ALIQUIS. All are agreed on one subject that, whatever may be his genesis and pedigree, man's existence on the earth is an august and solemn reality. Nothing is easier than to be wordy and discursive on his dignity and achievements. His greatness, and the variety and magnitude of his productions, forcing themselves upon our notice, extort admiration and applause. He is everywhere recognized as possessing powers of perception and high reasoning, an unfettered will, a glorious imagination, and a capacious memory. He discovers moral and spiritual affinities, can dwell with the invisible, anticipate immortality, and is conscious of aspirations that nothing sublunary or finite can satisfy.

NEMO. It is one of the strange charges preferred against Christianity that it makes too much of man,* that it represents God as more related to him than to nature, that it speaks of creation serving man, and not of his dependence upon it. But in these days of scientific triumph, how loudly would natural philosophers have derided Scripture had it represented him as inferior to nature, and the slave of its laws. In the zoological scale he may not be so great in bulk and strength and speed as some of the creatures that browse in the field, carol in the grove, or sport in the waters, but he is conscious of impulses, visions, and responsibilities, in which none of these can participate.

For some time now it has been a rooted conviction with me, that the knowledge of human nature is the one solid foundation both for natural and theological science. Especially is a competent acquaintance with the philosophy of the human intellect essential to the teacher and defender of religion. He cannot, like the geometer assume all his principles, and argue merely on the supposition of their truth, but must go back as far as inquiry can go, and concede the possibilities of error in many directions. "Religion subsequent to Revelation supposes a genuine philosophy of mind as the condition

* Spinoza.

of its truth."* Nothing is more obvious than that Christian theology implies the truth of certain metaphysical tenets, and it is as clear that in these days these assumptions of theologians are regarded by many as exploded errors. The only principles, therefore, which deriders of our belief hold in common with ourselves are the fixed principles of human reason, and if we cannot refute their doctrines on the implication of these principles, we cannot refute them at all. So that the study of the human mind is to all pre-eminently advantageous, and to the theologian absolutely indispensable. Many of the modern puzzles and difficulties in our discussions have no better foundation than an ignorance of the nature and limits of human reason. When we put away theory, hypothesis, and fancy, from paraded doubt, it is marvellous how meagre and harmless it becomes. This species of unbelief is certainly calculated to damage youthful and unfurnished minds, and also the minds of those older persons, who cannot bear the breath of opposition, but whose spirits collapse at the first question or difficulty, likewise the minds of many who are so engaged with the business of life, as to be debarred a personal painstaking investigation; but it is innocuous on the mind of the disciplined thinker. While fully admitting that apart from human learning and many acquisitions, a man may become fully acquainted with the evidences of the divinity of the gospel, yet a scientific, intellectual, and critical scepticism must be met by weapons of its own kind. We must divest ourselves however of the notion, that scepticism. involves superior sagacity or strength of mind, and maintain that the highest intelligence is on the side of an inspired Revelation. One preventive of scepticism in young men will be their studying the laws which regulate their own minds, manifested in their perceptions, intuitions, thoughts, and volitions. For every young man there is a critical period of doubt as he comes first to wrestle with great questions, and to inquire into

Sir W. Hamilton,

the grounds of that which hitherto he has believed on trust. At this period he requires sympathy and guidance. With some doubters, as you well know, it is useless appealing to experiences, and you can only meet them by the equipments of facts and reason. Scepticism may indicate power, but never the highest power either in kind or degree. The highest form of power is in affirmation and construction, while to deny, to object, to find flaws, to destroy anything that can be destroyed, is comparatively easy.

