bad, for the reasons relied on by the appellants, subject to the opinion of this Court.

In order to prevent the case from being sent down to be reheard if their judgment should prove incorrect, the Sessions allowed the respondents to prove their case. It appeared that the order for the binding, and the indenture, and the allowance of such indenture, were all written upon one sheet of paper, and were correctly set out in the examinations. The appellants then took the same objections to the allowance of the indenture, as already mentioned to have been taken to the examinations setting out such indenture and allowance. The Sessions allowed both the last-mentioned objections.

If the Court should be of opinion that the statement of the grounds of appeal was insufficient for the reason above mentioned, or that the examinations were sufficient and the binding valid, notwithstanding the above objections thereto, the order of Sessions was to be quashed, and the order of removal confirmed. If the Court should be of opinion that the statement of the grounds of appeal was sufficient, notwithstanding the above-mentioned objection, but that the examinations were insufficient, or that the binding was invalid, for any of the reasons above relied on by the appellants, then the order of Sessions was to be confirmed.

The case was argued in last Trinity term. (a)

*Hall and Pashley, in support of the order of Sessions, admit*194] ted, on the authority of Regina v. Stainforth, 11 Q. B. 66 (E. C. L. R. vol. 63), that the objection to the indenture, on the ground that it did not appear on the face of the allowance to have been made within the jurisdiction of the justices, could not be sustained. They then relied upon Regina v. Colerne, 11 Q. B. 909 (E. C. L. R. vol. 63), as deciding that the signature by nine overseers to the grounds of appeal was sufficient; and cited Rex v. Bawbergh, 2 B. & C. 222 (E. C. L. R. vol. 9), to show that the order of justices for the binding must be referred to in the indenture of apprenticeship. And they contended that the reference in the allowance of the justices was not equivalent, because the allowance was no part of the indenture itself; and cited Scudamore v. Vandenstene, 2 Inst. 673,(6) and Cooch v. Goodman, 2 Q. B. 580 (E. C. L. R. vol. 42), to show that the allowance could be no part of the indenture, to which the allowing justices were not made parties.

J. T. Ingham and Pickering, contrà.-In Rex v. Bawbergh, the indenture seems to have contained no reference whatever to the order. Such reference is contained in this indenture; for the allowance was written on the same instrument, and intended to form part of it, and was signed by the justices before the execution of the indenture was completed, and therefore is itself part of the indenture; Broke v. Smith,

(a) June 10th, 1848. Before Lord DENMAN, C. J., PATTESON, WILLIAMS, and ERLE, JS. (b) S. C., as East Skidmore v. Vaudstevan, Cro. Eliz. 56.

Moore, 679, 2 Rol. Abr. 23, tit. Faits, pl. 4 (G.),(a) Burgh v. Preston, 8 T. R. 483 note (2) to Jevens v. Harridge, 1 Wms. Saund. 9 d (6th ed.). The allowing justices are *considered parties to the inden[*195 ture; for by stat. 56 G. 3, c. 139, s. 1, the justices are to sign their allowance of the indenture before it is "executed by any of the other parties thereto." Cur. adv. vult. Lord DENMAN, C. J., in the vacation sittings after this term (February 24th), delivered judgment.

The first point reserved was, whether a notice of appeal signed by nine overseers of the poor should be intended to be signed by a majority. It was not denied on the argument that such intendment should be made; and we are of opinion that the notice was valid..

The other objections to the examinations and the instruments of binding resolve themselves into two. First, whether the allowance of the indenture of apprenticeship is duly signed; and, secondly, whether the order for binding is duly referred to in the said indenture.

The form of the allowance as regards the first of these points is, "We," "justices," &c., "in and for the West Riding," "do hereby assent" and sign our allowance:" and the objection is, that it does not appear that they were in the county when they signed. The answer is, that the literal meaning of these words is that they, being justices, and being in the county, and acting for it, sign: and this answer is, in our judgment, sufficient.

The last objection is, that the order is not referred to by its date in the indenture; the allowance, which contains what is required, being said to be not in the indenture, and a reference in the indenture to the allowance not making it a part thereof; and Rex v. *Bawbergh, 2 B. & C. 222 (E. C. L. R. vol. 9), was relied on.

