by the British Parliament itself, and control of the exercise by Canada of the power so granted her is vested, not in the Courts, but in the British Government through the reserved right of veto, and in the British Parliament through the exercise of its supreme authority.

That therefore no Court should take upon itself to declare that any provincial enactment is beyond. the power of the legislature that passed it, unless it is also prepared to say that the right to legislate on the subject-matter has been surrendered to the Dominion, or is in conflict with some statute of the British Parliament; and similarly with any Dominion enactment.

That any and every attempt by the Courts to set limits to Canada's power to legislate through its Parliament or legislatures, save on the ground of repugnancy to some British statute, should be protested against and resisted to the utmost.

If the result be that the claim of full self-government is recognized by the Courts, the end desired will be attained; if the claim be denied the way will be clear to demand a change in the Act. But to reiterate on the platform and in the press that the right is possessed, and at the same time, without protest, to permit the Courts to restrict its exercise, is to check progress, and may mean retrogression.

A FALCONER.

THE GROTIUS LEGEND.

"If a book which is meant for contemporaries and deals with present day affairs, opens with a historical disquisition carrying us back a couple of centuries, the reader is apt to be suspicious." Thus begins "The Three Steps in the Evolution of the Law of Nations,"" by Prof. C. Van Vollenhoven, of the University of Leyden. There is also another sort of suspicion aroused at reading the author's admiration for William Jennings Bryan and Christian De Wet-not in their respective capacities as orator and raider, where admiration would not be misplaced-but as exponents of International Law. Nevertheless the Professor's essay is well worth reading.

His first stage-the hobbledehoy period-runs from 1570 to 1770. "One may as well look for snow in the dog-days, as for endeavour to promote international order in the Law of Nations during the 16th and 17th centuries. And hardly anyone requires it, for that matter. Most princes and governments-they may be called Maurice of Orange, or the Great Elector, Cromwell, or Charles the Twelfth-have but one object: to secure paramount power for their country, to make and keep their country so strong as to be safe from the attacks of others. If they succeed in this, either alone or allied with other powers, they become, indeed, for the greater part, a danger for the weaker nations at once; but the Law of Nations is not concerned with that. Hence it is possible for a sprightly-minded author like Hübner to write as late as 1759, that the Law of Nations of his day consists for seven-eighths of rules concerning ceremonial; it is for this reason that this Law of Nations offered no remedy at all, when Louis the Fourteenth in years of absolute peace impresses foreign merchantmen with crew and all, for trading in the service of France, without any compen

1 The Hague, Martinus Nyhoff: The Carswell Co., Ltd., 75c.

sation; and hence it is that all this Law of Nations in practice amounts to nothing but the right of the strongest-people going to war for every trifle. The politician knows that and is resigned. The states of the period have to learn the art of living side by side, and mutually to adapt themselves; it is all they can do as yet. Modern Law of Nations presupposes fixed boundaries, but at that time boundaries were for ever changing; towns like Bois-le-duc and Maestricht, the strip of land between Flanders and France, the country of Lorraine, clearly prove this." "And yet, however curious it may seem, this first stage has never provoked any resentment. Why not? Because it never pretended to greater excellence than it possessed, because people knew what it was worth. It was unlovely, pitiable, characterless; but it was honest." Where does Grotius come in?

"Grotius was the envoy of Sweden at Paris (16351648), when Richelieu was at the height of his power (1624-1642); he is living near or in Paris, when the Cardinal is appointed a minister. But the contrast between the two men could hardly be more flagrant. Richelieu, the brilliant representative of a noble but ambitious people at a time of unbridled international anarchy; Grotius, considering his embassy, which in practice is not much of a success, as a mission-station from which he can labour for his creed concerning the Law of Nations. The two men passed each other by; on either side they found but scanty respect for one another; and the Cardinal, no doubt, believed not a word of the book of 1625, so pompously dedicated to his royal master, if indeed, he took the trouble at all to read in it for one hour in his life.

"And yet Grotius's doctrine, according to some, was acknowledged as the law of Europe before the end of the century-before the end of the century whose policy was still completely Richelieu's!"

So that in the first stage of the Law of Nations, Grotius and Confucius were equally influential!

In our Professor's second stage from 1770 to 1914 Grotius was a name to conjure with-the conjurer in chief, Vattel, taking care to entirely misconstrue the original fetish. Grotius had a well-developed theory of crime and punishment in international relations.

"Vattel may possibly have been a good man in the opinion of his relations and domestic servants; but he gave a Judas-kiss to Grotius's system.

"Can this be proved?

"When confronted by the opposed opinions of Richelieu and Grotius, between the system of 'paramount power,' which refuses to account for its deeds and desires to go its own way; and the system which arraigns state crimes-Vattel sides wtih Richelieu; he sides with Richelieu, and calls his unbridled arbitrary dealings 'sovereignty.' With Grotius sovereignty means supreme control of a country's home affairs and a country's internal development but by no

means a license to commit a crime or some other injustice; for what remains in that case of that Law of Nations which holds the states together? According to Vattel, not anybody, whosoever, is entitled to give an opinion as to whether a state may possibly commit a crime or other injustice with the exception of the sovereign state alone."

"According to Grotius, the criminal state may be punished by the others. According to Vattel, even the country invaded, foaming at the mouth with anger, may not judge of the assaulter of its territory. 'Nous ne sommes point reçus à nous plaindre de lui, comme d'un infracteur du Droit des Gens.' How could the learned and discerning Grotius (he elsewhere observes) err so much as to ascribe even to a neutral nation a right to judge of the conduct of a sovereign state?"

After describing the efforts of Conferences at the Hague and of benevolent statesmen to reform this second Law of Nations, our Professor concludes:

"It was not to be. On Monday, August 3rd, 1914, at a quarter to seven at night, the authorities at Paris

opened the Berlin telegram, containing the declaration. of war. On Tuesday, August 4th, at breakfast, everyone knew that Vattel's Law of Nations had become bankrupt. Not the Law of Nations, not all Law of Nations, but this misshapen conglomeration of hypocrisy and cynicism, of whining about immutable duties of states, and of indulgence about every sin of which a state was guilty. What Grotius and Gladstone, the Czar and Bryan could not effect, what all the menacing episode till 1914 could not effect, was brought about by one blow in August, 1914; the scales fell from all eyes, the rottenness of Vattel's product was exhibited to all the world, the Law of Nations which had been triumphant for a century and a half was smashed to bits."

Following Grotius-as Grotius wrote-the author comes to some conclusions with regard to "neutrality" and the "open sea" that seem sound, but which we should not have expected to come from a Dutchman.

"Well then, what was an abomination to Grotius, has become an abomination to millions in belligerent and neutral countries during the present war. They say with President Wilson that neutrality in a war like the present is intolerable; with the Brazilian Barbosa they say that the present deaf-mute and frigid neutrality must yield up its place to a new sort of neutrality which feels and judges. Why? Because they deeply feel that to kindle a war (putting aside the question which side was responsible in 1914), is criminal; that it is the greatest crime which a state may perpetrate; and because they regard the war waged by the adversary as a punishment. They reproach governments which conform to the rules of neutrality of the second Law of Nations with unmanliness and the lack of insight into the new era. If they are answered that those governments have to adhere to them, because these rules are laid down in the binding treaties of 1907, they only reply that those treaties should be replaced by a new Law of Nations, the