had to oppose. He did not pat then to the test, but withdrew to the as.cmbly, as he did on the 15th of July; unfrtunately, circumstances were much changed, the 2 sembly far from being able to afford bina protection as they had then done, when acting in concert with the populace of Paris, were themselves degraded into a tool of the insurgents, and were ordered to sign tir own dissolution. All the competitors for power had united to efface the last remains of the old government; however small the real power and influence of the crown might then have boca, it was a cousider the clog upon all the parties; because, while it was in existence, it was the medium through which the functions of goverment must generally pass; but the Ling was no sooner deposed, than two powerful factions which had been distinctly pronounced before, openly entered the lists for superiority. The one was the city of Paris, who had possession of the King and the assembly, with a strong party in the latter, though a minority in their favour; the other was the party of the Gironde, with a majority of the assembly, and who had in their interest the confederated national guards, especially those of the other departments, who were by no means satisfied with the presumptuous pretensions of the city of Paris. The new common council which the sections had chosen for the 10th of August, insisted upon having the entire charge of the Royal Family, and acted more like a legishture, and as having the supreme power of the state, than as a council of police. (To be continued) SUMMARY OF POLITICS, CONTINENTAL COALITION.-It is generally useless to speculate upon a subject like this, without having official documents to proceed upon; and, even now, when we have before us the oficial note of the Russian minister, Laron Novosilezoff (see p. 188), and the demi-official auswer of the French governmen (see p. 213), I shodd be inclined to pass over them in silence, did pot the exultations, in the mjulsterial papers, seem to call for the few remarks, with which I purpose to trouble the reader. Ever is it has been understood, that Novoslitzoff, who we now find was destined to enter upou negotiations with the French, in consequence of the overture made to Bogland, by Napoleon, in January last; ever since it has been understood, that this rainister was, or was about to be, recalled, prvious to his entering on any negotiation at all, the Pitt newspapers have discovered strong smp 66 toms of satisfaction. At what, one could hardly gues, especially when it was recollected, that the Russian minister was, as it was then said, and as has now appeared to be the case, sent at the request of his Britannic Majesty! Considering his fact, one could hardly guess at the cause of the minister's joy, that the messenger of peace was about to return without having reached his jour ney's end; be, when we came to see the note of Novosiitzoil, and to find, that, by the effect of recent events, Russia Ind been induced to assure a lange becoming an intended principal in die war; then we could discover a reason for equilation, because such a circumstance was calculated to feed those hopes, which the immediate interest of the minister leads him to endeavour to keep alive. No sooner did th. sore of Novosilt zoff appear, than the munist press began to sing triumph; not triumph over die enemy, at least, the foreign enemy, but the enemy in St. Stephen's chapel." Herc," said the Pitt writers, you insisted that "none of the powers of the continent would "form alliances with Mr. Pitt; now, je "Foxes and Windhams hide your dimi"nished heads!" Neither upon the moderation nor upon the originality of this sentence will we stop to remark; but, as to the fact, which it expresses, we must be indulged in a few words. We never said, that Mr. Pitt would find none of the powers of the continent to form alliances with him against. France; tos, which of us did not know, that there never was that subsidy yet offered which did not find some the ready to receive it. But, what we did say, or, at least, what I said, I will now repeat, and shall be very much inclined to leave the reader to judge (without any comment as to what has since inken plo), wheder I was right, or wrong, said, that, at the instigation of Mr. Nu, no codition, upon such a principle and such a sole as were necessary to restore the liberties of Europe, or even to check the power of France, weld ever be fonael; I said, that it was very doubtftd whether Russia would take to cake part in de war, and that, if she did, it would be totally unless, with end to England, unless Austria or Frussia, or both of then, joined her, and hotily co-operated with her in the war; and, upon its being somewhat ill-naturedly obyaved, that, if Austria and Prussia joined Russia in the war, we should then say, that it would be quite useless unless Mr. Pitt could gain the Mchawi, todians also; upon this observation being made, I said, that the Mobarks were not necessary, but that money was, and that all † should, in case of a I powers, of whose disputes we have here been