of Stanston, Caithness. He was born in 1829, and became a member of the Society of Advocates in 1854, and soon afterwards a partner in the firm of Messrs. Chalmers and Farquhar, at Aberdeen. In 1861 he was appointed to the office of Commissary Clerk, which post he held until a few weeks before his death. He was an ardent student of natural history, especially that of the north of Scotland. He was a still more enthusiastic archæologist, and a Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland. At the meeting of the British Association at Aberdeen in 1859, he arranged, along with Mr Charles Dalrymple, the very magnificent collection of antiquities gathered from every corner of Scotland, and relating to every period of its history. Mr Chalmers was for some time an active magistrate for the county of Aberdeen.

Infant Passengers on Railways.-The case of Austin v. G. W. Railway Co., decided by the Court of Queen's Bench on 18th April last (16 L. T. N. S. 320), contains a doctrine of some importance. A child three years of age brought his action against the Railway Company to recover damages for personal injuries sustained through the defendants' negligence while carrying him in a parliamentary train. His mother had taken a ticket for herself, but paid nothing for the child. The Railway Company chiefly founded on the fact that the child being more than three years of age, ought to have been paid for, under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 85, s. 6, and this not having been done the company was under no liability. Their counsel contended that though there might be no fraud on the part of the mother (the jury negatived fraud), yet there was a misrepresentation analogous to that made by a passenger conveying merchandise in a box delivered to the company as his personal luggage. In such a case the box is carried at the risk of the owner. Cahill v. L. & N. W. Railway Co., 30 L. J. C. P. 289, 31 L. J. C. P. 291. The Court, however, disregarded this contention and held that "the contract, as the jury had found it, was to carry both mother and child. It was entered into,” said the L. C. J., "by the mother on behalf of herself and the child; and if the law gives the company any remedy against the mother for making any misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or innocent, they may avail themselves of it. But this does not, under the circumstances, affect the right of the infant plaintiff to recover. The Court seemed to hold that though the infant contracted through the mother, yet he was not affected by misrepresentations made by her, and that the difference in the case of Cahill v. L. & N. W. Railway Co., was that there the company did not contract to carry the box of merchandise. Blackburn J., went further and held that, irrespective of contract, a duty was imposed on the company to use proper and reasonable care in carrying the plaintiff, for if he had been killed by the gross negligence of the engine driver, the latter would have been indictable for manslaughter. An opinion has been pretty generally stated that the railway companies must now begin to make

a charge for carrying children in arms in order to cover the risk, seeing that they are responsible for accidents to them. In certain trains, however, they are compelled by statute to carry them free; and, as no novel principle is involved in the case we have cited, it can not be imagined that the companies have hitherto acted under an impression that the law was different, or that they will now find any advantage in changing their system in this respect.

The Representation of the People (Scotland) Bill.-The doubts and uncertainties of many kinds which hang around this measure would prevent us from commenting on it this month, even if we could afford space. But we think it right just to mention the provisions contained in the 21st section, which repeals all enactments now in force regarding appeals from Sheriffs in Registration Courts, and provides in lieu thereof an appeal on a case stated, both in counties and burghs, to a new Court of Appeal proposed to be constituted. The section further corrects a serious defect in the act constituting the existing Registration Appeal Court, by enabling the Appeal Court to remit to the Sheriff appealed from to amend the statements in his special case. The proposed Court is to "consist of three judges of the Court of Session, to be named on or before 1st Sept. in each year, by the Lord President of the Court, or failing him, by the Lord Justice Clerk, one judge to be named from each division of the Inner House, and one from the Lords Ordinary in the Outer House," &c. We believe this would be a material improvement on the existing Court, which, though much superior to the old Sheriffs' Appeal Court, does not always pronounce decisions sound in themselves or receiving that unquestioning respect which the judgments of the Inner House generally command. Moreover the constitution of the Court is such that its jurisdiction might come to be extended in the course of time to other classes of cases, so as to relieve the divisions of some of the arrears by which they are still oppressed, and indeed to take the place of that Third Division which has long been suggested. Whether a fluctuating Court, nominated by the Lord President, is the right thing may be doubted.

