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client, and he nonsuited the plaintiff. Held, that these costs did not come within sect. 118 of the Act, as none of the costs were for work done in any County Court, and that the solicitor was entitled to sue for the same, the judge being bound to try the case and decide as to the reasonableness of such costs. (Boydell v. Millar.) ...page 299 Practice Costs-Particulars-Interpleader issueSignature of particulars-Signature by clerk of solicitor Sufficiency of such signature. Order VI., r. 10, of the County Court Rules 1889 provides that the solicitor of a plaintiff suing by a solicitor shall indorse on the particulars his name or firm, &c., and the scale of costs in the appendix allows the solicitor certain costs of preparing particulars of claim and necessary copies provided that such particulars and copies are signed by the solicitor." Held, that the signature of the solicitor's name by the solicitor's clerk, who has a general authority to conduct his master's business, is a sufficient compliance with these rules, and a sufficient signature of the particulars by the solicitor to entitle him to his costs. (France v. Dutton.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

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Indictment-Registration law-Overseer-Preparation of voters lists-Wilful breach of duty by overseer in-Whether overseer can be indicted for such breach of duty-Motion to quash indictment.-An indictment will not lie against an overseer for wilful breaches of the duties imposed upon him by the Registration Act of 1843, in preparing and publishing voters lists, inasmuch as for every such breach of duty-the duties being new duties created or re-created by the statute-a special tribunal is created by sect. 51 of the Act, and a penal action given by sect. 97, which excludes the remedy by indictment. (Reg. v. Hall.) ... Manufacture of false evidence-Attempt to pervert due course of justice-Judicial tribunal-Arbitrators-Tampering with arbitration samples. It is not necessary in order to complete the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice by the manufacture of false evidence, that such evidence should be made use of. To tamper with evidence to be laid before arbitrators, appointed by the parties to a contract for the determination of differences arising under such contract, is to attempt to pervert the ends of justice by misleading a tribunal of a judicial nature. The prisoner was indicted for having unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly altered the character of the contents of certain sample bags of wheat which had become, and were, evidence to be used before arbitrators appointed in accordance with the terms of a contract to decide any question that might be in dispute between the buyers and sellers of a cargo of wheat, with intent thereby to pass the same off as true and genuine samples of the bulk of such cargo, and thereby to injure and prejudice the buyers of the cargo and to pervert the due course of law and justice. By a contract for the sale of a cargo of wheat, certain stipulations were made for the settling of any disputes that might arise by arbitration, and, for the purposes of being used as evidence in any such arbitration, samples were taken from the bulk by the prisoner on behalf of the seller, and by another person on behalf of the purchaser. Such samples were sealed and taken to the prisoner's house, and while they were in his possession the prisoner tampered with them by extracting the contents of the bags which he cleaned and replaced in the bags without breaking the seals, thereby producing very much better samples. The samples so altered were forwarded by the prisoner to the London Corn Trade Association, who by the terms of the contract were to appoint arbitrators in default of arbitrators being appointed by the parties should any question be in dispute, and who were also to elect a committee of appeal if necessary for the purpose of hearing and finally deciding any appeal against the award of the arbitrators. No arbitration in fact ever took place. Held, that

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the indictment was good and alleged an offence, although it did not allege that an arbitration took place, or that the samples were used as evidence; that the offence committed by the prisoner was not a mere private cheat, but was an attempt to mislead a tribunal of a judicial nature by the manufacture of false evidence; and that it was therefore not necessary that the evidence should have been in fact used in order to constitute the offence Held also, that, inasmuch as charged. the prisoner had forwarded the sample when altered to the association in London, and had thereby put it out of his power to retract what he had done, he had done all he could do to pervert the due course of law and justice, and was therefore rightly convicted upon the evidence of the offer.ce with which he was charged. (Reg. v. Vreones.)

DEBTORS ACT 1869.

...page 389

Judgment summons-Order for payment by instalments-Receiving order previously made against debtor - Jurisdiction. An order for payment by instalments, under sect. 5 of the Debtors Act 1869 cannot be made in the High Court upon a judgment summons after a receiving order has been made against the judgment debtor. (Re Nuthall; Ford v. Nuthall.)

DIVORCE.