speaking; and, I will leave it entirely for the reader to judge, whether something very nearly approaching to such a division would not be a possible, not to say a probable, consequence of such a coalition, and such a war, as those, for which the ministerial writers appear so impatient, and at the prospect, real or imaginary, of which they give such demonstrations of joy.That such a con sequence of the war would, to say nothing more, add to the already great dangers of England, no one will, I should suppose, be inclined to deny; and, therefore, we ought very seriously to reflect upon the probable consequences of a war, in which, at this time, Austria should become a part. If, indeed, Russia had stepped forward for the sole, and the openly avowed, purpose of rea placing the Bourbons upon the throne of France, there would have been ample se co-operation of the three great powers abovementioned, require of Mr. Pitt, would be to find guineus (for his paper-money would not servc) to support the expenses altendant upon such a coalition for the space of five years, or, if that were too much reasonably to expect, I would content myself with three years. From this re-statement of our opinions, and which re-statement the reader will, I think, pronounce to be correct, he will easily judge of the fitness of the present triumph, on the part of the ministerial writers, who, at the most, pretend to make sure of Russia only; and venture to extend even their hopes no further than Austria. In order to judge of their wisdom in placing so implicit a reliance on the active co-operation of Russia, we should reperuse the several documents relating to the dispute between Russia and France, the progress of which dispute, with references to the several documents thereunto appertain-curity for Austria; but, after all that we ing, will be found in this work, Vol. VI. p. 690.The disposition of Russia, as pretty clearly indicated by the footing upon which she chose to remain, with respect to France, was before remarked on; and, surely, such a rupture, on the part of a great and leading power, was never before heard of in the world. That the chief cause of her anger with Napoleon was his apparent, his evident, resolution not to suffer her to interfere in the affairs of the South of Europe, particularly Italy, every one must, one would think, have been then convinced. It is, therefore, quite natural, that she should now be more seriously angry with him than before; but, power to hurt does not always accompany anger; and, in the present case, such a power certainly does not exist, and will not exist, unless the aid of either Austria or Prussia can be obtained by Russia. That the aid of Prussia will be obtained there does not, at present, any hope appear to be entertained; and, if Austria joins Russia in the war, without Prussia, I think, for the reasons which I have before stated, that the overthrow of the House of Austria is at much less distance than many people seem to imagine; for, in the case of such a war, the peace we should reasonably have to look to, would be a peace, in which France and Russia would both be gainers: who the loser must be is evident.It is, of course, without any pretensions to superior sagacity, that I offer an opinion upon such a subject; but, it is an opinion I have long entertained, and more than once expressed, that, to divide Europe into two great empires, the EASTERN and the WESTERN, would not be very uncongenial to the politics of the two have seen, who amongst us, even us.common men, does not know pretty well to what to ascribe the declaration in the Russian note, that the negotiation should commence. if at all, without acknowledging the new title of Buonaparté. No one will be unmindful of the advances towards the overthrow of Austria, that Buonaparté might make, and, perhaps, is making, in peace; but, it will take him long to arrive at Vienna in peace; not so, probably, in war; and then, let it be recollected, that there will be nobody for him to negotiate with but Russia! For the result of such a negotiation what friend of Austria must not tremble! In short, though there appear great dangers to Austria from remaining at peace with Napoleon, the progress of his power unchecked, there appear, under the present circumstances, greater dangers to her in a war, in which she should be joined, upon the Continent, only by Russia; and, as the preservation of Austria is of great importance to us, her being now plunged into such a war, ought, if my opinions are correct, to be a subject of sorrow rather than of joy. -Let us now see what a figure we exhibit in this scene, Our Sovereign receives from Napoleon an overture to treat for the restoration of peace. He is advised to answer, and does answer, that he cannot negotiate without first consulting with those powers of Europe, with whom he has " confidense tial communications." He is then advised, as we are now informed by the Russian En-t voy, to request the Emperor of Russia to send a person to meet the pacific overtures," which Napoleon had made to the Court of