ROYAL COMMISSION.-The Queen has appointed George Biddel Airy, Esq., the Astronomer Royal; the Earl of Rosse; Lord Wrottesley; Sir John Shaw, K.C.B.; Lieut-Gen. Edward Sabine; Thomas Graham, Esq., Master of the Mint; William Henry Miller, Esq.; and Henry William Chisholm, Esq., Commissioners to inquire into the condition of the Exchequer Standards of Weights and Measures.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON RAILWAYS consists of Col. Wilson Patten, Mr Cave, Mr Goschen, Mr Bonham Carter, Mr Dodson (chairman), Mr Woodd, Mr Whitehead, Sir Colman O'Loghlen, Mr Packe, Mr Scholefield, and Sir Edward Colebrooke. The purpose of the Committee is to inquire into the provisions for securing the comple. tion of Railways within a limited time, and to report as to the expediency of altering the Standing Orders requiring such provisions, or the Act 9 Vict. c. 20. The Committee, it is understood, will consider whether the Standing Order of the House of Lords, passed at the end of last session, locking up the deposited capital of new railway companies until a portion of their lines is completed, should be repealed or

Law of Master and Servant.-Lord Elcho's Bill for amending the Law of Master and Servant embodies the recommendation of the committee over which he presided. It proposes to repeal the existing law; to place all questions of contract under the same jurisdiction as civil and not criminal suits, with precisely the same remedy for either party. Magistrates may give damages and impose penalties. If these are not paid they may issue a warrant of distress, and only in default of distress may the party be summoned to show canse why imprisonment should not be inflicted the term being limited to six months. Criminal offences are to be heard at the quarter sessions.

This will be a desirable reform, but more in sentiment than in reality. It is an apparent injustice that a servant should be sent to jail for breaking his contract with his master, while the master could only be sued in an action for breach of contract with his servant. No wrong was actually done, because the master always paid the damages and the servant rarely or never, and the remedy that was sufficient for the one was insufficient for the other. But justice should not appear one-sided. -Law Times.

THE COUNSEL FOR THE FENIAN PRISONERS.-The Irish Government has greviously affronted Mr Isaac Butt. He was named by the Fenian prisoners to conduct their defence, and accepted the office, but the Government only offer him £25 as a retaining fee, and £3, 3s. as a refresher for each day of the trial. Mr Butt refuses to accept those fees, as utterly inadequate, and prefers to defend the prisoners at his own cost, which, as the trials will last weeks and his practice is large, will not be slight. We do not see that Government is bound to select the highest members of the Bar to defend men accused of sedition, but if they do select them, they should pay them as they would if retained on their side. No other Government on earth, except perhaps the American, would pay sixpence.-Spectator.

LAWYERS AND DOCTORS.-Law and Medicine are directly at variance on the subject of insanity. Science has made vast forward strides, but law is as it was a century ago. Principles based upon imperfect knowledge of psychology are still gravely propounded from the judgment-seat, and juries are directed to determine a question of life or death upon a ruling utterly opposed to all that science has ascertained to

be true.

A remarkable instance of this antagonism was exhibited last week in the case of Karl Andersen, tried and convicted of the murder of a sailor while upon the voyage. There is a superstition amongst sailors that ill-luck attends a ship that has a Fin aboard. In the vessel of whose crew Andersen was one, was a sailor who, although calling himself a Russian, was believed to be a Fin. The ship met with foul weather and many troubles. Andersen was a gloomy fellow, and thought by the sailors to be a little crazed. He had no quarrel with the alleged Fin; he bore to him no personal malice, but his mind brooded upon the thought that he was the cause of all their misfortunes, and he had expressed his conviction that they should all perish if the Fin were not removed. At last he murdered the unfortunate object of his superstition, was seized red-handed, was brought to trial, refused to plead, and was found by the jury to do so obstinately. During his trial his countenance and manner impressed all the spectators with a belief that he was insane. The Judge, however, in strict accordance with the law as it is laid down, told the jury that if the prisoner knew what he was doing, and that it was wrong to do it, he was responsible for his act, whatever delusion might have prompted it. He was convicted and sentenced to death. But the public mind, better informed than the law on the subject of insanity, protested against the verdict, and the sentence is not to be carried into execution.

But wherefore should it be left to the Home office to apply the principles of improved science to the rules of antiquated law-to say, Legally you are a murderer, morally you are a madman?" If the law, as properly put to the jury by the judge, is a right law, why is it not enforced? If it is a bad law, why is it not altered? It cannot be but mischievous to have one principle gravely proclaimed in the Central Criminal Court, and another principle acted upon by the Home-office. The Judge says "delusion" does not excuse a criminal; but Mr Walpole, in this instance in full accord with enlightened public opinion, says that it does, and accordingly he snatches the victim from the gallows to which an erroneous law had consigned him. The moral of this is, that the famous resolutions that profess to define insanity are in conflict with advanced science-that they require revision, and ought to be brought into accord with the psychology of 1867.—Law Times.

Notes of Cases.

COURT OF SESSION.

(Reported by William Guthrie and Donald Crawford, Esquires, Advocates.)

FIRST DIVISION.

BELL'S TRUSTEES v. NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY COMPANY.-May 15.

Railway-Level Crossing-Siding-Interdict-Agreement.

