direct, always afloat, in fourteen lay-days, and ten days on demurrage, over and above the said laying days at 101. per day." The vessel having been or dered to M., arrived with her cargo at the usual place of discharge in the river, and commenced to unload. It was the master's duty to put the timber over the ship, and form it into rafts, whence it was conveyed away by the charterer. In the course of unloading, bad weather came on, and though the ship did not leave her anchorage, the rafts could not be formed, so that the charterer was unable to take the timber away. The bad weather caused a delay of four days in discharging the ship. In an action by the shipowners against the charterer for demurrage, it was held, that inasmuch as under the charter-party a fixed number of days was allowed for discharging the cargo, the charterer undertook the risks of casualties in the weather which might interrupt the process of unloading, and was liable to pay demurrage for delay so occasioned, notwithstanding he was not in default, and was ready to receive the timber.1 By a charter-party it was agreed that a steamer should proceed to three safe loading places between C. and M. as ordered, and proceed with cargo to H. or L. (dangers and accidents of the seas excepted.) Then followed this proviso :-" Should the steamer not have arrived at first loading port free of pratique and ready to load on or before a certain day, charterers have the option of cancelling or confirming 1 Thiis v. Byers, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 244; 45 L. J. Q. B. 511, this charter-party." The vessel arrived off the first loading port two days before the day named, but the sea and weather prevented any communication with the shore, and she was unable to get pratique on the day named in the charter-party, but was compelled by stress of weather to put into V., where the charterer's agent cancelled the charter-party. Held, that the arrival of the steamer at the first loading place free of pratique by the day named was a con. dition precedent, the non-fulfilment of which entitled the charterers to exercise the option of cancelling the charter-party; and that the clause excepting Le dangers and accidents of the seas applied only to the voyage.1 2 In Hurst v. Usborne, the owner by a charterparty agreed that the ship, then bound for H. should proceed with all convenient speed, to the north of England for coals, from thence to Limerick, and there load a cargo of grain or other merchandise for the defendant, and the ship having been delayed by bad weather did not arrive at Limerick till long after the time expected: Held, in an action by the owner on the charter-party, that evidence on behalf of the defendants that the Limerick export grain trade is carried on only at a certain season, which had expired before the ship arrived, was inadmissible and that charterers were liable. By the maritime law, in the absence of custom 1 Smith v. Dart, L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 105; 54 L. J. Q. B. 121. master, on the part of the owner, to receive and properly stow on board the goods to be carried, which ordinarily, are to be delivered to him alongside. For any damage to the goods occasioned by negligence in the performance of such duty, the owner is liable to the shipper.1 2 Thus, it is the duty of the master to provide proper ropes and tackle for the reception of the goods into the ship, and if a cask be accidentally staved in letting it down into the hold of the ship, the master is answerable for the loss.3 If the damage results from the misconduct of the master, he is answerable to the owners, and probably also directly to the shipper. If it happens through the misconduct of the mate, or others of the crew, without default on the part of the master, it has been held that the master is not answerable to the owners.' Where goods are sent to be laden on board a general ship, the master is not liable to the owner of the goods for damage done to them by the negligent stowage of a stevedore appointed by the charterer, the stevedore not being an agent or servant of the master. Nor is the master liable, in such case, for the acts of the stevedore, though the charterparty stipulate that the stevedore shall be paid by, and act under, his orders, except the acts of the stevedore be done in pursuance and in the execution of the master's orders.4 1 Blakie v. Stembridge, 18 L.J.C.P. 331. Ch. & Tem. on Car. 153. Goff v. Clinkard, I. Wills 282. * Blakie v. Stembridge, 28 L. J. C. P. 329; Sack v. Ford, 32 L.J.C.P. 12. This duty of the master has, however, in many cases been modified by custom or contract.1 And his liability for the safe conduct of the goods continues until they are actually delivered to the consignee; when they are once delivered, however, it ceases.2 3 When the pilot continues in charge of the navigation of the ship, it is the duty of the master and crew to keep a good look out; to attend to the general management of the ship; to see that the ship and her equipments are sufficient and proper, and that her crew are competent, and that obedience is promptly rendered to the pilot in all things relating to the management of the ship, and as long as the pilot continues to act, not to interfere with the conduct of the ship, except in cases of extreme necessity." 6 If the pilot is intoxicated, or is steering a course to the certain destruction of the vessel, the master may interfere and ought to interfere, but it is only in urgent cases. 8 As soon as the pilot assumes his proper functions on board, he supersedes the master in his control of the ship, in all matters which relate to her navigation; he is bound to use due diligence, care, and 1 Per Willes, J., in Blakie v. Stembridge, 28 L. J. C. P. 332. 2 Kay on Sh., Vol. 2, 1157. 3 The Iona, L. R. 1 P. C. 426. The Velasquez, L. R. 1 P. C. 494. The City of Cambridge, L. R. 5 P. C. 459. • The Diana, 1 W. Rob. 136. The Maria, 1 W. Rob. 110. The Peerless, Lush. 30, 32; The Duke of Manchester, 2 W. Rob. 470, 480. reasonable skill, and is answerable if it is proved that the ship either does, or suffers damage, through his default, negligence, or want of skill, the persons under him having done their duty.' A mere suggestion by the captain of a ship to the pilot as to the orders that should be given, not amounting to an interference, will not transfer the responsibility to the master, so as to render the owners liable if the order is a negligent one. It is within the province of the pilot compulsorily in charge of a vessel to decide whether the state of the weather is or is not such as to render it imprudent to get under way. But there may be circumstances of weather in which the captain of a ship would not be exonerated if he allowed his vessel to be got under way by the pilot.2 The exceptions as to negligence make it incumbent upon owners of cargo, who seek to render the owners or master liable, to prove affirmatively that the injury was caused by such negligence." The exceptions limit the liability, but not the duty of the owners and master; nor do they relieve the owners or master from the obligation to navigate with ordinary skill and care. It is still their duty to do what they can by reasonable skill and 1 The Portsmouth, 6 C. Rob. 317. The Oakfield, L.R. 11 P.D. 46; 55 L.J. Ad. 11; The Guy Mannering, L R. 7 P. D. 132. 3 Czech v. Gen. S. N. Co., L.R. 3 C.P. 17; Phillips v. Clark, 26 L. J. C.P. 168; Gill v. Manchester R. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 186. * Steinmann & Co. v. Angier Line, L R. 1 Q. B. (1891) 624. |