act of 1882 provides that such appeal must be taken before such election is held.

But to this it may be answered that in this State, and we believe we may safely say in this country, whenever an appeal is allowed to a higher court, that some time is always fixed within which such appeal must be taken. If the appellant does not take his appeal within the prescribed time it will be dismissed. But if taken in time, and once properly before the appellate court, it is heard and tried according to the law rules governing the trial of such cases in that court, and without any reference to the time within which the appeal was required to be taken. This is undoubtedly the general rule, and the fact that the appeal in this case was required to be taken before the election would not, of itself, imperatively require the appellate court to try the case before the election.

But the appellant contends that taking the whole law, it was its purpose and intent that the registration should be perfected before the election, and that upon the delivery of the lists to the judges of election which is done on the morning of the election the power of the courts to make corrections is at an end, until after the next annual sitting of the registers. To determine this question some reference to the object of the law and its provisions is necessary.

The general object of the registration law is to secure to every qualified voter the right to vote in his proper district, and to prevent disqualified voters from voting. The act of 1882, chapter 22-the existing registration law remedies a defect that had existed in the previous law. This law permits the duly qualified voter to apply to the register to have stricken from the lists the names of all persons disqualified to vote in any particular precinct or district, and to appeal to the courts if his application is refused by the register. While the duly qualified voter's ballot may be deposited and counted, his right to vote, so highly prized by the citizen, may be rendered comparatively valueless to him if his vote can be nullified by fraudulent voting.

It was to prevent this that the act of 1882 gave to any qualified voter not only the right to have himself registered but to see that the lists were kept clean. An appeal is allowed, provided it is taken within the prescribed time, in all cases where a name is improperly put on or kept off the lists.

The appeal is taken by a petition to the court or judge stating the facts, etc., and if the petition shows a prima facie cause of complaint, the judge or court orders a summons and proceeds to try the case.

The

The jurisdiction of the court attaches as soon as such petition is filed within the prescribed time, and showing a prima facie case. jurisdiction of the courts having attached will not be ousted by lapse of time, except by some express provision in the law, or the evident and unmistakable intent of the act that it should not continue beyond the day of election. There is no such express provision, nor can we gather from the law that such was the intent of its framers.

It is apparent that the act contemplated that these cases should be disposed of as soon as ther possibly could. This is evident from the fact that the twenty-second section requires the summons to be issued

VOL. XI.-14

forthwith upon the filing the petition, and more strongly still by the general purpose of the law that every election should be fairly conducted. But the interest of the voter in a correct list is not confined to the one election immediately following the filing his petition. There may be a special election held before the next annual correction of the list. These special elections are provided for by sections 23 and 26 of the act of 1882. These sections provide that at such special elections the list made at the previous October sittings of the registers, as corrected by the judges, shall be the list of the qualified voters. If, for want of sufficient time, the courts are unable to complete the correction of the lists before the annual November election, there can exist no reason, either in the language or policy of the law, why it should not be completed afterward, to be used in the event of a special election.

But it has been argued that there is no practical use in correcting the list, after the annual November election, because before the next regular election the registers would again sit, and they could make the corrections. If we throw out of view entirely the contingency of a special election, still there will exist no valid reason why the correction should not be made after the annual election.

The act of 1882, by prescribing a punishment for it, very clearly recognizes the possibility of fraud being practiced by the registers. In the event of such fraud being practised, it would be very Utopian to expect the fraud to be remedied by him who perpetrated it. He could hardly be expected to undo one fall what he had purposely done the fall before. The appeal was given as well to correct and prevent fraud as to rectify mistakes; one method of perpetrating a fraud is to place and keep on the list the name of a disqualified voter, and known to be such by the register. The only way to get such names off is by appeal. If the argument of the appellant is correct, and the power of the courts over the list ends with the annual election, then if a large number of fraudulent names are on the list, it is difficult to see how the fraud is ever to be remedied, without at least a change of the registration officer. The agreed statement of facts in this case show that there are one thousand cases still unacted upon by the courts.

This fact demonstrates the impossibility of trying all the cases in the very limited time between the October sitting and the November election. These thousand cases may or may not be cases involving fraud. If fraudulent, are they to remain there until the next election and be voted again, and again escape striking off for want of time, or did the legislature intend the whole list to be purified by the courts, if the registers failed in their duty? We think there can be but one answer to this question.

It has been argued that the jurisdiction of the courts in this matter being a special statutory one its existence must be shown, and many cases have been cited to sustain this proposition. To this we assent. But the existence of the jurisdiction in this case is affirmatively shown by the filing the petition. The question here is not when the jurisdiction attaches, but when it ends. No case has been shown or can be shown holding that a court having once properly obtained jurisdiction

of a case can lose it before the trial witnout some positive law to that

effect.

Nor can we consider the question of costs, pressed in the argument, as having any influence in the decision of this question. If the petitioners fail in their cases, like any other plaintiffs, they are taxed with all the costs. If it is shown that the registers have acted in bad faith they alone are responsible for the costs. It is only in the event that the registers are mistaken that the costs are taxed to the city.

While it would be desirable in every case that as few burdens as possible should be thrown on the city, still the successful operation of so important a law should not be impaired or hindered by the possible contingency of some costs falling upon the corporation. Judgment affirmed.

NEW JERSEY COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS.

In error to supreme court.

STATE v. LOVE.

January 4, 1887

William C. Spencer, for plaintiffs. John A. Blair, for defendant. PER CURIAM. The opinion of the supreme court is affirmed.