But it appears

[*196

to us that that case is inapplicable; for there the date of the order was not referred to upon the instrument at all; here it is. The essential fact, therefore, of that case is absent from this. Upon principle, also, it appears to us that the objection fails. If the allowance is in the indenture, the reference to the date, which is in the allowance, is also in the indenture. For, a reference to the date of an order being equally effectual on whatever part it may be written, and not being the act of any one in particular, the place where it may be found within the four corners of the instrument ought not to affect its validity. If the parties procured it to be written before they executed the deed, whether the writing was above or below the seal, whether on the side or the back, and whether the language of the reference purported to be that of all who seal, or of one only, or of another person, and to be adopted by them, the statute would be complied with. It is almost superfluous to cite authorities to show that all that is written on the instrument, according to the intention of the parties, before execution, constitutes the deed,

(a) Chibborn v. Horwood.

and that matters subscribed or endorsed may be incorporated; Broke v. Smith, Moore, 679, is in point; and the doctrine has been uniformly acted on since. The allowance was intended to be, and was written on the present instrument, and signed by the justices before execution by the other parties: it was therefore in the indenture at the time of execution; and it contains the required reference.

This alone would suffice: but, supposing this to *leave the

*197] matter at all doubtful, the reference to the allowance in, and the

adoption of it thereby into, the operative part of the deed would remove such doubt: and, further, the language of the statute confirms this view; for, after making certain provisions in respect of the indenture, it goes on to require that the justices shall sign their allowance of such indenture" "before the same shall be executed by any of the other parties thereto." The justices are thus to be by the statute parties to the indenture; and that which they sign is a part of the indenture, seeing that it is an indispensable part, and must precede in execution all other parts.

Lastly: The grounds of this decision are confirmed because, instead of defeating, it validates an instrument, the words of which show that the parties intended to do all that is required by law to make it valid. Therefore, the order of Sessions will be quashed.

Order of Sessions quashed.(a)

(a) Reported by H. Davison, Esq.

TURRILL v. CRAWLEY. Jan. 26.

An innkeeper has a lien on a carriage, brought to the inn by a guest, for its standing room, though the carriage does not belong to the guest himself.

TROVER for a chariot. Pleas: 1. Not guilty; 2. Not possessed. Issues thereon.

On the trial, before COLERIDGE, J., at the Middlesex sittings after last Easter term, the following facts appeared. The plaintiff was a coach builder in London, and the defendant an hotel keeper at Norwood. In January, 1844, a Miss Jerden hired the chariot in *question of the *198] plaintiff for one month, or three, six, or twelve months, at her option, and had her arms painted thereon, as was proved to be a common practice in such cases. Shortly afterwards, she arrived with the carriage and jobbed horses at the defendant's hotel, and resided there for several weeks. During her stay, the carriage was taken care of in the defendant's coach house. She left the hotel without the carriage; and the horses were returned to the job master. Her bill at the hotel was unpaid. After the expiration of the term for which the carriage had been hired,

the plaintiff required the defendant to deliver it up to him. The defendant claimed a lien upon it for Miss Jerden's hotel bill, and refused to deliver it. The bill contained a weekly charge for the standing of the carriage. For the plaintiff it was contended that the lien of an innkeeper does not attach to the goods of a stranger, or even to any goods of the guest except such as the money or labour of the innkeeper has been expended on; and that the plaintiff ought, under the circumstances, to have inquired into the ownership of the carriage. For the defendant it was proved that Miss Jerden represented to the plaintiff that the carriage was her own; and it was contended that in truth she had purchased it. The jury found that the carriage was hired and not sold, but that the defendant did not know it was not the property of Miss Jerden. The learned Judge was of opinion that the claim of lien was established, and directed a verdict for the defendant on the second issue, with leave to move to enter a verdict for the plaintiff.

