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lofs is not to be imputed to himself but he who rejects the dictates of reafon and confcience, voluntarily deprives himfelf of their aid. The lofs originates in his own folly.

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Her. Ah! fo much the more is he to be pitied! A furious maniac, who fhould pluck out his own eyes, would deferve more compaffion than an ordinary blind man. Dem. Come, let us accommodate the business. fomething to be faid on each fide of the queftion. There is every where reason for laughing, and reafon for weeping. The world is ridiculous, and I laugh at it: it is deplorable, and thou lamenteft over it. Every perfon views it in his own way and according to his own temper. One point is unquestionable, that mankind are prepofterous; to think right, and to act well, we must think and act differently from them. To fubmit to the authority, and follow the example of the greater part of men, would render us foolish and miferable.

Her. All this is, indeed, true; but then, thou haft no real love or feeling for thy fpecies. The calamities of mankind excite thy mirth : and this proves that thou haft no regard for men, nor any true refpect for the virtues which they have unhappily abandoned. FENELON, Archbishop of Cambray.

" SECTION II.

DIONYSIUS, PYTHIAS, AND DAMON.

Genuine virtue commands respect, even from the bad. Dionysius. AMAZING! What do I fee? It is Pythias just arrived. It is indeed Pythias. I did not think it poffible. He is come to die, and redeem his friend!

Pythias. Yes it is Pythias. I left the place of my confinement, with no other views, than to pay to Heaven the vows I had made; to fettle my family concerns according to the rules of juftice; and to bid adieu to my children, that I might die tranquil and satisfied.

Dio. But why doft thou return; Haft thou no fear of death? Is it not the character of a madman, to seek it thus voluntarily ?

Py. I return to fuffer, though I have not deferved death. Every principle of honour and goodness, forbids me to allow my friend to die for me.

Dio. Doft thou, then, love him better than thyfelf?

Py. No; I love him as myself. But I am perfuaded that I ought to fuffer death, rather than my friend; fince it was me whom thou hadst decreed to die.. It were not just that he fhould fuffer, to deliver me from the death which was defigned, not for him, but for me only.

Dio. But thou supposest, that it is as unjust to inflict death upon thee, as upon thy friend.

Py. Very true; we are both entirely innocent; and it is equally unjust to make either of us fuffer.

Dio. Why doft thou then affert, that it were injustice to put him to death, instead of thee?

Py. It is unjust, in the fame degree, to inflict death, either on Damen or on myfelf; but Pythias were highly culpable to let Damon fuffer that death, which the tyrant had prepared for Pythias only.

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Dio. Doft thou then return hither, on the day appointed with no other view, than to fave the life of a friend, by lofing thy own ?

Py. I return, in regard to thee, to fuffer an act of injustice which is common for tyrants to inflict; and, with refpect to Damon, to perform my duty, by refcuing him from the danger he incurred by his generofity to me.

Dio. And now, Damon, let me addrefs myfelf to thee. Didft thou not really fear, that Pythias would never return; and that thou wouldst be put to death on his account?

Da. I was but too well affured, that Pythias would punctually return; and that he would be more folicitous to keep his promife, than to preferve his life. Would to heaven, that his relations and friends had forcibly detained him! He would then have lived for the comfort and benefit of good men; and I should have the fatisfaction of dying for him! Dio. What! Does life difpleafe thee?

Da. Yes; it difpleafes me when I fee and feel the power of a tyrant.

Dio. It is well! Thou fhalt fee him no more. der thee to be put to death immediately.

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Py. Pardon the feelings of a man who fympathizes with his dying friend. But remember it was Pythias who was devoted by thee to deftruction. I come to fubmit to it, that I

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may redeem my friend. Do not refufe me this confolation in my last hour.

Dio. I cannot endure men, who defpife death, and fet my power at defiance.

Da. Thou canst not, then, endure virtue.

Dio. No: I cannot endure that proud, difdainful virtue, which contemns life; which dreads no punishment; and which is infenfible to the charms of riches and pleasure.

Da. Thou feeft, however, that it is a virtue, which is not infenfible to the dictate of honour, juftice, and friendship. Dio. Guards, take Pythias to execution. We fhall fee whether Damon will continue to defpife my authority.

Da. Pythias, by returning to fubmit himself to thy pleafure, has merited his life, and deserved thy favour; but I have excited thy indignation, by refigning myself to thy power, in order to fave him; be fatisfied, then, with this facrifice, and put me to death.

Py. Hold, Dionyfius! remember, it was Pythias, alone who offended thee: Damon could not.

