younger son entered by abatement [as distinguished from DISSEISIN (q.v.)] into the land, the Statute of Limitations did not operate against the elder son (Littleton, s. 396; Sharington v. Shrotton, 7 & 8 Eliz., Pl. Com. 306; Page v. Selby, Bull. N. P. 102; Doe v. Long, 1841, 9 Car. & P. 773). [This was one consequence of the doctrine of possessio fratris (q.v.). See Wms. on Seisin, 55.] By sec. 13 of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, when a younger brother or other relation of the person entitled as heir to the possession or receipt of the profits of any land, or to the receipt of any rent, enters into the possession or receipt thereof, such possession or receipt is not to be deemed to be the possession or receipt of or by the person entitled as heir. As to the effect of this section, see Jones v. Jones, 1847, 16 Mee. & W. 712.

[Co. Lit. 227a; Comyn's Digest, 5th ed., vol. i. p. 1; Cruise's Digest, i. 51.]

Abatement of Legacies.-Under certain circumstances, legatees are obliged to part with the whole or portions of their legacies, although the subjects devised to them remained, and were not adeemed (see ADEMPTION) at the testator's death. This obligation is termed

"abatement" (Roper on Legacies, 4th ed., i. 356).

1. GENERAL LEGACIES.-In case of a deficiency of assets, all the general legacies must abate proportionately in order to pay the debts, but a specific legacy does not abate at all unless there be not sufficient without it. An executor has no power to give himself a preference in regard to his own legacy, as he has in the instance of his own debt (Toller, 347). A residuary legatee cannot claim abatement on the part of general legatees, as they are entitled to have their legacies paid in full, although it should leave no surplus for the residuary legatee (see Baker v. Farmer, 1868, L. R. 3 Ch. 537; Breashur v. Dor, 1830, 4 Sim. 21; 58 E. R. 9; In re Tootal's Estate, 1876, 2 Ch. D. 628).

In the case of legacies given generally and then the residue on trust to pay further legacies, these latter are in the nature of a "residuary legacy," and will not be payable until the other legacies have been paid (In re Smith, [1899] 1 Ch. 365; In re Malone, [1897] 1 Ir. R. 571).

When a general legacy is given in consideration of a debt owing to the legatee, or of his relinquishing any right or interest, it does not abate with voluntary legacies. So, where a testator makes a general bequest to his wife in lieu of dower, such a legacy will be entitled to a preference of payment over the other general legacies, her election to accept the legacy placing her in the situation of a purchaser of what is given her by the will (Burridge v. Bradyl, 1710, 1 P. Wms. 127; 24 E. R. 323; Davenhill v. Fletcher, 1754, 1 Amb. 244; 27 E. R. 163; Heath v. Dendy, 1826, 1 Russ. 543; 38 E. R. 210; 25 R. R. 135; Norcott v. Gordon, 1844, 14 Sim. 258; 60 E. R. 357). Such a legacy has no priority, where the testator leaves no real estate out of which the widow is dowable (Acey v. Simpson, 1842, 5 Beav. 35; 49 E. R. 489; 59 R. R. 404), or where the only real estate of the testator was conveyed to him with a declaration against dower (Roper v. Roper, 1876, 3 Ch. D. 714; In re Greenwood, [1892] 2 Ch. 295).

Pecuniary legacies abate in proportion, notwithstanding a direction in the will that they are to be put "in the first place," or a direction as to the time of payment. If, however, an intention that any legacies are to be paid in full is to be collected, or reasonably inferred, it will be

otherwise (Blower v. Morret, 1752, 2 Ves. Sen. 420; 28 E. R. 268; Cazenove v. Cazenove, 1889, 61 L. T. 115; In re Sweder's Estate, [1891] 3 Ch. 44).

In cases where stock is bequeathed as a general legacy, and the legatee is called upon to abate with other general legatees, the abatement will be regulated by the value of stock at the end of one year next after the testator's death (Blackshaw v. Rogers, 1778, cited by the Master of the Rolls in Simmons v. Vallance, 1793, 4 Bro. C. C. 349; 29 E. R. 929).

