and unprovable self-evident truths to be sought?" Manifestly by introspection alone-the careful analysis of consciousness by each one for himself. In order successfully to combat with those who accept idealism we must, for the sake of those who do not accept the nature-given bridge between object and subject, begin from a purely subjective basis. This, as has been said, is the method declared necessary by Mr. Spencer himself, and he also tells us to the same effect: * "The first step in a metaphysical argument, rightly carried on, must be an examination of propositions for the purpose of ascertaining what character is common to those which we call unquestionably true, and is implied by asserting their unquestionable truth. Further, to carry on this inquiry legitimately, we must restrict our analysis rigorously to states of consciousness considered in their relations to one another: wholly ignoring anything beyond consciousness to which these states and their relations may be supposed to refer. For, if, before we have ascertained by comparing propositions what is the trait that leads us to class some of them as certainly true, we avowedly or tacitly take for granted the existence of something beyond consciousness; then, a particular proposition is assumed to be certainly true before we have ascertained what is the distinctive character of the propositions which we call certainly true, and the analysis is vitiated. If we cannot transcend consciousness-if, therefore, what we know as truth must be some mental state, or some combination of mental states; it must be possible for us to say in what way we distinguish this state or these states. The definition of truth must be expressible in terms of consciousness; and, indeed, cannot otherwise be expressed if consciousness cannot be transcended. Clearly, then, the metaphysician's first step must be to shut out from his investigation everything but what is subjective; not taking for granted the existence of anything objective corresponding to his ideas, until he has ascertained what property of his ideas it is which he predicates by calling them true." Now, although I have the good fortune to agree, to a certain extent, with Mr. Herbert Spencer as to the limits and necessary conditions of inquiry, yet my view as to the ultimate and final test of all truth whatever differs profoundly and fundamentally from his. I differ from him, and deem his conception of this test to be inadequate and false, because he makes that test a purely negative one. He asserts that "inconceivability" is the ultimate and supreme test of truth. "A discussion in consciousness proves to be simply a trial of strength between different connexions in consciousness—a systematized struggle serving to determine which are the least coherent states of consciousness. And the result of the struggle is, that the least coherent states of consciousness separate, while the most coherent remain together; forming a proposition of which the predicate persists in the mind along with its subject. . . . If there are any indissoluble connexions, he is compelled to accept them. If certain states of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways, he is obliged to think them in those ways. . . . Here, then, the inquirer comes down to an ultimate uniformity-a universal law of thinking." test of ultimate truths false because merely negative. ... As I have said, I consider Mr. Spencer's test inadequate, Mr. Spencer's and am convinced that his analysis of consciousness is incomplete and misleading. He fails to distinguish between two distinct classes of ultimate psychical phenomena, and consequently does not really accept, as he professes to do, the absolute dicta of consciousness for the basis of his philosophy. He fails to distinguish between merely negative mental impotencies or simple inconceivabilities on the one hand and positive perceptions or intuitions on the other. He fails to note the utterly different classes of judgments which severally affirm either that they simply cannot conceive a given proposition to be true, or that they positively do see that the opposite of a given proposition cannot be true. Negative perceptions of simple inconceivability are reflex, but positive intuitions (as when I gaze at a picture on the wall before me) are direct. Mr. Spencer distinguishes between two classes of unbelievable propositions, namely: (1) the simply unbelievable or incredible, and (2) the inconceivable. He defines † the former as a proposition "which admits of being framed in thought, *Psychology,' vol. ii. p. 450. but is so much at variance with experience" "that its terms cannot be put in the alleged relation without effort;" and he gives us an example-a cannon-ball fired from England to America. An inconceivable proposition is defined by him as "one of which the terms cannot, by any effort, be brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts between them:" and he gives as examples of inconceivability "that one side of a triangle is equal to the sum of the other two sides;" and the idea of resistance, disconnected from the idea of extension in the resisting object. Now, in the first place, it must be presumed that with Mr. Herbert Spencer the term "framed in thought" is equivalent to "represented in imagination," and the distinction he draws is as