Board of Guardians, elected in accordance with the provisions of the statute, continued him in his office, and that the Poor Law Board refused to sanction the appointment; but Mr. Sparling has not. been deprived of his situation within the meaning of the 76th section, that is to say by reason of the operation of the Act, and moreover, his situation or employment was not an "office within the meaning of the Act. However reasonable it might be that compensation should be granted, there is no power under the Act to grant it. The Act is not the causa causans, the deprivation of Mr. Sparling's employment, although it may perhaps be the causa sine qua non. The proper course was taken of informing the Guardians that they had no power to continue the appointment. The old body of trustees were changed into the new body of guardians, under the control of the state, and the new body is informed by the state under whose control it is that the appointment could not be sanctioned.

PER CURIAM.-We think that he was deprived of his employment by the operation of the Act.

Then, secondly, the employment is not an "office" within the operation of the Act. He was an attorney paid by the month, and such an employment cannot be said to be the same as, for instance, the

office of town clerk where there are duties to be performed which are incidental to such office. See The King v. The Mayor of Bridgwater (2), where under 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 66, a town clerk was held to be entitled to compensation. Can it be said that a solicitor employed as Mr. Sparling was to do the Poor Law work at a salary is an "officer ?"

By s. 2 of the Metropolitan Poor Act, 1867, "words" in that Act have the same meaning as in the Poor Law Acts, one of which is 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. By s. 109 of that Act the word "officer" shall be construed to extend "to any clergyman, schoolmaster, person duly licensed to practise as a medical man, vestry clerk, treasurer, collector, assistant overseer, governor, master or mistress of a workhouse, or any other person who shall be employed in any parish or union in carrying this Act or the laws for the relief of the poor into execution, and whether performing one or more of the aforesaid functions." Mr. Sparling cannot be said to come within any of these descriptions, nor within the earlier part of the 76th section of the Metropolitan Poor Act, 1867.

Core in support of the rule.-Upon the facts stated in the affidavit, Mr. Sparling is clearly an officer within the meaning of the 76th section. He was in the service of the Guardians. He comes also within the meaning of the interpretation given to the word in s. 109 of 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76, which has been referred to by the other side. The only legal business he was called upon to transact was the carrying the laws for the relief of the poor into execution. The Queen v. The Justices of Cambridgeshire (3) shews how an interpretation clause is to be construed. Lord Denman, C.J., in delivering the considered judgment of the Court, said-" We apprehend that an interpretation clause is not to receive so rigid a construction; that it is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, nor as strictly defining what the meaning of a word must be under all circumstances. We rather think that it merely declares what persons may be comprehended within that term where the circumstances require that it should." He also referred to Dwarris on Statutes, 565, 573; The King v. The Mayor of Bridgwater (2); The Queen v. The Corporation of Warwick (4); and The Queen v. The Poor Law Board (5).

The judgment of the Court (6) was (on Jan. 14) delivered by

BLACKBURN, J.-In this case a rule has been obtained for a mandamus to the defendants to assess the reasonable compensation to William Sparling. Cause was shewn by the late Attorney-General (the present Chief Justice of the Common Pleas), who stated that the board were contented to abide by the decision of this Court as final.

We have, therefore, to determine, not merely whether there is enough doubt to make it proper to let a writ go, but whether we think that the applicant is entitled to have compensation, the amount of that compensation not being a question before us.

It was agreed that the facts were all accurately stated in the affidavit of Mr. Sparling. The material facts are as follows [His Lordship stated the facts as they are above set out.]

We apprehend that it is clear, on the one hand, that he did not thereby acquire any freehold office during life or good behaviour, but also clear on the other, that he did become possessed of a situation or place or employment under the trustees, and that, if he had been dismissed without sufficient cause and without reasonable notice to terminate his employment, he would have had a remedy for such dismissal.

The 76th section of the Metropolitan Poor Act, 1867, provides that

"Officers and persons appointed or acting under any such local Act for any purpose of the relief of the poor, or otherwise in the service of the guardians, and superintendent registrars of births, deaths and marriages, and registrars of births and deaths, and registrars of marriages, shall be entitled to continue in office after the constitution of the new board of guardians, under this Act, to the same extent as if this Act had not been passed; and their service before the constitution of that board shall be reckoned in the computation of any superannuation allowance to which they may become entitled: Provided that in case any officer of a union or a parish

(6) Blackburn, J.; Quain, J.; & Archibald, J.

shall be deprived of his office by reason of the operation of this Act, the Poor Law Board may award to him such compensation for the loss of his office and its emoluments, either by way of gross sum, or by way of annuity, as to them shall seem reasonable."