London; and, it is singular enough, that in nations. The question with him is not, whether a proposition to treat, whether a treaty itself, will produce good or ill to his country; but, whether it will produce effects favourable to the duration of his power; whether it will add to his majorities in the House of Commons; and, M. Hauterive (to whom the French demi-official paper is ascribed) certainly does him great injustice ascribed) certainly does him great injustice in imputing to him projects for dividing the French territory; for, his projects of di extend not an inch beyond the opposition" benches of the House of Commons, which projects will, too, no longer succeed with him. Certainly, "when the English mi 66 easting about us for a mediator, and a bearer, of our pacific views, we pitch not only upon a power at enmity with France, but a power who had chosen a cessation of all diplomatic intercourse as the means of giving proof of that enmity! Russia, whether in consideration of Lord Mulgrave's being our foreign minister, or for some other reason equally cogent, perhaps, yields to our solicitation, and sends an Envoy, not to Paris, but to Berlin, there to ask the mediation of a third power, in the important matter of obtaining passports for the person sent in our behalf.viding, Mr. Hauterive may be well assured, The Court of Berlin obtains the passports; but, just as the Envoy is setting off, he is stopped, not by the request of England, but by the fresh umbrage which Russia has taken at the conduct of Napoleon, whereat the English ministry express their joy! If any thing was ever more puerile than this, better calculated to expose the first mover to the contempt of the world, it has not yet reached my ear, or presented itself to my imagination. But, as we shall see more clearly in the sequel, it ought not to surprise any one, who has had an opportunity of observing the expedients, the miserable shifts, which have constantly marked the Pitt system of external policy, according to which, the interests and honour of the nation, and the dignity of the crown, are as nothing, when weighed against the place of the minister. The minister, one of whose eyes is constantly fixed, as I have frequently observed before, upon the City of London and the other upon the Chapel of St. Stephen, found that it would be expedient for him to do something, in consequence of the French note of January last. To send a negociator to Paris he could not, without hazarding his influence at court, or without exposing himself to the mortification of being compelled to return to the peace of Amiens and all its stipulations, while France conceded nothing to him. In short, he saw, in a negotiation with France, great danger to the duration of his power; and, therefore, he chose the round-about measure that we have just been contemplating, a measure which he regarded as sufficient to furnish him with a justification both with those who wished for a continuation of the war and those who wished for peace. The absurdity, therefore, which the demi-official French writer seems to impute to the measure exists only when the measure is considered as to its effect amongst the different nations concerned; and, that writer ought to have known, that such is not the light in which Mr. Pitt ever considers any of the transactions, in which he is, or has been, engaged with foreign : nistry wish for peace, they will feel that a French note inust be answered with an English note." Certainly as to the business of restoring peace, there could not be the least necessity for obtaining a Russian channel of communication, especially after Napoleon had made the overture. It was, besides, degrading in the extreme; and, the question of Hauterive, whether France and England could be " so reduced as to "await the decision of their differences " from a distant country, to whom the in"terests of both are so little known," is very pertinent. But, though there were these, and many more objections to the mode of proceeding adopted upon this occasion, all these objections were overbalanced by the mighty consideration above-mentioned and thus it is, that we suffer, that we are punished, that we are burdened sometimes and disgraced at other times, for the purpose of gratifying the love of rule, the haughtiness (for I will not call it ambition) of a minister. As to the recrimination contained in the French answer to the Russian note, it is, indeed, a tough morsel. I should be glad to hear it replied to by the Russian cabinet, on the one hand, and by Mr. Pitt and Lord Wellesley on the other. It is true, that the people whose countries have been over-run, who have been rendered either the subjects of, or tributary to, Russia and England, are, generally, a feeble and contemptible race, and that to defeat them in battle is little more than defeating a flock of sheep or a herd of swine; but, will Lord Wellesley or the hero of York Town say this? No: we have boasted of our eastern victories as glorious to our arms; we have boasted of our eastern conquests; we have boasted of our Empire