Cruelty-Absence of physical violence-Parties living apart under separation deed-Delay-Matrimonial Causes Act 1857. The petitioner and her husband were married in 1858, the former being seventeen and the latter twenty-three years of age at that time. For about five years they were fairly happy together. Between 1862 and 1870 he on many occasions committed adultery with divers women, and frequently spoke to his wife on the subject and flaunted his amours before her, and neglected his wife for the society of women of loose character. Her health became seriously impaired by the mental worry caused by her husband's conversation and continued course of misconduct and neglect. No cruelty in the nature of bodily violence was proved. In 1870 the husband and wife separated by deed, and no proceedings for divorce were taken by the wife until the only son of the marriage came of age, when this petition was presented. Butt, J. refused to grant a divorce, on the ground that the conduct of the husband did not amount in law to cruelty. Held, by the Court of Appeal, without deciding whether the petitioner had made out a case of cruelty or not, that there had been such unexplained delay in taking proceedings as to disentitle her to a divorce. (Beauclerk v. Beauclerk.)

Custody of children-Decree on grounds of cruelty and adultery-Order for custody to petitioner made at time of decree-Subsequent misconduct of petitioner-Affirmative evidence of respondent's respectability and fitness-Reference to registrar-Report-Motion-Order for custody rescinded-Fresh order made in favour of respondent. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to custody of children; but in each case, as it may arise, the court is to consider what is best in the interests of the children. In July 1888, in an undefended suit by the wife, the respondent was pronounced guilty of adultery and cruelty, and a decree nisi was made, dissolving the marriage, and giving the wife the custody of the two children-a boy and a girl. The petitioner took no steps to enforce the order with respect to the boy, who accordingly continued with his father, the mother taking charge of the girl. The decree was in due course made absolute, and in Feb. 1889 an order was made, by consent, that the respondent should pay to the petitioner 751. a year. The petitioner was subsequently guilty of drunkenness and immorality, and, at the end of 1890, the respondent filed a notice of motion, asking that the order for custody should be rescinded, and that the order for maintenance should be either varied or rescinded. The matter was re

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ferred to the registrar, who took evidence and reported upon the present unfitness of the petitioner and of the present fitness of the respondent. The petitioner was not represented upon the motion, and the Court (Jenne, J.), being satisfied by the affidavits filed, that the interests of the children would best be served by giving the custody to the father, rescinded the original order and made a fresh order in the father's favour.The Court, in the absence of evidence that any part of the 751. was ordered in respect of the maintenance and education of the female child, or that it was in fact more than one-third of the joint income of the parties, declined, upon this motion, to vary or rescind the order for maintenance. (Witt v. Witt.)

...page 121

Custody of children-Guardianship of Infants Act 1886-Order-Effect.-The wife petitioned for a judicial separation on the ground of her husband's cruelty, and she also prayed that the court would append to the decree a declaration, in terms of sect. 7 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, that the respondent was a person unfit to have the custody of the children of the marriage. The cruelty proved was, substantially, that the respondent pinched and kicked the petititioner, and threw cold water over her, and told her that he did so in order to make her miscarry. One of the children was in bed with her at that time. The respondent put the petitioner out of the house at night in her nightdress, it was then raining; the children were very frightened and screamed, and a policeman afterwards went to the house and fetched them away, and took them to a neighbour's house, in which the petitioner had sought refuge. The respondent on many occasions ill-used the children and made them cry, he made use of filthy language in their presence, and used epithets to one of the children about the petitioner, or to the petitioner in presence of that child, and the boy himself afterwards used those epithets to the petitioner. Held, that the respondent was а person unfit to have the custody of the children; and that the effect of declaring him so to be, under sect. 7 of the Act of 1886, was merely to put upon him the onus of affirmatively proving himself to be a reformed character, and fit to be intrusted with the children's custody, in case of any application which might be made in respect of their custody after the petitioner's death. (Webley v. Webley.)

Desertion - Plea established - Decree. - The wife petitioned for a divorce on the grounds of desertion coupled with adultery. The marriage took place in April 1875, and in 1876 or early in 1877 there was a temporary separation, which the petitioner stated to have been on account of the respondent's intemperate habits. In 1877 the respondent, who was a hosier at the date of the marriage, finally left his wife, but they continued to correspond for some years. In or about the year 1884 the wife heard rumours as to her husband's mode of life; and subsequently, in 1886, she went to Australia, partly with the object of ascertaining the truth of those rumours, and partly with the object of singing at concerts, by which latter means she was supporting herself and child. She found he was living with a woman, and had children by her. The wife made no request to her husband to return to her, or to take her back to live with him. Subsequently she returned to England, and eventually instituted this suit, charging adultery and desertion in and since 1886. Held, that, although there was in law no desertion prior to 1886, yet the fact of his taking up with another woman and starting in another home, and not contributing anything to her support, constituted desertion in and since 1886; and that the petitioner was entitled to a decree nisi for the dissolution of the marriage upon that ground, coupled with adultery. (Drew v. Drew.) Husband's petition - Conditional decree Allowance ordered for wife's maintenance Dum casta et sola vixerit-Restrictive clause omitted -Order-Costs - Practice. The husband ob

