strong, or nearly as strong, as that sustained in the recent case of the Minister of Dunbarney v. Heritors (Kirkwood v. Grant), Nov. 7, 1865, 4 Macph. 4. Are we now to see in operation the principle contended for by Lord Benholme, “that in regard to old valuations which have stood the test of two centuries, fair play ought to be given to them; and that what they set forth ought to be held pro veritate, unless they are impeached by reduction ?" Minister of Banchory Devenick v. Heritors, Feb. 3, 1865, 3 M. 482, 492. Or are we to expect an Act of Sederunt, such as that recommended by the Lord Justice-Clerk, and it is said strongly urged upon the Court by Lord Barcaple, cheapening and simplifying the procedure in such questions, and enabling a minister to get the existence of free teind inquired into in the process of augmentation ?

The Teind Court. It was noticeable that during the greater part of the sitting of the Teind Court in which this decision was pronounced, the place of Lord Barcaple was vacant. It is not wonderful that he should consider it more important to get through his ordinary business than to form a part of the pageantry of the Court of Teinds. The amount of ordinary business at his lordship's bar is very great; the number of debates waiting for hearing being so large that, it is said, his lordship will probably fix no more proofs to be taken before himself during the present session. Moreover, under the existing Outer House arrangements, Lord Barcaple's working week is very much broken up. Tuesday is the only entire day which he always has for the ordinary roll. Every other Wednesday he attends the Teind Court. Thursday is his blank day. Friday is entirely occupied with Teind business. Saturday is only a half day. Thus, assuming that each Teind Court occupies only one hour (which is under the average), his lordship is allowed only twenty-five hours in each fortnight for ordinary motions and debates, without deducting the time occupied by jury trials and proofs. Whether any larger reform of Outer House arrangements may be practicable we do not now say. But the absurdity of keeping eight or nine judges sitting every alternate Wednesday to determine whether two or three ministers shall have twenty pounds of additional income, should surely be put an end to. It not only interrupts the business of the Lord Ordinary on Teinds, but that of the Inner house. It is quite unnecessary that this should be so. The Teind Court consists of the judges of the two Divisions and

the Lord Ordinary for Teinds, and FIVE judges constitute a quorum (2 and 3 Vict. c. 36, § 8). There is therefore no reason, except perhaps the reason of ostentation, why both Divisions should be stopped for the generally paltry business of this Court. Four judges of one division, and one taken from the other, will make up a Teind Court, which might be presided over by the two chiefs alternately, leaving the other Division to go on with three judges, and letting the Lord Ordinary on Teinds attend to his proper business for the day. There can be no doubt that some such arrangement was in the view of the Legislature in passing the measure referred to. Of course a larger Court might still be formed to hear any cause of importance. We have thus suggested how the Court may expedite business and economize judicial power, without any external interference. The judges have of late years shown themselves laudably anxious to carry out such reforms, and we trust that it will be in this case unnecessary for impatient suitors to refer the matter to the reforming ardour of the Lord Advocate. When Parliament deals with the Teind Court, there must be far more radical alterations than this.

The Registration Appeal Court.-This Court has concluded its annual sitting since our last issue, and the rapid and satisfactory manner in which its work was done, is, apart from other considerations, a sufficient justification of its institution. The points of registration law decided have not been numerous, for, as commonly happens, each year produces a crop of questions, in the different counties where political warfare exists, all turning very much on the same, or similar legal principles. This year the largest class of cases related to "value," and the questions were, generally, what deductions should be made in estimating the value of the property in respect of which a party seeks enrolThe general principle deducible from the terms of the Reform Act unquestionably is, as Lord Ormidale well expressed it, "that we are not to be too curious as to titles-that the substantial right and interest is to be looked to." Hence it was held (Henderson v. Maxton, Nov. 1866) that a widow's terce must be deducted from the value of the subjects on which her husband's heir is enrolled, although she is neither served nor kenned. question with the heir, who is, in fact, where kenning has not taken place, a joint pro indiviso proprietor along with her, the widow "has as complete a right to her terce as he has to the lands." The notorious fact that the formality of serving, and

ment.

In a

still more that of kenning to the terce, have almost become obsolete in practice, made it difficult to arrive at any other result, even under the guidance of so deservedly high an authority as Sheriff Fraser. It would have been virtually to affirm the general proposition that terce should never be deducted at all. This decision is in conformity with the old registration law (Cay, 215). The case of subjects subfeued in lots, without any allocation of the cumulo feu-duty recognized by the superior, affords another illustration of the general principle referred to. The feu-duty which the sub-vassal actually pays" as a condition of his right" (in the words of the Reform Act), and not the cumulo feu-duty for which his portion of the ground is contingently liable to the over-superior, is to be deducted from the value of his property. (Shaw Stewart v. Hector, Dec. 1, 1866; Stewart v. Macfarlan, and other cases.) This sets at rest a question fiercely contested, and perhaps never finally settled in the old Registration Courts. (Cay, 217, sqq.)

In another case (Guy v. Reston) it was held that a proper ground-annual is an "heritable subject" in the sense of the Act, and therefore affords a good qualification. It is thus distinguished from the anomalous qualifications rejected last year in the cases of M'Culloch v. Freeland, 4 M. 130 (a "free yearly annuity" heritably secured), and M'Culloch v. Smith, 4 M. 132 (a "liferent yearly ground-annual”).

