will be presumed after the date of a divorce or of a decree for judicial separation, or of an order authorizing non-cohabitation under s. 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 19) (n). Neither husband or wife can give evidence of non-access for the purpose of bastardising a child (0). If a bond be given by a man to a woman with whom he is cohabiting at the time, there is no presumption that it is given in consideration of future cohabitation (p). The law presumes that every person intends the probable consequences of his acts. Thus, in homicide, when the death is proved, malice is presumed; and it is for the prisoner to prove the extenuating circumstances which may reduce the act from murder to manslaughter, or to justifiable or excusable homicide (g); and where the death of another person is caused by a wanton act of the prisoner, he is guilty of murder, as if he purposely drove a carriage furiously amongst a number of people, or discharged a loaded gun in the middle of a crowd (). So a person carrying a child suffering from an (n) Hetherington v. Hetherington, L. R., 12 P. D. 112; 56 L. J., P. 78; 57 L. T. 533; 36 W. R. 12. (0) See as to evidence of non-access, post, ch. vii. rule 4. (p) Vallance v. Blagden, L. R., 26 Ch. D. 353; 32 W. R. 918. (9) Per Lord Ellenborough, R. v. Dixon, 3 M. & S. 15. (r) 1 Hale, P. C. 475. infectious disease along a public highway, so as to endanger the health of passengers, was held to be guilty of a misdemeanour, without proof of an intent that any person should catch the disease (s); and, again, where a person had published a pamphlet with an indecent tendency, it was held to be no defence that he had done so with the bonâ fide purpose of exposing the errors of the Romish Church (t). Where a debtor knew that his departure from England would have the natural and necessary effect of defeating and delaying his creditors, he was held to have departed with that intent, and to have committed an act of bankruptcy (u). In an action for libel, it was held that a judge was wrong in leaving it to a jury to say whether the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff, inasmuch as if the tendency of the libel was injurious to the plaintiff, the defendant must be taken to have intended the consequence of his own act (x). Omnia præsumuntur ritè esse acta. This maxim is an expression in a short form of a reasonable probability, and of the propriety in point of law of acting on such probability. The maxim (8) R. v. Fantandillo, 4 M. & S. 73. (t) R. v. Hicklin, L. R., 3 Q. B. 360; 37 L. J., M. C. 89; 16 W. R. 801. (u) Ex parte Goater, 22 W. R 935. (1) Haire v. Wilson, 9 B. & C. 643; see also Fisher v. Clement, 10 B. & C. 472. expresses an inference which may reasonably be drawn when an intention to do some formal act is established; when the evidence is consistent with that intention having been carried into effect in a proper way; but when the actual observation of all due formalities can only be inferred as a matter of probability. The maxim is not wanted where such observance is proved, nor has it any place where such observance is disproved. The maxim only comes into question where there is no proof one way or the other; but where it is more probable that what was intended to be done was done, as it ought to have been done, to render it valid; rather than that it was done in some other manner which would defeat the intention proved to exist, and would render what is proved to have been done of no effect (y). It is a general presumption of law that a person acting in a public capacity is duly authorized so to do, and there is a similar presumption that a public officer acting in execution of a public trust will do his duty (); and therefore it is presumed that all who act as justices of the peace, or as constables, have been duly appointed (a). On an indictment for having committed perjury before a surrogate of the Ecclesiastical Court, proof that the person who administered the oath acted as surrogate has been held sufficient primâ facie evidence that he had been duly appointed, (y) Per Lindley, L. J., in Harris v. Knight, L. R., 15 P. D. 179. () Per Lord Ellenborough, R. v. Verelst, 3 Camp. 433; and per Blackburn, J., Waddington v. Roberts, L. R., 3 Q. B. 579; 37 L. J., Q. B. 256; 16 W. R. 1040. (a) Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366. and had authority to administer the oath (b). This presumption has been adopted by the legislature in the case of excise (c) and custom-house officers (d). The rule does not apply to private appointments, such as tithe-collectors, or a town-clerk (e), for in these cases the appointments must be proved. A private document, such as a deed, bill of exchange, or promissory note, is presumed to have been written at the time when it bears date (f), and this extends even to letters (g). Where indentures of a pauper's apprenticeship would have been invalid, if not executed in conformity with the rules of the Poor Law Commissioners, and there was no evidence to show that their regulations had been observed, it was held that, in the absence of contradictory evidence, it must be presumed that the regulations had been observed (h). So, generally, the orders of justices will be presumed to have been made according to all statutory formalities (i). Thus, when to prove a parish apprenticeship secondary evidence of a lost indenture was admitted, it was presumed that the indenture had been executed according to all the requisites of 56 Geo. 3, 139, because there was evidence that an arrange (b) R. v. Verelst, 4 Camp. 432. (e) R. v. Mayor of Stamford, 6 Q. B. 433. (f) Malpas v. Clements, 19 L. J., Q. B. 435. (g) Goodtitle v. Milburn, 2 M. & W. 853; Hunt v. Massey, 5 B. & Ad. 992. (h) R. v. St. Mary Magdalen, 2 E. & B. 809. (i) Williams v. Eyton, 4 H. & N. 357. ment for the apprenticeship had been made before magistrates, and that an apprenticeship had subsequently existed (7); but it seems that it would be otherwise where there is no such evidence (). The rule in similar cases has been extended to the principle that that may be presumed which accounts reasonably for an existing state of things; and therefore the fact that a person served an apprenticeship raises a presumption that he was duly bound an apprentice, so as, the indenture having been sought for in vain, to create a settlement by apprenticeship (m). The fact of a marriage having taken place before a registrar in a chapel raises the presumption that the chapel was properly registered, and the marriage legal (n); and, in support of a plea of coverture, a certificate of the defendant's marriage in a Roman Catholic Chapel according to the rites of that Church, with evidence of subsequent cohabitation, was held to be primâ facie proof of a valid marriage under 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, the same presumption arising as in the previous case (o). In short, wherever a marriage has been solemnized, the law strongly presumes that all legal requisites have been complied with (p); and the fact of the ceremony of marriage having been performed by a clergyman in a place where Divine Service (k) R. v. Broadhempston, 1 E. & B. 104. (0) Sichel v. Lambert, 15 C. B., N. S. 781. Cf. De Thoren v. Attorney-General, L. R., 1 App. Cas. 686. (p) Smith v. Huson, 1 Phill. 294. |