Opinion of the Court, per RAPALLO, J. In the case at bar, the respondent by her answer, sets up title in her father, Benjamin Florence, to the whole of the premises in controversy, a conveyance of the whole of the premises from him to her and her sister Mary Ann, subject to his possession during his life, and a conveyance from Mary Ann of her share, and avers, that by means of such conveyances, she (the respondent) became, and ever since has been, and is, the sole owner in fee of the premises sought to be partitioned, and denies that any of the parties to this action, except said respondent, have, or own, or are entitled to, the lands described in the pleadings, and now owned or possessed by her, or any estate or interest therein; and she denies the plaintiff's right to the relief asked for. These averments constitute a sufficient denial of a holding in common, and without regard to the questions raised as to the title and possession of Benjamin Florence, they constitute, if sustained by proofs, an insuperable bar to this action. The conveyances were duly proved, and are found by the referee. The respondent testified on the trial, that she and her sister Mary Ann had possessed the farm, and claimed to own it, from the time of her father's death, which happened in September, 1865, until Mary Ann deeded to her, September, 1866, and that she had lived there ever since. The referee finds, that the defendant Euphemia and her grantor have been in possession of the property since the year 1828, claiming to be the owners in fee under the deed from Minott Mitchell and wife to Benjamin Florence; and he also sets forth in his findings the conveyance from Benjamin Florence, and from Mary Ann Florence to Euphemia. It is not necessary to examine the correctness of the decisions of the referee, in regard to the possession and title of Benjamin Florence. A subsisting adverse possession by Euphemia, at the time of the commencement of the action is clearly established; and though of comparatively short duration, it is sufficient to bar this action, and sustain the referee's conclusion dismissing the complaint. This result could not be varied by any disposition, which might be made of the Statement of case. other questions raised in the case; and the judgment should, All concur but CHURCH, Ch. J., not voting LEWIS SUNDERLIN et al., Respondents, v. HENRY BRADSTREET et al., Appellants. The proprietors of a mercantile agency engaged in collecting and publishing for circulation among all its patrons, information as to the standing and financial credit of merchants and traders, are liable for a false report thus disseminated, injurious to the credit of the subject of it, although made in good faith and upon information deemed reliable. Such a communication is privileged, only when it is confined to those having an interest in the information. The fact that the libelous communication was in cipher, understood by the subscribers only, does not affect the liability. (Decided September 7th, 1871.) APPEAL from judgment of the late General Term of the seventh judicial district, entered upon order denying motion for new trial, and directing judgment on verdict in favor of plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were merchants, doing business in the city of Rochester. The defendants were the proprietors of a mercantile agency. They published a semi-annual volume, containing the names of persons and firms doing business in various parts of the United States and Canadas, and information in reference to their financial credit. They also published what they called a weekly sheet of corrections, which was sent to their subscribers in the city of New York by private messenger, and in the country by mail. About ten thousand copies of their semi-annual volume, and between three and four thousand copies of their weekly sheet are so distributed. In this weekly sheet, under the date of January 31st, 1868, they published that the plaintiffs had failed. This was con Statement of case. fessedly false. The plaintiffs called upon the defendants, for the names of the parties furnishing the information, which they refused to give, but published the next week a retraction of the report complained of. The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for $400. Case and exceptions ordered to be heard at, first instance at General Term. Delavan F. Clark, for appellants. That, if the communication was privileged, the action is not maintainable without proof of express malice. (Harris v. Thompson, 24 Eng. L. & E., 370; Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N. Y., 20.) The communication was privileged. (Cur., per CAMPBELL, 2 Ch. L., in Harrison v. Bush, 5 Ell. & Bl. Q. B., 348; Van Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y., 193; SELDEN, J., in Lewis & Herrick v. Chapman, 16 id., 369; PARKE, B., in Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cromp., Mees. & Rosc., 193; Goldstein v. Foss, 2 Car, & P., 252; S. C., 6 B. & C., 154; Gettings v. Foss, 3 Car. & P., 160; Fleming v. Newton, 1 H. L. C., 379; Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N. Y., 20; note to Wyatt v. Gore, Holt's N. P., 299; Townsend on Slander and Libel, § 239; Billings v. Russell & Waters, Boston Law Reporter, vol. 8, N. S., 669; Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y., 477, overruled, Taylor v. Church, 8 id., 452.) A person, believing himself possessed of knowledge, which if true, does or may affect the rights and interests of another, may communicate it to that other. (Townsend on Libel and Slander, § 241; 2 Greenl. Ev., § 421.) Liberty of publication is permitted to the extent of the exigencies of society and business. (Parsons v. Surgey, 4 Foster & Fin., 248, and note; Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cromp., M. & Rosc., 181; Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Adol. & Ellis, N. S., Q. B. R., 308; Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., Law Rep., 4 Q. B., 262; Fleming v. Newton, 1 House Lords Cas., 379; Gassett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94.) W. F. Cogswell, for respondents. The communication was not privileged. (Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y., 452.) Opinion of the Court, per ALLEN, J. ALLEN, J. The only question presented by the appeal, has respect to the character and occasion of the publication of the alleged libel, and is, whether the circumstances and occasion of the publication were such as to absolve the defendants from liability, in the absence of proof of express malice; that is, whether it is within the protection of privileged communications. We might properly decide this question upon the authority of Taylor v. Church (4 Seld., 452), in which this precise question was determined by a unanimous court, seven judges taking part in the decision, the other judge refraining from expressing an opinion, for the reason that he was not present at the argument. The point was made upon the trial of the action, and presented by counsel upon the appeal in this court, and was material to be decided for the guidance of the court below, upon a re-trial which this court ordered, inasmuch as, if the publication was privileged, it would probably be fatal to the plaintiff's cause of action; and the court, by a deliberate and formal resolve, adjudged that the alleged libel was not a privileged communication. The circumstances under which this judgment was given, as well as the method adopted by the judges in determining this precise question by a formal declaration, entitle the decision to peculiar weight as an authority. That case cannot be distinguished from this in any circumstance favorable to the defendant. The decision, as abstracted by the reporter, was that "one who undertakes, for an association of merchants in New York, to ascertain the pecuniary standing of merchants and traders residing in other places, who are customers of some of the members of the association, and who furnishes reports to all the members of the association, irrespective of the question, whether they have an interest in the question of the standing of such merchants and traders, is liable for any false report made by him prejudicial to the credit of the subject of it, although made honestly, and from information upon which he relied." Opinion of the Court, per ALLEN, J. In the case before us, the defendants were in no sense the agents of an association of merchants, or of their patrons. Of their own volition, and for their own profit, they established a bureau for collecting and disseminating information as to the character, credit, and pecuniary responsibity of merchants and traders throughout the United States. The business is in the nature of an intelligence office; and it is not intended by this to intimate, that it is not an entirely lawful and reputable business; or that it is not of general utility, or perhaps, a necessity to the commerce and business of the country. All may be conceded that is claimed for it by its friends; but in its conduct and management it must be subjected to the ordinary rules of law, and its proprietors and managers held to the liability which the law attaches to like acts by others. The information acquired by them was their own, and was communicated to others, or made public in such form and upon such terms as the defendants dictated. In the established course of their business, they communicated with their patrons by means of semi-annual publications, with weekly corrections printed and furnished to each. The number of copies of each publication being about 10,000, distributed to every part of the country among merchants, bankers, and traders. The alleged libel was published in one of the weekly corrections of the regular semi-annual publications, and was thus extensively circulated. Its distribution was general among all the subscribers to the defendants' publication, irrespective of their interest in the question of the plaintiffs credit and standing. Whether a libel or slander is within the protection accorded to privileged communications, depends upon the occasion of the publication or utterance, as well as the character of the communication. The party must have a just occasion for speaking or publishing the defamatory matter. A communication is privileged within the rule when made in good faith, in answer to one having an interest in the information sought; and it will be privileged if volunteered when the |