Hosea xi. 4. not drawn with these 'cords of men,' with these moral engagements, but in a more impulsive manner driven and spurred on with such impetuous propensions as are founded in matter; which yet are directed by the wise and vigilant eye, and by the powerful hand of a Providence to a more beautiful and amiable end, than they themselves were acquainted with. But yet the lawyers, the civilians, would fain enlarge the law of nature, and would willingly persuade us that all sensitive creatures must be brought within the compass of it; for this they tell us, 'The law of nature is that which nature has taught all animals, for that law is not limited to the human race, but is common to all animals that live on the land, and in the sea, and also to birds.' Nay, they are so confident of it, as that they instance in several particulars, 'the union of male and female,' the begetting, upbringing, and preservation of offspring,'s very many things done for self 6 support and protection,' the organized republic of bees, the marriages of doves.' But not only the critics, but the schoolmen also, do sufficiently correct the lawyers for this their vanity; for certainly these men mean to bring beasts, birds, and fishes into their courts, and to have some fees out of them. Perhaps they expect also that the doves should take licenses before they marry; it may be they require of the beasts some penitential, or, which will suffice them, some pecuniary satisfaction for all their adulteries; or it may be the Pope will be so favourable, as 1 Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit, nam jus illud non solum humani generis est proprium, sed omnium animalium quæ in terra marique nascuntur, avium quoque commune est.-Ulpian, lib. i., Off. de Justitia et Jure. 2 Maris et fœminæ conjunctio. 3 Liberorum procreatio, educatio, conservatio. Plurima in tutelam propriam facta. Apium respublica; columbarum conjugia. to give his fellow-beasts some dispensation for all their irregular and incongruous mixtures.1 But yet, notwithstanding, they prosecute this their notion, and go on to frame this difference between 'the law of nations and the law of nature.'2 The law of nature, say they, is that which is common with men to irrational creatures also, but the law of nations is only between men; but this distinction is built upon a very sandy bottom-what the true difference is, we shall see hereafter. Now, all that can be pleaded in the behalf of the lawyers is this, that they err more in the word than in the reality. They cannot sufficiently clear this title of a law; for that there are some clear and visible stamps and impressions of nature upon sensitive beings, will be easily granted them by all, and those instances which they bring are so many ocular demonstrations of it; but that there should a formal obligation lie upon brutes, that they should be bound to the performance of natural commands. in a legal manner, that there should be a 'law written'3 Rom. ii. 15. upon them, so as that they should be left without Rom. i. 20. excuse,' and lie under palpable guilt, and be obnoxious to punishment for the violation of it, this they cannot possibly find out, unless they could set up this candle of the Lord' in sensitive creatures also, whereas there are in them only some 'imitations of the life of men,' as the philosopher calls them, which the orator renders 'resemblances of virtues,' some apish imitations of reason, some shadows of morality, some counterfeit ethics, some wild The author is evidently of Valla's opinion, 'Jus naturale dicere quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ridiculum est.'-Elegant. Ling. Lat. c. 48. 2 Νόμιμον ἐθνικὸν καὶ νόμιμον φυσικόν Jus gentium et jus naturale. 3 Νόμος γραπτός. 4 Ὥστε εἶναι ἀναπολογήτους. • Μιμήματα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωής. • Virtutum simulacra.-Cicero, De Finib. v. 15. economics, some faint representations of politics, amongst some of them. Yet all this while they are as far distant from the truth of a law, as they are from the strength of reason. There you may see some sparks of the Divine power and goodness, but you cannot see the candle of the Lord.' Now these men might have considered, if they had pleased, that as for the prints and footsteps of nature, some of them may be seen in every being. For nature has stamped all entity with the same seal; some softer beings took the impression very kindly and clearly, some harder ones took it more obscurely. Nature played so harmoniously and melodiously upon her harp, as that her music proved not only like that of Orpheus, which set only the sensitive creatures on dancing; but, like that of Amphion, inanimate beings were elevated by it, even the very stones did knit and unite themselves to the building of the universe.1 Show me any being, if you can, that does not love its own welfare, that does not seek its own rest, its centre, its happiness, that does not desire its own good, which all things desire,' as he speaks. Pick out an entity, if you can tell where, that does not long for the continuation and amplification, for the diffusion and spreading of its own being. Yet surely the lawyers themselves cannot imagine that there is a law given to all inanimate beings, or that they are accountable for the violation. Let them also demur a while upon that argument which Suarez3 urges against them, that these sensitive creatures are totally defective in the most principal branches of the law of nature; as in the acknowledging of a Deity, in the adoring of a Deity. Where is there the least adumbration 1 Hor. Ars. Poet., 391, 394. 2 Oû Távтa èpierov.-Plato, 'the philosopher;' vide preceding page. 3 De Legibus, lib. ii. of Divine worship in sensitive beings? What do they 'Never by brutal violence be swayed, Cook's Translation. What are those laws that are observed by a rending and tearing lion, by a devouring leviathan? Does the wolf oppress the lamb by a law? Can birds of prey show any commission for their plundering and violence? That amorous poet, Ovid, shows that these sensitive creatures, in respect of lust, are absolute Antinomians. And what though you meet with some 'single cases,'1 some rare patterns of sensitive temperance? A few scattered and uncertain stories will never evince that the whole heap and generality of brutes act according to a law. You have heard, it may be, of a chaste turtle,-and did you never hear of a wanton sparrow? It may be you have read some 1 Τὸν δὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων, 2 'Απαξ λεγόμενα. HESIOD. Ἔργ. καὶ 'Ημέρ., i. 274-277. A story of a modest elephant, but what say you in the meantime to whole flocks of lascivious goats? Yet grant that the several multitudes, all the species of these irrational creatures were all without spot and blemish in respect of their sensitive conversation, can any therefore fancy that they dress themselves by the glass of a law? Is it not rather a faithfulness to their own natural inclinations? which yet may very justly condemn some of the sons of men, who, though they have the candle of the Lord,' and the lamp of His law, yet degenerate more than these inferior beings, which have only some general dictates of nature. This is that motive with which the satirist quickened and awakened some of his time. 'This proves our spirits of the gods descend, While that of beasts is prone and downward bent; To them but earth-born life they did dispense, To us, for mutual aid, celestial sense.'-TATE's Translation. A law is founded in intellectuals, in the reason,2 not in the sensitive principle. It supposes a noble and freeborn creature, for where there is no liberty there is no law, -a law being nothing else but a rational restraint and limitation of absolute liberty. Now all liberty is 'radically in the intellect;' and such creatures as have no light, have no choice, no moral variety. The First and Supreme Being has so full and infinite a liberty, as cannot be bounded by a law; and these low and slavish beings have not so much liberty as to make |