It is on the proper construction of this section that our judgment in the present case depends.

Upon the argument of the rule two points were made for the defendants. First. It was said that the applicant was not deprived of his situation by reason of the operation of the Act. But we expressed our opinion on the argument that, as the effect of the Act was to subject his employers to the regulations which rendered it illegal in them to continue his employment, he had been deprived of it by reason of the operation of the Act.

The second objection was that this employment was not an office within the meaning of the Act. On this question we took time to consider.

We agree that the word office," in its strict legal meaning, would not include such an employment as this. We doubt very much whether there was any person employed for any purpose connected with the relief of the poor under a local Act, whose employment could be called an "office" in the strict legal sense of the word. If there were such persons, they must have been very few; and to give the word this strict legal sense, would be to render the Act nugatory.

But we think that we must construe the words of this Act with reference to the subject matter and the context. The Municipal Corporation Act, 6 & 7 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 66, gave compensation to those who had lost an office of profit." In The King v. The Mayor, &c., of Bridg water (2), the person claiming compensation was clerk to the justices of the borough, and it was argued that this was not an "office;" but Williams, J., there says "This may, in some sense, possibly be considered as no office, but not in the sense used in the Act. The effect of the 66th section, especially that part of it in which the party claiming is directed to distinguish the office, place, situation,

employment or appointment,' seems to be that a reasonable interpretation is to be given, and that the word 'office' must be understood in a greater latitude than an office strictly legal." And this was, we think, the ground of the decision in that case. And we think that we ought to apply the same principle to this case. Now, when we find in the enacting part of the section that "officers and persons appointed or acting under any such local Act for any purpose of the relief of the poor, shall be entitled to continue in office after the new constitution of the board," and that then, in the proviso immediately following, the words "officer" and "office" are again used, we think that the word "office must be understood in a greater latitude than an office strictly legal, and must be construed to include the situation of those persons appointed or acting for the relief of the poor, who, under the earlier part of the section, would be entitled to continue in office. And we are the more induced to put this construction on the Act, because we think that, to put the strict legal construction on the word "office," would render the Act nugatory, and give compensation to very few, if any, persons. This we cannot believe to have been the object of the Legislature.

It was argued that, in the 2nd section of the Act, it was enacted that, "words shall have the same meaning as in the Poor Law Acts," and that this Act, therefore, incorporates the interpretation clause of the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 109, which enacts that "officer" shall be construed to extend to any clergyman, schoolmaster, person duly licensed to practise as a medical man, vestry clerk, treasurer, collector, assistant-governor, master or mistress of a workhouse, or any other person who shall be employed in carrying this Act, or the laws for the relief of the poor, into execution;" and it was said that a solicitor is not there named. We do not agree that where, from the context, it appears that a word is used in a particular sense, we are to depart from that sense because, in the interpretation clause, it appears that the word is to be extended to include other things; but if we did, we should say that

a solicitor employed to transact the legal poor law business of the parish, is a person employed in carrying the Acts for the relief of the poor into operation. And it may not unreasonably be said that a solicitor employed at a fixed salary to do this, is very much ejusdem generis with a medical man who receives a fixed salary for attending the sick poor; and a medical man is mentioned as an 66 officer." But our judgment does not depend on the interpretation clause contained in the Act of 1834, though brought into the Act of 1867. We proceed on what seems to us, from the object of the 79th section of the Act of 1867, and the language there used, to be the intention expressed in that enactment.

We are therefore of opinion that the defendants ought to enquire into the circumstances, and award such compensation as to them shall seem reasonable. We give no opinion as to what that should be. Rule absolute.

Frauds, Statute of-29 Car. 2. c. 3. s. 17-Connection between two Writings by internal Reference-Auctioneer's Sales Ledger and Conditions of Sale-Liability of Auctioneer for not making binding Contract.

The plaintiff sent a grey mare to the defendant for sale by auction. The defendant circulated a catalogue, forming one document with the conditions of sale, wherein the mare was described and numbered, and the sale advertised for a day named. The sale took place on such day, and the mare was knocked down to M. Prior to the sale the defendant had prepared a sales ledger, containing in several columns the particulars of each horse to be offered for sale, with blanks for the purchasers and prices, which blanks were filled up by the

clerk of the defendant as soon as each horse was knocked down. The number and description of the plaintiff's mare as entered in the sales ledger corresponded exactly with the number and description in the catalogue, and immediately after the sale M. wrote to the defendant (to return the mare as not up to warranty) a letter identifying her by number and description :-Held, that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for negligence in not having made a binding contract with M., and that the letter of M. was not sufficient to shew that there was a contract which would be binding upon M.

