Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice
SAGE, 24. veebr 1997 - 176 pages
Private Desires, Political Action is an accessible overview of one of the most important approaches to the study of politics in the modern world - rational choice theory. Michael Laver does not set out to review this entire field, but rather to discuss how we might use rational choice theory to analyze the political competition that affects almost every aspect of our lives.
The broad-ranging scope of the book introduces the theory at many levels of analysis, including: the private desires of individuals; the social context of how people fulfil their desires; and the problems of collective action. The discussion of these problems extends into the arena of politics, where the activities of `political entrepreneurs′ or politicians and the formation of political parties and coalitions are addressed.
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2 Rational Actors
3 Collective Action
4 Political Entrepreneurs Politicians and Parties
6 Party Competition
7 The Politics of Coalition
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actually alliances anarchistic argument assumptions bargaining power behaviour benefits cabinet coalition bargaining coercive collective action problem collective consumption conditional co-operation confess consumed contract costs course of action credible Dalkey defect dimension of ideology dimension-by-dimension median discussion effect election electoral enforcer entry example Figure free riders fulfil Hobbesian ideal policy ideological imperfect information important incentive indifference curve individual interaction intrinsic involved Jack Jill Joe-Bob logic median voter motivations objects of desire outcome package of political particular party competition payoff matrix payoffs person players policy dimension policy packages policy positions political entrepreneurs political parties politics of coalition possible potential preferences Prisoner's Dilemma game private desires produced promises rational choice theory real world reason reputation resolve collective action rival politicians secular saints sense Shepsle shirk single dimension social spectrum stay silent supply political services tastes theorists things threat truffles voting William Riker winning coalition