and the submission cannot be made a rule of Court, and this power they still possess (Hamilton v. Bankin, 3 De G. & Sm. 782). Where an action at Common Law is referred, and the submission is by Judge's order, order of Court or of Nisi Prius, the statute 9 & 10 Will. III. c. 15, does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Courts of equity to set aside an award which they possessed before the passing of that statute. But where a submission is made a rule of Court under 9 & 10 Will. III. c. 15, equity has no jurisdiction to grant relief, neither has it any power to do so where the parties have agreed that the submission may be made a rule of a Court of Common Law in pursuance of the statute (Davis v. Getty, 1 S. & S. 411).

The causes which will induce the Common Law Courts to set aside an award will have the same effect in the Courts of equity, and any grounds capable of influencing the former Courts-such as improper conduct of the arbitrator, or the parties to the reference, &c.-can be relied on to set aside the award in equity. If the submission be made a rule of Court in the Chancery Division, the proper mode of procedure is by motion, notice of which may be served on the arbitrator, and must be so on the other side. The notice should state in "general terms " the grounds on which the application is made, and a copy of the affidavit (if any) should be served with it. The application must be made to the division of the Court of which the submission has been made a rule. The procedure on application to set aside an award is the same in both the Common Law and the Chancery

Chancery
Division can

grant specific
performance.

No specific performance where award is

uncertain or unreasonable.

Divisions, the difference formerly existing in the practice of the two divisions being now abolished.

Specific Performance of an Award.

The Chancery Division of the High Court will grant specific performance of an award on the application of an aggrieved party, but before doing so, the act awarded to be done must be of such a character as the Court would have enforced, if it had been an agreement between the parties. This granting of specific performance is peculiar to the Courts of Equity, and cannot be ordered by any Court of Common Law. It means performance of the exact thing agreed upon by the parties, and in order to obtain it, the act to be done must be specific. If, therefore, the act ordered by the award to be done is the conveyance of land, or the making of a lease, the Court will regard the award as the agreement of the parties, and enforce it as such unless the award is void for uncertainty (Hopcraft v. Hickman, 2 S. & S. 130). The Court will not compel specific performance of an award where the agreement contained in the submission is of such a character as, owing to its unfairness or unreasonableness, will prevent the Court interfering in respect of the award made in pursuance of it. Neither will the Court interfere where the award is excessive or defective, as in both those cases application could be successfully made to set the award aside altogether, and equity will not make an order which is capable of being evaded, so that although an award is good in part, equity will

formance will be granted where there performance,

has been part

not enforce the good part if it cannot enforce the whole (Nickels v. Hancock, 7 De G. M. & G. 300). Where there has been part-performance of an Specific peraward the Court will compel specific performance of the whole, and this although the award is not binding in form of law (Norton v. Mascall, 2 Vern. 24). The Court will not interfere to compel specific performance of an award unless the parties avail themselves promptly of its assistance, delay in any attempt to enforce the award being fatal to the application for relief (Eads v. Williams, 24 L. J. Ch. 531). Court will not interfere to compel specific performance

The

illegal or ambiguous.

if the award direct any illegal act to be done, neither but not where in cases where the award is ambiguous or uncertain. act awarded is If one of the parties have made an ineffectual attempt to set the award aside, the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction to compel specific performance (Blackett v. Bates, L. R. 1 Ch. 117). Unless the effect of the action of the Court would be to grant relief to both parties, it will not grant specific performance of an award. The Court will not make enquiries as to the reasonableness of the act directed by the award, as the arbitrator is the judge of the matters referred to him, and having been chosen by the parties themselves, they cannot afterwards call his decision into question (Blundell v. Brettargh, 17 Ves. 242).

APPENDIX.

ARBITRATION BILL. [H. L.]

MEMORANDUM.

THE Bill is intended to consolidate the general law as to arbitration. It does not deal with special measures of arbitration such as 5 Geo. IV. c. 96 (Act to consolidate and amend the laws relative to the arbitration of disputes between masters and workmen), or with the special provisions for arbitration contained in many Acts of Parliament; for example, the Artizans' and Labourers' Dwellings Act, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 36, the Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, or the Building Societies Act, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 42.

The cases cited in the margin are merely illustrative; they do not exhaust the chief authorities.

The Bill proposes no changes in the law; the utmost which it does is, when there are conflicting decisions, to state the law in accordance with what appears to be the correct view.

It is intended, however, by those at whose instance the Bill has been prepared, to propose in committee amendments carrying out the following, among other, changes :

(1.) An abridgment of the power of revoking submissions which, to some extent, still exists, which has been frequently condemned by Judges, and which is found inconvenient and prejudicial. See Randell v.