1869 v. LLANTRISSANT. spondents. There Cockburn, C.J., says: "Rent is primâ facie evidence of value. Suppose at this moment there were no lease, and THE QUEEN the appellants wanted to take it, what is the rent they would give? They would arrive at that by this process. What is the traffic on the branch, what are the expenses, what are the profits it would produce to the main line?" And Blackburn, J., says, "What would be the elements of the rent? Why, amongst others, the capacity to add to the takings of the main line." The Court cannot decide against the respondents without overruling those cases. Eastern Railway Company v. Haughley (1) is distinguishable. There the rate was sought to be made on the mileage principle in disguise; it was an attempt to bring in traffic, not originating in the parish, as contributing to the profit earned by diminishing the expense of working the whole traffic on the line, while here it was the traffic over the branch that earns the profit on the main line. Field, in reply. Great MELLOR, J. It is not very easy, and I do not attempt to reconcile all that has been said in the various cases on the subject of assessing to the poor-rate branch lines of railway, or lines contributing to the traffic or feeding of other lines. It appears to me to be immaterial whether the line be a branch or a main line. The true principle on which the rate ought to be made is by ascertaining what is the rateable value in each particular parish through which the railway passes, and that is to be based on what a hypothetical tenant would give for the line in that particular parish. The question we are asked is, whether the fact that the railway in the parish of Llantrissant contributes additional traffic to the Great Western Railway is to cause it to be rated to something in addition to the profit which the railway itself earns. This question is decided in principle by the Haughley Case (1), and I abide by what I said in that case. I think it must be taken that the Lord Chief Justice in the Haughley Case (1) did not quite adhere to the suggestion he threw out in the Cannock Case. (2) I do not believe there was any difference of opinion between us in the Haughley Case (1), and certainly what I expressed in that case I (1) Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 666. way Company v Cannock, 9 L. T. (2) London and North Western Rail- 325. VOL. IV. 2 I 1 1869 บ. abide by in the present case, that the rateable value in each parish THE QUEEN of a line of railway passing through several parishes must depend LLANTRISSANT. On the actual earnings of the part of the railway within the particular parish, deducting the actual expenses of that part. Some difficulties have been introduced by confounding the hypothetical tenant with the actual tenant; it is not because a particular tenant will give a large sum as rent that that is any criterion of the rateable value. The simple question is, whether or not because the traffic that passes over the parish of Llantrissant gets on to the Great Western Railway, and thereby enhances the traffic of the Great Western Railway, any additional sum is to be allowed to the parish of Llantrissant? Putting the question in that simple form, I can give but one answer to it, that no addition ought to be made; and I think therefore the order of sessions must be confirmed. HANNEN and HAYES, JJ., concurred. Order of sessions confirmed. Attorneys for appellants: Young, Maples, & Co. Attorneys for respondents: Wrentmore & Son, for Spickett & Price, Pontypridd. April 24. . THE QUEEN v. THE METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS. Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 Vict. c. 18), s. 68-CompensationInjury to Land-Obstruction to a Public Right. The principle of the decision of the House of Lords in Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway Company (Law Rep. 2 H. L. 175) is, that in order to entitle a claimant to compensation under s. 68 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, the injury must be done to land or some interest in land, and a mere personal injury, though connected with the enjoyment of particular land, is not ground for compensation. Therefore, where the occupier of premises near the Thames had been used to draw water from the river, and to bring barges to a draw dock, as public rights, and not as rights attached to the premises, and was obstructed in the enjoyment of these rights by the works of the embankment: Held, that he could not claim compensation under s. 68. ; RULE, calling on W. & C. Batstone to shew cause why a certiorari should not issue to bring up an inquisition verdict and judg ment taken before the sheriff of Surrey touching the claim made 1869 v. METRO POLITAN BOARD OF WORKS. by the Batstones against the Metropolitan Board of Works, in respect of their interest in a certain messuage, tenement, and here- THE QUEEN ditament, called "Pottery No. 5," situate in Ferry Street, Lambeth, having been injuriously affected by the execution of the works of the board, in order that the same might be quashed. The facts, as disclosed upon the affidavits, were as follows: The Metropolitan Board were empowered by 26 & 27 Vict. c. 75, to make an embankment on the south side of the Thames. The act incorporates (s. 15) the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. W. & C. Batstone carried on the business of potters at a place called "Pottery No. 5" in Ferry Street, Lambeth. On the 3rd of July, 1867, they caused a notice to be served on the board, stating that the premises in their occupation in Ferry Street had been and were injuriously affected by the exercise by the defendants of the powers given to them by the above Act, and claiming 40007. as compensation. As no part of the claimants' premises was taken for the works of the embankment, nor was any right or easement of the claimants interfered with, the defendants were not willing to pay compensation; they therefore, under protest, issued