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over which the person had no control when he is accidentally or occasionally called upon to exercise reasonable care with respect to it; and that is especially applicable to the present cases where the dog which did the injury was not the dog of the defendants, the company, and was not a dog which they had a right to exercise any control over beyond turning it off their station. Unless there was negligence in not turning it off, there was none all. Here the evidence does not show that the defendants had any opportunity of removing the dog, or that they neglected through their servants to do so. I am therefore obliged to come to the conclusion that the rule ought to be absolute to enter a nonsuit. Smith v. the Great Eastern Railway Company, 26 L. J., C. P. 22.

The

WATERCOURSE.-Riparian rights.—An old mill had been worked since 1804 by water taken from a natural stream by a weir and goit (mill-lead) constructed by the original proprietor of the mill. The goit was made through the land of B., a riparian proprietor, under an agreement (not under seal) by which he was to receive an annual payment of 5s. for allowing the water to pass to the mill. present occupier of the mill brought this action against the defendant, a riparian proprietor above B.'s land, for drawing off the water of the stream at a point above the weir.-Held, that the action was maintainable. Per B. Martin. The right to have a flow of water through another man's land to work one's mill is the subject of property and of grant, and not merely of licence. And even assuming that, as the agreement was not under seal, sixty years' possession did not confer a good title as against B., yet the actual possession and enjoyment of the goit gave the plaintiff a valid right of action against the defendant, a wrongdoer. Per B. Bramwell.-The plaintiff was the grantee of a right or mode of enjoyment which it was competent to B. to grant to him; and as such grantee he could maintain actions against those who disturbed him. Per B. Channell.-The plaintiff was a riparian proprietor with respect to the goit, and had all corresponding rights to the water of the natural stream, though flowing in an artificial channel. (Note for reference. Miner v. Gilmour, 1 C. B., N. S. 590; Hill v. Tupper, 2 H. & C. 121; Stockport Waterworks Company v. Potter, 3 H. & C. 300.)—Nuttall v. Bracewell 37 L. J., Ex. 1.

NEGLIGENCE.-Fellow-servant.-A railway station, which was used both by the G. W. Company and the L. and N. W. Company, was under the charge of a servant of the L. and N. W. Company. A train belonging to the G. W. Company having been improperly and negligently shunted into a siding, injured the plaintiff, a servant of the L. and N. W. Company, who was there engaged in cleaning carriages. Held, that the injury was caused by the negligence of the driver in the discharge of his ordinary duty to the G. W. Company alone, and not in the course of any common employment with the plaintiff; and that therefore the plaintiff could maintain an action for damages against the G. W. Company. Warburton v. the Great Western Railway Company, 36 L. J., Ex. 9.

STAMP DUTY..-Conveyance.-By an indenture reciting that a dissolution of partnership between two partners had taken place, and the share of the retiring partner in the assets of the firm had been found to be a certain specified sum, and an arrangement had been made, by which a portion of that sum was to be paid at once by the continuing partner, and the remainder secured by a mortgage of the partnership assets, the retiring partner conveyed to the continuing partner all his estate and interest in the partnership assets.-Held, that this indenture was a conveyance upon a sale within the meaning of 13 & 14 Vict., c. 97, Schedule, tit, "Conveyance," and was chargeable with an ad valorem stamp duty upon the sum payable to the retiring partner. Christie v. the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 36 L. J., Ex. 11.

POOR-RATE.-Game Lease.-Where the owner of land occupied it himself, and leased to another the right of sporting and taking game thereon.-Held, that, in assessing the land to the relief of the poor, the value of the right of sporting and taking game ought not to be deducted in estimating the rateable value of the land. Reg. v. Inhab. of Thurlstone, 1 E. & E. 502, 28 L. J., M.C. 106, doubted. R. v. the Guardians of the Battle Union, Q. B., 36 L. J., M. C. 1.

THE

JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE.

THE FRENCH BAR.

(Continued from the August Number of the Journal.)

IN the present and following articles we shall continue the history of the French Bar from the close of the seventeenth century until the French Revolution, which swept away the old régime, including the ancient Parliament and the Order of Advocates, which had been so long and so intimately associated with it. A great name, not absolutely belonging to the French Bar, but closely connected with it, meets us towards the end of the seventeenth century. That name is D'Aguesseau, than whom no one has ever understood and appreciated better the utility and importance of the profession of an advocate, or discoursed more eloquently upon its duties, privileges, and requirements. This eminent man was born at Limoges in 1668, and was appointed King's Advocate at the Chatelet of Paris at the early age of twenty-one. Soon afterwards he became Advocate-General to the Parliament, and was made Procureur-Général when only thirtytwo—a success almost as rapid as that of the celebrated Grotius, who pleaded at the Bar when only seventeen, and was made Attorney-General of the Netherlands at twenty-four. D'Aguesseau's first discourse, delivered as Advocate-General at the age of twenty-five, has for its subject the independence of the advocate, and is throughout a magnificent and elaborate eulogium upon the Bar. In it occur these words since so often quoted : It is an order as ancient as the magistracy, as noble as virtue, as necessary as justice; it is distinguished by a character which is peculiar to itself, and it alone always maintains the happy and peaceful posVOL XI. NO. CXXIII.—MARCH 1867.