true as obvious, between propositions which can be imagined but are not to be believed, and those which cannot be imagined at all. He does not, however, as has been said, distinguish sufficiently between propositions, as a little introspection will convince any unprejudiced experimenter. classes of able proposi There are, in fact, not one, but two distinct classes of unimaginable propositions, and it is the second of these Two distinct (ignored by him) which alone compels the mind to unimaginabsolute, unconditional, universal, and necessary tions. assent to their contradictories, because their contradictories are seen to be absolutely, unconditionally, universally, and necessarily true. There are altogether four kinds of propositions in consciousness: : 1. Those which can be both imagined and believed. 2. Those which can be imagined but cannot be believed. 3. Those which cannot be imagined but can be believed. 4. Those which cannot be imagined and are not believed, because they are positively known to be absolutely impossible. We need not occupy time with a consideration of the first two kinds, but the latter two require careful discrimi * 'Psychology,' vol. ii. pp. 406, 407. .... nation. It is surely somewhat surprising that Mr. Spencer does not discuss the two meanings of the word "inconceivable," pointed out long ago in the controversy between Mill and Whewell, and fully admitted by Mr. G. H. Lewes, who observes: "That which is unpicturable may be conceivable; and the abstraction which is impossible to . . . . imagination is easy to conception." The word "inconceivable" is sometimes taken to denote simply that which the mind cannot picture in a distinct mental image. At other times it is made use of to signify that which is "unintelligible" or "unthinkable." But a great number of things which cannot be pictured to the imagination can most certainly be thought and understood, and none of those who uphold the validity of our intuitions of objective necessary truth pretend that that which cannot be imagined is necessarily untrue. Fortunately, in this matter of the declarations of consciousness, the appeal is to facts and experiments-facts that can be observed, experiments that can be carried on by every one a little advanced in philosophy, and therefore possessing that which is a necessary condition of such advance, namely, a habit of careful introspection. I venture confidently to affirm that we have as certain evidence for this distinction of kind between our own thoughts as we have for the very being of those thoughts themselves. The existence of this distinction as a fact is incontrovertible, and the fact of this declaration of consciousness should be first carefully noted; its validity may be considered afterwards. The first class of Mr. Spencers inconceivable propositions (our simply unimaginable ones) are, or, for all we see, may be, the mere results of mental impotence; they are but negatively and passively inconceivable. The second class of inconceivable propositions (our necessarily false ones) are those which are positively and actively inconceivable, because they are clearly known by the mind to be absolutely and universally impossible. At present we have not to consider Problems of Life and Mind,' vol. i. p. 420. whether such perceptions are objectively true and valid, but to point out that, as a fact, they subjectively exist. Let us, then, first note certain propositions which the mind seems impotent to imagine, but which the intellect can both understand and believe. The intellect clearly conceives a force varying inversely as the square of the distance between two bodies it reciprocally affects; yet this variation cannot be adequately represented by any image to the imagination. We can, again, conceive an infinite addition of fractions, which shall yet never attain to unity; but such a conception is utterly beyond the power of the imagination. Again, we can not only conceive but it is evidently a necessary truth that (a2+ab+x) + (a b − x + b2) = (a + b) × (a+b), let x+b2) a, b, and x, represent whatever whole numbers they may; yet this can by no means be directly represented by the imagination. Professor * But conceptions may be formed as to modes of existence of which we have had no experience whatever, and A fallacy of necessary deductions can even be drawn from such Helmholtz. deductions. Thus Professor Helmholtz has conceived "beings living and moving along the surface of a solid body, who are able to perceive nothing but what exists on this surface, and insensible to all beyond it;" and he adds, “ifsuch beings lived on the surface of a sphere, their space would be without a limit, but it would not be infinitely extended; and the axioms of geometry would turn out very different from ours, and from those of the inhabitants of a plane. The shortest lines which the inhabitants of a spherical surface could draw would be arcs of greater circles;" also there would be many shorter lines between the same two points if there were two poles. Moreover, he tells us, such beings "would not be able to form the notion of parallel geodetical lines, because every pair of their geodetical lines, when sufficiently prolonged, would intersect in two points," &c. This passage is not only interesting as demonstrating our power of *The Academy,' vol. i. p. 128. |