that the charterer had failed to appoint a stevedore, the charterer's option so to do not dispensing with the ordinary duty of the master properly to load the ship. It is his duty to load the ship with any lawful merchandise which the charterer or his agents may send alongside, not exceeding what the ship can reasonably stow and carry; and he must bear in mind in loading her that the centre of gravity must be kept in the proper place, so that she should not roll or labour, and cause the ship to be so loaded that she does not become top-heavy."

Where a ship was chartered from London to San Francisco and Victoria, "the goods to be brought to and taken from alongside at merchant's risk and expense" at port of discharge; and the ship to be consigned to charterer's agents at the port of discharge and a stevedore recommended by charterers to be employed at ship's expense. At San Francisco the agents incurred expenses in unloading and reloading, partly caused by the manner in which the cargo had been loaded in London. The charterer's agents in settling the freight with the Captain at the port of discharge, put these expenses in the account as due from the shipowners to them, and insisted on their being allowed as against the freight. The Captain objected, but yielded under pressure and signed the account. Held, that these were properly ship's expenses, and that the owners were liable for them.3

1 The Anglo African Co. Ld. v. Lamzed, L. R. 1 C. P. 226. Pust v. Dowie, 33 L. J. Q. B. 175. Roberts v. Shaw, 8 L. T. 634.

By a charter-party it was agreed that the ship should proceed to Leith and to London and there load cargo to be shipped by the charterers; and that a stevedore should be "appointed by the charterers in London only, but employed and paid for by owners." Cargo was loaded at Leith by the charterers, no information as to the London cargo being then asked for by the Captain. On the voyage to London, owing to bad weather, some of the cargo was damaged and some was shifted. After the arrival of the vessel at London it was necessary to land the damaged cargo to be re-conditioned, and to re-stow the cargo which had shifted. It also became necessary to shift some of the cargo to enable the London cargo to be properly stowed. Owing to these matters, and to some delay on the part of the stevedore who had been appointed under the terms of the charter-party, three days more than those allowed by the charter-party were occupied in loading at London. Held, that the stevedore was the servant of the owners, and that the charterers were not liable for demurrage arising either from his delay or from the necessity of moving the cargo; and that the charterers were not liable for any of the expenses of moving the cargo, because they were either expenses of stowage or of work done for the benefit of the cargo, without the authority of the charterers.'

The owner of a ship had chartered her to A. for the purpose of being loaded; the charter-party

1 Harris v. Best, 7 Asp. M. L. C. 272.

Master to sign

provided that the stevedore was to be nominated by the charterer, and be under the control of the Captain, and was to be paid by the owner. A. sub-chartered the ship to B., entering into a charterparty with a similar clause. B. employed the plaintiff, who was a stevedore, to load the ship, and introduced him to the defendant as the person who was to load the ship. The defendant frequently came on board while the ship was being loaded, and superintended and gave certain instructions relative to the stowage of the cargo. In an action by the plaintiff against the defendant for non-payment of his charges,-Held, that there was evidence of a contract between the plaintiff and defendant. On completion of the loading the plaintiff sent in his account to B., headed "To captain and owners," and pressed B. for payment. B. had sent in his account to A., and A. had sent in his account to the defendant, with the item "Stevedores' account" charged. The defendant had paid A.'s account, and A. had paid B.'s account. B. became bankrupt, and did not pay the plaintiff. Held, that the defendant was liable to pay the plaintiff's account.1

Where, by the charter-party, "the master is to as presented. sign bills of lading as presented," the master is not

Bills of lading

only authorized, but has an obligation imposed upon

him to grant or sign bills of lading in whatever form, and to whatever effect he may be required to sign them.

1 Eastman v. Harry, 3 Asp. M. L. C. N. S. 117.

The meaning of the stipulation that the master shall sign bills of lading seems to be that the shipowners shall, through the master, contract with the shippers, for the charterer's benefit, and not that the master shall do so as agent for the charterer. The master signs not exactly as agent of the charterer, but because he is bound to sign by reason of the charter-party. Therefore, where, though in fraud of the plaintiff, a bill of lading was granted and signed by the master under and in strict pursuance of his authority, which had been indorsed for value to the plaintiffs, it was held that the property in the goods mentioned in the bill of lading had passed to them, and that they were entitled to maintain an action for non-delivery." Where freight is to be paid according to the weight delivered at the end of the voyage, and the charter-party contains a clause that the master should sign bills of lading for the weight of the cargo put on board as presented to him by the charterers, as between the shipowner and charterer, the master is bound to sign without weighing the cargo; but the shipowners would not be bound to deliver more than was shipped, there being no warranty, either express or implied, that the charterers might not make mistakes. If, however, the shipowner pays to the consignees the difference in value between the quantity alleged to have been shipped and the quantity delivered, he

1 Smidt v. Tiden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 447; The Emilien Marie, 32 L. T. 435. Gabarron v. Kreeft, and Kreeft v. Thompson, L. R. 10 Ex. 274; 44 L.J, Ex. 238.

cannot recover the same from the charterers, such payment on his part being voluntary. Thus, where a declaration stated that it was agreed between plaintiff's and defendants that the plaintiffs' ship should take a cargo of coals from C. to B., "the master of the ship to sign bills of lading for weight of cargo put on board as presented to him by the defendants, without prejudice to the tenor of the charter-party;" that 573 tons of coal were shipped, and that the defendants caused the master to sign bills of lading for 605 tons, whereby the plaintiff's were forced to pay the consignees at B., 317. for the value of the difference between 605 tons and 573 tons and 137. for dues; it was held on demurrer that the declaration was bad.1

It was stipulated by a charter-party made between the plaintiffs and the defendants that the master of the ship should sign bills of lading as presented, or pay a named penalty. He refused to do so, and sailed from the port of loading without having signed any bills of lading. He proceeded to the port of discharge, and delivered a portion of the cargo to the consignees, but ceased doing so and warehoused the remainder, as they, acting under instructions from the charterers, claimed to deduct from the freight an amount equal to the penalty named in the charter-party. In an action by the charterers against the shipowners for conversion and for penalties,-It was held, that the plaintiff's

1 Brown v. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 562; 41 L. J. C. P. 289.