1869 FARRER V. CLOSE. June 4. therefore, I think that the determination of the magistrates should be reversed. The Court being equally divided, Attorneys for appellant: Shaen & Roscoe. EVANS v. BIGNOLD. Appeal dismissed. (1) Insurance Policy on Life-Omission of name of Person Interested—14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2. The plaintiff's wife being entitled under a will to 2007. on attaining her majority, the trustees of the will agreed to advance the 2007. to the plaintiff on his obtaining a surety for the repayment in the event of the wife dying under twentyone. A person became surety on condition that an insurance was effected on the life of the wife. The 2007. was advanced, and an insurance effected by the plaintiff in the name of the wife on her own life : Held, that, as the plaintiff was primarily interested in the policy, it was illegal and void by force of 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, which renders it unlawful to make a policy without inserting the names of the persons interested therein. DECLARATION, by William Evans as administrator of Mary Ann Evans, on a policy of insurance for 2007. effected with the Norwich Union Life Insurance Society (of which the defendant was the public officer) by Mary Ann Evans on her own life. Plea, that the policy was, in truth and in fact, made by the plaintiff in the name and on the pretended behalf of Mary Ann Evans, but for the use, benefit, and on the account and behalf of the plaintiff, and not for the use, benefit, or on account of Mary (1) By 32 & 33 Vict. c. 61: "An Act to protect the funds of Trades Unions from embezzlement and misappropriation," s. 1: "An association of persons having rules, agreements, or practices among themselves as to the terms on which they or any of them will or will not consent to employ or to be employed, shall not, by reason only that any of such rules, agreements, or practices may operate in restraint of trade, or that such association is partly for objects other than the objects mentioned in the Friendly Societies Acts, be deemed for the purposes of s. 24 of the Friendly Societies Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 63), for the punishment of frauds and impositions, to be a society established for a purpose which is illegal, or not to be a friendly society within the meaning of s. 44 of the said Act." By s. 2 the Act is not to continue in force after the 31st of August, 1870. Ann Evans, and that the name of the plaintiff was not inserted in the policy or the name of the person interested therein, or for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy was made; and the policy was and is an unlawful policy under and pursuant to the provisions of 14 Geo. 3, c. 48. (1) Issue having been joined on this plea, a case was stated by consent. Mary Ann Evans was married to the plaintiff during her minority; she was entitled under the will of her father to 2277. and upwards, upon her attaining the age of twenty-one years. During her minority the plaintiff was in want of 2007., and applied to the trustees of the will to advance that sum to him in part payment of his wife's legacy, which the trustees agreed to do upon having the repayment of the money secured by a Mr. Jacobs, in the event of Mrs. Evans dying before attaining her majority. Mr. Jacobs having consented to become security for the repayment of the money on condition of an insurance being effected on the life of Mrs. Evans, the 2007. was advanced by the trustees to the plaintiff, and a policy of insurance for 2007. was, on the 2nd of November, 1863, at the request of Mr. Jacobs, effected by the plaintiff with the defendant's office in the name of his wife. The policy merely recited that "Mary Ann Evans, No. 44, South William Street, Cardiff, wife of William Evans, hath agreed to effect an insurance upon her own life with the Norwich Union Life Insurance Society for the sum of 2007.," &c. Mary Ann Evans attained her age of twenty-one years on the 28th of November, 1864, and died on the 15th of March, 1865, the premiums having been duly paid; but the society refused to pay the sum insured upon the grounds stated in the plea. The Court were to have the power of drawing inferences of fact as a jury might: the question being whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover in the present action. Pinder, for the plaintiff. The plaintiff sues as the adminis (1) 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2: "It shall not be lawful to make any policy or policies on the life or lives of any person or persons, or other event or events, without inserting in such policy or policies the person or persons' name or 1869 EVANS v. BIGNOLD. 1869 EVANS บ. BIGNOLD. trator of his wife. There is no difficulty in a married woman contracting in a matter in which she is interested if the husband allows it, and she can join in the action: Dalton v. Midland Railway Company (1); and the chose in action will survive to the wife: Fleet v. Perrins (2); the plaintiff, therefore, rightly sues as administrator of his wife. [COCKBURN, C.J. The objection to the policy raised by the plea and upon the facts is, that the husband was the person who was interested and who effected the insurance.] The wife had an insurable interest in her own life: Wainwright v. Bland. (3) [COCKBURN, C.J. Conceding that, the insurance was, at any rate, primarily for the benefit of the husband.] In Halford v. Kymer (4) Bailey, J., says: "If a father, wishing to give his son property to dispose of, makes an insurance on his son's life in his son's name, not for the father's own benefit, but for the benefit of his son, there is no law to prevent his doing so." In Shilling v. Accidental