so as to initiate the liability of the latter, whatever it may be, to take his part as to loading. In every case it is a condition precedent to suck right of the shipowner, to place his ship at the disposition of the charterer for such purpose, that the ship should be at the place named in the charter-party as the place whence the carrying voyage is to begin, and that the ship should be ready to load, so far as the ship's part of the operation of loading is concerned.1

The vessel will not be "ready to load" within the meaning of such a clause, unless she be completely ready and discharged in all her holds, so as to give the charterer complete control of every portion of the ship available for cargo. Thus, where the cancelling clause stipulated that a steamer should be "ready to load on or before the 31st March," it was held, that it meant that in working hours of the 31st March, the steamer was to have all her holds discharged of outward cargo and ready, and that it was not enough that some of her holds were ready. And in Hick v. Tweedy, where the defendants, by letter, undertook to load the plaintiff's steamer at Odessa, but inserted a clause, "charterers having the option of cancelling, if she is not ready to receive cargo by December 12th next," Charles, J. held, that as the ship reached Odessa and, so far as she was concerned, was ready to load before the 12th December, the charterers

2

1 Nelson v. Dahl, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 568, 581.

2 Groves v. Volkart, 1 C. & E. 309.

3

3 63 L. T. 765; Smith v. Dart, L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 105; 51 L. J. Q. B. 121.

could not refuse to load her. The charterers were found to have proved a custom of the port of Odessa, that a ship is not considered ready to receive cargo, or ready to load, until she is in berth alongside the quay; and it was admitted that the steamer did not, in consequence of the crowded state of the port, get alongside the quay until some days after the 12th December. It was, however, held that the language of the particular contract prevented the application of the custom at Odessa.

Under a charter-party in the ordinary form, the shipowner is bound to have his ship at the port of loading in the condition contemplated by the charterparty, ready to receive a cargo. If he is prevented by any unforeseen cause, he would be liable on his contract. So in the case of the charterer not loading within the stipulated time. If he fails to do so through any accident, that is his misfortune, and he is liable to the shipowner. Both parties, therefore, must be ready, and cannot maintain an action unless they were. Ford v. Cotesworth' decided that where neither party is ready because they are both prevented by a superior power, neither can maintain any action for the unreadiness of the other.

Thus, where the plaintiff knowing that the ship R. was under a contract with the British Government to load military stores as dead weight at Malta, and that with such stores on board she would not, without special permission, be permitted by the

1 L. R. 5 Q. B. 544.

Ship's readiness to Bail.

Spanish Government to load any cargo at a Spanish port, entered into a charter-party with her owners by which it was agreed that the R., "after loading dead weight at Malta for owners' benefit," should proceed to a Spanish port, and there load a cargo of fruit. The ship proceeded with the military stores on board to Valencia to load the plaintiff's cargo, but permission could not be obtained from the Spanish Government to load. The ship was in all other respects ready to load:-IIeld, that no action. could be maintained by the charterers against the shipowners for not being ready to load, as both parties were prevented from performing their contract to be ready with a ship and cargo by the action of a superior power.

In Oliver v. Fielden," it was held, that the readiness to receive a cargo in all May was a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to recover against the defendants for not loading a full cargo, and that a plea stating the ship was not ready to receive cargo in all May was good.

The words "ready to receive cargo," inserted in a shipping order mean that the ship, on the day named in the shipping order, shall be ready to receive a full cargo, by whomsoever offered, and not merely ready to receive the quantum of cargo mentioned in the shipping order.3

Where the owner engages that the ship shall be ready to sail for her destined port at the expiration

1 Cunningham v. Dunn, L.R. 3 C.P.D. 443; 48 L.J.C.P. 62.

* 18 L. J. Ex. 353.

3

Taylor v. Brooke, 1 Bom. H. C. R. App. 48.

of the laying days, or sooner if required by the charterers, this means that the ship shall be provided with her crew, and in a proper state of repair to stil.

In Seeger v. Duthie1 the clause in the charterparty provided that "If the ship be not ready either on the owner's or charterer's part, at the abovenamed dates, then demurrage is to be paid by the party in default. When the ship was ready to sail and had received nearly a full cargo, the charterers required the master to take some acids and gunpowder on board; this he declined to do on the ground that he could not with safety carry more cargo than he had, and gave the charterers notice of his readiness to sail, and demanded the ship's papers which were refused him until he undertook to ship the acids and gunpowder; this he eventually did and sailed after the ship had been delayed several days beyond the laying days. It was held, that the master could recover damages, the delay on his part not having been occasioned by a want of readiness to sail, and that it could not be said he was not ready to sail simply because of his unwillingness to take the acids and gunpowder on board.

The meaning of the word "forthwith" is with all Forthwith. proper despatch, without unreasonable delay; it does not mean any definite time. It is not equivalent to "immediately," or "at this very moment, nor any specific moment of time." And it has been held "that when pursuant to a charter-party, a vessel

130 L. J, C. P. 65.

To load in regular turn.

is to proceed forthwith' on a voyage, she need not be ready to start at the moment when the charter is signed; it is sufficient if she be able to sail without unreasonable delay; and that it was for the jury to decide what is unreasonable delay."1

On a written agreement for the hire of a vessel to be made ready to take on board "forthwith, evidence is inadmissible to show that the parties agreed that the vessel should be ready in two days. But evidence of the known circumstances of the vessel is admissible to show how soon she might reasonably be expected to be ready.

The ship is sometimes, as in coal charters, to be loaded or unloaded "in regular turn," or "in regular turns of loading;" or other similar expressions are used. If in such cases the ship is ready, at the proper place, and does not get her turn, the charterer is liable for her detention.

The meaning of "in regular turn" must depend upon the manner in which the work is ordinarily done at the port. Evidence may be given of any general regulation or practice thereof. Thus, where the defendant chartered the plaintiff's vessel to proceed to Newcastle-on-Tyne, and there be ready forthwith "in regular turns of loading," to take on board by spout or keel, as directed, a complete cargo of four keels of coal, and the remainder coke. In an action for not loading the vessel with coke within a reasonable time:-Held, that evidence was admis

1 Hudson v. Hill, 43 L. J. C. P. 273; Roberts v. Brett, 34 L. J. C. P. 241. 2 Simpson . Henderson, 1 M. & M. 300.