Actions cannot be maintained on infants' contracts. Partnership of infants. Goode v. sufficient to explain the general nature of an infant's liability and exemption from liability. Now, therefore, the general rule being that an infant cannot bind himself except for necessaries, next comes the question-Suppose he do, in fact, enter into a contract for something not falling under that denomination, what will be the consequence? In the first place, no action can be maintained against him during his infancy upon any such contract, nor afterwards, unless he elect to confirm it. But, in the second place, the contract is not absolutely void but voidable (a); and, therefore, when he arrived at the age of twenty-one, he may confirm it, and, if he do so, he will become liable to an action upon it. I will exemplify this by the case of Goode v. Harrison, which I have already cited from 5 B. & A. 147. A person of the name of Goode entered into a trading partnership with an infant under the age of twenty-one, called Bennion; a third person, named Harrison, supplied them with goods, and after Bennion came of age, he took no step to signify to the world that he disclaimed the connexion with Goode, but, on the contrary, allowed it to be supposed that he was (a) In Thornton v. Illingworth, 2 B. & Cr. 824., BAYLEY J. says, that "in the case of an infant, a contract made for goods for the purposes of trade is absolutely void, not voidable only;" and LITTLE DALE J. says the same. PARKE B., however, in Williams v. Moor (suprà), holds that the promise is not void in any case, unless the infant chooses to plead his infancy. See the next note, p. 214. still in partnership with him. After this, Harrison supplied Goode with more articles, and brought an action against him for the price, jointly with Bennion, as a co-defendant. Bennion set up his infancy, and urged that, as an infant cannot bind himself by a contract made in the course of trade, his agreement, while under age, to become Goode's partner was not binding upon him, and, consequently, that, not being Goode's partner, he was not liable for the articles supplied to him. On the other hand, it was urged that admitting the partnership contracted while he was an infant to be voidable, it was nevertheless in his option, when he arrived at his full age of one-and-twenty, to adopt and confirm it: that by his conduct he had done so; and that consequently he was liable for the goods supplied afterwards. The question was argued, as you may suppose, with great ability, the counsel being Baron PARKE and the late Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE. The court decided in favour of the plaintiff. The principle is clearly and strictly laid down in the judgment of Mr. Justice BAYLEY, "It is clear," says his lordship, "that an infant may be in partnership. It is true that he is not liable for contracts entered into during his infancy; but still he may be a partner. If he is in point of fact a partner during his infancy, he may, when he comes of age, elect, whether he will continue that partnership or not. If he continues the partnership, he will then be liable as a partner. If he dissolve the partnership, and, if when of age, he take the proper means to let the world know that the partnership is dissolved, then he will cease to be a partner." It is easy to apply this mode of reasoning to any other sort of contract, see also Southerton v. Whitelock, 1 Str. 690. However, in order to prevent persons from inconsiderately confirming contracts made by them during infancy, and to obviate the danger of attempts to foist such confirmation on them by false evidence, it is enacted by 9 G. 4. c. 14. s. 5., that no action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person upon any promise made, after full age, to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification after full of age any promise or simple contract made during infancy, unless such promise or ratification shall be made, by some writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith. See for a decision on this Act, Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A. & E. 934. (a) Now, then, such being the effect of an infant's (a) In the cases where, as we have seen, it has been questioned, whether contracts by infants were not void ab initio, it has also been held that they were consequently incapable of ratification. In Moor v. Williams, 11 M. & W. 256., the point was raised, whether a contract on the account stated was not void, and the subsequent ratification therefore was of no avail: but the Court of Exchequer held, as before stated, that there was just the same reason why an infant coming of age should be allowed to confirm an account stated, as to make himself liable on any other contract which he might have entered into during his infancy. Mr. Baron PARKE, moreover, held, as we have seen, that the promise is not void in any case; and this is certainly now the prevailing opinion. contract with regard to the infant himself, it remains only to say a word or two as to their he legal The ratification sets up and fect of tification. gives validity to an otherwise invalid contract; it " removes the bar of infancy;" it is not therefore of the nature of a new contract: for the only consideration is the moral duty arising from the previous transaction; and that is no consideration at all. (Jennings v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 501., per PARKE B.; but it gives legal effect to the original obligation, and to all its concomitants. The question of consideration therefore does not arise on the ratification, but relates to that of the old contract, upon which the plaintiff should declare, and not upon its revival, according at least to the form of pleading in Cohen v. Armstrong, 1 M. & Sel. 724.; Thornton v. Illingworth, 2 B. & Cr. 824.; and Hartley v. Wharton. It is not easy to see how the want of consideration for the new promise could be otherwise got over in the face of Monckman v. Shepherdson, 11 Ad. & Ell. 415., which decided that a good consideration once forfeited could not be revived by a parol promise founded upon. a moral obligation. There is nothing in the terms of the statute to supply the want of consideration; or at all to help the action: it simply requires that evidence of the ratification shall be in writing. The case of an acknowledgment to take a debt out of the Statute of Limitations appears in this respect analogous: in that case the plaintiff declares not on the acknowledgment, but on the original contract: see Leaper v. Tatton, 16 East, 420. If this be a correct view of the case where the defendant pleads infancy, the plaintiff, instead of a new assignment, replies the ratification, as in Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A. & E. 934., and Cohen v. Armstrong. It has been held that where the infant has given a bond, it cannot be ratified by the usual memorandum, so as to give a right of action upon it; for an instrument under seal can only be confirmed by one of as high a nature. Baylis v. Dyneley, 3 M. & Sel. 477. See as to the evidence of ratification, p. 79 antè. Persons who contract with infants are bound by their contract. Contracts by effect on the other contracting party. And, as to him, the rule is, that he is bound though the infant is not; for, to use the words in which the rule is stated in Bacon's Ab., Infancy, I. 4."Infancy is a personal privilege of which no one can take advantage but the infant himself; and, therefore, though the contract of the infant be voidable, yet it shall bind the person of full age; for, being an indulgence which the law allows infants to secure them from the fraud and imposition of others, it can only be intended for their benefit, and is not to be extended to persons of the years of discretion, who are presumed to act with sufficient caution and security. And, were it otherwise, this privilege instead of being an advantage to the infant, would in many cases turn greatly to his detriment. Thus, for instance, in Holt v. Ward, 2 Strange, 937., a gentleman of full age had promised to marry a minor. It was decided that she might maintain an action against him for breach of promise, though he could not have done so had she refused to perform her side of the contract. Again, in Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & S. 205., an infant was allowed to maintain an action on a contract to purchase a crop, on which no action could have been maintained against him. I now come to the second class of persons on whose capacity to contract I think it necessary to observe. I mean that of married women. Now a contract by, or with a married woman, |