sooner the better; by a Law of Nations which suits the conscience of present-day humanity."

"The other item is concerned with 'the open sea.' The second Law of Nations had crammed into people —and the treaties express as much-that in the customary war, waged for the sake of fighting, netural commerce may only be impeded on account of one of three reasons: on account of breach of a lawful blockade at sea; on account of transporting contraband by sea; and on account of breach of neutrality, by giving aid at sea. A 'desideratum' of the Second Peace Conference of 1907 went farther still in this direction: commercial and industrial intercourse between belligerents and neutrals-it said-should be very specially protected. Not only has all this (being a residue of treaties dating from the First Law of Nations) nothing to do with the 'open sea,' which Grotius advocated and enforced-his 'open sea' only means that a state may not claim the sea as its own, nor monopolize peaceful sea traffic-but all this is even in flat defiance of the principle of Grotius's punitory war. When in April, 1599, the Netherlands attempted to overcome Spanish militarism, whose leaders evidently will not rest 'till all have bowed their necks under the Spanish yoke,' they resolve, authorized by Barneveldt himself (the republic being only twenty years old), to blockade Spain by sea, and even by land, cutting off all trade and however angry seafaring nations may be at this, Grotius warmly applauds the measure."

The author's last words may be prophetic.

"Grotius's Law of Nations stands at the door, and it knocks. For three hundred years we have let it knock. Now it is getting too strong for us. We have not yet turned the key, but the bolts have been drawn."

Perhaps Professor! perhaps! But there are a few fellows still living that like the idea of your honest old First Stage, when they go to it à la Richelieu, and the winner takes all.

THE COUNTY JUDGES ACT, 1919.

For some time past the County and District Court Judges have been urging upon the Dominion Government the necessity of an increase in their present salaries, and it is generally understood that such an increase has been promised upon the condition that the number of Judges, and especially of Junior Judges, should be decreased. On April 28th, 1919, the Acting Minister of Justice, in reply to an inquiry in the House by a member from another province, made the following statement: "There are several vacant County Court judgeships, inclusive of the one referred to by the hon. member, but this Government having suggested to the various Provincial Governments that they should take into consideration the reduction of the County Court judiciary in each province, by amalgamation or otherwise, I have not thought well to recommend to council the filling of the present vacancies."

It was presumably in view of this suggestion from the Justice Department, that the above mentioned Act was introduced at the last session of the Ontario Legislature. This Act received its third reading on April 15th, and was assented to on April 24th, but, by section 6, it shall not come into force until a day to be proclaimed by the Lieutenant-Governor.

Under the present section 5 of "The County Judges Act," R. S. O. 1914, chapter 58, provision was made for the appointment of a Junior Judge in every county or district, the population of which exceeds 80,000, and also in every county in which a city is situated, and in several other counties and districts specifically named. By section 7, provision is made for the appointment of second and third Junior Judges in the County of York.

By section 2 of the new Act, section 5, above mentioned, is repealed, and the following substituted there

for: "A Junior Judge may be appointed for each of the Counties of York and Wentworth." By section 3 it is provided that the repeal of said section 5 shall not affect any appointment of a Junior Judge heretofore made. Section 7, above mentioned, is not repealed, so presumably the County of York will still be entitled to a Senior and three Junior Judges. It will also apparently be still permissible to appoint new Senior Judges in all counties now having the right to two Judges.

By section 4 of the amending Act, new sections numbered from 20 to 26 inclusive have been added. Several of these new sections are substantial re-enactments of sections 19 to 25 inclusive, of R. S. O. 1897, c. 54, which were first enacted in 1876, and were then commonly known as "The Grouping Act." The constitutionality of these provisions came before the Queen's Bench Division in 1885, in G! soa v. McDonald, 7 O. R. 401, on an application for prohibition to restrain proceedings to enforce an order of the General Sessions of the County of Renfrew, which were presided over by the County Judge of Lanark, under the provisions of these sections. It was held by Armour and O'Connor, JJ., that the County Judge of Lanark had no power to preside at the Sessions in the County of Renfrew, the sections authorizing him to do so being ultra vires. Wilson, C.J., upon this point gave no positive opinion, but inclined to the opposite view. These sections were however still continued in the Revised Statutes of 1887 and 1897, but in the revision of the Act, made in 1909, preparatory to the general revision of 1914, the previous Act was entirely repealed, and the repealing section contained the following sub-section: "(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of sections 19 to 28 of the said Act, any district or group formed under the provisions of the said section 19, and now existing, shall continue to exist, and the provisions of the said sections shall continue to apply to such district or group." I understand, however,

that in consequence of the decision in Gibson v. McDonald, the Judges in "grouped" counties ceased to holl County Courts in other than their own counties, and I am not aware of any group in which the above saving clause has had any practical application. For some reason no action was taken, in consequence of the decision of the Supreme Court hereinafter referred to, which virtually overruled the above decision, although the latter was not referred to on the agreement.

In 1891 a somewhat similar question arose in British Columbia in the case of Piel Ke-ark-an v. Reginam. under section 14 of chapter 25 of the Revised Statutes of that province, which authorized a County Court Judge to act as such in certain cases, in a district other than that for which he was appointed. While the matter was pending, the Dominion Parliament passed an Act, 54-55 Vict. c. 28, the first two sections of which are now substantially contained in sections 30 and 31 of R. S. C. 1906, c. 138. These sections are as follows:

"30. The jurisdiction of every County Court Judge shall extend and shall be deemed to have always extended to any additional territory annexed by the Provincial Legislature to the county or district for which he was, or is appointed, to the same extent including such additional territory.

"31. It shall be competent to any County Court Judge to hold any of the Courts in any county or district in the province in which he is appointed, or to perform any other duty as a County Court Judge in any such county or district, upon being required so to do by an order of the Governor-in-Council, made at the request of the Lieutenant-Governor of such province.

"(2) The Judge of any County Court may, without any such order, perform any judicial duties in any county or district in the province on being requested so to do by the County Court Judge to whom the duty for any reason belongs.

"(3) The Judge so required as aforesaid shall, while acting in pursuance of such requisition or request, be deemed to be a Judge of the County Court of the county or district in which he is so required or requested to act, and shall have all the powers of such Judge."

A proviso was added in the original Act, that this legislation should not affect any litigation then pending in the Courts, in which any question had been raised as to the jurisdiction of a Judge beyond the limits of the county or district for which he was originally appointed. The Supreme Court of British Columbia had in the meantime decided against the constitutionality of the Provincial Act, 2 B. C. R. 53. This decision was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada on a reference to that Court by the Governor-General-in-Council: Re County Courts of British Columbia, 21 S. C. R. 446; so that the above legislation was virtually declared to be unnecessary.

The new section 26, contained in the amending Act, is of sufficient importance to be quoted in full, and is as follows:

"26. Where a vacancy occurs in the office of the Judge of the County Court in any county included in a County Court district, and the Lieutenant-Governor declares that, owing to the lack of sufficient business, it is unnecessary that the vacancy should be filled, the remaining Judges in the district shall arrange for the performance of the duties of the Judge of the County Court of the county in which the vacancy occurs by one of themselves or by some other person competent by law in that behalf, and every Judge or other person so acting shall have the like powers, and shall perform the like duties as a Judge or other person competent by law in that behalf appointed or authorized for that purpose may exercise and perform under any statute of Ontario in the county in which the vacancy has occurred."

VOL. XXXIX. C.L.T.-20