their warrant to the sheriff to summon a special jury to determine the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants. At the inquisition taken on the 24th of October, 1867, it was admitted that Ferry Street runs at right angles with the Thames, and that the claimants' premises are situate some seventy yards away from the river up that street. That Broad Street is the next street to Ferry Street on the east side, running parallel with it, and also at right angles with the river, and that High Street runs parallel with the river, joining Ferry Street at its west end, and Broad Street at its east. It was also admitted that at the end of Ferry Street, where it goes down to the river, there was a common and public right from time immemorial for all persons freely to dip for and take water from the river for their own use without payment, and that there was a right of way or access to the river for that purpose. It was further admitted that at the end of Broad Street, where it goes down to the river, there was a free public draw dock, and that all the public had a right to resort to and use this dock, and to take carts there, backwards and forwards, to load and unload barges, and that barges had a right to lie and be there, and 1869 this right was free to all the public. It was proved that in the THE QUEEN Construction of the works of the embankment which were then in v. METRO POLITAN BOARD OF progress the defendants had caused the embankment to be erected in front of the spot in Ferry Street where the public right to take water was exercised, and that since the works were commenced in that spot the access to the river there by the public had been practically cut off, so that the right to take water could not be exercised as before; and it was suggested that this deprivation would continue until the embankment works were completed at that spot. It was also proved that at the draw dock at Broad Street only one or two barges could now be got up to load or unload instead of four or five as formerly, and that the access to the dock by barges was attended with difficulty and danger. There was no direct evidence whether the obstruction was permanent or not. The claimants, in carrying on their business of potters on their premises, had been in the habit of sending and dipping for and fetching water from the river at Ferry Street to use in their business, and also had been used to have the sand used in their business brought by barges to the draw dock at Broad Street. They proved that since the commencement of the embankment works they had been prevented by the works from obtaining access to the river for these purposes, and they founded their claim to compensation, first, for having been deprived of the use of their right to dip and get water, and, secondly, for having been deprived of the use of the right to bring barges to the draw dock. It was admitted that there was no right or easement appurtenant to the claimants' premises to go to the river to dip or get water, or to use the draw dock. The jury assessed the amount of compensation on the first head of damage at 50%., and on the second head at 407. The Montagu Chambers, Q.C., and Bridgman, shewed cause. claimants are entitled to compensation. Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway Company (1) will be relied upon by the other side, but that case only decided that where the obstruction was not permanent the party injured has no claim to compensation. The reasoning of Lord Westbury in that case is in favour of the claimants. If the (1) Law Rep. 2 H. L. 175. 1869 v. METRO POLITAN BOARD OF WORKS. premises are damnously affected so that the person living there suffers a loss, they are injuriously affected within the meaning of THE QUEEN the statute. Here the claimants' trade has suffered, and were it not for the statute they could have maintained an action. Upon that point the authorities are clear. Where a highway is obstructed, and a person using it suffers a pecuniary loss, Rose v. Miles (1), Greasly v. Codling (2), shew that an action will lie. It has also been decided that damage of an indirect nature entitles the person suffering it to compensation; so that if a road was lowered, as in Reg. v. Eastern Counties Railway (3), or if there is a deviation, as in Chamberlain v. West End of London and Crystal Palace Railway Company (4), or a narrowing of the road, as in Beckett v. Midland Railway Company (5), in all these cases the party injured would be entitled to compensation. There is no difference between narrowing or altering a road and the obstructions by which the claimants are injured.; Parry, Serjt., and Philbrick, in support of the rule. The claimants' land is not, nor is any interest therein, injuriously affected within the meaning of s. 68. If before this enactment a claimant could not have supported an action, he cannot since its passing be entitled to compensation; and, moreover, it does not follow that in every case where a claimant could have brought an action he can have compensation; he can only have compensation where he could have brought his action for an injury to land, and not for a mere injury to a personal benefit. The claimants suffer an inconvenience with the rest of the public. If they are entitled to compensation, every body is entitled to compensation. Winterbottom v. Lord Derby (6) is an express authority that the claimants could not have brought an action, and Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway Company (7) that they are not entitled to compensation. MELLOR, J. I think we are bound to give our judgment for the defendants on the authority of Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway Company. (7) Although the decision in that case was given on a particular state of facts, we must be guided by the reasons on which (1) 4 M. & S. 101. (2) 2 Bing. 263. (3) 2 Q. B. 347. (4) 2 B. & S. 605; 32 L. J. (Q.B.) 173. (5) Law Rep. 3 C. P. 82. (6) Law Rep. 2 Ex. 316. (7) Law Rep. 2 H. L. 175. |