Dio. Alas! what do I fee and hear! where am I? How miserable; and how worthy to be fo! I have hitherto known nothing of true virtue. I have spent my life in darknefs and error. All my power and honours are infufficient to produce love. I cannot boaft of having acquired a fingle friend, in the courfe of a reign of thirty years. And yet thefe two perfons in a private condition, love one another tenderly, unrefervedly confide in each other, are mutually happy, and ready to die for each other's prefervation.

Py. How couldst thou, who haft never loved any perfon, expect to have friends? If thou hadst loved and respected men, thou wouldst have fecured their love and refpect. Thou haft feared mankind; and they fear thee; they deteft thee.

Dio. Damon, Pythias, condefcend to admit me as a third friend, in a connection fo perfect. I give you your lives; and I will load you with riches.

Da. We have no defire to be enriched by thee; and, in regard to thy friendship, we cannot accept or enjoy it till thou became good and juft. Without thefe qualities, thou canft be connected with none but trembling flaves, and base flatterers. To be loved and esteemed by men of free and gen

erous minds, thou must be virtuous; affectionate, difinteres ted, beneficent; and know how to live in a fort of equality with those who fhare and deferve thy friendship.

FENELON, Archbishop of Cambray.

SECTION III.

LOCKE AND BAY L E.

Christianity defended against the cavils of Scepticism. Bayle. YES, we both were philofophers; but my philofophy was the deepeft. You dogmatized: I doubted.

Locke. Do you make doubting a proof of depth in philofophy? It may be a good beginning of it; but it is a bad end. Bay. No the more profound our fearches are into the nature of things, the more uncertainty we fhall find; and the moft fubtile minds fee objections and difficulties in every system, which are overlooked or undiscoverable by ordinary understandings.

Locke. It would be better then to be no philofopher, and to continue in the vulgar herd of mankind, that one may have the convenience of thinking that one knows fomething. I find that the eyes which nature has given me, fee many things very clearly, though fome are out of their reach, or difcerned but dimly. What opinion ought I to have of a phyfician, who fhould offer me an eyewater, the use of which would at first so sharpen my fight, as to carry it farther than ordinary vifion; but would in the end put them out? Your philofophy is to the eyes of the mind, what I have.fupposed the doctor's roftrum to be to thofe of the body. It actually brought your own excellent understanding,which was by nature quickfighted, and rendered more fo by art and a fubtility of logic peculiar to yourfelf; it brought, I fay, your very acute understanding to fee nothing clearly; and envelope all the great truths of reafon and religion in mifts of doubt.

Bay. I own it did; but your comparison is not just. I did not fee well, before I used my philofophic eyewater; I only fuppofed I faw well; but I was in an error, with all the reft of mankind. The blindness was real, the perceptions were imaginary I cured myself firft of those false imaginations, and then I laudably endeavoured to cure other men.

Locke. A great cure indeed! and don't you think that, in return for the fervice you did them, they ought to erect you a ftatue ?

Bay. Yes; it is good for human nature to know its own weakness. When we arrogantly prefume on a ftrength we have not, we are always in great danger of hurting ourselves, or at least of deferving ridicule and contempt, by vain and idle efforts.

Locke. I agree with you, that human nature should know its own weaknefs; but it fhould alfo feel its ftrength, and try to improve it. This was my employment as a philofopher. I endeavoured to discover the real powers of the mind, to fee what it could do, and what it could not; to reftrain it from efforts beyond its ability; but to teach it how to advance. as far as the faculties given to it by nature, with the utmost exertion and most proper culture of them, would allow it to go. In the vast ocean of philofophy, I had the line and the plummet always in my hands. Many of its depths I found myself unable to fathom; but, by caution in founding, and the careful obfervations I made in the courfe of my voyage, I found out fome truths of fo much ufe to mankind, that they acknowledge me to have been their benefactor.

Bay. Their ignorance makes them think fo. Some other philofopher will come hereafter, and fhow thofe truths to be falfehoods. He will pretend to difcover other truths of equal importance. A later fage will arife, perhaps among men now barbarous and unlearned, whofe fagacious discoveries will difcredit the opinions of his admired predeceffor. In philofophy, as in nature, all changes its form, and one thing exifts by the deftruction of another.

Locke. Opinions taken up without a patient investigation, depending on terms not accurately defined, and principles begged without proof, like theories to explain the phænomena of nature, built on fuppofitions inftead of experiments, muft perpetually change and deftroy one another. But fome opinions there are, even in matters not obvious to the common fenfe of mankind, which the mind has received on such rational grounds of affent, that they are as immoveable as the pillars of heaven; or (to fpeak philofophically) as the great laws of Nature, by which, under God, the univerfe is fuf

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