the Fort, and was "to proceed thence direct to load under this charter." The vessel, on arrival at Fort Jefferson, was taken by the military authorities, in spite of the protest of her master, and compelled to make two voyages to Key West, to bring coal, upon which the Fort depended to work the engine which supplied it with water. As soon as practicable after her release, she went to Bayport and was there loaded by the charterer's agent under protest, and took her cargo to New York, and there delivered it; but the market price of it had fallen between the time when she would, in the ordinary course of navigation, have arrived with it and the time of her actual arrival, and thereupon the charterer claimed to recover the difference in value occasioned by the fall in the market as damages for a breach of the charter :-Held, that time was not an essential element in the contract: That the insertion of the word "direct" in the charter did not vary the contract, which was, that the vessel should proceed without unreasonable delay and by the usual route: that no time having been prescribed by the parties, the presumption was that they intended a reasonable time that where a party is bound to the exercise of even the highest degree of diligence, he is not responsible for delay caused by the interposition of irresistible force without fault of his own, and that the detention in this case by the military authorities was such irresistible force, and that the vessel was not responsible for that delay.1

1 The Onrust, 3 Asp. M. L. C. 30.

The proceedings of courts of law do not fall within the term restraint of princes.1

The word "people" means the supreme power, "People," that is the ruling power of the country, whatever it meaning of. may be. Therefore where a mob or a multitude of people seize a vessel and compel the master to sell the cargo, this, though an act of piracy, will not come under the present exception."

Where the charter-party does not contain the exception of "restraint of princes," the parties cannot excuse themselves for non-performance of the contract, on the ground that events have occurred which they could not foresee or control, not having expressly limited their responsibility in such a case;3 neither will the parties be absolved from the fulfilment of the contract, if it appears that the persons restraining the vessel did not do so in the exercise of any acknowledged prerogative of the Crown, or of any power vested in it of declaring peace or war with a foreign government.1

Thus, a charterer of a ship who convenants to send a cargo alongside at a foreign port, is not excused from sending it alongside, though in consequence of the prevalence of an infectious disorder at the port, all public intercourse is prohibited by the law at the port, and though he could not have communication without danger of contracting and communicating the disorder.5

1 Finlay v. Liverpool & G. W. S. S. Co. 23 L. T. 251.

Nesbitt v. Lushington, 4 T. R. 783.

3 Paradine v. Jane, Allyn's Rep. 27; Startup v. Cortazzi, 2 C. M. & R.165. Evans v. Hutton, 12 L. J. C. P. 16; Gosling v. Higgins, 1 Camp. 451; Hill v. Idle, 4 Camp. 327.

Barker v. Hodgson, 3 M. & S. 267.

The Queen's

enemies.

War.

"The Queen's enemies" or the "King's enemies" means the enemies of the carrier's sovereign, whatever title he may enjoy, whether Queen, emperor, president, duke, doge, or aristocratic assembly, and lest there should be anything left out, "restraint of princes" comprehends every case of interruption by lawful authority. Thus, where a Mecklenburg ship loaded at Odessa for the United Kingdom, proceeded to Falmouth and was there ordered to Limerick to discharge, and the master was prevented from doing so by the act of the enemies of his sovereign, the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin: It was held, that the enemies of the sovereign of the carrier were included in the words "the King's enemies."

"It is now fully established, that inasmuch as the presumed object of war is as much to cripple the enemy's commerce as to capture his property, the declaration of war imports a prohibition of commercial intercourse and correspondence with the inhabitants of the enemy's country, and that such intercourse, except with the license of the Crown, is illegal." It is an established rule that one of the consequences of war is the absolute interdiction of all commercial intercourse or correspondence between the subjects of the hostile countries, except by the permission of their respective sovereigns. It is illegal for a subject in time of war, without license, to bring from the enemy's port, even in a neutral ship, goods purchased in the enemy's country, after the commencement of hostilities, although

D

1 Russell v. Niemann, 34 L. J. C. P. 10.

not appearing to have been purchased from an enemy; in effect that trading with the inhabitants of an enemy's country is trading with the enemy.1 Lord Stowell observed:-"The cases where acts of parliament have, on different occasions, been made to relax the navigation law, and other revenue acts; where the government has authorised under the sanction of parliament, a homeward trade from the enemy's possessions, but has not specifically permitted an outward trade to the same, though intimately connected with that homeward trade, and almost necessary to its existence; that it has been enforced where strong claims not merely of convenience, but almost of necessity, excused it on behalf of the individual; that it has been enforced where cargoes have been laden before the war, but where the parties. have not used all possible diligence to countermand the voyage, after the first notice of hostilities; and that it has been enforced not only against the subjects of the Crown, but likewise against those of its allies in the war, upon the supposition, that the rule was founded on a strong and universal principle, which allied States in war have a right to notice, and apply mutually to each other's subjects." . The force of a declaration of war has been held equal to that of an Act of Parliament, prohibiting intercourse with the enemy, except by the Queen's license. As an Act of State done by virtue of the prerogative exclusively belonging to the Crown, such a declaration carries with it all the force of law. It is founded

1 The Hoop 1 C. Rob. 196; Potts . Bell, 8 T. R. 549.

2

upon the jus-belli which Lord Coke' states to be a portion of the law of England, adding in republicá maxima conservanda sunt jura belli. This force has been attributed to it, amongst other cases in Furtado v. Rogers, where Lord Alvanley, C. J.; said:-"We are all of opinion that on the principle of the English law, it is not competent to any subject to enter into a contract to do anything which may be detrimental to the interests of his own country-and that such a contract is as much prohibited, as if it had been expressly prohibited by Act of Parliament."

As to the mode of operation of war

upon contracts of affreightment made before, but which remain unexecuted at the time it is declared, and of which it makes the further execution unlawful or impossible, it is established that the effect is to dissolve the contract, and to absolve both parties from further performance of it.

The removal of merchandise, even though acquired before the war from an enemy's country, after knowledge of the war, without a royal license, is as a general rule illegal.3

Where a charterer has assigned him a certain number of days wherein to load a vessel at a foreign port and before their expiration, war is declared between the nation, whose flag the chartered vessel flies, and such foreign State, it becomes illegal from the time of such declaration of war, to attempt to perform the

3 The Philip, cited in Potts v. Bell, & T. R. 555. See the judgment of Willes, J., in Exposito v. Bowden, 27 L. J. Q. B. 17.