A ship loaded with hides and tobacco whilst on her voyage encountered bad weather and shipped much sea-water, whereby the hides were wetted and rendered putrid. Neither the tobacco nor the packages containing it were immediately in contact with nor directly damaged by sea water, but the tobacco was damaged and deteriorated in flavour by the fœtid odour proceeding from the putrid hides.1

Loss by jettison rendered necessary by storms or tempests.2

Where a vessel for the purpose of discharging her cargo was fastened by tackles to a barge on one side, and a lighter on the other, but the lighter's tackle breaking, water got into her port holes and damaged the cargo.3

While a steamer was loading in a harbour, her draught was increased by the weight of the cargo, until the discharge pipe was brought below the surface of the water, which then flowed down the pipe under the valve, and some cocks or valves in the machinery having been negligently left open, water flowed into the hold and injured the goods.1

Loss occasioned by hidden obstructions in the river, newly placed there, and of a character that human skill or foresight could not have discovered and avoided. 5

Thus, running on a recent snag which could not be seen, is within the exception " dangers of the river."6

1

Montoya v. The London Ass. Co., 6 Ex. 451; 20 L. J. Ex. 254.

2 The Milwaukee Belle, 21 L. T. 801.

3 Laurie v. Douglas, 15 M. & W. 746.

* Davidson v. Burgand, L. R. 4 C. P. 117.

Ang. on Car. s. 168.

• Parsons on Sh., Vol. 1, 257n. 3.

Where a vessel was chartered to proceed to Newport and there load for San Francisco, the freight of which voyage was insured, but before reaching Newport, she got ashore, and the time necessary for getting her off and repairing her so as to be a cargo carrying ship, was so long as to put an end, in a commercial sense, to the commercial speculation, and the charterers abandoned the contract, and hired another vessel; it was held, that there had been a total loss of the chartered freight by perils of the seas within the meaning of the policy.1

The following losses have been held not to be included in the term dangers or perils of the sea, &c.:

Collision arising from the negligence of master and crew navigating the vessel which carries the goods.2

Fire has never been regarded as a peril, danger, or accident of the sea, within the meaning of those terms as known to mercantile usage or the law.3 Injury by rats to cargo, although every possible precaution is taken to prevent it."

Damage by cockroaches. 5

A loss arising from rats eating holes in the ship's bottom is not within the perils insured against by the common form of a policy of insurance."

1Jackson v. The Union Marine Insurance Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 125.

Lloyd v. Gen. Iron Screw Collier Co., 33 L. J. Ex. 269; Grill v. Gen. Iron Screw Collier Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 476.

The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Baker, 7 Bom. H. C. Rep., O. C. J. 203.

Kay v. Wheeler, L. R. 2 C. P. 302; Laveroni v. Drury, 22 L. J. Ex. 2. The Carlotta, 3 Asp. Mar. L. C. N. S. 456; Dale v. Hall, 1 Wils. 281. The Miletus, cited in Parsong on Sh., Vol. 1, 258n.

Hunter v. Potts, 4 Camp. 203.

Loss caused by worms which have destroyed the ship's bottom.1

Loss by lightning, though an act of God, is not a peril of the sea.2

Loss by heat.3

If a ship be driven by stress of weather on an enemy's coast and there captured.*

Where a vessel, about to sink from the effects of bad weather, puts into an intermediate port and the master sells the ship and cargo without necessity."

If a ship, hove down on a beach within the tideway for repairs, be thereby bilged and damaged."

Meat shipped at Hamburg for London was delayed on the voyage by tempestuous weather, and solely by reason of such delay became putrid, and was necessarily thrown overboard at sea; this was held not a loss by perils of the sca, or within the words "all other perils, losses and misfortunes" in the policy."

Stoppage of

Where it was agreed by charter-party that the char- Neaps and terer should not be liable for delay in loading caused Navigation. by neaps and stoppage of navigation, and the lay-days were exceeded in consequence of the lighters which were bringing the cargo (one of salt) down the rivers Weaver and Mersey to Birkenhead, the place of

1 Rohl v. Parr, 1 Esp. 445.

2 The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Baker, 7 Bom. H. C. R., O. C. J. 204.

3 The Freedom, L. R. 3 P. C. 594.

Green v. Elmslie, Peake's N. P. 278; Hahn v. Corbett, 2 Bing. 211; Livie v. Janson, 12 East. 618.

Bad weather.

loading, being delayed by neaps of exceptional lowness at the junction of the Mersey and Weaver, and it was proved that it was the invariable practice, for all salt intended for foreign exportation to be brought to Birkenhead from the Weaver by water, that there were no storehouses for sait at Birkenhead; and that it was never ke ot there to await the arrival of vessels. The charterer was held to be relieved from liability under the above exceptions, upon the ground that they must be taken to apply to bringing the cargo to Birkenhead for loading purposes.

In Postlethwaite v. Freeland, Lord Selborne, L. C., in the House of Lords, summed up the law as to the rights and obligations of shipowners and merchants with regard to the time allowed for loading and discharging ships, as follows:-" If by the terms of the charter-party, the charterer has agreed to discharge the cargo within a fixed period of time, that is an absolute and unconditional engagement, for the non-performance of which he is answerable whatever may be the nature of the impediments which prevent him from performing it, and which cause the ship to be detained in his service beyond the time stipulated.”

Where the chertor-party gave the charterer the option of refusing to load if the ship did not arrive at the port of loading by November 28th, unless

1 Allerton S. S. Co. v. Falk, 6 Asp. M. L. C. 287.

2 L. R. 5 App. Cas. 599.

"prevented by stress of weather or other unavoidable impediment," and owing to adverse wind and bad weather she did not arrive until January 20th, the charterer was not entitled to refuse to load her, although the ship had been to an intermediate port and had taken the full usual time in discharging there.1 Tindal, C.J., held, that the charterer's option did not arise if ordinary diligence had been used, even though tlie delay might have been avoided by unusual efforts.

Where a given number of days is allowed to the charterer for unloading, a contract is implied on his part, that from the time when the ship is at the usual place of discharge, he will take the risk of any ordinary vicissitudes which may occur to prevent his releasing the ship at the expiration of the laydays. So, where a charterer is allowed a given number of days for unloading a vessel, there is an implied contract on his part that from the time when the vessel is at the usual place of discharge, he will take the risk of any ordinary vicissitudes which may occur to prevent his releasing the ship at the expiration of the lay-days.

Thus, where a vessel was chartered for a voyage from Pensacola to a safe port in the United Kingdom, as ordered, with a cargo of timber. Sixteen working days were to be allowed for loading, and "to be discharged at such wharf or dock as the charterer may

81

1 Granger v. Dent, M. & M. 475.

2 Randall v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352,

641