Whateley, in last Trinity term, obtained a rule nisi accordingly. *Martin and Hayes now showed cause.-An hotel keeper has the same rights of lien as an innkeeper; Thompson v. Lacy, [*199 3 B. & Ald. 283 (E. C. L. R. vol. 5): and this lien extends to goods received with the guest, whether the property of the guest himself or not. The innkeeper's lien is founded on his liability. He is liable to indictment if he refuses to receive a guest; Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 213 (E. C. L. R. vol. 32). With the guest he must receive the goods of the guest, and keep them safely. He is answerable for the safe custody of his guest's carriage; Jones v. Tyler, 1 A. & E. 522 (E. C. L. R. vol. 28). His liability is not confined to the guest's own goods; Beedle v. Morris, Cro. Jac. 224, S. C. Yelv. 162, Coke's Entr. 347 a, pl. 2, Robinson v. Waller, 1 Roll. Rep. 449, S. C. 3 Bulstr. 269, York v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866, Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark. N. P. C. 172 (E. C. L. R. vol. 14). That the lien is inseparably connected with the duty appears from this; that, where a horse is placed at an inn by a person not a guest, the innkeeper is under no duty to allow the horse to remain, and, consequently, has no lien for its keep; Binns v. Pigot, 9 C. & P. 208 (E. C. L. R. vol. 38). So, to render an innkeeper liable for goods stolen from the inn, the owner of them must be a guest at the time of the theft, as appears from the view taken by three judges (absent, the fourth) in Gelley v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. 188. This species of lien, therefore, has no reference to contract, but attaches to the goods themselves, independently of the guest's title; and, when the lien has once attached, it continues after the interest of the guest has expired. There is the same lien upon the guest's carriage as upon his horse. The lien is a *general lien for the guest's expenses; but a special lien is sufficient in the present case; for the defendant had a claim for the standing of the carriage.

[*200

Whateley and Hance, contrà.-An innkeeper cannot detain the goods

of a third person to secure the debt of a guest: and, if he has such a right, it is confined to live chattels. In Skipwith v. J. S., 3 Bulstr. 271,(a) the Judges of this Court were equally divided on the question whether an innkeeper had a lien for the meat of a horse brought to an inn by a stranger. In Robinson v. Walter, 3 Bulstr. 262, S. C. 1 Roll. Rep. 449, Poph. 127, the Judges, three against one, appear to have been of opinion that the innkeeper had such a lien: but it appears from the report in 1 Roll. Rep. 449, that an issue was recommended, and nothing concluded. There it is intimated that the lien was good against the owner, because he would have had to keep the horse, and that he was benefited by the meat given to it. There is at all events a distinction between animals and inanimate chattels with reference to the innkeeper's right of lien. When a bailee has expended money or labour on chattels, he has in all cases a lien upon them. A trainer has a lien on a race horse for the charges of keeping and training him; Bevan v. Waters, 1 Moo. & M. 235 (E. C. L. R. vol. 22).(6) York v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866, and most of the cases cited for the defendant were cases of lien for the keep of a horse. In Stirt v. Drungold, 3 Bulstr. 289, it was held that the innkeeper had a lien on the horse for his meat; but some question was made *whether he might retain the saddle and bridle as well as *201] the horse. The distinction between living and inanimate chattels is especially noticed in Yorke v. Greenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866, by three of the Judges (referring to Stirt v. Drungold, 3 Bulstr. 289), who held that, if a man set his horse at an inn, though he lodge in another place, that makes him a guest, and the innkeeper is obliged to receive him; for the innkeeper gains by the horse, and therefore that makes the owner a guest, though he was absent. Contrà of goods left there by a man, because the innkeeper has no advantage by them." In Gelley v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. 188, also, the distinction is recognised. [WIGHTMAN, J.-In Stirt v. Drungold, 3 Bulstr. 289, there was no claim in respect of the saddle and bridle.] Nor in this case is there any claim for money or labour expended on the carriage. The lien, therefore, must be set up for the guest's personal expenses: but the innkeeper has no such general lien even upon a horse; Rosse v. Bramsteed, 2 Roll. Rep. 438. The argument, however, principally relied on by the plaintiff is, that the defendant had no excuse for not inquiring into the ownership of the carriage, and that, as it was not the property of the guest, the claim of lien is not sustainable.

Lord DENMAN, C. J.-I am of opinion that this rule must be discharged. If an innkeeper has a right to detain all the goods brought to his inn by a guest for all the guest's expenses, then the defendant is entitled to succeed; and the defendant is also entitled to succeed if the right is merely to detain any one particular thing for its own expenses.

(a) Cited in Robinson v. Walter, 3 Bulstr. 269. See S. C. 1 Bulst. 170.

(b) See Forth v. Simpson, Q. B. Trin. Term, 1849.