contribution, and the corresponding obligations of the contributors, have their origin in the fact of a common danger which threatens to destroy the property of them all; and these rights and, obligations are mutually perfected whenever the goods of some of the shippers have been advisedly sacrificed, and the property of the others has been thereby preserved. But the negligent navigation of the master cannot afford any pretext for depriving those shippers whose goods were jettisoned, of their claim to a general contribution. They were not privy to the master's fault, and were under no duty, legal or moral, to make a gratuitous sacrifice of their goods, for the sake of others, in order to avert the consequence of his fault. The Rhodian law, which in that respect is the law of England, bases the right of contribution not upon the causes of the danger to the ship and cargo, but upon its actual presence. The owners of goods thrown overboard, having been innocent of exposing the vessel and her cargo to the sca-peril, which necessitated jettison, their equitable claim to be indemnified for the loss of their goods, is just as strong as if the peril had been wholly due to the action of the winds and waves."

When the ship takes the ground under any extra- Stranding. ordinary circumstances of time or place by reason of some unusual or accidental occurrence, such an event is a stranding.1

It is not merely touching the ground that constitutes a stranding. If the ship touches and runs,

Wells v. Hopwood, 3 B. & Ad. 20; De Mattos v. Saunders, L.R. 7 C.P. 581,

the circumstance is not to be regarded. But if she is forced ashore or is driven on a bank and remains for any time upon the ground, this is a stranding without any reference to the damage she sustains.'

Where a vessel takes the ground in the ordinary and usual course of navigation and management in a tide river, or harbour upon the ebbing of the tide or from natural deficiency of water, so that she may float again upon the flow of the tide or increase of water, such an event is not stranding. The mere fact of a vessel sustaining an unexpected injury by reason of the hardness of the bottom (provided it be in a place where she is properly laid in the ordinary course of the voyage) will not turn the taking the ground into a stranding."

The following have been held to be instances of stranding:

Striking upon a rock and remaining fixed for fifteen or twenty minutes, by which material injury was sustained.3

A ship, under charge of a pilot, was fastened at the pier of the dock basin by a rope to the shore and left there, and she took the ground, and when the tide left her, fell over on her side and bilged.*

In the course of a voyage along a canal it became necessary, in order to repair the canal, to draw off the water. The ship having been placed in what

1 Harman v. Vaux, 3 Camp. 429.

2 De Mattos v. Saunders, L. R. 7 C. P. 581; Magnus v. Buttemer, 21 L.J.

G. P. 119.

Baker v. Towry, 1 Stark. 436.

* Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4 M. & S. 77.

appeared to be a safe situation, when the water was drawn off impinged upon some piles, the existence of which was not previously known.1

A ship was driven by stress of weather into a harbour, at the mouth of which she struck upon an anchor and was in danger of sinking, to prevent which she was warped higher up in the harbour, where she took the ground and remained fast half an hour.2

Vessel in a tide harbour. At the first low-tide she grounded on the mud, but on a subsequent ebb, the rope by which her head was moored to the opposite side of the harbour stretched, and the wind blowing at the same time, she did not ground entirely on the mud which it was intended she should do, but her fore part got on a bank of stones, rubbish, and sand near to the quay, and the vessel was strained.3

A ship ran on some wooden piles four feet under water in a river, erected about nine yards from the shore to keep up the banks of the river, and lay on these piles till they were cut away."

A ship proceeding down river, a moderate wind suddenly took her ahead, and she went ashore stern foremost. There she remained fast for two hours until the tide flowed, when she got off and proceeded on her voyage.

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1 Rayner v. Godmond, 5B. & A. 225.

2 Barrow v. Bell, 7 D. & R. 244.

3 Wells v. Hopwood, 3 B. & A. 20.

♦ Dobson v. Bolton, Shee's Marsh. Ins. 171.

Harman v. Vaux, 3 Camp. 429.

What is not a stranding.

Stoppage of trains.

A ship having struck upon a sunken rock and received damage, was run ashore by direction of the pilot, was repaired and afterwards proceeded on her Voyage.1

The striking of a ship on a rock, where she remained a minute and a half, and was laid on her beam ends.2

A vessel took the ground on two successive days in going into harbour, under direction of a pilot, and being afterwards moored in the usual course, was thrown on her broadside by the receding of the tide.'

Taking the ground on the falling of the tide in a tide harbour, in a spot where the ship is properly placed for the purpose of unloading, whereby she was hogged and strained.*

Upon the ebbing of the tide a vessel took the ground in a tide harbour in the place where it was intended she should, but in so doing, struck against some hard substance, by which two holes were made in her bottom.5

In "The Village Belle," causes were excepted which might prevent the loading, "including civil commotion, strikes, riots, stoppage of trains, &c.' The port of loading was Bilbao, and that place was at the time threatened by Carlist forces, who cut the railway for some days. But Sir R. Phillimore

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1 Burnett v. Kensington, 7 T. R. 210. M'Dougle v. Royal Ex. Ass. Co., 4 M. & S. 503.

Hearn v. Edmunds, 4 Moo. 15.

Magnus v. Buttemer, 21 L. J. C. P. 119.

Kingsford v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 458; Crump on Ins. 289.

• 30 L. T. 232.

held, that to excuse the charterer for delay in the loading, it was not sufficient to show a general civil disturbance, and a stoppage of the railway for a short period: it must be shown that there was a disturbing cause of such a character as to prevent, and that it actually did prevent, the loading.

The four possibilities under which the accident of Collision. a collision could arise, have been clearly stated by Lord Stowell, thus, "In the first place it may happen without any blame being imputable to either party, as where the loss is occasioned by a storm, or any other vis major and in that case, the misfortune must be borne by the party on whom it happens to light, the other party not being responsible to him in any degree. Secondly, a misfortune of this kind may arise where both parties are to blame; where there has been a want of due diligence or skill on both sides. In such a case, the rule of law is, that the loss must be apportioned among them, as having been occasioned by the fault of both. Thirdly, it may happen by the misconduct of the suffering party only; and then the rule is, that the sufferer must bear his own burden. Lastly, it may have been the fault of the ship which ran the other down; and, in this case, the injured party would be entitled to an entire compensation from the other."1

The mere happening of a collision, without more, is no evidence of negligence on the part of the ship sued, and in order to fix such ship with the loss, it is necessary for the party suing to give evidence of

1 The Woodrop, 2 Dods, 83,