Appeal from the County Court of Lancashire holden at Liverpool.

The plaint was to recover 301. " for loss sustained by the plaintiff through the negligence of the defendant in or about the matter of a certain grey mare sent by the plaintiff to the defendant's repository to be sold by the defendant, by reason of the defendant not making a binding contract with Thomas Maguire, to whom the said grey mare was knocked down at the sale, and for not otherwise observing the printed conditions under which the said grey mare was offered for sale." The learned County Court Judge had directed a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff for an amount agreed upon.

The facts proved were theseThe plaintiff, being the owner of a grey mare, sent her to the repository of

49. Grey mare, 6 years old, 15.3 hands
high, steady to ride and drive.

Prior to the sale, the defendant caused to be made in such of the columns in his "sales ledger" as were applicable to matters ascertainable before the sale, entries relating to the horses described in the catalogue, the ledger and the catalogue following the same numerical order. sale took place as advertised, and the plaintiffs mare was in turn, according to numerical order, put up, and knocked down to Thomas Maguire for 33 guineas.

The

Thereupon the defendant's clerk wrote in the columns of the sales ledger left blank for the purpose, opposite to the lot in question, the name of the purchaser and the price.

The entry in the sales ledger was

Age.

Reserve.

Purchaser. Amount.

The mare was afterwards re-sold for 291. 88. only, and the plaintiff having been nonsuited in an action against Maguire, in which neither the sales ledger nor the above letter were put in evidence, afterwards sued the defendant for negligence as above stated. At the hearing the defendant put in evidence the catalogue and conditions of sale, the sales ledger, and Maguire's letter, and proved by his own mouth that the entries No. 49 in page 7 of the catalogue and in the sales ledger related to the same animal. It was then contended for the defendant that this was sufficient evidence of a signed note in writing of the bargain within the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, but the learned Judge being of opinion that there was no proof of a sufficient connection by reference or otherwise between the conditions of sale and the entries in the sales ledger, gave judgment for the plaintiff.

The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether, under the circumstances above stated, there was evidence of a signed note or memorandum in writing sufficient to satisfy the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds.

Herschel, for the defendant.-There are two questions in this case: First, whether there is a sufficient connection by internal reference between the sales ledger and the conditions of sale to give them the force of one document ? Secondly, whether the letter of Maguire is sufficient to supply the deficiency of connection, if any? On the first point it will be necessary to distinguish Hinde v. Whitehouse (1). That case is distinguish able, because there the auctioneer simply held the conditions of sale in his hand at the time of sale, whereas here there is a sufficient internal reference from one writing to another to make a good contract. Taking these two documents together, a reasonable inference might be drawn that they refer to the same thing. The date, the number of the lot, the name of the seller and of the thing sold, all alike correspond. In Hinde v. Whitehouse (1) the date alone corresponded.

(1) 7 East, 558.

[BLACKBURN, J.-There would seem to be no doubt that the same mare is meant, but it is necessary to shew that the same conditions of sale were meant.]

"Lot" is a well-known word in connection with auctions, and it is a reasonable inference that Lot 49 means Lot 49 in the catalogue.

[QUAIN, J.-Is not the principle this, that there must be such reference from one document to the other as will make them one document ?]

It is contended that there is such a reference here made by the word "lot," meaning thereby "lot in the catalogue.' He also cited Allen v. Bennet (2), Dobell v. Hutchinson (3) and Buxton v. Rust (4).

Wheeler, for the plaintiff, was desired to confine his argument to the second point. The letter of Maguire does not contain any mention of the price. [He was then stopped.]

Herschel, in reply.—Bird v. Boulter (5) is an authority to shew that the defendant's clerk in making the entry in the sales ledger is an agent for a purchaser at the sale.

BLACKBURN, J.-I am of opinion that the judgment of the County Court Judge should be affirmed. The ordinary practice at auctions-a practice so well known that we should take judicial notice of it -is for the auctioneer to sign the catalogue under his authority from both parties to sign it and bind them. But such a catalogue must contain all the conditions of sale, otherwise there is no sufficient memorandum within the Statute of Frauds. The ordinary usage is for the auctioneer to sign, and he generally does, still if the auctioneer had a sales ledger in which all the conditions of sale were copied out, and were to sign that, such a signature might be binding. It is, however quite clear that such a signature, if made by the auctioneer's clerk, would not under ordinary circumstances be binding,