upon. It also ushered in a period of great legislative activity, of numerous codes of law, designed to weld together as far as possible the heterogeneous populations of the empire. These are outside the scope of the book before us, which, however, in the stirring incidents of an eventful period does not lose sight of the steady development and concentration of military strength and security. Lord Roberts arrived in India just five years before the Mutiny broke out. He took an active part in the leading events of the fierce struggle which ensued, and in after years his life was spent in the perplexities and constant conflicts involved in our relations to the tribes on the north-western frontier, and in the eventual establishment of that scientific frontier which, aided by a political understanding with Afghanistan, is to be the first line of defence against any hostile attack which the future may have in store for us. The most astounding characteristic of the years just before the Mutiny was the infatuated sense of security which pervaded all classes of Europeans. On the very eve of the outbreak there was no suspicion at all amongst the officers serving with native regiments that discontent was universal amongst the sepoys, and that a mutiny of the whole Bengal army was imminent. The reliance on native fidelity on the part of those officers was so unbounded that, even after half the native army had mutinied, the officers belonging to the remaining regiments could not be brought to believe that any treachery lurked in the minds of their own particular men. They remonstrated, in many cases passionately, almost to the point of insubordination, against measures of disarmament, when these involved imputations on the loyalty of their own immediate regiment. Yet the evidence forthcoming of widespread disaffection was overwhelming. The Punjab officials on the first outbreak laid hands on all native correspondence in the post-office. They found that the number of seditious papers was alarmingly great, and that every native regi ment with which they had to deal was implicated. It was clear from them that the sepoys had been made to believe that we intended to destroy their caste by contaminating the cartridges which they had to bite with a mixture of cow's fat and lard-one abhorrent to the Hindu, the other to the Mussulman. Lord Roberts uses the expression "made to believe," but extraordinary as it will always appear to the historian who appreciates the strength of the religious sentiment amongst Hindus and Mahomedans, the fanaticism with which they cling to their religious ideas and the animosity with which they regarded what they considered a covert attempt to compel the adoption of Christianity after the destruction of caste, there was ample ground for their intense dissatisfaction. The recent researches of Mr. Forrest in the records of the government of India, says Lord Roberts (i. 431), prove that "the lubricating mixture used in preparing the cartridges was actually composed of the objectionable ingredients, cow's fat and lard, and that incredible disregard of the soldiers' religious prejudices was displayed in the manufacture of these cartridges." The sepoys complained; but their officers, in the belief that such utter indiscretion amongst the authorities was impossible, assured their men that the mixture used was perfectly unobjectionable. Nothing was easier than for the men quartered near Calcutta to ascertain from natives employed in manufacturing cartridges at Fort William arsenal that these assurances were contrary to the fact. Distrust accordingly spread far and wide. The not unnatural belief was held that government and officers were determined to undermine their religion. The suddenness with which an elaborately organized and general mutiny burst upon us must be attributed to the general sentiment of abhorrence and desperation which had been so wantonly provoked; to the infatuation which blinded those whom wisdom after the event convicts of having had numerous warnings; to the existence of a military system in which natives stood to Englishmen in the proportion of six to one, and were trusted to guard-that is, were trusted with the possession of-almost all the arsenals and magazines, the British officers in principal command being, in too many instances, men who were worn out in mind and body by long residence in the country. Blind confidence on the part of the British, intense dissatisfaction on the part of the natives, and their possession, actual or imminent, of arms, ammunition, and places of strength, are amply sufficient to account for the rebellion. The political position of Great Britain at that time influenced, no doubt, the proceedings of the chiefs of the Mutiny. The prestige of British arms had been seriously damaged in Afghanistan only sixteen years before, and the early disasters and mismanagement of the Crimean expedition had not retrieved it. It is well known that Nana Sahib's confidential agent, Azimula Khan, visited the Crimea during the siege of Sebastopol. He had been three years in London, a man of no rank at all, received and fêted