REED, J. (dissenting). I am unable to join with the majority of the court in affirming the judgment below. The judgment intervenes, and the reason given in the court below in support of the judgment expressly declares a legal proposition which I am constrained to regard as a dangerous departure from a correct rule of statutory construction. This proposition seems to be this, namely: that whenever the legislature has conferred upon a special statutory tribunal the power to place or increase an impost upon property upon a condition that previous notice shall be given to the owner of the intended action, nevertheless such tribunal, in spite of the express statutory requirement, may proceed without notice if the service of the statutory notice happens to be inconvenient.

The point arises in respect to the action of the board of finance of Jersey City, sitting as commissioners of appeal, in raising the valuation of property belonging to the estate of William E. Dodge, deceased. By the policy of our tax laws the valuation of property in the first instance is made by the assessors, subject to correction by the township committee, or the body which represents in cities the township committee. The duplicate is then delivered to the collector. The valuation is then a finality, unless one of the two things afterward occurs. The tax payer may apply to the board for a reduction of the valuation, or upon complaint by the collector or some other person, the commissioners may increase the valuation.

The latter action can only be taken, according to the terms of the statute, after giving notice to the tax payer. In the present case the executors of William E. Dodge were, by the terms of the will of Mr. Dodge, the representatives to whom notice should have been given. It appears that they reside in the city of New York and, although an attempt was made to give notice, none was in fact given.

The supreme court was of the opinion that the statutory requ.rements did not apply to non-resident tax payers. This conclusion was placed upon the ground that otherwise a duty would be imposed upon the collector which he could not perform, and in most cases the attempt to increase the assessment of non-residents would prove abortive. But I think that no one would contend that a notice given out of the limits of the State would not be entirely effective in laying a foundation for the action of the commissioners. Therefore, it cannot be said that there existed an inability to give notice to a non-resident of the State. Nor in many instances does there exist any greater inconvenience in giving notice to the one than the other.

What obstacle prevents the service of a notice by the collector of Jersey City personally upon or at the dwelling of a resident of the city of New York, which does not appertain to a service upon a resident of the county of Cape May?

So I do not perceive that it can be coneluded that the legislature meant residents only, because service upon non-residents was either impossible or universally more difficult than service upon residents.

But I am of the opinion that neither inconvenience nor impossibility of service is an answer to the requirements of the statute. It was probably within the power of the legislature to have provided that the commissioners could, at stated meetings, increase valuations without notice. The tax payer would then have been warned of the power of the board to so deal with the assessment against him, and if he desired to be heard in case there was any action taken in that direction, he would have been compelled to watch the proceedings of the board throughout all its sessions. This, however, would put upon every tax payer such an unreasonable burden that it is hardly conceivable that such a scheme would find countenance in any legislative body. The plan here actually provided was, therefore, a reasonable one. The valuation placed in the duplicate was to be final unless the tax payer himself applied for a reduction, or he was notified of an effort to raise the valuation.

The legislature might have provided an easier method of giving notice, and then the tax payer would have been put upon his guard to watch for and answer such monition.

The legislature has, however, in express terms required not that a man shall not be taxed without notice, but when once assessed, that assessment shall not be altered against him without a certain kind of notice.

There is nothing here to construe. A court, says Mr. Maxwell, is not at liberty to speculate on the intentions of the legislature when the words are clear, or to construe an act according to its own notions of what should have been enacted. Maxwell Int. Stats., 6.

In no State has this rule of statutory construction been more frequently enforced than in this. 3 Harr. 71; 3 Vr. 207; 9 id. 214;

2 id. 515; 6 id. 550; 13 id. 125.

All acts which impose taxes are specially subjected to a strict construction. Daines v. Heath, 3 C. B. 941.

And in regard to the requirement of notice as a condition precedent to an alteration of valuations, the remarks of Judge COOLEY are forcible and just: "The courts," says he, "have been particularly careful to see that revising tax tribunals did not change assessments to the prejudice of tax payers, who, under the circumstances, had no reason to look for or anticipate any such change. If the tax payer does not appeal he has the right to suppose that the assessment against him will be allowed to stand as made." Cooley Tax. 268.

Aside from the injustice of such a course of action, I have found no case in which it has been intimated that when either in tax or other proceedings a statute requires notice as a precedent condition to a step in such proceeding. such a step can be taken without notice, because the notification is difficult or impossible.

I think that because of the absence of notice to the tax payer, the board of finance had no power to raise the valuation of his property, and that the judgment below should be reversed.

NEW JERSEY COURT OF CHANCERY.

GEBEL V. WEISS.
April 13, 1887.

The plaintiff married W. supposing him to be a single man, and while they were living together they purchased the premises in question, which were paid for with the plaintiff's money. The deed was taken in both their names as husband and wife. W. died, and the plaintiff afterward ascertained that he had a wife and children living at the time of their marriage. Thereupon she brought this action against the wife and her children to obtain title to the whole property on the ground of W.'s fraud in inducing their marriage and in taking the deed of the property jointly as husband and wife. Held, that she was entitled to the decree prayed for.

Bill on relief. On final hearing on pleadings and proofs.

Carl Lentz, for complainant. F. E. Blackwell, for defendants. RUNYON, Chancellor. The complainant was married to Peter Weiss on the 11th of February, 1872. They lived together until October 9, 1881, when he died John Zipfel by deed dated February 27, 1875, conveyed to them in fee a lot of land in Newark. The conveyance was made to "Peter Weiss and Kunigunda, his wife," and the consideration was $2,040, of which sum $440 were paid in cash on the delivery of the deed, and for the rest, $1,600, a mortgage was given by them to Zipfel, payable in five years from date the date of the deed - with interest.