Ship (continued)

at Sea provides that "Every steamship, when approaching another ship so as to involve risk of collision, shall slacken her speed, or stop and reverse, if necessary." A collision occurred during a fog in the English Channel between the steamers A. and L. The master of the L. first heard the whistle of the 4. a point or a point and a half on his starboard bow. He heard the whistle afterwards, and found that it was gradually broadening on his starboard bow. As a whistle followed which did not seem to broaden, he stopped his engines. From the next whistle he was satisfied that the other vessel was porting, and closing rapidly on his starboard bow, and he thereupon reversed his engines full speed. Two more whistles followed, when the A. came in sight, crossing the L. at an angle of forty degrees. The collision took place soon afterwards. If the A. had not ported, the two vessels would have passed starboard to starboard on opposite courses. BARNES, J., held that the L. was to blame for not having slackened speed before she did, and that the A. was also to blame for porting and for not stopping. The Lancashire (App.), 34 On appeal by the owners of the L.,-Held, by the Court of Appeal, that when the L. stopped, the indications were not such as to shew her master distinctly and unequivocally that if both vessels continued to do what they were doing, they would pass clear without risk of collision, and that therefore, upon the authority of The Ceto (Law Rep. 14 App. Cas. 670), the appeal must be dismissed. Ibid.

6. collision: lights: ship making way, but "not under command": regulations for prerenting collisions at sea, article 5]-A steamship partially disabled, but able to proceed at four or five knots an hour, held, in the circumstances, not justified in exhibiting the three red lights at her mast-head required by article 5 of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea in the case of a ship "not under command"; and in the absence of proof that the side lights were also visible, held liable for the consequences of a collision. Owners of P. Caland v. Glamorgan Steamship Co. (Lim.) (H.L.), 41

Judgment of the Court of Appeal (61 Law J. Rep. P., D. & A. 54) affirmed. Ibid.

7.--collision: limitation of liability: collision between steamers belonging to same owners: loss of effects of crew: common employment: nonliability of owners in respect of crew space : gross tonnage: register tonnage: merchant shipping act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), ss. 21, 22, and 23: merchant shipping act amendment act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 63), s. 54: merchant shipping act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 124), s. 9: merchant shipping (tonnage) act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 43), s. 1]-The steamships P. and C., belonging to the same owners, came into collision, and the C. sank with her

cargo and the personal effects of her master and crew. In an action brought by certain owners of cargo on board the C., THE COURT found the P. alone to blame for the collision. The shipowners having commenced an action to limit their liability in respect of the collision, it was Held, first, that the crew of the C. were not in common employment with the crew of the P., and were, therefore, entitled to claim against the fund in respect of their lost effects; secondly, that in section 9 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1867, the words "registered tonnage" in sub-section 3, and

register tonnage" in sub-section 4, refer to the gross tonnage as registered, and that the liability in the case of steamships being based upon the gross tonnage, the plaintiffs were entitled to deduct the crew space under that section in computing their tonnage for the purposes of the action. The Petrel, 92

8. collision: overtaking and crossing rules: regulations for preventing collisions at sea, articles 16 and 20]-A steamer which has been overtaking another at night, and, after being within the range of the latter's stern light, has drawn up until within the range of her side light, does not-if the courses of the two vessels are converging courses-thereby become a crossing vessel within article 16, but continues subject to the provisions of the overtaking rule, article 20. The Molière, 102 9. collision: river Thames: anchor hanging from hawsepipe: stock not awash: compulsory pilotage: Thames rules: sea rules]—A steamer, being navigated in the river Thames, was, in accordance with the orders of her pilot-of whom she was in charge by compulsion of law-carrying her anchor hanging from the hawsepipe, the stock not being awash, and while so doing was run into by a steam-tug, which sustained considerable damage from the anchor:-Held, that the pilot was responsible for the breach of the Thames rule with regard to the mode of carrying the anchor, and that the owners were exempt from liability. The Monte Rosa, 20

The difference between the result of a breach of Sea Rules and Thames Rules considered. Ibid.