In the following instances particular general legatees have, on various grounds, claimed exemption from abatement, but have been held to be liable in common with other general legatees :

(a) Legacies to servants (Attorney-General v. Robins, 1722, 2 P. Wms. 25; 24 E. R. 627).

(b) Legacies to Charities (Attorney-General v. Hudson, 1720, 1 P. Wms. 675; 24 E. R. 564; Bishop of Peterborough v. Mortlock, 1784, 1 Bro. C. C. 566; 28 E. R. 1301).

(e) Legacies of sums of money to executors for their care and trouble (Duncan v. Watts, 1852, 16 Beav. 204; 51 E. R. 756).

(d) Legacies to creditors whose debts have been previously liquidated by composition at less than their real amounts (Coppin v. Coppin, 1725, 2 P. Wms. 292; 24 E. R. 735).

(e) Legacies to pay another person's debts.

Legacies of money to be laid out in land or stock.

(9) Legacies for mourning rings or mourning (Apreece v. Apreece, 1813, 1 Ves. & Bea. 364; 35 E. R. 142).

(h) Legacy to erect a monument (probably); although in Masters v. Masters, 1718, 1 P. Wms. 423; 24 E. R. 454, Lord Parker, C., exempted such a legacy from abating with the general legacies.

(i) Legacies to wives and children, unless the rule of abatement is excluded by the terms of the instrument, or there is an intention to give priority apparent on the face of it (Blower v. Morret, supra; Cazenove v. Cazenove, supra; In re Sweder's Estate, supra).

2. SPECIFIC LEGACIES.-Specific legatees can only be called upon by the executor for abatement, upon failure of the general personal estate to discharge debts. These legacies, therefore, must be fully satisfied, to the prejudice of general legatees. But when the personal assets, not specifically bequeathed, are insufficient to pay all the debts, then the specific legatees must abate in proportion to the value of their individual legacies (Sleech v. Thorington, 1754, 2 Ves. Sen. 561, 564; 28 E. R. 357; Clifton v. Burt, 1720, 1 P. Wms. 680; 24 E. R. 566; Roper on Legacies, 4th ed., i. 356).

The principle of the distinction between the two classes of legatees is the presumed intention of the testator to give a preference to those to whom he has bequeathed specific parts of his personal estate, severed from the rest (Roper on Legacies, i. 354).

On the same principle, if the testator's freehold estate be subject to debts, a specific devisee of it will be obliged to contribute, upon a deficiency of the general personal assets, with the specific legatee of a chattel (Long v. Short, 1717, 1 P. Wms. 403; 24 Ê. R. 445; In re Saunders-Davies, 1887, 34 Ch. D. 482; In re Bawden, [1894] 1 Ch. 693).

Bequest of diamonds on trust for sale. Directions to pay two legacies of £600 and £700 out of the trust proceeds, not mentioning

disposition of surplus, if any. Will contained residuary bequest. The proceeds were only £900, and the £700 legacy was for other reasons declared void. The residuary legatee claimed abatement, but it was held that the £600 was a first charge on the proceeds, which must be satisfied before he could take anything (In re Tunno, Raikes v. Raikes, 1890, 45 Ch. D. 66).

3. DEMONSTRATIVE LEGACIES.-Legacies in part specific and in part general, i.e. bequests of money with reference to a particular fund for their payment, and not simply a gift of the specific fund itself. Such a legacy is so far general, that, if the fund be called in, or fail, the legatee will not be deprived of his legacy, but be permitted to receive it out of the general assets; but it is specific, in the sense that it will not be liable to abate with general legacies upon a deficiency of assets (Mann v. Copland, 1817, 2 Madd. 223; 56 E. R. 317; Creed v. Creed, 1844, 11 Cl. & Fin. 491; 8 E. R. 1187; 65 R. R. 252; Livesay v. Redfern, 1836, 2 Y. & C. 90; Tempest v. Tempest, 1857, 7 De G., M. & G. 473; 44 E. R. 185; Roberts v. Pocock, 1798, 4 Ves. 150; 31 E. R. 77).