Death Insurance Company (5), Martin and Bramwell, BB., were of opinion that a father might insure his own life in his own name for the benefit of his son with the money of the son. H. T. Cole, Q.C. (with him Raymond), for the defendant, cited Hodson v. Observer Life Assurance Society (6), and was then stopped by the Court. COCKBURN, C.J. The case is too clear to require further argument. I will take it in favour of the plaintiff, that the object of the policy, looking at the circumstances stated, was bonâ fide for the ultimate benefit of the wife: that is, that the policy was to operate for the present for the protection of the person who had become surety on an advance of money to the husband, but that after it should have satisfied this original purpose, on the wife's attaining her majority and the money being repaid on the receipt by her of the legacy, it should operate for the benefit of the wife herself. (1) 13 C. B. 474; 22 L. J. (C.P.) 177. (2) Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 536; in Ex. Ch. ante p. 500. (3) 1 Moo. & Rob. 481. (4) 10 B. & C. at p. 729. (5) 2 H. & N. 42; 26 L. J. (Ex.) 266. (6) 8 E. & B. 40; 26 L. J. (Q.B.) 303. But then it seems to me to be perfectly clear, if one person has a present interest in the policy, though after that present purpose is satisfied another person may be the party interested, that according to the words and spirit of the statute, the name of the person having the present interest as well as the person ultimately interested must be inserted. Here, the wife's name is the only name inserted, and, although she is to have the ultimate benefit of the policy after the previous purpose had been satisfied, yet, assuming that, the husband was primarily interested and his name ought therefore to have been inserted. Consequently, the policy was unlawful under the statute and void, and there must be judgment for the defendant. MELLOR, J. I have come to the same conclusion, though with great reluctance. The objection to the policy is, that it is made by the husband for the immediate benefit of the husband, but in the name of the wife only, for it recites that the wife has agreed to effect an insurance on her own life. Now, whatever might have been the ultimate object of this insurance, the husband was immediately interested in it, and s. 2 requires that the names of all the persons interested should be inserted in the policy, otherwise the policy is unlawful. LUSH, J. I am of the same opinion. No doubt the law as to life insurance sometimes operates harshly; but no one can say that the law is not based on the soundest principles. Very great crimes may and have been committed, owing to the facilities offered by life insurance. And it was accordingly thought desirable that no person should be at liberty by the contract of insurance to acquire clandestinely an interest in a policy on the life of another. And in order to effect that object it was enacted by s. 2 of 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, that it should not be lawful to make a policy on the life of any person without inserting in it the names of all the persons interested. The only question is whether the names of all the persons interested have been inserted in the present policy. The plea alleges, that the policy was, in fact, made by the plaintiff in the name of his wife for the use of himself. Do the facts prove that? They do, most conclusively. It appears that the wife being a minor, was entitled to between 2007. and 3007., under the will of 1869 EVANS v. BIGNOLD. 1869 EVANS v. BIGNOLD. July 3. her father on attaining twenty-one; the husband being in want of 2007. applied to the trustees under the will, and they agreed to advance the 2007., on the condition that a third person would guarantee the repayment in the event of the wife dying under twenty-one, and he made it a condition of his giving the guarantee that an insurance should be effected on the life of the wife. The policy was accordingly effected by the husband to protect himself and the surety, so as to enable them to repay the trustees the advance in the event of the wife dying under twenty-one; but in the policy there is no mention made of anybody but the wife, the husband's name being only mentioned as the husband of the person effecting the insurance on her own life. This policy was therefore unlawful within s. 2. It may be, the husband had in view continuing the policy for the benefit of the wife; but that does not render the policy lawful within s. 2, as it is clear that it was effected primarily for the husband's benefit, and the section requires the names of all persons interested to be inserted. HAYES, J., concurred. Judgment for the defendant. Attorney for plaintiff: J. A. Sharp. Attorney for defendant: C. Blake, for E. Field, Norwich. SIMPSON v. YEEND. "Bribery"-Parliamentary Election-Municipal Election-17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 2-22 Vict. c. 35, s. 12. By 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 2, and 22 Vict. c. 35, s. 12, every person shall be deemed guilty of "bribery," who shall . . . offer, promise, or promise to procure, or to endeavour to procure, any money or valuable consideration to or for any voter ... to induce him to vote. . . at any parliamentary or municipal election. The defendant, soliciting the vote of a voter, said "he should be remunerated for any loss of time:"— Held, that this was an offer or promise within the sections. APPEAL from the county court of Staffordshire, holden at Lichfield. The facts of the case are given at length in the judgment. June 4. Gray, Q.C. (R. Henn Collins with him), for the plaintiff, contended that the promise of the defendant was clearly a |