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tained a decree nisi by reason of his wife's misconduct, but at the time of pronouncing such decree, the Court intimated that it would not be made absolute unless and until the petitioner should secure a sum (to be agreed) for the maintenance of the respondent. The parties, in due course, agreed upon a sum, to be paid weekly by the petitioner, and the case was put in the paper for the decree to be made absolute. A question then arose as to whether the allowance was to be paid only so long as the respondent should live chaste and unmarried, or whether it should be ordered to be paid without any such restriction. The wife thereupon instructed counsel, and ap peared upon the motion for making the decree absolute, when Held, that, as the amount agreed upon was a bare maintenance for the wife, it should be payable to her without any restrictive clause whatever. Held also, that the wife was entitled to her costs of appearing upon the motion. (Lander v. Lander.)

...page 120

Husband's petition - Decree nisi - Co-respondent not dismissed from suit-Intervention by Queen's Proctor-Plea served on co-respondent-Collusion and conspiracy established against petitioner and co-respondent-Application by Queen's Proctor to condemn parties in costs.-The Court condemned the co-respondent, as well as the petitioner, in the costs of the Queen's Proctor, where the latter had intervened and succeeded in establishing pleas of collusion and connivance against the co-respondent as well as against the petitioner, and where the co-respondent had not been dismissed from the suit at the time the decree nisi was pronounced, but was duly served with the Queen's Proctor's plea, and, although not appearing thereto, he still remained a party to these proceedings within the meaning of the Divorce Act 1858 and the Matrimonial Causes Acts 1860 and 1878. The Court made an order rescinding the decree nisi in the absence of the petitioner, who, having cross-examined the witnesses called by the Queen's Proctor (including the respondent), and having given evidence in chief, failed to submit himself to cross-examination. (Taplen v. Taplen, the Queen's Proctor showing cause.)

Wife not appearing-Husband formerly convicted of aggravated assault - Separation and allowance granted thereon to wife-Wife's subsequent adultery-Discretional bar-Decree for dissolution. Decree dissolving the marriage pronounced in favour of a husband who had been convicted by justices of an aggravated assault upon his wife, and against whom a separation order and an order for an allowance had been thereupon made. (Sergent v. Sergent and Weaver.)

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Husband's petition for settlement-Refusal.-The husband obtained a divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery with the co-respondent. He petitioned that certain jewellery belonging to his wife should be sold, and a settlement made of the proceeds, giving her a life interest in the income arising from the investment of those proceeds, with remainder to himself. His income was substantial, his wife's only 721. a year. The registrar reported against the petitioner. The Court confirmed the registrar's report, and refused to order any settlement. The petition was thereupon dismissed with costs. (Schofield v. Schofield and Cowper.) Practice Discovery against infant respondent -Adultery-Divorce Act 1857-Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869.-On a petition for dissolution of marriage on account of the alleged adultery of an infant respondent, the question arose whether the infant could be compelled to make an affidavit of documents. Butt, J. held, on the authority of Mayor v. Collins (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 326; 24 Q. B. Div. 361), that she could not be compelled to do so. Held, by the Court of Appeal, that the case of Mayor v. Čollins did not apply, as the Rules of the Supreme Court 1883 did not affect divorce proceedings which were regulated by the old practice of the Ecclesias