I

session of independence." Of the advocate he says: "Free, without being useless to his country, he devotes himself to the public without being a slave to it, and condemning the indifference of a philosopher who seeks independence in indolence, he laments the misfortune of those who only enter upon public duties at the expense of their liberty." D'Aguesseau pronounced another famous oration in 1699 on "the causes of the decay of eloquence," which is deserving of attentive perusal; and, in 1716, composed instructions for the use of his son, which treat specially of the science of law, and in which he particularly recommends the study of the pleadings of the most eminent counsel, and attendance at the conferences of the Order of Advocates, as the best means of forming a young orator and a young magistrate. D'Aguesseau was a rare example of the happy union of great virtues and great talents. He was an admirable writer, a successful orator, an independent and upright magistrate. We admire in his discourses," says an accomplished French writer, "an eloquence justly proportioned to the subject of which it treats; sublime in the most elevated; communicative and interesting in the simplest; a select erudition, a profound logic relieved and adorned with all the graces of rhetoric."

We now come to two of the greatest names of which the French Bar can boast-those of Normand and Cochin. Both were contemporaries of D'Aguesseau born in the same year1687-and inscribed on the roll of the Bar, Cochin in 1706, and Normand in 1707. Normand rapidly achieved a high position, and was surnamed the "Eagle of the Bar." In person and countenance he was eminently handsome, his gestures were graceful, and his voice sweet and sonorous. All Paris flocked to hear his pleadings, and the highest personages sought the honour of his acquaintance. He lived like a nobleman; and his house, furniture, and equipages were of the most luxurious description. During the vacations he was in the habit of entertaining at his country house men of rank, philosophers, the most distinguished members of his own profession, and the most famous artists.

In short, he led a life hitherto unknown in an advocate, and far removed from the simplicity and frugality of the ancient Bar. Professionally, however, he was not only one of the ablest but one of the most honourable and conscientious of men. Nothing would persuade him to take up a cause which he believed to be unjust, and his scrupulous accuracy with regard to what he asserted was

so well known that the judges used to say of him, "Believe a fact at once when Normand attests it." Normand was a good writer and distinguished for his literary attainments; and Bussy-Rabutin, Bishop of Luçon, presented him to the French Academy, who unanimously received him as a candidate for admission into their body. It was, however, the custom, then as now, that the candidate should call upon the members of the Academy to solicit their votes; and Normand, considering this practice to be unworthy of the dignity of the French Bar, gave up the honour which it was proposed to confer upon him. He died in 1745, at the age of

fifty-eight.

His private retired, and He was a

Still more celebrated than Normand was Cochin, inscribed on the roll of advocates at the early age of nineteen. life-unlike that of his great rival--was quiet and his religious opinions tended towards Jansenism. splendid pleader, and very soon, after his first appearances at the Bar, acquired a high reputation and an extensive practice. In one of his earliest causes before Parliament, the opposite counsel -Julien de Pruay, one of the most powerful debaters at the Bar-had spoken first, but after hearing Cochin's speech he turned to Aubray, who was charged with the reply, and said, "It is for you to see how you will fight out your case a week hence; for me I confess I could do nothing but sob. Here is a man who comes up to the idea I had of eloquence. I believe him raised up to teach us how far its perfection can be carried." Of the same speech Normand remarked to Cochin that he had never heard anything so eloquent. To which Cochin happily and gracefully replied, “It is evident, sir, that you do not belong to the number of those who hear themselves." Cochin died in 1747, at the age of sixty, and in 1749 his principal works were published in six volumes 8vo. Nothing can prove more strongly the respect in which he was held by his contemporaries than the terms in which the approbation of the censorship was given. "The works of this great man are a debt due to posterity for the honour and instruction of the Bar, of which he was the chief and the model."

In the winter of 1717 took place one of those interferences by the Court with the dignity of the Order, which the French Bar were ever so prompt to maintain. It arose in the following way: An advocate named Sicault, who should have pled at the audience of the criminal court, was detained before the Parliament, and kept the judges waiting for some minutes; and when he at last

appeared, the President informed him that the Court had taken into consideration the propriety of interdicting him from the exercise of his functions, and it was through special favour that they had not done so. Upon this the advocates present immediately withdrew from the Court, and Arrault, then batonnier, along with two seniors called upon the President and stated to him the dissatisfaction of the Bar with this unjust reprimand, and their determination to practise no more before his Court unless he would make a public apology to the Order. The President saw that he had gone too far and promised that, at the next audience, he would make an ample explanation. Accordingly, at the time appointed, Sicault presented himself before the Court and explained what had taken place on the former occasion, after which the President said to him: "The Court will always put the best construction on what you have stated. It is convinced of your zeal and of your attention to fulfil the duties of your office; it is convinced that your conduct is regular; it will never fail to show, on all occasions, the consideration and esteem which it entertains towards your Order in general, and to yourself in particular."

The Bar was shortly afterwards engaged in a more serious and important dispute, in which it sided with the Parliament in its resistance to the edicts whereby the Regent Orleans had bestowed extraordinary and dangerous privileges upon the Scottish financier, Law. In 1720, the Regent, in order to restore in some sort the finances ruined by the system of Law, and the abuse of that system by parties in power, proposed an edict, granting to a company the monopoly of the trade with India. This edict Parliament refused to register; whereupon the Regent banished the Parliament to Pontoise, and the Palace was taken possession of by musqueteers, while the councillors received their letters of exile. The order of advocates, as usual, adhered to the Parliament, and refused to exercise their functions at Pontoise. In vain the Procureur-Général wrote a letter addressed to Babel, the batonnier, commanding them to plead at Pontoise. They answered unanimously, "that neither Babel nor the Advocates were bound to obey the orders of the Procureur-Général; that their function was free, and also habitual in the place where the Parliament was settled and free." At length the Parliament was recalled to Paris in December 1720, and resumed its duties as if no interruption had taken place. The First President warmly expressed his gratitude and that of Parliament to the

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