in the East." The makers and defenders of the peace of Amiens, when' told of the acquisition of territory made by France, and left in her hands, failed not, in the fullness of that discretion," for the want of which they were reproached, to remind us, and to remind the world too, of our acquisitions in the East, acquisitions which, they asserted, were sufficient to, balance against those of France; and, let it never be forgotten, that that wise man and most discreet gentleman, Mr. Pitt, in his speech of the 3d of November, 1801, scrupled not to say, that our conquests in India had given a perfect consolidation to our strength. Indeed, from the whole course of his reasoning, it appeared, that he considered, or, at least, wished his hearers to consider, our conquests in India as more than equivalent to the conquests which the treaty of Amiens had left in the hands of France; whereat the kind-hearted, the generous souls, that listened to his harangue were ready to blubber with exultation. Now, however, they find the inconvenience resulting from such a boast; they find that they have to suffer from the force of an argument founded upon that boast, or, at least, which that boast renders fair, and, by the English ministry, incontrovertible; they feel the effects of a minister's acting upon a system of expedients, and having in view no other object than the preservation of his power. Such a minister never looks beyond the present moment. He is always in trouble of some sort or other. His place is continually in danger, in a greater or less degree, and he is continually thinking of the means of obviating that danger. When he was defending the preliminaries of peace, and boasting of the effects of our eastern conquests, the danger to his place (for, in fact, he still held it) arose from the statement of his adversaries, that he had left France in possession of an acquisition of territory that would render her the mistress of all the west of Europe, and that would, consequently, greatly hazard the safety of England. Thus pressed, all that he sought, or wished for, was, something wherewith to meet this statement; and out came the boast about our victories and acquisitions in India. We may condemn his conduct, we may curse the hour that committed our interests and our honour to "prudence" such as his; but, no one can blame the French for availing themselves of the argument with which he has furnished them, and which neither he, nor any one of the present ministers, can, without the most palpable inconsistency, without giving proofs of insincerity the most scandalous, attempt to controvert. They have borsted, they have officially come forward with an annual boast of their Indian conquests; and, who does not know, that a very few months have elapsed, since the two Houses of Parliament, after having solemnly resolved that Indian conquests are unwise and unjust, passed a vote of thanks to a person who had sent home an account of his having made more Indian conquests. In short, is it not notorious to the whole world, that we have, in the East, over-run nation after nation; and that, either as subjects or as tributary states, we have compelied, by one means or another, more than twenty millions of people to submit to our will. As to the description of those means I will not attempt it. The reader will himself easily determine, whether they have been more or less unjust, more or less cruel, more or less insulting, more or less violent and fraudulent, than the means employed by the French in their European conquests and annexations; but, I am sure he will agree with Mr. Burke, and will keep the fact in mind, that "fraud, injustice, oppression, and plunder, 'in In"dia, are crimes of the same blood, family, "and cast, with those that are born and 66 "bred in Europe."- -It may, indeed, be said, and I am ready to say, and think my self able to prove, that our conquests, that Our Empire in the East" and our tributary states there, not only do not tend to strengthen, but that they tend to enfeeble, and have actually enfeebled the power of England, while they afford the means of sapping the foundation of her constitution and of vitiating the manners of her people, This the French know, too: but will our ministers dare assert it? Have they not as serted the contrary? Will they not persevere in those assertions? Does not their system in a great degree require such a perseverance? And who, then, are to blame, who reasonably can blame, the French for profiting therefrom?As to the argument, that the powers of Europe have no right to interfere in matters relating to India, that country coming under the description of colonies; what, in answer to this, has Napoleon to da more than to consider Italy, Switzerland, and Holland as colonies? Such an argument is worth nothing; and, if we resche, that the law of nations shall not be appealed to as a rule of conduct for us with regard to India and the twenty millions of people there cur subjects or tributary to us, what right have we to appeal to the law of nations as a rulo for the conduct of