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tical Courts; that discovery had always been allowed in the Divorce Court: but that adultery being an ecclesiastical offence the court should not allow discovery by interrogatories, or by an order for an affidavit of documents, where such discovery would tend to show that the person making it had been guilty of adultery; and that therefore, without deciding whether or not discovery could, in any case, be granted against an infant respondent, it should not be ordered in the present case, as it could only be required in order to prove the adultery of the respondent. (Redfern v. Redfern.) ... ...page 68 Practice-Order for maintenance of wife-" Dum sola Insertion et casta vixerit" or omission of clause. When an order is made by the Divorce Division for the payment by a husband of an allowance for the maintenance of the wife under 29 & 30 Vict. c. 32, s. 1, there is no rule as to the insertion or omission of the "dum sola et casta" clause, and the judge must decide, on the circumstances of each case, whether or not that clause shall be inserted. A wife obtained a divorce owing to the misconduct of her husband. There were no children of the marriage. The wife had no property, and in consequence of the husband being a man of small means the allowance which he was ordered to make her was not more than sufficient for her bare subsistence. Held, that the order ought not to contain the "dum sola et casta clause. (Wood v. Wood.). Wife's adultery Condonation-Direction to juryPlea not established.-A husband who had received from his wife a confession of adultery, thereupon went home with her and they slept together upon that and the following night. He then sent her away to her relations, and they parted upon affectionate terms. The same day as he saw her off at the railway station, he signed a petition praying for a divorce. Upon the plea of condonation put forward by the wife, the learned judge directed the jury that the fact of the parties sleeping together was not conclusive, but that they must take that fact in conjunction with the other facts of the case, in forming a conclusion as to whether the adultery had been condoned. (Hail v. Hall and Kay.)

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Wife's confession-Husband's separation thereupon -Sufficient excuse- - Subsequent adultery-Decree.-A bona fide confession of adultery by a wife to her husband, believed in by him, is sufficient excuse for his leaving her. The husband, in 1881, found a letter in his wife's possession, and taxed her with adultery with a certain man. She admitted it, and he (the husband) left her. He was a journeyman jeweller, and had no means at that time to commence proceedings. He, about 1890, found that she was living with another man as his wife, by whom she had four children. The Court, finding that he was justified in leaving his wife upon her confession of adultery in 1881, and that his explanation of want of means was sufficient to explain the delay in taking proceedings to have his marriage dissolved, granted him a decree nisi. (Faulkes v. Faulkes and Stainton.)

EASEMENT.

Light-Derogation from grant Grant of vacant land-Building contemplated by parties to grantCovenant as to windows looking out on land of grantor-Implied obligation not to obstruct lights. -In 1875 W. conveyed land to the trustees of a religious body who were desirous of erecting a chapel thereon. The deed of conveyance set forth fully the trusts upon which the grantees were to hold the land, including trusts to erect a chapel in such manner as the grantees should with the sanction of the religious body deem necessary or expedient, and trusts in certain events to let, sell, or mortgage the land and buildings; the conveyance also contained a covenant by the grantees with W. that all windows in the chapel looking out on the other land of W. should be of fluted or ground glass. There were no buildings upon the

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land at the date of the grant, and no plans or specifications of the proposed chapel were submitted to W. for his approval. In Feb. 1878 the grantees commenced to build a chapel having windows looking out upon the land retained by W. In Nov. 1878 W. entered into an agreement to sell this land; and it was shortly afterwards conveyed by him to the defendants, who in May 1890 commenced to build thereon in such a manner as to obstruct the light of the chapel. Held, that W. had, in effect, given permission to the trustees of the chapel to erect such a building as they thought fit; and that, the chapel having been erected in a reasonable manner, neither W. nor his assigns could complain of the position of the chapel or of the way in which it was lighted. Held, that, it having been within the contemplation of the parties to the conveyance of 1875 that a chapel would be built on the land conveyed, having windows looking out on the land retained by W., W. and his assigns were under an implied obligation not to do anything to obstruct such windows. (Bailey v. Icke.)

