hull, and plaintiffs did then believe that she was at Wyburgh, and about to sail to Hull; and in fact she had just sailed on her voyage from Wyburgh to Hull. Rejoinder: That the representation mentioned in the plea was contained in the charter-party, and was parcel thereof, and of the contract thereby made; and that the ship was not, at the time of the making of the charter-party, at Wyburgh. On special demurrer,

Held That the mere representation, as alleged in the plea, was no answer to the declaration: and that the rejoinder, if it alleged a warranty, was a departure.

Held by ERLE, J., that if the rejoinder had not been a departure, the breach of warranty would not have been an answer to the action, the defendant having to some extent availed himself of the contract.

ASSUMPSIT. The first count stated that, to wit, on 14th June, 1847, by a charter-party of affreightment then made between plaintiffs, then being owners of the ship The Phesdo, of the measurement, &c., of the one part, and defendant of the other part, it was witnessed that the said ship, being tight, &c., and fitted for the voyage, should, with all convenient