and by its being impregnated with the odour of petroleum. The Court held that such damages were recoverable, and that it was not to be presumed that the charterers, persons experienced in the trade, would have arranged to bring home a cargo of fruit in a vessel which had carried out a cargo of petroleum in barrels, unless they had understood that a cleansing of the vessel in the customary manner, after the discharge of the cargo of petroleum, would have enabled the vessel to bring home the cargo of fruit in good order, free from the stains of or the odour of petroleum. There were no exceptions in the bills of lading as to petroleum damage; but the rights of the parties, so far as petroleum damage was concerned, were to be governed by the provisions of the charter-party as to petroleum. The effect of the provisions of the charter-party was that the vessel being about to carry out petroleum in barrels, she should, if "cleansed as customary" before loading the return cargo of fruit, not be liable for damage by petroleum to such return cargo, and that the charterers having had notice of such carriage of petroleum, took the risk of damage to such return cargo from the petroleum, if the vessel were cleansed in the customary manner before loading such return cargo. The evidence showed that vessels which had carried petroleum in packages, did after being cleansed in a proper manner bring back cargoes of fruit such as the "Carlotta" had without the fruit being damaged, and the fact of such damage in the pre Notice of of loading required. sent case was to be accepted as evidence that the vessel was not cleansed in the customary or proper manner. That it did not alter the case that some or all of the damage might have arisen from the sweat of the hold dropping upon the cargo. The complaint was not that the cargo was damaged by being wet, or that it became musty therefrom, but that, whether the water of the sweat was the vehicle or not, the taste and odour of the petroleum were conveyed to and left with the cargo, when that would not have happened if the vessel had been properly cleansed. The sweat and the water thereof would have produced no damage if they had not been conveyors of petroleum taste and odour, and they would not have conveyed such taste and odour if the vessel had been thoroughly cleansed in the proper and customary manner. Before the lay days at the port of loading can begin to run against the charterer, he must have had notice of the ship's arrival, and of her readiness to receive cargo. If a delay occurs owing to no notice having reached him, and if he had not "fair means of knowing that the ship had arrived and was ready," he is not responsible. If when the charter is made the ship is already in the place named, the shipowner may place the ship at the disposition of the charterer as soon as the ship is ready, so far as she is concerned, to load, by giving notice thereof to the charterer. If the place named be of the larger description, as a port or dock, the notice may be given, though the ship is not then in the particular part of the port or dock in which the particular cargo is to be loaded; but if the place named is of the more limited description, the notice cannot be given until the ship is at the named place, though the ship is in the port or dock in which the named place is situated.1 In Pyman v. Dreyfus, the "Lizzie English" reached Odessa outer harbour, and as near as she could get to a loading berth, on the 22nd December 1888, and D. & Co. received notice on that day from the Captain that the said steamship was ready to receive cargo. The cargo was then ready to be loaded on the said steamship, and D. & Co. were then ready and willing to load the same, if and so soon as the said steamship got a loading berth alongside a quay in the inner harbour at Odessa, where the cargo was stored, but not before. There were no practicable means of loading the said steamship at Odessa, except at or alongside a quay berth either in the inner or outer harbour. The harbour master at Odessa refused to allow the said steamship to go to a loading quay berth either in the outer or inner harbour at Odessa, until her regular turn came after the ships that had arrived at Odessa before her. There was not at that time a custom at the port of Odessa that steamships under charter were only considered ready to receive cargo when moored alongside the quays. The "Lizzie English" was ordered in her turn by the harbour master to a quay loading berth on the 1 Per Brett, L. J. in Nelson v. Dahl, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 581. L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 152; 59 L. J. Q. B. 13. 8th of January 1889, and D. & Co. began to load her on the 10th, and her loading was completed on the 15th of January. The arbitrator further found that the lying days of the "Lizzie English" expired on the 5th of January, and that eleven days were ocupied in loading and discharging her, and awarded that Messrs. Pyman were entitled to receive for demurrage and detention of the said steamship the amount claimed. D. & Co. moved that the award should be set aside, or referred back to the arbitrator on the ground that as a matter of law on the facts found as stated in the award, such award ought to have been in favour of D. & Co. Huddleston, B., after citing the above passage from the judgment of Brett, L. J. said: "It seems to me that the owners satisfied the requirements of this contract when the ship had entered the outer harbour, and notice had been given to the merchants of her readiness to receive cargo." To a declaration in an action by the shipowner against the charterers for not loading a cargo of coals pursuant to charter-party, by the terms of which the vessel was to proceed to a certain dock, and there load in the usual and customary manner at any one of the collieries the defendants might name; the defendants pleaded that they had not any notice of the ship having proceeded to and arrived at the said dock, and of her being ready to receive cargo, "wherefore the defendants did not, nor could load her." Held, on demurrer, after verdict for the defendants on the issues in fact, that the plea meant that, by reason of the want of notice, the defendants were prevented loading the vessel, and that, therefore, the plea was good.' Where by the terms of a charter-party, a ship is to proceed to a certain port, and there load a full cargo for the agents of the freighter, but the freighter has no interest in the outward cargo, his agents are entitled to notice from the captain that the vessel is ready to receive her homeward cargo, and if no such notice be given, the freighter is not liable for not providing such cargo.2 The shipowner is not bound to give notice of the Notice of arrival of the ship and its readiness to discharge.3 The general principle is that when the goods are sent, with a bill of lading or without, the shipowner has a right to expect from the consignee of the goods reasonable diligence to inquire after the arrival of the ship. And apart from custom or special contract the shipowner is not bound to give notice to the consignce of the arrival of ships; but the consignce is bound, within a reasonable time after the arrival to be ready to receive and remove his goods, and in default of his so doing, the shipowner may land them, and demand wharfage or other proper charges for landing. readiness to discharge. The first right of the shipowner is the right of Vessel must be placing his ship at the disposition of the charterer, ready to load. 1 Stanton v. Austin, L. R. 7 C. P. 651; 41 L. J. C. P. 218. Fairbridge v. Pace, 1 C. & K. 317. Nelson e. Dall, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 568, 583. * Houlder v. General S. N. Co., 3 F. & F. 170; Harman v. Clarke, 4 Camp. 159; Harman . Mant, 4 Camp. 161. |