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ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. Bishop-Book of Common Prayer-Communion Service-Rubrics-" Minister "-1 Eliz. c. 2 and 14 Car. 2, c. 4 (Acts of Uniformity)-Lighted candles -Mixing water with the wine-Administering the mixed chalice-Eastward position-Breaking of the bread" before the people "-Singing of the 'Agnus Dei "--Making sign of the cross in the Absolution-Making sign of the cross in the Benediction-Ceremony of ablution.-A bishop when officiating in the Communion service is "minister" within the meaning of the rubrics of the order for the administration of the Holy Communion contained in the Book of Common Prayer, and is bound to observe the directions given to the minister therein. The mere fact of two lighted candles not wanted for the purpose of giving light standing on the Holy Table continuously throughout the Communion service is not unlawful. In the administration of the Holy Communion the mixing of water with the wine in and as part of the service is unlawful, but the consecration and administration of wine with which water has been mixed apart from and before the service is not unlawful. The words "north side" in the rubric at the commencement of the Communion service, which provides that "the priest, standing at the north side of the table, shall say the Lord's Prayer, &c.," being introduced during the period when the table was placed lower in the chancel or in the body of the church, and stood lengthwise, having a north and a south side and an east and a west end, and being impossible of literal fulfilment now that the table has been moved back to the east end of the chancel and so placed as to have an east and a west side and a north and a south end, a certain liberty in the application of the term exists, and it is not unlawful for the minister to stand at the northern part of the west side of the table with his face to the table and his back to the people. It is unlawful for the minister to stand during the prayer of consecration in the Communion service so that the manual acts of breaking the bread and taking the cup into his hand are not visible to the people. The singing of the anthem Oh! Lamb of God" by the choir immediately after the prayer of consecration in the Communion service is not an illegal addition to the service. The making the sign of the cross in giving the absolution and in giving the benediction in the Communion service is unlawful. It is not unlawful for the minister to pour wine and water into the paten and chalice in order to cleanse them, and to drink up such wine and water in the sight of the people without any break or interval after the benediction at the end of the Communion service. and others v. The Bishop of Lincoln.) Pew in church-Right appurtenant to houseFaculty-Evidence of user-Presumption of legal origin. The exclusive right to a pew in a church

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Parliament-Registration of voters-Bankrupt— Undisturbed occupation of dwelling-house-Subsequent acceptance of rent by landlord-Inhabitant occupier of dwelling-house as owner or tenant-Bankruptcy Act 1883-Representation of the People Act 1867.-By the 20th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 the property of a bankrupt vests in his trustee. At a court for the revision of the parliamentary lists of voters of a borough, objection was taken to B., the nature of whose qualification appeared in the list as dwelling-house,' on the ground that, as he had been adjudicated bankrupt during the qualifying period, his property, including the tenancy of his house, had passed to his trustee, and that he had not therefore, occupied the qualifying property as tenant during the whole of the qualifying period. B.'s actual occupation of the house had never been disturbed, and after the adjudication the landlord, on the usual quarter days, accepted the rent from him. No act of any kind in relation to the bankrupt and his dwelling-house was ever done or signified by anyone officially connected with the bankruptcy. Held, that the undisturbed holding over of the bankrupt, coupled with the subsequent receipt of rent by the landlord, constituted a tenancy by the bankrupt as tenant to the landlord from the time of the adjudication, and that he had occupied as tenant during the whole of the qualifying period, and was entitled to have his name retained upon the lists. (Mackay v. McGuire.)...

Registration of voters Claim to be inserted in list of voters-Authority to agent to make and sign claim-Power to delegate authority Due notice of claim" by applicant.-The appellant had signed and sent to an agent a printed form of authority which was in the following terms: "I hereby give authority to Charles Coppack to make and sign on my behalf a claim to vote, &c., as I may seem to him to be qualified, and to appear on my behalf in support of the claim." The agent being of opinion that the claim should be made, directed a clerk, occasionally employed in his office, to sign it in the appellant's name, which he did. Objection was taken, and the revising barrister expunged the appellant's name from the list of claims on the grounds that the above authority could not be delegated, and that it had not been proved to his satisfaction that the appellant had given due notice of his claim to be inserted in the list of voters as required by sect. 38 of the Parliamentary Registration Act 1843. Held, on appeal, that, as the agent had exercised his judgment under the authority, and had arrived at the conclusion that the claim should be made, and had directed his clerk to sign it, such claim was good. (Brown, app., v. Tombs, resp.)...

EMPLOYER AND WORKMAN. Dispute "-Summons for settlement by court of summary jurisdiction-Six years' limitation-Employers and Workmen Act 1875.-The respondents were owners of collieries and other worke, and the appellant was a general labourer in their employment, at a fixed wage of 28. 8d. per day, but was not employed in or about the collieries. In May 1889 a dispute arose between the respondents and the appellant. The latter claimed to be a workman subject to the sliding-scale agreement by which the rate of wages of workmen in South Wales