In Guy v. Paterson, Nov. 21, the Court decided that the proprietor of a piece of ground laid off for building, but on which no houses have yet been built, which is of no agricultural value, but would bring £290 if sold as a building stance, is not entitled to be enrolled. The Sheriff of Renfrewshire had decided that he was, and that decision seems to be more nearly in conformity with the natural construction of the Act, as well as with common sense. It is also the principle adopted by the Court of Common Pleas in England. In the case of Astbury v. Henderson, 15 C. B. 251 (1854), the case showed that A had bought building ground for £150, and had refused an offer of £15 a year of ground rent for it. Jervis, C. J., in sustaining his claim, said, "The true question is, what is the land reasonably worth? what would it fetch in the market? I felt at the moment impressed with the argument that the realisation of that value depends upon something to be done with the land. . But when it comes to be considered, it is evident that in all cases the value of the land depends upon something that is to be done with it by the owner."

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". . It seems to me that the price originally given for the land, the offer made and refused, and the finding of the revising barrister that, if let upon a building lease for 99 years, it would be worth an annual ground rent of £15, shew that this land is of the clear yearly value of £40 and upwards, and entitles the owner to a vote within the 8 Hen. 6, c. 7." Maule, J., said, "The revising barrister seems to have thought that if the appellant had the power to let the land to a tenant from year to year, or upon. an ordinary occupation lease, at a rent amounting to 40s. a year, the estate would be sufficient to confer a vote; but that it would be otherwise where that is to be done by a building lease. I see no ground for the distinction. True, you cannot let land on a building lease till you have found some one willing to be a lessee. It is equally true that, until you find a tenant you cannot create a tenancy from year to year." We cannot but think that this is the true meaning of the statute, which does not require the owner to be in receipt of issues and profits, if he is "in the occupation" of the subjects. Here the subjects were proved to be 'capable of yielding" the necessary revenue, and the owner was in the occupation of them so far as they were capable of occupation. The former Registration Courts seem to have adopted the English principle in one case at least (Cay, pp. 162, 207.)

It was one of the most noticeable features in the proceedings of the Court, that the "cases" stated by the Sheriffs were often severely criticised by the judges as being disconform to the statute, and that one of them (Cameron v. Anderson, Nov. 28) was so defective, that the appeal was dismissed. Probably several others deserved the same fate. It is much to be regretted that any failure should take place in a form of procedure which, we hope, will ere long be much more extensively applied in Scotlond. Lord Kinloch said that "it would be expedient for Sheriffs to read and act upon the decisions of this Court." We may add that the cases stated in election and other appeals in England, with the decisions thereupon, would also be a profitable study. It is surely time that learned Scotch lawyers should be able to perform a duty which in England (and even in Scotland, see Reg. v. Gilroys, March 20, 1866, 4 M. 656) is performed with facility and accuracy by every justice of peace clerk. It is not the Sheriffs alone upon whom all the blame must lie. It is the duty of the appellant, at times, no doubt, a somewhat delicate one, but still his duty, to see that the case is properly prepared. VOL. XI. NO. CXXI.-JANUARY 1867.

The Sheriff has to draw it up hurriedly, in order that it may be delivered in open Court at a time convenient for all parties; and he is entitled to, and will always be ready to accept, every assistance from both sides; so that the party appealing has generally himself to blame if his case is defective. We assume, of course, that the usual and only proper course is adopted, that the Sheriff reads over the scroll case in presence of the parties, and hears their suggestions as to the facts which should be stated, and the form of the case.

The New Professorship of International Law at Cambridge.— Dr Whewell, late Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, among the many benefactions to that university with which his whole career was identified, and on which his whole affections were centred, founded a Professorship of International Law, with a salary of £500 a year. With a quaint, humorous appreciation of the flagging interest felt in the university and the study of law, he has made a provision against his professorship being converted into a mere sinecure, to which we would call the attention of all persons desiring to add to the teaching staff of our universities. We would also impress upon them the propriety of never founding a Chair with a smaller salary than that which is provided by the rev. Doctor. The Law Times says:

"The late Dr Whewell, by his will, devised and bequeathed to the master, fellows, and scholars of Trinity College certain property upon trust for the promotion of the study of international law in the university of Cambridge. For this purpose he made provision for the endowment of a professorship and scholarships in the university-the former to be called. the Professorship of International Law,' and the latter to be obtained by proficiency in the said subject. The electors to the professorship and scholarships are to be the Vice-Chancellor, the Master of Trinity (with casting vote), the Regius Professor of Civil Law, the Professor of Moral Philosophy, the Professor of the Laws of England, and the Professor of Political Economy. The Professor is required to give at least twelve lectures on, or in connection with, the subject of international law in every academic year, and his stipend (£500 a year) is to be dependent on his obtaining a class of at least ten resident members of the university. The Professor is enjoined by the will to make it his aim in his lectures, and in all parts of his treatment of the subject of international law, to lay down such rules and to suggest such measures as may tend to diminish the evils of war, and, finally, to extinguish war between nations."

The Procurators' Act.-Our attention has been called to a notice, in a contemporary, of a decision of the Sheriff of Ayrshire under the Procurators' Act, which is apt to lead to misapprehen