lized its effect by reserving to himself the choice of half the candidates. Under the Empire the predominant power of the Princeps left no room for ambitio, except in the narrow sphere of elections to municipal offices. The most remarkable enactment of this kind under Augustus was directed not against electoral corruption, but against the bribing of jurymen-a far more criminal misuse of money, but one which attracted very little attention under the Republic. A well-known bon mot of Cicero, one of his best, alludes to this species of tampering in a very light tone. Clodius had been acquitted on a charge of violating the rites of the Bona Dea, when Cicero gave evidence against the alibi which he set up. 'The jury,' sneered Clodius, 'did not give you credit on your oath.' 'Yes,' retorted Cicero, Twenty-five out of the fifty-six did; the remaining thirty-one refused you credit, for they took their bribe in advance.'

6

6

One is naturally surprised to find such copious legislation on electoral corruption in Rome; the more so when we remember that the ancient republics in the extreme scantiness of their legislation, offer a singular contrast to modern governments. The remarkable phenomenon is not the prevalence of bribery in Rome, but the apparent strenuousness of the effort to put it down. Like Sunday Closing Acts in the present day, these Bills about bribery were proposed and passed as a sort of homage to virtue, though recognized as utterly ineffectual even by their proposers, who indeed were frequently the first to violate them. Surely not even an Abderite, if he had lived a year in Rome, could fail to see.that it mattered not two rows of pins,' or, as a Roman would say, 'a pomegranate's core' (ciccus), to the electorate whether Cæcilius or Cornelius was made consul. Corruption is the administration of a gift or a reward intended to serve as a motive in the performance of functions for which the proper motive is a conscientious sense of duty. In popular governments, resting on a very wide suffrage exercised by a very unenlightened electorate, there are broadly only two forces, beside bribes,* which can be supposed to constitute a motive for voting this way rather than that. is a sense of Imperialism, which in itself implies considerable political education, and which we have seen the Roman conspicuously lacked. The other is party spirit, and neither did this exist in the seventh century of the city.

One

'Only party phrases,' writes Mommsen, were in free circulation;

*Other forces, such as economic delusions, religious fanaticism, &c., have operated and are still operating. But they have not been general or widespread. They have usually been set in motion and kept in activity by despots or demagogues to further their own ends. Rom. Hist.' iii. p. 74, Eng. trans.

of the parties themselves there was little trace in matters really and directly practical. Throughout the whole seventh century the annual public elections to the civil magistracies, especially to the consulship and censorship, formed the real standing question of the day, and the focus of political agitation; but it was only in isolated and rare instances that the different candidates represented opposite political principles; ordinarily the question related purely to persons, and it was for the course of affairs a matter of indifference whether the majority of the votes fell to a Cæcilian or a Cornelian. The Romans thus lacked that which outweighs and compensates all the evils of party life-the free and common movement of the masses towards what they discern as a befitting aim-and yet endured all those evils, solely for the benefit of the paltry game of the ruling coteries.'

Where there is no general or enthusiastic sense of Imperialism and no keen party rivalry, there is no soil in which a conscientious sense of duty may grow up. It is not easy to see why it should be more immoral in the illiterate and unintelligent voter to give his vote for payment, than to give it at the bidding of some caucus, or league, or newspaper, or individual, whether that individual be a small local wire-puller or a great party leader. Indeed, the extreme democrat who speaks of universal suffrage as a right goes far towards denying the moral culpability of the corrupt voter. A man has no right to make money out of that which is his only as a trust, but surely, it might be urged, a man has a right to dispose of that which is his own—of his vote, as well as of the labour of his hands or of his brain.

The ancient Greek republics were saved from the influence of direct electoral corruption by various circumstances in their history. The two forces to which we have just referred, Imperialism and Party Spirit, were largely developed in Greece. Nicias knew that he could count on the spirit of Imperialism in the Athenian citizen when, to encourage his soldiers in dire straits in the harbour of Syracuse, he reminded them of tò péya ὄνομα τῶν ̓Αθηνῶν—pathetic words in the mouth of the old general so sick and weak in body; but so strong and stout of heart. The democracy of Athens-if indeed it can be correctly called a democracy-had a political education far superior to the Roman, or to the rank or file under modern popular governments; and her citizens developed a sense of duty to Athens which made them cling not only to a heavenborn Pericles, but to an honest plodding Nicias, whose only merit was his firm hold of that feeling which the Olympian ' inculcated so eloquently-he was an parts of Athens, ἐραστής 'enamoured' of the stately personality of his country.

When no larger feeling swayed the Greek populace, Party Spirit (pica) had its full effect. Aristotle tells us that in a certain Arcadian state sortition superseded election, because the electors invariably chose their own partizans (Tods èpi@evoμécovs), instead of the person most eminent in public affairs. Solon recognized the value of Party Spirit, when he punished the citizen who on the outbreak of any sedition or attempt at revolution should stand aloof and take part with neither side. Aristotle records the terms of an outspoken oligarchical oath taken on assuming office, And I will be malignant against the People, and will devise against them whatsoever evil I can.' This catechism of one's duty to his party remained without a parallel till President Andrew Jackson proclaimed the doctrine, To the victors the spoils.' But other influences rendered electoral corruption, impossible in Greece. In many states the most important offices were made to depend on lot; sometimes on methods of appointment not more rational, but equally adverse to bribery. This is the account which Plutarch gives us of the mode of electing the Elders in Lacedæmon; and it is probable that the same system was employed in choosing far more important officers, the Ephors. It is justly characterized by Aristotle § as 'quite too childish'

'When the assembly had met, certain persons selected for the purpose were shut up in a building near at hand, so that they could not see or be seen, but could only hear the shouting of the assembly. For, as with other matters, the Lacedæmonians decide between the competitors by acclamation. One by one the candidates were introduced according to an order fixed by lot, and walked without speaking through the assembly. The loudness and enthusiasm of the shout raised as each candidate entered was estimated and taken down on a tablet by the persons shut up in the adjacent building: who then returned as elected him who was received with the longest and loudest shout.'