France with regard to her neighbours? Our plea, the constant and the only plea, of cur ministers for their encroachments in the East, is, necessity; the necessity of subduing, or annexing, such or such a state, in order to secure our own do minions, and to preserve the tranquillity of India, And, is not this the plea of Napoleon? Has it not been the plea constantly set up by all the invading and encroaching rulers of France? Does not Napoleon insist, that the annexation of Genoa, for instance, is necessary to the security of France and to the preservation of the tranquillity of Europe? Most falsely he so insists, I am ready to allow; but, is our plea in India founded in perfect truth? Granted, that Napoleon's is "the tyrant's plea;" but, is ours the plea of justice and moderation? And, if the press at Paris is a slave in the cause of oppression, is the press at Calcutta at perfect liberty to comment, upon the motives whence conquests and encroachments are made in India? The partition of Poland forms another ground of justification of the conduct of France; and here, too, have we to smart for Mr. Pitt's love of power and place. It had often been asserted, that it was owing to his miserable policy in the year 1791, that all confidence in England was lost upon the Continent, and that the North of Europe, in particular, became suspicious of us; but, the grounds of this charge were never fully stated, in print, at least, till the first open rupture between the Pitts and the Addingtons induced these latter formally to prefer the charge, in the pamphlet from which my motto is taken, which pamphlet has always been ascribed to Mr. Bragge, and which I shall now quote somewhat at length, first reminding the reader, that, though the author endeavours to implicate Lord Grenville in the transaction, and, indeed, to throw on him great part of the blame, his Lordship did not come into the cabinet till the series of measures drew to a close. "Let "me now," says he, "come to a transac"tion which I before hinted at, and let me in my turn inquire a little more particular 66 ly into the claims of the late administration to superior wisdom and vigour in their "negociations with foreign powers." [We must just stop here to remark upon the extreme candour of this Addington advocate, who, whenever commendation is to be bestowed upon measures adopted in the early part of the Pitt administration, takes care to remind the reader, that Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham did not then make a part of it; but, when censure is the object, he is as careful not to remind the reader of that circumstance.] "I shall carry back my "render to a period, it may be said, some"what remote; it is, however, what I be"lieve has bad more influence upon the "conduct of Prussia, and has contributed “to its buse desertion" [Your prudent. Ad dingtonian can be venemous, upon occasion, and rude too] “and the turn which affairs "have taken in the North, more than all "that this ministry has done, or could do, "if they were even as wicked and as fool"ish as Cobbett represents them to be. "What I allude to is the Russian armament in 1791. Will it be believed, that this "same administration" [still appearing to suppose that Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham made part of it], "which is cried up "as so exclusively wise and penetrating, "and, above all, so firm and vigorous, "should not only have exposed itself to ab"solute derision and contempt, but com"mitted a deliberate breach of faith? That "it shrunk from engagements which it had "contracted, out of pure fear lest a war "should be unpopular; lest (shall I say it!) 66 66 a clamour for peace should shake them in "their seats ?" [Oh, yes! say it say it, by all means; for, rest assured, that it is a -truth which will be very useful to the nation, if it can be once thoroughly impressed upon their minds.] "Every Englishman will easily enter into the feelings of Lord "Whitworth upon this occasion. Never was mortification more complete. He had, by direction from our court, held the most high and threatening language, and protested that war would be the immediate consequence of his remonstrances not "being attended to. Relying, however, upon the assurances given by the gentlemen on the other side, the Russian cabi"net stood firm; and our great, our mighty, 66 66 66 our vigorous negociators gave way. They “did, indeed, show some delicacy for "Lord Whitworth; they did put it in his power to shut himself up, as he did, for "six weeks; and sent Mr. Faulkner to "make their apology to the Empress, and "assure her, I suppose, of their readiness to "receive her future commands. Mr. Fox, and his friends, backed by Mr. Wilberforce, will, perhaps, stil insist, that "Ochako was not an object for which we ought to go to war. Peitso; but, where, "then, was the wisdom of Lord Grenville "and Mr. Pitt to commit the country ter “ such an object? Or, why persist in it_till. they involved the nation in disgrace. The "fact is, and, though not generally known, "is now no secret, that our interposition |