as a royal prince in that ridiculous way which our social enthusiasms suggest. His correspondence was seized, and it was discovered that the Nana Sahib had widespread relations with Turkey, the king of Delhi, the nawab of Oudh, and other great personages. Both he and his crafty agent were looked upon as harmless exemplary creatures; the latter was engaged to an English girl, and one of his letters from an elderly dame in England called him her dear Eastern son. On the other hand, there were some incidents in the political position favorable to us. Lord Dalhousie had concluded a treaty with the ameer of Afghanistan, which kept the Afghans quiet during a period when, had they turned against us, we should assuredly have lost the Punjab, and probably the whole country north of it. The Sikhs had been conquered, and had passed from open hostility to equally sincere friendship. Throughout the Mutiny they remained perfectly loyal, and performed the important service of keeping open communication between Delhi and the Punjab. The third inci dent in our favor was the outbreak of hostilities with China, and Lord Elgin's timely diversion of troops to Calcutta, which had been intended for Canton. The fourth incident was that in this critical moment of the history of the native race of India, no leader of any mind or mark came to the front. If those four incidents of the position had been wanting, and we had been deprived of the advantages which they combined to confer, the impression left on our minds from Lord Roberts's narrative of the portentous struggle which ensued is, that the rebellion would never have been suppressed nor India reconquered in the summary way described. We should have had to withdraw within narrow limits, and begin most of the work afresh. The thrilling tale of the marvellous achievements by which empire was successfully restored within a year and a half of the first outbreaks at Berhampur andMeerut is unfolded in these volumes. Lord Roberts took an active part in many of them. He was at Peshawur when the telegram of the 11th May, 1857, arrived, which proved to be a message from Delhi "to all stations in the Punjab" that a very serious outbreak had occurred at Meerut, and that Delhi had joined in the Mutiny. The first thing for those at Peshawur to do was to secure the Punjab. The course decided on was to trust the chiefs and people, and to form a movable column, to act where it was wanted. To Roberts's great satisfaction (it is always his good luck to which he attributes his selection) he was appointed staff-officer to its commander. He remained with it until the progress of events urgently required the presence at Delhi of all artillery officers not doing regimental duty. From the 28th June onwards he took part in that memorable siege and in its final capture. That siege was typical of the whole struggle. It was a siege of a fortress of enormous strength held by untold thousands of armed men trained to war and in possession of our arms and ammunition, by a force of 3.217 British, with Sikhs and Gurkas, the total never reaching ten thousand troops of all kinds. The besiegers were themselves besieged; there was no retreat; and if success were delayed, the Punjab authorities were convinced that there would be a struggle for European existence within the Punjab itself. General Wilson hesitated, face to face with what seemed to be absolutely impossible, to take a stronghold by force, only to find himself amongst enemies who were vastly superior in numbers and position. An incident is given which marks the intense determination to which the real leaders of the British force had worked themselves as they grasped the calamitous and far-reaching consequences which delay would have involved. Nicholson had resolved that if a particular council of war hesitated to assault, he would propose the supersession of General Wilson-an unprecedentedly extreme step to take in presence of the enemy. Lord Roberts, at this distance of time, and after frequent discussion with others, believes that Nicholson would have been right, for if Wilson had refused to sanction the assault, desperate as it seemed, he would have proved himself unfit for the post. The whole of the wonderful narrative is given in this book, with an amount of detail which must render it extremely valuable to all military students. Nicholson will ever remain the hero of the capture of Delhi. He has won his place in history as one of the greatest heroes whom the human race has produced. His threat, after he was mortally wounded, to shoot his own commander-in-chief if he wavered when surrounded and outnumbered, in the midst of the city into which the small besieging army had forced its way, is one of the most striking incidents in the annals of war. The spirit which saved our empire in India was the spirit of determination, inextinguishable even in death. One feels that the triumph of the besieging force was enhanced by the knowledge that Nicholson lived till we had occupied the palace and had gained complete possession of the whole city. At sunrise on the 21st September, 1857, just seven days after the