Electoral corruption, then, was little practised in Greece, a fact which is the more impressed on us when we remember how rare is the word dezάew, the only word for 'to bribe' in Greek; and it is oftener used for tampering with juries than with electors. Aristotle does not recognize electoral corruption at all, unless such is his meaning when he says that in Carthage the most important offices, including even the throne and the command of the forces, were purchasable,' || adding the candid reflection, it is natural that a man should make money of his

* Poi. viii. (v.) 3,9. Lycurg. c. 26.

§ Pol. ii. 9, 23.

† Pol. viii. (v.) 9, II.
|| ὠνητάς, Pol. ii. II, 10.

office if he has to pay for it.' Even in this passage it is not certain that Aristotle does not mean that the fees or expenses on entering office at Carthage were purposely made very heavy, to render it inaccessible to any but the very wealthy. Ör again, it may have been possible to purchase high office in Carthage as it was possible till quite recent times to purchase commissions in the British army, and judicial positions in France. If his meaning is that office was accessible only by means of bribery,* then in this respect, as well as in the pluralism which prevailed in her government, Carthage seems to have been unique in the ancient world as known to Aristotle.

Other and worse forms of corruption were far more prevalent in Greece, the payment of persons invested with public functions to use them unjustly, and of juries to give verdicts against the evidence. The mutual recriminations of Demosthenes and Æschines bring into strong prominence the untrustworthiness of public functionaries, and this is illustrated still more clearly by the history of Sparta. When Pausanias, after the battle of Platæa, called on Thebes to surrender her Medizing leaders, the latter voluntarily gave themselves up in the expectation that they would be tried, and their acquittal would be procured by their powerful friends.† Pausanias shared their anticipation, and accordingly put the prisoners to death at once without any trial. It is a singular coincidence that this same Pausanias, only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta in hopes of buying off his punishment. Leotychides, Pleistoanax, Astyochus, Cleandridas, and Gylippus, all took bribes. And Thucydides § tells us that the' trierarch and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet (all except Hermocrates) took money from Tissaphernes to betray the interests of their country. Themistocles took and administered bribes, but it was to save, not to betray his country. If ever dishonour stood rooted in honour, it was when Themistocles took a bribe from Euboea to pay it to Adimantus, when he laid at the feet of Hellas not only his genius but his probity. Other Greeks, from Leonidas to Amompharetus, were ready to lay down their lives for their country. To impede the trampling hosts of barbarism, Themistocles threw down his honour in their path.

Aristotle ¶ observes that the Ephoralty in Sparta was corrupt : 'The Ephors are chosen from the whole body of the people, so

* Such appears to be the opinion of Polybius, vi. 56, 4, πapà μèv Kapyydoviois σῶρα ψανερῶς διδόντες λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἀρχάς.

§ viii. 45. ¶ Pol. ii. 9, 19.

the office often falls into the hands of very needy persons, who accordingly have shown themselves corrupt.' He then quotes a recent case' in which the Ephors, being bribed, did their best to ruin the State. Hence, as he calls the Ephoralty the keystone of the whole constitution,' * we may infer that Sparta was largely infected with the lower form of corruption. On this subject Aristotle † makes a remark, which shows how little electoral corruption prevailed in Greece. He condemns canvassing he condemns even the candidate's application for office. 'The man,' he says, 'who is fit for the place should have it, whether he wants it or not. No one would apply for office if he were not ambitious and ambition and covetousness are the most common motives to crime.'

Hence perhaps the dyslogistic connotation of ambition' in Shakspeare and the writers of his time. It has often been remarked how largely the philosophy of Aristotle-which in the hands of the Schoolmen was for centuries the only study of Europe, and which has thus usurped by far the largest share of the attention of civilization from the time of Aristotle to the present day--has impressed its mark on all the languages which have a Latin basis. To it and to it alone we owe such common words as 'actually,' 'habit,' 'category,' 'predicament,' ' energy,' 'motive,' 'maxim,' 'principle,' and many others. The pedlar who recommends the quality of his wares and offers a reduction on taking a quantity, little thinks he is using words which but for the philosophy of Aristotle would never have found their way into his language.

The kinds of corruption which Aristotle apprehends are the embezzling of public moneys and the dishonest discharge of public functions. To meet the former abuse he proposes that transfers of public money should be made in presence of all the citizens, and duplicates of the accounts deposited with certain bodies; and to counteract the latter, that there should be certain distinctions ordained by law for those who have a good name for probity.' An English judge would look on a reward given for incorruptibility as an insult to the morale of the Bench;

* συνέχει γὰρ τὴν πογιτείαν τὸ ἀρχεῖον τοῦτι. † Pol. ii. 9, 27.

Pol. ii. 9, 21.

These, too, are the forms of malversation which are the target of the comic poet's scorn. 'How eagerly,' exclaims Trygæus (Aristoph. Pac. 908) does the Prytanis admit Theoria! You would not have been so ready to do it gratis, Sir Prytanis; if you had received nothing, it would have been no reception day!' So Cleon, when at school, could only learn tǹy Awport on the lyre (Eq. 889), 'all his knowledge was tips; and in the same play his cry the beggar's, 'For the Lord's sake,' (Eq. 1083).

§ Pol. viii (v.) 8, 19.