Declarator, interdict, and damages, concluding that defrs. had no right to make a siding on the portion of their Railway where it passes through the pursuer's lands of Bellmount, near Falkirk, so as to obstruct, interrupt, or impair the rights and privileges connected with the crossings possessed by them in terms of agreement dated 16th Sept. and 8th Oct. 1851. A proof was led, and various findings were formerly made. Afterwards a remit was made to ascertain whether the siding increased the danger, or materially interfered with the convenience of the crossing.

Lord CURRIEHILL -When their land was originally taken, the pursuers had received ample compensation, and the Sheriff had awarded them accommodation in consequence of the severance of their property by the railway in the shape of a bridge, which the pursuers afterwards by agreement dispensed with, accepting a level crossing and a sum of money instead. Lately the company found it necessary to have a siding, which they made on their own land at a place where they were legally entitled to make it. There was admittedly no conventional prohibition of such a siding; but it was said that they must make the siding so as not to interfere with the level crossing. It was established, however, in point of fact, that the use of the level crossing was not interfered with, provided ordinary care were taken in the use of it-a proviso which was applicable to every level crossing. Ordinary care was incumbent on every person who had such a right, and he was not entitled to be freed from all risk. This action was an attempt to obtain immunity from that ordinary care.

Lord ARDMILLAN concurred.

Lord PRESIDENT-The report showed that there was no danger beyond that which the proprietor of a level crossing must lay his account with. It would be a public evil to allow the proprietor of a level crossing to tie up a railway company, and prevent them from making the regular and proper use of the line for traffic. Every increase of traffic is an additional risk, which, in the view taken by the pursuer, the proprietor of a level crossing would be entitled to object to; but that is a risk which he has in view when he takes his level crossing as a probable additional burden. Looking at the situation of this property-a few hundred feet from an important station -it was a very natural place for a siding. Nothing was more important for public safety than a proper supply of sidings on railways. Action dismissed.

Act.-Moncrieff and Gloag. Agents-Wilson, Burn, & Gloag, W.S. -Alt.-Blackburn. Agents-Hill, Reid, & Drummond, W.S.

SCOTTS v. DRUMMOND AND HERIOT.-May 17.

Right of Way-Public Place-Seashore-Natural Harbour-Interruptions of Use-New Trial.

A verdict was returned in favour of the purs., fishermen at Coldingham and Eyemouth, upon the first and third of three issues, each of which raised a question as to the existence of a road. The jury negatived the second issue. The defrs. moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was contrary to evidence as regards the first and third issues. The first issue claimed a public road from Coldingham on the south to the harbour of Petticurwick on the north passing through the lands of Northfield. The second related to a right of way for foot passengers from Coldingham shore to the point of the seashore called Burnmouth Harbour, and on to St. Abb's Head, and to the seashore at Petticurwick or Petticowick. When issues were adjusted, the question was raised whether Petticurwick was a public place in the proper sense, and the pursuer consented, by minute, that that question should be open for determination at the trial.

The LORD PRESIDENT-The first ground on which it was contended that the verdict was against evidence, was that there was not evidence that Petticurwick was a public place. There could be no doubt on that question. This natural harbour had been proved to be a public place in the proper sense of the term as used in such questions. It was said that there were no houses or artificial harbour works, nor anything but a natural harbour. But a natural harbour was the best of all harbours; and, if sufficient for its purpose without any works of man's hands, might be as capable of being a public place as any other place. That was not the question, however, but rather whether the harbour had in fact been used. The Court had laid down in a former case (Darrie v. Drummond, Feb. 10, 1865, 3 Macph. 496), that a mere point on the seashore was not a public place in the sense in which a public right of way must have its terminus at a public place, unless indeed there be an explicit averment of the uses profitable or useful made of the shore after getting to it, and which were the object of getting to it. The case was different where the place had been used by the public. This natural harbour was near St. Abb's Head; and in certain states of the wind, when it was difficult to get round the promontory, it was used, according to the evidence, as a harbour of refuge by the fishermen of the coast. It was in evidence that some of them had had their lives saved by means of it. There was thus an attraction to the place, for it was proved not merely to be a desirable resort, but an indispensable harbour of refuge. That was probably the first cause of the use of the place; but its use by no means ended there. The fishermen, having become familiar with it, resorted thither on other occasions. Boats were drawn up, and even left to winter there. Fish were landed, and conveyed away to market by the very road in the first issue. There was also evidence that things were brought to the place for the use of the boats, and that others than fishermen resorted to it. The fishermen may have had the chief use, but the evidence went considerably beyond that, and there could be no doubt that it was a public place in the proper sense. It was suggested upon two other grounds that the road had not been proved to be a proper public road. (1.) That the use had been by fishermen only. His