Belief

Here I may observe that Christian and saving faith includes two elements,-belief and trust. Belief must precede trust, since we cannot confide in a person unless we admit his existence and claims. respects facts and relations; trust rests on a person. We believe on the ground of evidence; we trust on the ground of character. Christians as a rule confide on the ground of testamentary evidence, and if they add to it an implicit faith, they enter into rest, "knowing in whom they have believed." Scepticism cannot destroy, in some cases indeed cannot disturb, the strength of their trust. But it may dim and hamper the belief of opinions and relations, and thus make confidence or trust difficult in the case of those who have not believed with the heart unto salvation. Some aspects of the scepticism of the day aim at trying to the utmost the faith of the most confirmed, since they seek to throw doubt upon all revealed religion, and launch the human mind upon the vast and trackless ocean of uncertainty without chart, or compass, guide or destination. This rationalistic speculation produces and encourages the infidelity of the indolent and indifferent, who view Christianity merely as a system of theoretical opinions. which men may believe without benefit, and neglect without injury. Hence you will see with me the importance of a knowledge of the evidences in which Christian belief reposes, and especially in the case of youth, that their concrete act of faith may become impregnable by their belief resting on intellectual

convictions, as well as being rooted in their affections. From these observations you will notice there is a large field of religious truth which does not immediately involve truth in a person. In this field questions arise that are for the intellect solely, and yet that may be so decided that faith in God, or in the Gospel shall be impossible. Such, for instance, as the questions of the being of a personal Deity, of human responsibility to Him, and of a future state. It is here where such surmisings arise as nourish the rationalistic scepticism of our age, which consists in a disbelief of those essential truths without which religious trust cannot be exercised. A man may so reject or ignore truth as to render himself unable to trust in God, or in the Gospel, or in a sense of responsibility, or in existence after death. The inquiry then, is here suggested, is there within the reach of man evidence which ought to convince him of the reality of Divine truth? We hesitate not to aver that such evidence is at hand, and that our relationship to a personal God may be ascertained, that the truth and necessity of the Gospel may be established, and that human responsibility and destiny may be known. If so, then we discern the moral character of scepticism, and find that before God it is sinful and offensive, for it is that evil thing which the Scriptures designate and brand unbelief. How far evidences of these things can reach heathens and individual cases God only can judge, but when we look to ourselves it is no breach of charity to say, that the religious indifferentism and sceptical doubt of our country, are not for want of instruction and proof to the contrary. I must still remind you that the speculations of an intellectual philosophy which so largely pervade society, and which appear to many so perilous and formidable, are but the old opponents of the Gospel in more modern guise. It is true they are impeding the triumphs of Christian truth, but they present no difficulty which has not already been met and overcome. In these introductory remarks I have been wishful to encourage Christian

candour and earnestness;-earnestness in searching out evidence on all sides of every question, and candour in estimating this evidence, real or alleged, coming to us from philology, science, history, or criticism. If we fail not to discriminate between axioms and inductions, and become ourselves examples of Christian life and power, we have nothing to fear from the researches and objections of modern scepticism, albeit, protean in form, for though it has strength among us, there is something stronger.

QUIVIS. I acknowledge these observations of yours are re-assuring. My friend here, when reporting your previous conversations, surprised me by your positive declarations of the truth of Christianity, and of its harmony with the inductions of sound philosophy, and ascertained history. We are accustomed now-a-days to a different order of speech. Men speak of God and of the Gospel, and of the human spirit, and of immortality falteringly, and with sceptical faintness, or inuendoes. All things are attributed, as far as language can be understood, to developments, to a blind series of contrivances, to insensible and unknowing forces. Religion we are told "consists of love, complete submission to an exalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of dependence, fear, reverence, gratitude, hope for the future, and perhaps other elements."* The Bible is referred to as a legendary book, "a petty sanctuary of borrowed beliefs." This fleeting and perplexed life is everything; vice and virtue are mere matters of convenience and taste; grief is to be assuaged by forgetfulness; and the grave becomes the melancholy refuge and tomb of being. Any reverent mention of God, or a warm recognition of His goodness, of dependence upon Him, or of man's moral responsibility to Him, is met either with expressions of contempt, or with a silence that betrays unbelief. And too much of this is found among salaried teachers and professors of the Christian religion. Judging from what I hear

Darwin's "Descent of Man." Vol. I., p. 63.