assault, a royal salute proclaimed that we were again masters of Delhi; in the afternoon the last of the Mogul emperors surrendered, and was brought into the city; on the 23d Nicholson died. The fall of Delhi broke the back of the rebellion. Failure, or even too longdelayed success, would have put a strain on the loyalty of the people beyond what it could bear. The general opinion was, and is, that Sikhs and Punjabis would have risen. To carry Delhi the Punjab had been denuded of troops, but after its fall there still remained the task of opening up communication with Cawnpore and Lucknow. Accordingly, the very day after Delhi fell a column was despatched to Cawnpore, and the Punjab was still left to take care of itself. Roberts was attached to this column, which consisted of seven hundred and fifty British and nineteen hundred natives, and at once, the day after Nicholson's death, marched out of Delhi to open up the country between the Jumna and the Ganges. An urgent summons from Sir James Outram at the Lucknow Residency reached them, begging for aid as soon as possible, as provisions were running short. On the 26th October they arrived at Cawnpore, and for the first time heard the terrible story of what had happened there. They learned also that Havelock and Outram, with little more than three thousand men, had forced their way through Lucknow, only to find themselves surrounded by a vast multitude of the enemy. Outram wished the relieving force under Sir Colin Campbell to be spared the necessity of repeating this experience, and pointed out a different line of advance, which was adopted. Roberts with his column took a foremost part in the wonderful achievement by which the Lucknow garrison was relieved, which was carried out in every particular as originally planned, thus demonstrating with what care each detail had been thought out and each movement executed. The fall of Lucknow, which was effected on the 14 March, 1858, completed what the fall of Delhi had begun, the suppression of the Mutiny so far that every native must from that moment have despaired inevitable consequences which would of success. The remaining struggles ensue if an outbreak occurred at the were against men rendered desperate by their crimes, who, as they had forfeited all right to clemency, determined to sell their lives on the field of battle. To that category belongs the resistance which the Gwaliors offered both at Agra and Cawnpore. Jhansi, no doubt, remained to be subjugated, as also the rest of Oudh, Rohilkand, and Central India; but there was no very important city or stronghold in the hands of the enemy. Sir Hugh Rose's operations in Jhansi and Central India do not fall within the scope of this book. On the 1st April, 1858, there was a force of ninety-six thousand British soldiers in India, more than twice the number which existed before the Mutiny broke out, besides a large body of reliable native troops. By that date the reconquest of India by the triumphant suppression of the Mutiny was effected. While Nicholson's name will always be associated with Delhi, and those of Havelock and Outram and Sir Colin Campbell with Lucknow, the latter city cannot fail to recall that of Sir Henry Lawrence, one of the greatest names in British India prior to the Mutiny. Not merely was it his foresight and activity, as Lord Roberts points out, which rendered the defence of Lucknow possible against such tremendous odds for so long a time; but he was apparently the only European in India who had foreseen the catastrophe of the Mutiny, and who from the very first moment of its outbreak had accurately estimated its portentous gravity. No one commanded more thoroughly than he did the enthusiastic loyalty and obedience of the natives, and no one more thoroughly appreciated and trusted their many good qualities. Yet fourteen years before 1857 he had predicted the Mutiny, and the course it would take. In the Calcutta Review of 1843 he had commented on the habitual carelessness of the government, and its disregard of ordinary military precautions and preparations. He had shown how possible it was for a hostile party to seize Delhi, and had pointed to the beginning of the hot season which was not immediately suppressed. It seems unintelligible, looking at the whole position with the wisdom which follows the event, that warnings as to such obvious necessity should have been required, and still more that they should have been disregarded. When he first heard of the outbreak at Meerut, he telegraphed to the new governor-general, Lord Canning, at once to send to China and Ceylon for British troops, to call on the Nepalese to assist, and to give him that military control in his province which would enable him to control the elderly military officers, who were not to be relied upon, and who had in Oudh, as well as in many other places, to be effaced when the troubles began. Lawrence's influence with the natives enabled him to delay the outbreak at Lucknow until his measures for the defence of the Residency were completed, and to induce a considerable number of sepoys not only to continue in their allegiance, but