Thus God framed this great organ of the world; he tuned it, yet not so as that it could play upon itself, or make any music by virtue of this general composure (as Durandus1 fancies it), but that it might be fitted and prepared for the finger of God himself, and at the presence of His powerful touch might sound forth the praise of its Creator in a most sweet and harmonious manner. And thus nature is that regular line, which the wisdom of God Himself has drawn in being, 'for nature is order, or a work of order,'' as he speaks; whereas that which they miscalled fortune, was nothing but a line fuller of windings and varieties; and as nature was a fixed and ordinary kind of providence, so fortune was nothing but a more abstruse and mysterious and occult kind of providence; and therefore fortune was not blind, as they falsely painted and represented her, but they themselves were blind, and could not see her. And in this sense, that speech of that grave moralist, Seneca, is very remarkable: 'Providence, fate, nature, chance, fortune, are but different names for one and the same God."

But then secondly, Nature, as it is scattered and distributed in particular beings, so it is the very same with essence itself; and therefore spirituals, as they have their essence, so they have their nature too; and if we gloried in names, it would be easy to heap up a multitude of testimonies, in which these two must needs be 'synonymous.'

24

And thus nature speaks these two things,-(1.) It points out 'the origin of existence,' it is the very genius of entity; it is present at the nativity of every being, nay,

1 Note D. 2 Τάξις γὰρ ἢ τάξεως ἔργον ἡ φύσις.-Plutarch., ut sup. 3 Providentia, fatum, natura, casus, fortuna, sunt ejusdem Dei varia nomina.-De Beneficiis, iv. 8.

4 Ισοδυναμούντα.

Originem entis.

it is being itself. There is no moment in which you can imagine a thing to be, and yet to be without its nature.

(2.) It speaks the action of existence ;'1 and it is a principle of working in spirituals, as well as 'the source of motion and rest'2 in corporeals. All essence bubbles out, flows forth, and paraphrases upon itself in operations. Hence it is, that such workings as are facilitated by custom, are esteemed natural. Hence that known speech of Galen, 'Habits are second (acquired) natures." Customs are frequently adopted and engrafted into nature. Hence also our usual idiom calls a good disposition a good nature. Thus the moralists express virtues or vices that are deeply rooted, by this term-'become natural.'4

And so some, and Grotius among the rest, would understand that place of the Apostle, 'Does not even nature 1 Cor xi. 14. itself teach you,' of a general custom. But that word, 'nature itself," does plainly refuse that interpretation; and the learned Salmasius does both grant and evince that it cannot be meant of custom there.

And thus having seen what nature is, it will be very easy in the next place to tell you what the Law of nature is.

1 Operationem entis.

Principium motûs et quietis.

3 'ETÍKTηTOι þúσeis тà ë0ŋ.—Medd. Græc. Opera, Hülm, vol, iv. p. 452.

CHAPTER IV.

THE NATURE OF A LAW IN GENERAL.

BEFORE we can represent unto you the law of nature, you must first frame and fashion in your minds the just notion of a law in general. And Aquinas gives us this shadowy representation of it: 'A law is a certain rule and measure, according to which any agent is led to act, or restrained from acting." But Suarez is offended with the latitude of this definition, and esteems it too spreading and comprehensive, as that which extends to all naturals, ay, and to artificials too, for they have 'rules and measures of their operations.'2 Thus God has set a law to the waves, and a law to the winds; nay, thus clocks have their laws, and lutes have their laws, and whatsoever has the least appearance of motion, has some rule proportionable to it. Whereas these workings were always reckoned to be at the most but 'tendencies and gravitations,' and not the fruits of a legislative power. But yet the Apostle Paul, to stain the pride of them that gloried in the law, calls such things by the name of law as were most odious and anomalous. Thus he tells us of a law of death,'4

1 Lex est quædam regula et mensura, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur.

2 Regulas et mensuras operationum. 3 Inclinationes et pondera.

4 Νόμος θανάτου.

and 'a law of sin'1 though sin be properly lawlessness.'2 Rom. viii. 2. Thus he mentions the law of our members,' the same Rom. vii. 23. which the schoolmen call 'the law of excitement.'4

And yet this is sure, that a rational creature only is capable of a law, which is a moral restraint, and so cannot reach to those things that are necessitated to act to the utmost stretch of their powers.' And, therefore, Suarez gives us a more refined description, when he tells us, that a law is a certain measure of moral acts, of such a kind, that by conformity to it, they are morally right; by discordance with it, morally wrong."

A law is such a just and regular tuning of actions, as that by virtue of this they may conspire into a moral music, and become very pleasant and harmonious. Thus Plato speaks much of that 'melody and harmony's that is in laws; and in his second book De Legibus, he does altogether discourse of harmony, and does infinitely prefer mental and intellectual music, those powerful and practical strains of goodness, that spring from a well-composed spirit, before those delicious blandishments, those soft and transient touches that comply with sense, and salute it in a more flattering manner; and he tells you of a spiritual dancing that is answerable to so sweet a music, to these 'most divine flutings.' While the laws play in concert, there is a chorus of well-ordered affections that are raised and elevated by them.

And thus, as Aristotle well observes, some laws were 1 Νόμος ἁμαρτίας.

* Νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν Legem membrorum, Legem fomitis-apud Rabbinn. 7. Ad extremum virium.

2 Ανομία.

• Note E.

Lex est mensura quædam actuum moralium, ita ut per conformitatem ad illam rectitudinem moralem habeant, et, si ab illa discordent, obliqui sint. • Evpvēμla kai ovμpwvía.—De Legib. lib. ii. passim lib. iii. par. ii, vol. ii. p. 304. Bekker. Berol.

• Tà Deibтaтa avλýμara.-Plato, Minos, Opera, tom. iii. p. 75. Lond. 1826.

C

wont to be put in verse, and to be sung like so many pleasant odes, that might even charm the people into obedience. It is true, that learned philosopher gives as the reason of this, that they were put into verse 'that they might remember them the better;'1 but why may not this reason also share with it, that they might come with a greater grace and allurement, that they might hear them as pleasantly as they would do the voice of a viol or a harp, that has rhetoric enough to still and quiet the evil spirit?

But yet this does not sufficiently paint out the being of a law, to say that it is only 'a rule and measure;'2 and Suarez himself is so ingenuous as to tell us, that he cannot rest satisfied with this description, which he drew but with a coal as a rudiment rather than a full portraiture; and therefore we will give him some time to perfect it, and to put it into more orient colours.

And, in the meantime, we will look upon that speculative lawgiver, Plato, I mean, who was always new modelling laws, and rolling political ideas in his mind. Now, you may see him gradually ascending and climbing up to the description of a law, by these four several steps, and yet he does not reach the top and 'peak'3 of it neither. First, he tells us that laws are 'such things as are esteemed fitting; but because this might extend to all kind of customs too, his second thoughts limit and contract it more; and he tells us that a law is 'a decree of a state ;'5 yet because the mass and bulk of people, 'the rude heap and undigested lump's of the multitude, may seek to establish a wicked decree," as he calls it; therefore he bethinks himself how to clarify a law, how to purge out the

1 "Oπws μǹ émiλá@wvrai.—Prob. 19, sect. 28. Opera, tom. ii. p. 919. Berolin. 1831.

4 Τὰ νομιζόμενα.

2 Regula et mensura.

8 Ακμή.

6 Δόγμα πόλεως-Decretum civitatis.