....

10. damage to cargo: bill of lading: "management of the ship": improper storage]Oranges were shipped under a bill of lading containing (inter alia) the following excep tion: "Damage or loss. . . . from any act, neglect, or default. . . . in the . . . . manage ment of the ship." The oranges were damaged owing to improper stowage :-Held, that the words "neglect or default in the management of the ship" did not exonerate the shipowners from damage caused by improper stowage. The Ferro, 48

Ship in Ballast. See INSURANCE, MARINE, 2. Signature. See WILL, 1, 2.

Will-due execution: signatures of testator and attesting witnesses: Lord St. Leonard's act (15 Vict. c. 24), 8.1]-The disposing part of a will occupied the whole of the first of four sides of a sheet of foolscap paper, and the signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses appeared on the middle of the fourth side, leaving the second and third sides blank, -THE COURT held that the will was properly signed within the meaning of Lord St. Leonard's Act (15 Vict. c. 24), s. 1. In the goods of Arthur Fuller, 40

2.

due execution: wills act (1 Vict. c. 26), 8. 9]-A will was entirely in the testator's handwriting, and contained an attestation clause in the following form: "Signed by the testator, and acknowledged by him to be his last will and testament, in the presence of us present at the same time, and subscribed by us in the presence of the said testator and of each other." It appeared from the evidence that the testator brought the will to the shop of the elder of the two attesting witnesses, and told him that it was his will, that he then signed it, and asked him to affix his name as witness. He did so, and then called in his son, to whom the testator made the same statement, after which the son also signed his name. The father saw the testator's signature on the will at the time he signed it, and the son saw the testator's signature and also that of his father on the will at the time he signed:-Held, that the will was not duly executed in accordance with the Wills Act (1 Vict. c. 26), s. 9. Wyatt and Berry v. Berry, 28

3. implied revocation by subsequent will: cancellation of second will: reviral of first will: wills act (7 Will. 4. and 1 Vict. c. 26), 88. 20 and 22]-A testator made a will by which he left all his property to A.; he then made another will by which he left a particular estate to B.; he then cancelled the second will, and died without re-executing the first will:-Held, reversing the decision of BARNES, J., that the second will operated as a revocation pro tanto of the first will, and that the cancellation of the second will did not operate as a revival of the first will so far as it had been revoked. In the goods of Hodgkinson (App.), 116

4.

5.

rerocation: two codicils: words indorsed on third sheet of first codicil: blank piece of paper pasted over such indorsement: removal of paper]-Where a testatrix executed two codicils and struck out the names of the attesting witnesses to the first codicil and wrote underneath words to the effect that she had cancelled it, and also wrote some words on the back of the third sheet of the first codicil, and afterwards pasted a piece of blank paper over such writing, the Court ordered the removal of such blank piece of paper for the purpose of ascertaining whether the words written underneath amounted to revocation or not. In the goods of Gilbert,

111

revocatory clause: inserted by inadvertence]-A testatrix duly executed three testamentary documents, a will and codicil, and another will some years later. The last will, which was on a printed form, contained a revocatory clause. It was read over to the testatrix, who objected to the words of this clause at the time, but one of the defendants, who had filled up the blanks in the printed form of will at her request, told her that if this clause was struck out, the will would be invalid, and that the other wills would not be affected by the last will as it stood. He made these statements in ignorance, honestly believing them to be true:-Held, that as the last will had been read over to the testatrix, she must be taken to have known and approved of the revocatory clause as it stood, and that therefore it must not be omitted

from the probate. Collins and Tuffley v. Elstone, 26

Morrell v. Morrell (51 Law J. Rep. P., D. & A. 49; Law Rep. 7 P. D. 68) followed. Ibid.

See ADMINISTRATION; LUNACY; PRO