opinion true. For as the will cannot embrace an object unless it be presented 'under the shadow of good," so neither can the understanding close and comply with any opinion unless it be disguised 'under the appearance of truth."2 But to make appearance the very essence of truth, is to make a shadow the essence of the sun; it is to make a picture the essence of a man. I shall say no more to Protagoras than this, that if any opinion be false, his cannot be true, but must needs be the falsest of all the

rest.

Yet the end that these sceptics propound to themselves was, if you will believe him, 'a freedom from jars and discords,' from heresy and obstinacy, to have a mind unprejudiced, unprepossessed; the avoiding of perturbations, a milky whiteness and serenity of soul—a fair mark indeed; but how a roving sceptic should ever hit it, is not easily imaginable; for what philosophy more wavering and voluble? Was there ever a more reeling and staggering company? Was there ever a more tumbling and tossing generation ?

What shall I say to these old seekers, to this wanton and lascivious sect, that will espouse themselves to no one opinion, that they may the more securely go a whoring after all? If they be resolved to deny all things, as they can do it very easily, and have seemed to do it very compendiously, truly then they have taken a very sure way to prevent all such arguments as can be brought against them; yet because they seem to grant appearances, we will at least present them with a few appearances,' and we will see how they will move them and affect them. It were well, then, if Pyrrho, the forementioned painter, would but tell us, whether a picture would be all one with a 2 Sub apparentia veri.

1 Sub umbra boni.

3 'Αταραξία καὶ μετριοπάθεια.

4 Φαινόμενα.

face; whether an appearance be all one with a reality; whether he can paint a nonentity or not; whether there can be an appearance where there is no foundation for it; whether all pictures do equally represent the face; whether none can paint a little better than he used to do; whether all appearances do equally represent being; whether there are not some false and counterfeit appearances of things. If so, then his 'indifference" must needs be taken away; or, if there be always true and certain appearances of things, then his doubting and 'uncertainty '2 must needs vanish. When he is thirsty, and chooses rather to drink than abstain, what then becomes of his 'indifference?' if he be sure that he is athirst, and if he be sure that he seems to be athirst, what then becomes of his 'uncertainty ?' When the dog was ready to bite him, if he was indifferent, why did he run away? If it were an appearance, why did he flee from a shadow? Why was the painter afraid of colours? If his sense was only affected, not his understanding, how then did he differ from the sensitive creature, from the creature that was ready to bite him? If he tells us that he was the handsomer picture of the two, who was it then that drew him so fairly? was it an appearance also? Doth one picture use to draw another? When he persuades men to incline to his scepticism, what then becomes of his 'indifference?' When he makes no doubt nor scruple of denying certainty, what then becomes of his uncertainty ?' But, not to disquiet this same Pyrrho any longer, I shall choose more really to scatter those empty fancies by discovering the true original and foundation, the right progress and method of all certainty.

Now God himself, that eternal and immutable Being,

'that fixed and unshaken Entity," must needs be the fountain of certainty, as of all other perfections; and if other things be compared to Him, they may in this sense, without any injury to them, be styled 'appearances,' in respect of the infinite reality, and weighty and massy solidity that is in His most glorious being, by virtue of which, as Himself hath everlastingly the same invariable knowledge of all things, so He is also the most knowable and intelligible object, a sun that sees all things, and is in itself most visible. An atheist must needs be a sceptic; for God himself is the only immovable verity upon which the soul must fix and anchor. Created beings show their face awhile, then hide it again; their colour goes and comes, they are in motion and flow.'3 God is the only durable object of the soul. Now that the soul may have a satisfactory enjoyment of its God, and that it may be accurately made according to His image, God stamps and prints, as resemblances of His other perfections, so this also of certainty upon it. How else should it know the mind of its God? how should it know to please Him, to believe Him, to obey Him? With what confidence could it approach unto Him, if it had only weak and wavering conjectures ?

Now God lets the soul have some certain acquaintance with other beings for His own sake, and in order to His own glory. Nor is it a small expression of His wisdom and power to lay the beginnings of man's certainty so low, even as low as sense; for by means of such an humble foundation, the structure proves the surer and the taller. It is true there is a purer and nobler certainty in such beings as are above sense, as appears by the certainty of angelical knowledge, and the knowledge of God himself; 1 Τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ τὸ βεβαίως ὄν. 2 Τὰ φαινόμενα.

3 In motu et fluxu.

yet so much certainty as is requisite for such a rational nature as man's is, may well have its risings and springings out of sense, though it may have more refinings and purifyings from the understanding. This is the right proportioning of his certainty to his being; for as his being results out of the mysterious union of matter to immateriality, so likewise his knowledge, and the certainty of his knowledge, (I speak of natural knowledge,) first peeps out in sense, and shines more brightly in the understanding. The first dawnings of certainty are in the sense, the noonday glory of it is in the intellectuals. There are indeed frequent errors in this first edition of knowledge, set out by sense; but it is then only when the due conditions are wanting, and the understanding (as some printers use to do) corrects the old errata of the first edition, and makes some new errors in its own. And I need not tell you that it is the same soul that moves both in the sense and in the understanding; for 'it is the mind that sees, the mind that hears; and as it is not privileged from failings in the motions of the sense, so neither is it in all its intellectual operations, though it have an unquestionable certainty of some in both. The certainty of sense is so great, as that an oath, that high expression of certainty, is usually, and may very safely, be built upon it. Mathematical demonstrations choose to present themselves to the sense, and thus become ocular and visible.

The sceptics, that were the known enemies of certainty, yet would grant more shadow and appearance of it in sense than anywhere else, though erroneously. But sensethat racked them sometimes, and extorted some confessions from them which speculative principles could never do. Away, then, with that humour of Heraclitus, that tells us 'men's eyes are but weak and deceitful witnesses.'2 Surely 1 Νοῦς ὁρᾶ, καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει.

2 Κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοί.

he speaks only of his own watery and weeping eyes, that were so dulled and blurred, as that they could not clearly discern an object. But he might have given others leave to have seen more than he did.

Nor can I tell how to excuse Plato for too much scorning and slighting these outward senses, when that he trusted too much inwardly to his own fancy. Sextus Empiricus propounds the question, Whether he were not a sceptic? but he only showed himself a sceptic by this, for which he moved such a question. It is sure that Plato was sufficiently dogmatical in all his assertions; though this indeed must be granted, that some of his principles strike at certainty, and much endanger it; for being too fantastical and poetical in his philosophy, he placed all his security in some uncertain, airy, and imaginary castles of his own contriving, and building, and fortifying,—his connate ideas I mean, which Aristotle could not at all confide in, but blowed them away presently; and perceiving the proud emptiness, the swelling frothiness of such Platonical bubbles, he was fain to search for certainty somewhere else; and casting his eye upon the ground, he spied the bottom of it lying in sense, and laid there by the wise dispensation of God himself; from thence he looked up to the highest top' and 'pinnacle' of certainty, placed in the understanding. The first rudiments of certainty were drawn by sense; the completing and consummating of it was in the understanding. The certainty of sense is more gross and palpable; the certainty of intellectuals is more clear and crystalline, more pure and spiritual. To put all certainty, or the chiefest certainty in sense, would be excessively injurious to reason, and would advance some sensitive creatures above men, for they have some quicker senses than men have. Sense

1

Apex.

2

Πτερύγιον.