A satisfied legatee can be called upon by the other legatees to refund if it be afterwards found that the fund from which he has been satisfied has wasted (In re Lepine, Dowsett v. Culver, [1892] 1 Ch. 210). See ANNUITIES (8), Abatement; ASSETS; LEGACIES.

Abatement of Nuisance.-See NUISANCE.

Abatement of Purchase-Money.-This arises in cases of specific performance of contracts. The vendor is prima facie responsible for the description by which a thing is contracted to be sold. At law, advantage might be taken of a misdescription which rendered strict performance of the contract impossible and the purchaser's remedy was for damages, but the Courts of equity obliged the purchaser to accept the property, with an abatement of the purchasemoney by way of compensation, in cases where he would then obtain the reasonable and substantial benefit of the contract (Halsey v. Grant, 1806, 13 Ves. 73; 33 E. R. 222; 9 R. R. 143). See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE:-Compensation.

Abatement or Rebate (in Commerce).-An allowance of discount made for prompt payment.-The term is also sometimes used to express the deduction that is occasionally made at the customhouse from the duties chargeable upon damaged goods, and for a loss in warehouses.

Abatement, Pleas in.-Under the old system of pleadings, pleas which, without either admitting or denying the existence of the cause of action, alleged some matter of fact which would in law preclude the plaintiff from recovering upon the writ and declaration as then. framed, were called pleas in abatement. They belonged to the class of dilatory pleas (q.v.), as distinct from pleas in bar (see BAR, PLEA IN), because they raised a formal defence not affecting the merits. Such pleas would assert the non-joinder of some necessary party, or that either party was under some personal disability, or that another action was already pending for the same cause. But now, by Order 21, r. 20, all pleas in abatement are abolished. The proper procedure now

in such cases is explained in Kendall v. Hamilton, 1879, 4 App. Cas. 504; Pilley v. Robinson, 1887, 20 Q. B. D. 155; and Wilson v. Balcarres Brook Steamship Co., [1893] 1 Q. B. 422.

Abbey, Abbot.-An abbey denoted the place of habitation of a society of persons, male or female, leading a religious life, of which the head was known as an Abbot or Abbess. At common law these bodies were recognised as corporations, and the individual members of such corporations, other than lay members, are regarded in the eyes of the law as civiliter mortui. There were also other religious foundations of different kinds similarly recognised, but all abbeys, priories and other religious foundations of a like kind were dissolved chiefly by legislative action either before, or for the most part during, the Reformation (see 27 Hen. VIII. c. 28; 31 Hen. VIII. c. 13; 37 Hen. VII. c. 4; Edw. VÌ. C. 14). Since the date of the Reformation, no body of any kind professing to be a religious community has been recognised as such by the law. See also PRIORY; PRIOR. See also ROMAN CATHOLIC; CHARITIES; and as to abduction of nuns, ABDUCTION. For abbey lands, see TITHES. As to the legal position of present religious orders and the restrictions to which they are subject under statute or otherwise, see RELIGIOUS ORDER; JESUIT.

Abbuttals or Abuttals.-"Abbuttals seem to come from. the French abutter, i.e. the Buttings or Boundings of Lands, showing to what other Lands, highways or places they belong or are abutting " (Termes de la Ley). "The extremities or bounds of land; the parts in which it abuts upon neighbouring lands"-New English Dictionary, (Murray).