to share the dangers and privations of the siege-"a priceless service," says Lord Roberts, "for without their aid the defence could not have been made." We have no space to describe the enormous difficulties in the way of organizing the defence of a place where there was no fort and no magazine. Interesting as they are, they yield at this distance of time to the interest of a remarkable and powerful character. Before the end of May, in the midst of his own efforts and preparation, he wrote to Lord Can ning to point out that the desperateness of our position might be measured by the rising insolence of the natives. "It was only just after the Kabul massacre," he wrote, "and when we hesitated to advance through the Khyber, that in my memory such a tone has ever before prevailed." The political interest of this stupendous event culminates in a due appreciation of the causes which led to it, and of the means by which its recurrence may be prevented. Lord Roberts discusses both questions in his 30th and following chapters, and the point of most practical importance in his book is whether those views will be allowed to influence policy in the future. A long period of comparative rest and tranquillity had obscured in the minds of the natives all memory of their antecedent feuds, and race and religious discords. Had the Mutiny been successful and no native leader of statesmanlike capacity appeared on the scene, the anarchy which would have resulted, the scenes of turbulent confusion and oppression which must have followed the disappearance of our authority, would have served to facilitate the task of reconquest. At the time all British authorities were most anxious to make it clearly understood that it was not a general insurrection of the whole country against our rule, but a mutiny of soldiers against their officers. No one was more emphatic on that subject than the late Sir George Campbell. But it is only partially true. There is evidence of considerable disaffection and discontent on the part of the great landowners and potentates, most of whom had real or fancied grievances. The greased cartridges were quite sufficient to account for the mutiny of the soldiers, since they were not merely destructive in themselves of their caste, but were believed to be intentionally directed to that end-an end which it is unnecessary to explain was ruinous to their position in this world and the next. Still, a mutiny of that portentous character must have leaders of wealth and position, and these leaders must also have grievances which excite them to stake life and fortune on the result of a desperate enterprise. The most prominent of these leaders were the aged titular king of Delhi, the ex-king of Oudh, and the Nana Sahib. The two former led the Mahomedans, the latter the Hindus. The special grievance of the king of Delhi was that we had decided that the title of king, which we had bestowed on the successors of the Mogul emperor, should on his death be abolished and his family removed from Delhi. Lord Wellesley, at the beginning of the century, had drawn atten tion to the danger of allowing a Mohamedan prince, with all the surroundings of royalty, to remain at the seat of the old Mogul government. That danger should have been abolished at the time. But the East India Company had from the time of Lord Clive, and by virtue of what was called a grant of the dewanny obtained by that nobleman, governed India as the transferee of Mogul sovereignty, Queen Victoria's sovereignty, not being proclaimed till 1858. That fiction was convenient when it was first resorted to, and it took time to die a natural death. By Lord Dalhousie's time it was likely forgotten. The Mogul family probably recollected it, and accordingly it was to their intense humiliation and disgust that they were removed from Delhi, and deprived of the title of king after the death of its actual holder. Before the Mutiny broke out the king of Delhi was intriguing with the shah of Persia, and a proclamation was issued calling on all true believers to rise and fight against the infidels, for the Persians were coming. The part played by the king of Delhi was sufficient to prevent the Mutiny being exclusively an affair of discontented soldiery. Another circumstance which showed the political character of the movement was the effect produced on the minds of native chiefs by Lord Dalhousie's system of rapid annexation, culminating in the annexation of Oudh. The encroachments of the East India company in former generations, and the establishment of its power, were acquiesced in. They put an end to a period of intolerable strife and political confusion. and they co-existed with considerable native dominions. So long as the political result was that a balance of power between ourselves and native statesMahratta, Rajput, Sikh, or Mahomedan remained, they were prevented by their mutual jealousies and religious differences from combining against us. Lord Dalhousie's annexations, culminating in the seizure of Oudh, destroyed that balance, and rendered us in India what we now claim to be in South Africa, the predominant power. Hos |