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collieries, including those engaged in or about the collieries of the respondents, were regulated according to the selling prices of coal, and demanded percentages on his wages from the 2nd Oct. 1888, when he entered the respondents' service. On the 19th March 1890 the respondents took out a summons under the Employers and Workmen Act 1875 for the adjustment of the dispute by a stipendiary magistrate, and on the 31st March 1890, before the case was heard, dismissed the appellant from their service. When the case came before the magistrate on the 2nd April 1890, the appellant objected to the jurisdiction on the grounds (1) that the relation of employer and workman was at an end; (2) that there was no dispute within the meaning of sects. 3 (1) and 4 of the said Act, because no action founded on a legal claim had been commenced; (3) that the cause of dispute had arisen more than six months before the issue of the summons, and therefore the jurisdiction was ousted by sect. 11 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848. The magistrate overruled these objections, and adjudicated in favour of the respondents, but stated a case for the opinion of the Queen's Bench Division. Held, that there was a dispute within the meaning of the Employers and Workmen Act 1875 upon which the magistrate could adjudicate; and that the limit of time within such disputes may be brought before a court of summary jurisdiction is six years. (Charles, app., v. The Mortgagees of Plymouth Works, resps.)

EVIDENCE.

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Proof of documents-Attesting witness-Common Law Procedure Act 1854.-In a case where all the parties are represented before the court it is not necessary to prove by the attesting witness a deed for the validity of which attestation is not necessary within the meaning of sect. 26 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. (Worthington v. Moore.) ..: 338 Receipt of money-Advances secured by promissory note-Insufficient stamp duty-Evidence for collateral purpose-Stamp Act 1870.-The defendant in an action claimed to have made certain advances, and he tendered as evidence of one of the loans a promissory note for 40l. which was stamped with a penny stamp only. The plaintiff objected that a promissory note stamped with a penny stamp only was not admissible as evidence of the receipt of the money. The defendant admitted that the document was a promissory note, and insufficiently stamped as such; but he contended that, although it could not be admitted as a promissory note, it ought to be admitted as evidence of the receipt of the money. Held, that the receipt of the money was of the essence of the promissory note and inseparable from it; and that to admit the note as evidence of the loan would not be to admit it for collateral purposes, but would be making it available in the very way that the Stamp Act 1870 said should not be done. Held, therefore, that the court was bound to reject the note as evidence. (Ashling v. Boon.)

EXTRADITION.

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Habeas corpus-Homicide-Political offence-Reviewal of magistrate's decision.-By the Extradition Act 1870 and by the Extradition Treaty of 1880 between Great Britain and Switzerland, the crimes of murder and manslaughter are, with others, made the subject of extradition, and art. 11 of the treaty incorporates sect. 3 of the Extradition Act 1870, which excepts from extradition offences of a political character. Angelo Castioni, a fugitive criminal in England, had been committed to prison under the Extradition Acts 1870 and 1873 by one of the police magistrates at Bow-street, with a view to his extradition to Switzerland in consequence of a requisition by the Swiss Government for his surrender to take his trial in that country on a charge of murder. An application was made for a writ of habeas corpus for the release of the prisoner, on the ground that the offence charged was a political offence within the

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Sept. 26, 1891.]

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meaning of sect. 3 of the Extradition Act 1870. Held (adopting the definition of "an offence of a political character" suggested by Stephen, J. in his History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 2, p. 71), that the homicide for which the prisoner's extradition was demanded was committed not only in the course of, but as incidental to and part of a political insurrection; that it was therefore an offence of a political character within the meaning of sect. 3 of the Extradition Act 1870; and that the prisoner must be discharged. Held also, that the court was not bound by the decision of the magistrate on the facts before him, but had power to consider the whole matter, and to receive fresh evidence. (Re Castioni.) ...page 344

FRIENDLY SOCIETY.

Arbitration under rules of Friendly Societies Act 1875-Motion to High Court to set aside awardJurisdiction of the High Court.-The appellant, a member of a friendly society, having met with an accident, applied to his society for relief. His claim was refused, and under the rules of the society the dispute was referred to arbitrators, who decided against him. Held, on appeal, that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. (Re An Arbitration between Gollings and the Tradesmen's Friendly Society, Peterborough.)

he

Fraudulent misapplication of property of-Summary proceedings before justices Conviction under statute-Penalty, and order to repay-Imprisonment for default of payment-Remedy by action barred Friendly Societies Act 1875. The Friendly Societies Act 1875, by sect. 16, sub-sect. 9, provides that "if any person obtains possession by false representation or imposition of any property of a society, or having the same in his possession withholds or misapplies the same shall be liable on summary conviction to a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds and costs, and to be ordered to deliver up all such property, or to repay all moneys applied improperly, and in default of such delivery or repayment, or of the payment of such penalty and costs aforesaid, to be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, for any time not exceeding three months." The defendant had been convicted, under this section, of misapplying a sum of money belonging to the society, and had been ordered to repay such sum and to pay a penalty and costs, and was imprisoned for a period of two months with hard labour for default. The sum which was ordered to be repaid to the society not having been paid, the trustees sued the defendant to recover that sum. Held, that the conviction, order, and imprisonment, upon summary proceedings under the statute, were a bar to a subsequent civil action by the plaintiffs to recover the money. (Vernon and others V. Watson.)