Abdication.-English constitutional history supplies no precedent of a voluntary abdication of the crown. Edward II. was deposed; a Parliament having been irregularly summoned, articles were drawn up by declaring him unfit to reign, and commissioners were sent to request his assent to his son's succession. This he gave, and Sir William Trussell, as proctor for the whole Parliament, renounced their allegiance (Stubbs, c. XVI. 255). Richard II. was induced to execute a deed of resignation in which he absolved all his people from the oaths of fealty and homage and all other bonds of allegiance, royalty and lordship by which they were bound to him; but this was not thought enough, and Parliament proceeded to draw up articles against him, which the Estates voted were sufficient ground for deposing him. Then Henry of Lancaster claimed the crown, and was accepted by Parliament, and commissioners were sent to signify to Richard his deposition, and renounce their allegiance (Stubbs, c. XVI. 269; c. XVIII. 302). It was debated in the Convention Parliament at the Revolution whether the throne was vacant between Richard's resignation and the enthroning of Henry IV. In the case of James II., the Convention resolved that, "King James II. having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the kingdom by breaking the original contract between king and people, and having, by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons, violated the fundamental laws and withdrawn himself out of the kingdom, has abdicated the government, and that the throne is thereby vacant." The Lords wished to substitute "deserted" for "abdicated," which, it was

contended, was a word not known to English law, but the amendment was rejected, as leaving it open to James to return (see debate on the word "abdicated" in 5 Parl. Hist. 61, especially the future Lord Somers, p. 69). The Declaration of Rights simply recites that James had abdicated the government, and that the throne was thereby vacant. It seems to have been the general opinion in the debate above mentioned that a sovereign could lawfully abdicate; but it would not appear that an abdication could be fully carried out at the present day without an Act of Parliament.

Abduction.-1. A term originally used with reference to the taking of a person, not sui juris, out of the possession or custody of husband, parent or legal guardian. Abduction of women was common during the Middle Ages, being regarded as gallantry rather than crime, and probably a survival of marriage by capture (Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, ii. 363; Pike, History of Crime, i. 266, 477). At common law the remedies were by indictment or action for false imprisonment, if the person abducted was unwilling (3 Co. Inst. 55), or by action on the case (q.v.) by husband, parent or guardian, for the pecuniary loss sustained by him, or by writ de homine replegiando (Lord Grey's Case, 1682, 9 St. Tri. 127; Show. 61, 76; Calthrop v. Axtel, 1687, 3 Mod. 169; and see F. N. B. 66; 2 Co. Inst. 55). This writ is now disused and the writ of habeas corpus is employed instead (2 Co. Inst. 55; and see ADULTERY; HABEAS CORPUS; SEDUCTION).

Abduction has been the subject of much legislation since the Statute of Merton (20 Hen. III. c. 6), all repealed and superseded by statutes of this reign, with the following exceptions:

No larceny could be committed by taking or carrying away a ward or villein, "because they are in the realty" (3 Co. Inst. 109). But by Stat. Westm., 13 Edw. I. c. 35, it is a misdemeanor punishable by two years' imprisonment to take or carry away (rapere vel abducere), any infant, male or female, whose marriage belongeth to another (see 2 Co. Inst. 437). Where the child is a ward of the High Court, abduction is also punishable as contempt of Court (Herbert's Case, 1731, 3 P. Wms. 116; 24 E. R. 992).

By c. 34 of the same statute (also unrepealed), if a wife is carried away (abducta) with the goods of her husband, the "king shall have the suit for the goods so carried away." If a wife elopes, she forfeits her dower, unless her husband takes her back and is reconciled to her without coercion of the Church (2 Co. Inst. 435); and she can now also be indicted jointly with the adulterer for larceny (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, ss. 12, 16; R. v. Streeter, [1900] 2 Q. B. 601; R. v. James, [1902] 1 K. B. 540). The same chapter makes it a misdemeanor, punishable with imprisonment for three years and fine "at the king's will," to abduct a nun from the nunnery (domus), "even though she consent.'" Her church lord, the abbess or prioress, had also an action of trespass on the case against the offender (see 2 Co. Inst. 433-436, Reg. Jud. 269). Though nunneries are not now illegal (10 Geo. IV. c. 7, s. 37), the change, since the Reformation, in the policy of the law as to monastic vows and institutions, makes it strange that the enactment has not been expressly repealed. The subsequent Acts from 3 Hen. VII. c. 2, except the Habeas Corpus Act, being now repealed, it is enough to refer to Hawk., P. C., bk. i. c. 42; 1 East, P. C., 452, 457; 4 Black. Com., 288; 3