THE 1867 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE FOR IRELAND: GIVING, IN AN ABRIDGED AND ALPHABETICAL FORM AND ORDER, THE SEVERAL OFFENCES AND OTHER CAUSES OF COMPLAINT THE STATUTES RELATING THERETO; THE EXTENT OF JURISDICTION; AND WHETHER TRIABLE BY ONE OR MORE JUSTICES. AND, IN LIKE ALPHABETICAL ORDER, AN EPITOME OF THE CRIMES AND OFFENCES TRIABLE BY INDICTMENT. AND, AS AN APPENDIX, "THE PETTY SESSIONS (IRELAND) ACT, 1851," (WITH NOTES POINTING OUT TO WHAT EXTENT IT IS APPLICABLE TO OR AFFECTED BY PRIOR ABSTRACTS OF OTHER USEFUL AND IMPORTANT STATUTES; AND THE CIRCULAR LETTERS ISSUED FROM DUBLIN CASTLE FOR THE HODGES, DUBLIN: SMITH AND CO., 104, GRAFTON STREET, BOOKSELLERS TO THE HON. SOCIETY OF KING'S INNS. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. Ir is four years since the last Edition was published, and the work has been some time out of print. The favourable opinion of those most competent to judge of its merits, and the many applications made for a further issue, induced the Author to prepare a Third Edition. The design and plan are the same, but it is not to be taken as a mere reprint of the former. Since the publication of the Second Edition many important Acts have been passed which have rendered important changes and additions needful, such as those relating to Registration of Births, Marriages, &c., Vaccination, Property of Married women, Beer Houses, Dogs, Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases, the complete alteration in the Fishery Laws, and the Public Health Acts, &c. &c. These demanded much more time and labour than the Author had anticipated, and than the mere analysis, without further examination, would indicate. All however have been carefully incorporated with the text, and some additional notes and observations have been added which have considerably enlarged the work ; but the sole object was to render it more useful. BLACKROCK, CORK, February, 1867. PREFACE TO THE FORMER EDITIONS. THE powers, authorities, and duties of a Justice of the Peace depend upon his Commission, and upon the several Statutes which create objects of his jurisdiction, and by prescribed, specific, and general rules, direct and control the exercise of that jurisdiction. These all are, with sufficient certainty, ascertainable; yet they are so manifold and diversified that to recur to them when needful-to know what Statutes are repealed and what remain in force—is, even to those who make the law their profession, oftentimes matter of perplexity. Some very useful and elaborate works have been written for the assistance and guidance of the Bench and the profession, but as their authors felt it necessary to give the fullest attainable information on the subjects treated, with disquisitions on the numerous settled and unsettled cases, and on the technical difficulties and subtleties which occasionally may have to be encountered (always assuming that their readers must be accustomed to study of the law and the observing of statutable arrangements); it could not, at the same time, be expected of them to depart from the usual and established order, solely and simply to set down collaterally, and within the easy reach and comprehension of the youngest and least experienced Magistrate, the offence, &c., statute, chapter, and section bearing upon it, the extent of jurisdiction, and how his decision or order should be enforced, but which unmingled information is nevertheless the most important and essential, as being indispensable to enable any Magistrate, it matters not what may be his other judicial acquirements, to adjudicate safely, properly, and according to law, in any ordinary case. For the exercise of good sense, firmness, and sound discretion, Justices of the Peace also find abundant opportunity. They, not unfrequently, have most trying and difficult duties to perform, and orders to enforce, in deciding and determining unpleasant quarrels and disputes between their fellow-citizens, their neighbours, the tenants on their own or adjoining demesnes, but in doing so are sustained by the assurance that they are performing imperative duties in administering the laws of the land; and, in general, it will be found, even with the humblest class, that that decision which is, and also seems to be, founded upon the law, alone affords satisfaction and insures respect. But should the Justice, regardless of his power (under which must be included the knowledge) derived from the law, proceed to judicially exercise his office, he would soon discover himself to be extremely helpless, and perhaps to be expensively mistaken. It is quite true that he is amply protected while acting "bona fide, and under the belief that he is acting in the execution of his duty, and in a manner within his jurisdiction," and that, too, where his, error may, to some extent, be of the law as well as of the fact. It is otherwise where, altogether exceeding his jurisdiction, "he assumes to do that which under no circumstances can be justified by his authority." That duties, then, if so much consequence should not remain matters of indifference or mere conjecture, in addition to positive enactments, the Government instructions require that the Justice shall, when making any order, set forth particularly the Act of Parliament authorizing what he has done. It is further required that the officer of the Court shall make it appear on the commitment of any person summarily convicted; so that it is absolutely necessary that in all cases the Statute be consulted, and that the habit be kept up in the Court. The obvious necessity for this repeated and continued reference, and the danger and uncertainty of relying on a mere act of the memory, suggested to the author the idea of some such facile and |