GAMING.

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460, 728

Betting-Advertising as to betting-Racing Record -Lottery-Prizes for selecting winning horses.The respondent, a newspaper proprietor, published weekly a "Racing Record," which contained information as to races which had been recently run, and as to those which were about to take place; at the end of the book was a coupon, which the purchaser of the book might cut off, and, after writing upon it the names of the horses which he thought would win the six races mentioned on it might send to the respondent's office; the respondent offered prizes to the persons who selected six, five, or four winners, the prizes varying in amount according to the number of winners selected. The "Racing Records were sold principally through newsvendors or stationers, and a few copies only were sold by the respondent over the counter at his office. Held, that the respondent had not committed any offence under either the Betting

GIFT.

Chattel capable of delivery-Passing of property to donee- -Delivery first and gift afterwards. Delivery first and gift afterwards of a chattel capable of delivery is as effectual as gift first and delivery afterwards. (Re Alderson; Alderson v. Peel.)...

HABEAS CORPUS.

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Extradition crime-Extradition Acts 1870-Evidence required to justify commitment underNotary-Misappropriation of money by-Bailee or agent-Embezzlement and fraud as-Larceny Act 1861.-A French subject was arrested in Jersey on a warrant charging him with "embezzlement in France as an agent or bailee." The French diplomatic representative in London thereupon requisitioned the Secretary of State for his surrender on the ground that he was accused of the crime of fraud by a bailee" which was an extraditable offence under the Extradition Acts 1870 and 1873. Sir John Bridge, the police magistrate sitting at Bow-street, committed him to take his trial in France upon a warrant charging him with "embezzlement and fraud as an agent or bailee." The foreign warrant, issued in France, charged him with having" embezzled or misappropriated sums of money which had been delivered to him in his capacity of notary." Held, that there was nothing in the technical point that the warrants were not in proper form, and that they differed the one from the other; that the term used in the French warrant, abus de confiance, or fraudulent misappropriation of money deposited with the prisoner in his capacity of notary, is a perfectly good offence within the first schedule to the Extradition Act 1870, and also under art. 3 of our Treaty with France, clause No. 18 of the list of extradition crimes. Held also, that all that is necessary is to call the attention of the magistrate to what he is required to do in the case, and that it is sufficient if his attention is drawn to a particular crime under the Act, and it is for the magistrate to inquire whether the evidence laild before him establishes a prima facie case of what would be a crime by English law, and such as would justify him in committing the prisoner for trial in an English court. Held also, that the facts disclosed on the depositions warranted the magistrate in coming to the conclusion that, as regards four of the charges, there was a prima facie case under sect. 76 of the Larceny Act 1861. Held further, that, under this section, embezzlement in the sense of fraudulent misappropriation may be committed by others than clerks or servants, i.e., by bankers, bailees, or agents; and that there was nothing in the objection that, because the magistrate had committed on all the nineteen charges, the warrant would not be good as to all of them and was therefore bad as to all. (Re Bellencoutre.) .. 461 Right of appeal-Judicature Act 1873-Illegitimate child-Rights of mother.-The Queen's Bench Division having directed that a writ of habeas corpus should issue to the defendant to bring an infant child before the court in order that the court might determine whether the child should remain in his custody, or whether it should be handed over to its mother or to persons nominated by her: Held, that an appeal lay to the Court of Appeal. The case of Bell Cox v. Hakes (63 L. T. Rep. N. S. 392; 15 App. Cas. 506) distinguished on the grounds that the present case was not one of the liberty of the subject, but of the nurture and education of a child, and that the court was able in the present case to give effect to its order. Held also, that on the question of nurture and education the mother of an illegitimate child has the same rights over it as the father of an illegitimate child has over his child, and the court is bound to give effect to her wishes unless it should see that she is unfit to have the

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