big for our capacity, when we would comprehend the circumference of a world, and dwindles into nothing, when we endeavour after the idea of an atome.

It is possible this defect of imagination may not be in the soul it self, but as it acts in conjunction with the body. Perhaps there may not be room in the brain for such a variety of impressions, or the animal spirits may be incapable of figuring them in such a manner, as is necessary to excite so very large or very minute ideas. However it be, we may well suppose that beings of a higher nature very much excel us in this respect, as it is probable the soul of man will be infinitely more perfect hereafter in this faculty, as well as in all the rest; insomuch that, perhaps, the imagination will be able to keep pace with the understanding, and to form in itself distinct ideas of all the different modes and quantities of space.

SAMUEL CLARKE

[Samuel Clarke was born at Norwich in 1675. His father was an Alderman of that city and represented it in Parliament. Samuel was educated at the Free School of his native town. In 1691 he went to Caius College, Cambridge. Here he became an ardent student of the Newtonian philosophy, and at the early age of twenty, immediately after taking his degree, brought out an improved translation of Rohault's Physics, a work based on the principles of Descartes, intending thereby to guide the feet of University students into safer philosophic paths. This he further amplified in 1697, in an edition with copious notes, in which the doctrines of Descartes were corrected by those of Newton. Soon after 1701 he was presented to the living of Drayton, Norfolk. Thence he was transferred to London, being Boyle lecturer in the years 1704 and 1705. He was appointed chaplain to Queen Anne, and Rector of St. James', Westminster, in 1706 or 1707. died in 1729.]

He

SAMUEL CLARKE turned out a large amount of work in his comparatively short life. Besides his two more important contributions to philosophy, The Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God, and The Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, he carried on a lengthy and learned correspondence with Leibnitz upon the Principles of Natural Philosophy; another correspondence upon Liberty and Necessity; wrote a letter to a Mr. Dodwell on the Immortality of the Soul; another to Bishop Hoadly upon the Proportion of Velocity and Force in Bodies in Motion; corresponded with young Joseph Butler, afterwards the famous author of the Analogy of Religion; produced essays on Baptism, Confirmation, etc.; treatises on The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, and on The Primitive Fathers and the Canon of the New Testament; also Paraphrases of the Gospels, and some sermons.

Clarke's style is not particularly attractive. It is usually intelligible and fairly clear, but it inclines to be ponderous, and is marred by too plentiful sprinklings of Scripture texts. He

has no humour, no imagination, and no great depth or originality of thought. In his philosophical writings he sought to introduce the truths of other men in plain and simple language, and succeeded fairly well.

His sermons are clear, forcible and well sustained. They exhibit great common-sense and moderation, and though far from beautiful, are dignified and in good taste.

His Paraphrases of the Gospels are very able. The language is vigorous and fairly natural. They are colloquial, without irreverence or undue familiarity. We doubtless lose in them some of the simplicity of the authorised version, their diction being a trifle pedantic at times. They are, however, distinctly effective. The free rendering of passages so familiar as to be in danger of being slighted, often brings out their meaning, or possible meaning, with distinct and quickening effect. These homely paraphrases are perhaps the most lasting and valuable legacy to English literature that has been made by Samuel Clarke.

A. I. FITZROY.

ARGUMENTS TO THE BEING OF GOD

First. That 'tis evident, both we ourselves, and all the other beings we know in the world, are weak and dependent creatures; which neither gave ourselves being, nor can preserve it by any power of our own: and that therefore we entirely owe our being to some superior and more powerful cause; which superior cause either must be itself the first cause, which is the notion of God; or else, by the same argument as before, must derive from him, and so lead us to the knowledge of him. If it be said that we received our being from our forefathers by a continual natural succession (which, however, would not in any step have been possible without a perpetual providence); yet still the argument holds no less strong concerning the first of the whole race; that he could not but be made by a superior intelligent cause. If an atheist, contrary to the truth of all history, shall contend that there may have been, without any beginning at all, an eternal succession of men; yet still it will be no less evident that such a perpetual succession could not have been without an eternal superior cause; because in the nature of things themselves there is manifestly no necessity, that any such succession of transient beings, either temporary or perpetual, should have existed at all.

Secondly.-The other argument, to which the greatest part of the proofs of the being of God may briefly be reduced, is the order and beauty of the world; that exquisite harmony of nature, by which (as St. Paul expresses it, Rom. i. 20) the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. And this argument, as it is infinitely strong to the most accurate philosophers, so it is also sufficiently obvious even to the meanest capacities. Whose power was it that framed this beautiful and stately fabric, this immense and spacious world? that stretched out the North over the empty place, and hanged the earth upon nothing? (Job. xxvi. 7.)